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Abstract
This thesis investigates the relationship between memory and transitional 
justice (TJ) in Argentina and Uruguay from the 1980s to the present
The research focuses on two questions. First, how do TJ policies emerge 
and evolve over time? Second, what is the connection between TJ and the 
memory of past human rights violence?
These important concerns have, thus far, largely been sidelined by the 
literature. It is proposed here that memory is both integral and central to TJ 
policies, not only in terms of specific memorialisation initiatives (museums, 
memorials) that are sometimes examined by the scholarship.
Through the use of interviews, as well as primary and secondary sources, 
the following conclusions were reached.
First, the origins and evolution of TJ can be explained with reference to 
various dynamics, actors and power balances at local, national and 
international spheres. In Argentina and Uruguay, TJ was cumulative: every 
initiative was built upon previous achievements, complementing them. TJ 
often unfolded through unpredictable and unconventional paths, bearing 
witness to triumphs and failures, set backs and sudden developments.
Second, an interactive and dynamic interplay exists between memory and 
TJ. TJ initiatives are in fact influenced by ideas and representations of the 
past violence held by relevant social and political actors. Examining these 
narratives helps achieve a deeper understanding of how TJ policies were 
implemented and evolved. Additionally, TJ mechanisms, especially trials and 
truth commissions, often champion, whether explicitly or not, specific 
understandings about what happened during the contested years of violence. 
For years, Uruguay successfully minimised discussion on past crimes to the 
limited sphere of human rights activism. By contrast, the Argentine Executive 
never achieved such a hegemonic position on the landscape of memory and 
TJ. Rather, it was forced to endure a difficult co-existence with the military 
and human rights activists.
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Introduction
Over the past few decades, countries as diverse as East Timor, Guatemala, Chile 
and Rwanda have had to provide answers to a particularly difficult question. What, 
if anything, should be done about past injustices?
Since the early 1980s an unequivocal trend has been unfolding. Societies as far 
and as different as countries from Latin America, Africa and Eastern Europe had to 
confront the similar political, legal and moral dilemmas that are associated with 
coming to terms with a legacy of severe human rights abuses. As Jeremy Sarkin 
suggested, ‘dealing with past injustices is a crucial test for a new democratic order'. 
(Sarkin, 2001:144) Nonetheless, responding to such complex questions is far from 
straightforward. Rather, it normally entails challenging exercises in what Jose 
Zalaquett has described as 'balancing ethical imperatives and political constraints'. 
(Zalaquett, 1992:1425)
How shall we live with evil? asks the Argentine lawyer Carlos Nino. How should 
societies respond to 'offences against human dignity so widespread, persistent, 
and organised' that stretch morality and ethics to their limits? (Nino, 1996:vii) 
Similarly, Hannah Arendt alluded to the complexities raised by responding to 
radical evil through the ordinary measures that are at a society's disposal. Arendt 
noted how we 'are unable to forgive what [we] cannot punish and that [we] are 
unable to punish what has turned out to be unforgivable'. (Arendt in: Nino, 
1996:viii)
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Questions of Transitional Justice [hereafter TJ] are not novel but establishing 
when the notion emerged is subject to debate. Jon Elster, for instance, suggests 
that early episodes of TJ occurred in Athens in 411 and 403 B.C. upon the 
restoration of democracy after the defeat of the oligarchs. [Elster, 1998, 2004) 
Others, like Ruti Teitel, trace the origins of modern TJ to World War I, after which 
the international community debated the parameters of justifiable punishment 
(Teitel, 2003)
Nowadays, TJ refers to a network of practitioners, academics and institutions 
that are drawn together by a common concern with addressing a legacy of past 
human rights abuses that were perpetrated within the context of authoritarianism 
or conflict. Almost every aspect of TJ is disputed. There is no agreed definition of 
TJ, no single theory and the coining of the term itself is actually a source of debate. 
Teitel claims authorship of the expression in her latest article, where she asserts to 
have coined it in 1991. [Teitel, 2008:1) Paige Arthur, on the other hand, traces its 
first appearance to a Boston Herald article of 1992. (Arthur, 2009) Nonetheless, 
questions that would nowadays come under the TJ umbrella were already being 
discussed in 1988. In fact, the Aspen Institute Conference and the homonymous 
publication titled State Crimes: Punishment or Pardon tackled issues such as the 
political, legal and moral challenges of justice in transition, obligations under 
international law on redressing past crimes and the role of the military. (Aspen- 
Institute, 1989)
Notwithstanding whom the original author of the phrase TJ really was, its 
transmission and acceptance was significantly aided by the publication of Neil 
Kitz's influential three-volume collection entitled Transitional Justice: How
io
Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes of 1995. [Arthur, 2009:329- 
330)
This thesis focuses on TJ, to investigate specifically the previously unexplored 
relationship between TJ and memory. This introduction provides: first, a concise 
and organised literature review; second, the rationale behind the selection of the 
case-studies, and third, the research questions, arguments and original 
contributions of this work. Finally, there is an overview of what is examined in the 
remaining chapters.
Literature Review
TJ emerges as an academic discipline in the late 1980s and early 1990s, to study 
how societies emerging from conflict or authoritarian rule were confronting a 
legacy of violence. Much of this early literature directly drew upon the work of 
both leaders and scholars in Latin America and Eastern Europe who, upon 
democratisation, had to tackle first hand the dilemmas connected with redressing 
human rights abuses, without however jeopardising newly acquired and often 
fragile democratic structures.
In her recent article, Christine Bell aptly defined TJ as 'The Incredibly Fast Field'. 
(C. Bell, 2009:6) This is quite an appropriate label for a subject area that, from its 
initial origins in international law [IL), expanded so broadly as to now embrace 
several disciplines such as politics, anthropology, psychology, sociology and 
international relations.
TJ scholarship has certainly witnessed a remarkable development. By 2009, it 
has a dedicated journal, The International Journal o f Transitional Justice, 
established in 2007, several research institutes, including the International Center
i i
for Transitional Justice created in New York City in 2001, dedicated panels at 
international conferences, academic centres such as the Transitional Justice 
Institute at the University of Ulster, NGOs, offices in international organisations 
and UN-sponsored publications. -  see e.g. (OHCHR, 2006,2008)
All of this is both astonishing and puzzling, raising the questions of how and 
why this has happened? Still, despite this rapid development, the present 
boundaries of TJ are porous and open-ended, yet to be clearly defined.
This literature review is organised in three unequal parts. The first traces the 
origins of TJ, the second considers the present status of the scholarship, and finally 
gaps that this works aims to address are identified.
A thesis on TJ requires at least a working characterisation of what is meant by 
the term, despite the lack of consensus within the scholarship.
Definitions abound within the literature. Most highlight the legal, moral and 
political problems that arise in cases of accountability, others point to the 
mechanisms normally employed to confront such a legacy, and finally others still 
allude to conceptions of justice during periods of political change. See e.g. (C. Bell 
et al., 2004; Boraine, 2006; Roht-Arriaza, 2006; Teitel, 2005)
The working definition adopted here is the one advanced by the UN Secretary- 
General (UNSG) in its pioneering report titled The rule o f law and transitional 
justice in conflict and post-conflict societies of August 2004. There, TJ was denoted 
as comprising o f'[...] the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a 
society's attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in 
order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation. These may 
include both judicial and non-judicial mechanisms, with differing levels of
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international involvement (or none at all) and individual prosecutions, 
reparations, truth-seeking, institutional reform, vetting and dismissals, or a 
combination thereof.' (UNSG, 2004:4)
This definition is the most appropriate for three reasons. First, it underscores 
how TJ prompts moral, ethical and legal questions associated with coming to terms 
with a violent past. Second, it comprises a full variety of TJ mechanisms, 
illustrating the relevance of judicial and alternative tools, as well as elements of 
retribution and restoration. Finally, it recognises how TJ often unfolds at several 
levels, the local, national and international.
The Early Days of Transitional Justice
Current TJ debates originate from events that have been happening since the 
1980s, when transitions from military rule to nascent or restored democracy 
occurred in various parts of the world, but especially Latin America. Then and now, 
a society that is confronting TJ issues is, in the words of Elster (1998:14), 'in a real 
sense judging itself, driven by the desire to prove that 'We are not like them' as 
Vaclav Havel famously asserted, (cited from: Elster, 2006:1)
Within the scholarship there is undoubtedly a shared perception that TJ marks a 
clear temporal distinction between a before and an after. As Rosemary Nagy 
indicated, TJ 'bridges a violent or repressive past and a peaceful, democratic 
future', establishing a clear distinction between ‘now and then'. (Nagy, 2008:280) 
Several answers have been suggested on how best to respond to the past 
Nevertheless, there is agreement within the literature on the fact that 'some crimes 
are of such a magnitude that the wounds they leave in society cannot and must not 
be simply swept under the mg'. (Mendez, 1997b: 1) Indeed in the early days,
revealing the truth about past abuses was already recognised as a 'non-negotiable 
moral obligation of governments'. (Orentlicher, 2007:12)
The first generation of TJ academic writings mainly dealt with instances of 
transition from authoritarian regimes (normally military) to democratically- 
elected civilian administrations. The latter usually had partially functioning 
judiciaries and institutions to rely upon in confronting past crimes. Past violence 
habitually resulted from years of state-organised repression against the 
population. As Ellen Lutz asserts, the human rights framework was the explanatory 
paradigm in that context. (Lutz, 2006:326) This 'early days' (my term) scholarship 
presents transitional times as exceptional, just like the mechanism employed to 
handle past evils. (Elster, 1998)
Two crucial aspects of this literature are reflected upon in some detail here: its 
legalistic tone and the framing of the discussion in terms of mutually exclusive 
dichotomies.
The Prosecution Preference
This early scholarship emerged from IL, human rights in particular. Leslie 
Vinjamuri and Jack Snyder argue that there are two dominant perspectives within 
the TJ literature: pragmatism and legalism. (Vinjamuri & Snyder, 2004) 
Pragmatism is premised on what March and Olsen labelled as the logic of 
consequences.1 Accordingly, pragmatist accounts focus on issues of power, the 
interests of various political actors and 'the actual consequences of justice
1 Snyder & Vinjamuri (2003/2004:8) argue that ‘the logic of consequences assumes that actors try to achieve their 
objectives using the full panoply of material, institutional, and persuasive resources at their disposal. Norms may 
facilitate or coordinate actors’ strategies, but actors will follow rules and promote new norms only insofar as they are 
likely to be effective in achieving substantive ends’.
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strategies'. [Ibid.353) Legalism follows instead the logic of appropriateness.2 
Therefore, ‘underpinning much of the scholarship in this tradition is the 
assumption that the behaviour of actors in international politics is guided by 
norms that they believe to be appropriate', particularly the promotion of universal 
standards of justice. [Ibid.346-347] The logic of appropriateness 'dictates that 
reducing atrocities is in part a matter of persuading elites and masses to comply 
with international humanitarian norms'. [Ibid.347)
As a matter of fact, and as we shall see in more detail in chapter 1, in these early 
stages, numerous scholars indeed pointed to the existence of a universal duty to 
prosecute those who had committed human rights violations. Miriam Aukerman 
notably defined this tendency as the 'prosecution preference'. (Aukerman, 
2002:39-40)
Legalistic contributions have contended that there is an unmistakable trend in 
international law in favour of punishing the perpetrators of crimes like torture, 
genocide and war crimes. See e.g. (Bassiouni, 1996; Mendez, 1997a; Van-Dyke & 
Berkley, 1992) At that time, prosecutions were particularly perceived as the 
optimal method for dealing with atrocities.
Still, some scholars presented more nuanced positions. (Kritz, 1996; 
Orentlicher, 1991) In what is now regarded as a seminal article, Diane Orentlicher 
recognised that a duty to prosecute could not be systematically applied to all cases 
of transitions, regardless of local dynamics and histories. Instead, Orentlicher 
recognises that, although impunity is generally inconsistent with states' 
obligations under IL, this requirement should not be construed as demanding
2 Snyder & Vinjamuri (2003/2004:7) suggest that ‘norms define “a logic of appropriateness” that plays a central role in 
shaping the choices and actions that constitute a political order1. Under this logic, ‘norms do more than regulate 
behaviour1, they ‘mould the identities of actors, define social roles, shape actors’ understandings of their interests, 
confer power on authoritative interpreters of norms, and infuse institutions with guiding principles’. (Snyder & Vinjamuri, 
2003/2004:8)
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actions incompatible with political and legal dynamics on the ground. Orentlicher 
(1991:2598-2603) accordingly draws attention to the threat to stability that 
widespread prosecutions might cause, and argues for a limited and selective 
programme of trials. She claims that it is not necessary to prosecute all human 
rights violators, as exemplary trials would suffice.
The Dichotomies ofTJ
Claire Moon (2008:19) stresses how early literature adopted an 'entirely 
dualised way of thinking about issues central to transition'. Very frequently, 
dilemmas were in fact presented as encompassing the following positions: truth vs. 
justice, restoration vs. retribution, national political order vs. international legal 
imperatives, trials vs. forgiveness, peace vs. justice, and amnesty vs. punishment 
Such an approach is problematic on numerous grounds. First, TJ is neither 
progressive nor linear. Rather, it is likely to advance in unexpected ways, with 
setbacks or unpredictable progressions. There may even be further violence under 
democracy. Thus, TJ tends to linger for a long time, requiring different responses at 
various times. This challenges mutually exclusive positions. More often than not, 
bargains struck during transitional stages are not permanent, being usually 
revisited and questioned as time progresses.
Second, empirical research has demonstrated that ‘in many parts of the word, 
transitional justice solutions have been neither durable nor dichotomous'. (Sikkink 
& Booth-Walling, 2007:435) In effect, in several Latin American countries, for 
instance, the considerable variation that typified the post-transition years derived 
from evolving power balances and the passing of time.
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Third, this dualism did reduce the horizons of the discussion on the possible 
forms that TJ may take. Although prosecutions and truth commissions have been 
dominant, various other tools have been employed in practice, combining elements 
of retribution and restoration, as well as investigation and prosecution.
A welcome development is that more contemporary literature has moved away 
from both the prosecution preference and this dichotomous framing. Current 
scholarship has apparently transcended the tensions that were for long 
summarised by the truth vs. justice dilemma. These have been replaced by the 
recognition that there is in reality no consensus on how best to deal with the past, 
as Nigel Biggar argues. (Biggar, 2001) Likewise, Naomi Roht-Arriaza hails this 
advancement, contending that truth and justice are no longer mutually exclusive 
positions, but complement each other. (Roht-Arriaza, 2006)
Contemporary literature shares the conviction that the past cannot be ignored. 
It is however mindful that there does not exist a one-size-fits-all approach to TJ. In 
fact, in his latest contribution, Juan Mendez calls attention to the possibility that 
'what has worked in one country may fail in another'. (Mendez, 2009:160)
The dichotomies of early scholarship have been replaced by arguments pointing 
instead to a reality characterised by a variety of TJ goals and objectives that are 
mutually reinforcing and interconnected. See e.g. (Boraine, 2006; Fletcher & 
Weinstein, 2002; Roht-Arriaza, 2006) These works underscore the existence of 
intertwined sets of obligations in instances of systematic crimes. These include 
elements of truth, justice, reparations, memory and guarantees of non-repetition. 
These scholars have also increasingly adopted a longer term perspective and a
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local focus. But has TJ reached a consensus? Nothing could be further from the 
truth.
From State Terror to State Failure: Transitional Justice in the 21st century
The past decades have witnessed an unparalleled and unprecedented rise in 
efforts to pursue accountability both at the international and domestic levels. In 
the words of Teitel (2008:2), we are now living through 'a global phase of 
transitional justice'. While questions associated with accountability have largely 
endured unchanged, the nature of transitional societies has dramatically been 
transformed. If  in the early days TJ mainly occurred after episodes of state 
terrorism, the vast majority of contemporary transitional societies are principally 
emerging from armed conflict towards edgy peace. See e.g. (Branch, 2007; 
Longman, 2006; Ssenyonjo, 2007; Wigglesworth, 2008)
As a consequence, TJ was confronted by new challenges such as what should be 
done in situations where the alleged perpetrators totalled in their thousands? 
Where there is a lack of adequate facilities and infrastructure? When judges and 
moral leaders have often perished during the violence?
Lutz (2006) appropriately brings attention to the fact that present-day 
atrocities are mainly instances of war crimes, genocide or crimes against humanity 
committed by the state but to a greater extent than ever before by non-state actors. 
International humanitarian law has now become the new the language in which 
accountability demands are framed. (Lutz, 2006)
While early on human rights abuses frequently stemmed from strong states and 
the use of their full resources and powers, now the situation has been turned 
upside down. In the post-Cold War world, political violence is frequently triggered
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by the collapse of the authority and structures of the state, giving rise to them 
being notably branded as failed states.
From 1990 onwards, these new types of wars in which violence is defined along 
ethnic, racial or religious lines, have prevailed. In these situations, violence is 
multi-directional: state policies of ethnic cleansing or genocide, as in former- 
Yugoslavia or present day Darfur, often coexist with abuses of comparable scale 
perpetrated by non-state actors (namely warlords, rebel groups, organised-crime 
and even terrorist networks) like in Uganda or Pakistan.
The evolution of TJ over the years went hand-in-hand with, and reflected, the 
different sets of dilemmas that typify this new context of atrocities, such as gender 
violence, the rights of children or minorities.
Additionally, a positive occurrence is the expanding attention paid to local 
dynamics, culture and heritage when moulding TJ responses. Already the UNSG's 
Report (2004:7) recognised that 'pre-packaged solutions were ill-advised', and 
that 'experiences from other places should simply be used as a starting point for 
local debates and decisions'. Several current contributions underline how 
accountability at the national-level may often be insufficient, outlining the 
advantages associated with local-level programmes. (Roht-Arriaza & Arriaza, 
2008) For example, Kimberly Theidon studied the case of Peru, looking at the 
practices of communal justice in what she labels the 'micropolitics of 
reconciliation' that combine retributive and restorative forms to address the scars 
of the past. (Theidon, 2006:436)
This author concurs with Lutz (2006:333) when she stresses that TJ 'must be 
both contextually and culturally appropriate'. Current scholarship indeed
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embraces the use of local or hybrid mechanisms, such as the mixed courts of Sierra 
Leone, East Timor and Cambodia, the traditional dispute-resolution process of 
nahe b iti hot (unrolling of the mat) in East Timor, or the truth trials in Argentina.
When reviewing contemporary scholarship it becomes immediately apparent 
that the discipline is in a state of flux. Several fundamental concerns are currently 
debated, but one is particularly fitting for our purpose. What is TJ: is it a discipline 
or a field?
Christine Bell (2009:25) recently described TJ as a battlefield. She alleges that 
two battles are ongoing: one at the level of each transition for the control of TJ 
mechanisms and the direction of the transition; by constrast, the second 
encompasses academia, policy and practice in an attempt to master TJ and its 
goals. [Ibid.25-26) Bell's stance appears a rather suitable characterisation of the 
current state of affairs.
TJ evolved at an extreme speed and, during in its infancy in the mid-1990s, still 
pondering upon the questions associated with military transitions and the lessons 
to be learnt, the nature of human rights violence changed so severely as to force TJ 
to re-examine itself. Thus, it should not be surprising that TJ is in what I like to 
define as a 'soul-searching phase'.
For Bell (2009:6) TJ 'does not constitute a coherent "field" but rather is a label 
or cloak that aims to rationalize a set of diverse bargains in relation to the past as 
an integrated endeavour, so as to obscure the quite different normative, moral and 
political implications of the bargains'. Rather, Mendez (2009:157) asserts that 
‘there is no dispute that "transitional justice" is recognised as a field, distinct from 
related disciplines and human endeavours'. Nonetheless, Mendez acknowledges
the difficulties of providing 'an accurate description of its contours and scope'. 
[Ibid.') In discussing Bell's work, Mendez slightly changes his position towards the 
end of his discussion to state that 'perhaps TJ is a cloak at this stage in its process 
of becoming a field'. [Ibid. 160) A position closer to Mendez's is the one taken by 
Arthur (2009:358) who affirms that TJ is not simply part of the human rights 
movement, but ‘is a distinct field'. It is apparent that the issue is far from settled.
TJ is, if one thing is clear by this point, very much unsettled at present. In fact, 
contemporary TJ has fittingly been described as a patchwork of 'geographies of 
crime and justice' and 'zones of impunity', which comprise of a multilayered 
pattern of transnational crimes, national borders, state and non-state actors, and 
international norms of accountability as well as institutions. (Sriram & Ross, 
2007:46,47) Over the years, there has certainly been a proliferation of a 
multiplicity of sites of accountability. Further, in contrast to some early scholars 
that perceived accountability as a threat to stability and consolidation, TJ and 
reconciliation are now appreciated as long-term aspirations for political 
communities. (Leebaw, 2008)
This author feels that TJ literature suffers from various failings. First, several 
contributions within it tend to be largely descriptive: they outline how 
accountability was achieved in various societies, sometimes with the implicit 
assumption that legal responses should be the primary tools. See e.g. (Bassiouni, 
2000; Ocampo, 1999; Sieff & Vinjamuri, 1999) In this respect, Laurel Fletcher et al. 
have importantly pointed out how, notwithstanding the recognition that 'multiple 
kinds of interventions and institutional changes are necessary', still 'there remains
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an almost unremitting spotlight on trials and truth commissions'. (Fletcher et al., 
2009:167]
Second, a large section of the scholarship has a tendency to be prescriptive; this 
was particularly evident in the early days but still continues in the present. See e.g. 
(Lambourne, 2009; Mani, 2005] Despite the appreciation that a TJ blueprint does 
not only exist, but would actually be counterproductive, there is still a 
predisposition to look for best practices. These concerns are shared by some of the 
latest academic writings. Fletcher et al. (2009:210] for example ask whether it is 
'necessary to put into place a model that mimics Western legal mechanisms?' 
These scholars take a stand against what they label a 'standardised "tool-kit" of 
interventions' that can be used in different contexts, assuming that these 
mechanisms are 'appropriate and productive, if one can only determine which 
intervention to deploy'. [Ibid. 170]
Finally, the subject-matter of TJ has been excessively broadened to comprehend 
topics such as gender, structural violence, war economies, corruption, and social 
injustice. See e.g. (C. Bell et al., 2004; Mani, 2008; Nagy, 2008] All these concerns 
are unquestionably legitimate, given the context of new wars and conflict that TJ 
increasingly has to confront. Nevertheless, there is a perception that TJ has enough 
to contend with already. This state of affairs should make us wonder whether this 
expanding and overstretching of the discipline may not spell its end. What may 
apparently seem an obvious question actually becomes critical: are not other 
fields, such as development, IR or conflict studies, better equipped at addressing 
these concerns?
Roht-Arriaza's (2006:2] stand that 'broadening the scope of what we mean by 
transitional justice to encompass the building of a just as well as peaceful society
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may make the effort so broad as to become meaningless' definitely has some truth 
in it. Though interactions with other disciplines are vital, the stretching of TJ's 
boundaries to include such a variety of issues can be risky. It is not recommended 
here that these genuine problems should be overlooked, but that they are possibly 
best tackled by other subject areas. In this respect, Mendez (2009) also points to 
the significance of conversations with other actors such as conflict resolution 
specialists, or dialogue between development and TJ agents.
How is This Thesis Different?
This thesis takes a step back, returning to the origins of TJ. This is not, however, 
a return to the dualist approach of early works or the prosecution preference. On 
the contrary, what is encouraged is a focus on coming to terms with a heritage of 
past abuses once some sense of stability and peace is achieved. Granted, if left 
untended, from the ashes of violence, new violence is likely to emerge. 
Nonetheless, this author believes that TJ is best equipped to tackle the legacy of the 
past, while other academic disciplines could, and indeed should, simultaneously 
provide solutions to issues like structural violence or social injustice to effectively 
attend to the root causes behind violence and atrocities.
This thesis recognises the multifaceted essence of TJ, by embracing judicial, 
investigative and alternative methods. It also appreciates the multiple factors that 
shape the nature of TJ initiatives, and the manner in which they unfold. 
Accountability initiatives are seen here as 'slow-burning': accordingly, a long term 
perspective in examining how TJ evolves over the years has to be employed.
Indeed the selection of Argentina and Uruguay as case studies illustrates this. 
Elster has distinguished between immediate and second-wave TJ to underscore
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how dealing with the past is a continuous endeavour, likely to last for decades. 
(Elster, 2006:6) Immediate TJ refers to cases where accountability proceedings 
begin shortly after transition and come to end within a short space of time (the 
years 1983 to 1990 in Argentina, 1985 to 1989 in Uruguay). Second-wave 
instances highlight how after the initial endeavours, there may be a period of 
latency when no action is taken (Argentina 1990 to 2003, Uruguay 1989 to 2005). 
But this is only so until new proceedings start (Argentina 2003 to present, Uruguay 
2005 to present).
Finally, this thesis particularly aims to restore memory to a central position 
within TJ, where it rightfully belongs. From here comes its title. The Missing 
Memory o f Transitional Justice is in fact a challenging assertion that aspires to 
illustrate how memory has so far only been tangentially addressed by TJ. The 
creation of museums and memorials to the past has thus far been the only aspect 
of memory that has been considered.
Some, but only some, of the more recent scholarship has begun to deal with 
these issues. Elizabeth Jelin importantly calls attention to the fact that ‘much of the 
literature on transitional justice sets apart institutional and symbolic measures'. 
(Jelin, 2007b:156) Similarly, Alexandra Brito asserted in a 2008 lecture th a t'[...] 
there are two overlapping dynamics, transitional justice per se, and the politics of 
memory'. (Brito, 2008:3).
Already a decade ago, in what is now an influential article, Alexander Wilde had 
called on scholars to consider what he branded 'the expressive dimension of 
transitional politics', to look at how collective memory was activated in transitional 
societies. (Wilde, 1999:474)
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Although memory does weaken with time, Elster importantly emphasised that 
memories of emotionally charged events tend to deteriorate more slowly. (Elster,
2004) This is evident when thinking about the impact of the Holocaust but also 
more recent events such as state terrorism in the Southern Cone.
Collective memory for Mark Osiel (1995:475) 'consists of the stories a society 
tells about momentous events in its history, the events that most profoundly affect 
the lives of its members and most arouse their passions for long periods'. Thus, 
memory can be used as a political tool, and this is particularly so in the aftermath 
of human rights violence when rival versions over what happened in the past exist 
(Aguilar-Fernandez et al., 2001) Interestingly, collective memory, just like TJ, is not 
static. Memory does not preserve a single conclusive account of what happened. 
On the contrary, what is remembered changes with evolutions in ideas, interests, 
identities and visions of the future.
Osiel (1986) was among the first to consider how the different lenses through 
which various actors make sense of a country’s past had an impact on their actions 
in terms of legal accountability. (Osiel, 1986) This thesis takes a similar approach, 
in examining the multiple ways in which social, political and institutional actors 
that are involved in TJ remember the receding past and how their worldviews 
inform actions and strategies of accountability.
This project is very much in line with current scholarship. This author agrees 
with Jelin who asserts that 'policies of memorialisation are part of a larger arena of 
transitional politics and cannot be seen independently'. (Jelin, 2007b:139) Memory 
is not in fact just a secondary, symbolic and subjective layer, but 'an integral and 
central component of the practices and policies regarding the past'. (Jelin, 
2007b:156) For this author, a close relationship exists between TJ mechanisms
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and memory. As memory can be manipulated to obtain specific goals, TJ 
mechanisms need to be carefully examined to see if they are used to produce 
specific interpretations of the past violence. See e.g. (Lanegran, 2005; Schaap,
2005) As a matter of fact, trials and truth commissions, in particular, often 
champion, whether explicitly or not, specific understandings of what happened 
during the contested years of violence. This dynamic interaction between memory 
and TJ needs to be drawn out, in acknowledging that there will always be more 
than one memory of past atrocities.
Case Studies
The selection of Argentina and Uruguay as case studies for this thesis was based 
upon two criteria: the type of human rights violence that was experienced, and the 
saliency of the politics of transitional justice and memory.
Argentina and Uruguay lived through similar repressive military governments 
that were inspired by the national security doctrine in the 1970s and the early 
1980s. These regimes did however differ in terms of the length and the nature of 
the repression. Argentina and Uruguay also have quite different political cultures 
and historical backgrounds. While Argentina has a rather long history of military 
interventionism in political life, Uruguay was a model of democratic rule within the 
region until 1973.
When looking at the accountability policies that Argentina and Uruguay 
employed, different TJ mechanisms can be identified. Argentina is generally 
considered a regional and global protagonist in TJ, whereas Uruguay is more of a 
laggard. Interestingly enough, however, their positions are now closer than ever 
before. This is a trajectory that is definitely worth exploring.
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Argentina and Uruguay also encompass other significant issues. The dictatorial 
regimes in both countries relied on the complicity of law enforcement agencies and 
societal support for the violence, more often than not their passive endorsement. 
The extent of social complicity has been largely understudied. The role of cultural 
factors and their impact on the evolution of TJ has also been frequently sidelined. 
While Uruguayans are allegedly famous for their tradition of negotiations and 
compromise, Argentine political culture has been much more violent and 
intransigent throughout history.
Though Argentina and Uruguay are close neighbours, a comparison between the 
two has not been attempted in relation to questions of TJ. The Argentine case has 
often been likened to Greece's experience in 1974. See e.g. (Nino, 1996) Uruguay 
has conversely been studied generally together with Chile, as they share long 
histories of democracy in the region, as well as negotiated exits from military rule. 
See e.g. (Brito, 1993, 1997) Argentina and Uruguay feature together in some 
comparative collections on the Southern Cone. See e.g. (Brito, 2001b; Groppo, 
2001; Roniger & Sznajder, 1999)
Research Questions and Arguments
Two research questions are at the core of this project: Q1 - how do TJ policies 
emerge and evolve over time? Q2 - what is the connection between TJ and the 
memory of past human rights violence?
First, this thesis contends, in line with recent scholarship but in contrast with 
earlier writings, that there can be no blueprint or one-size-fits-all approach when 
discussing TJ. Rather, processes of accountability are fuzzy, non-linear and often 
messy. As a consequence, the trajectory of TJ cannot be mapped out beforehand.
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Rather, it tends to be unpredictable, also given that its politics often involve several 
actors and factors at local, national and international levels.
Second, TJ and memory have a dynamic and powerful interplay. Hence, TJ has to 
be complemented by a consideration of ideas and narratives over the past that are 
held by various social and political actors in providing a deeper appreciation of 
accountability policies. Further, TJ mechanisms, especially trials and truth 
commissions, get to play a specific part in terms of memory that is often left 
unaccounted for.
The original contribution of this thesis is three-fold. First, the framework on the 
politics of TJ (chapter 1) is holistic, in combining factors and actors on at least 
three levels (local, national, international). It allows for a more complete 
awareness of the emergence and later evolution of TJ that for this author lays 
somewhere at the intersection among these spheres.
Second, this work argues against the fictional separation that commonly exists 
between institutional and symbolic measures of TJ. It shows instead how TJ and 
memory are two intersecting dynamics in Argentina and Uruguay.
Last, it fills the gap in the existing literature, at least in Anglo-American 
scholarship, for examining the evolution of TJ in Argentina and Uruguay over the 
course of three decades (1980s to present). This is particularly important in the 
case of Uruguay that has largely been neglected after 1989 by most of the 
literature.
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Thesis Outline
Chapter one focuses on the politics of transitional justice. It considers four 
mechanisms (amnesties, trials, truth commissions, and reparations) and develops 
a scheme to unpack the emergence and evolution of accountability policies. It 
contends that their development is not linear, but rather nebulous and untidy. TJ 
originates from the constant interaction among local, national and international 
levels and unique combinations of historical, institutional, political, social and 
cultural factors as well as actors.
Chapter two discusses the politics of memory. First, it provides a background on 
the field of memory studies, and later outlines a framework necessary to untangle 
struggles over memory in transitional societies. It claims that ideas and 
representations of the past help understand the present and its politics, where the 
memories of the past violence remain highly contested and disputed for years.
Chapter three provides a succinct historical background on Argentina and 
Uruguay in the twentieth century, highlighting why these countries experienced 
unprecedented levels of state terror. It is argued that, from the mid-1950s 
onwards, and against the background of the Cold War, a blend of economic crisis, 
social conflict and polarisation, and extreme right and left-wing terrorism 
produced military regimes responsible for egregious human rights crimes.
Chapter four provides an account of transitional justice in Argentina and 
Uruguay since the mid-1980s. Three phases can be distinguished. Over time, the 
two countries used a variety of mechanisms, including truth commissions, 
prosecutions, amnesties and reparations, to come to terms with past evils. The 
emergence and evolution of policies of TJ can be explained with reference to the 
leadership of the Executive, the residual power of the armed forces, the role of
human rights organisations (hereafter HROs), the judiciary, and finally 
developments on the international stage.
Chapter five outlines the politics of memory in Argentina between the 1970s 
and the present. It suggests that the Argentine state attempted to have a 
hegemonic role in memory but was never successful. Rather, it was forced to co­
exist in the memory arena with two other powerful actors, the military and HROs. 
The chapter provides a short introduction on questions of memory in Argentina 
and then outlines the perspectives suggested by the government, the military and 
HROs. Third, memory knots, namely specific examples of places, dates and groups 
relating to memory, are discussed, looking at the Madres de Plaza de Mayo, H.I.J.O.S. 
and their escraches, commemorations on March 24, and the image of the 
desaparecidos, as well as the Memory Park and the ESMA. Last, the dynamic 
interaction between memory and TJ is explored, studying the 1984 CONADEP truth 
commission and the 1985 Trial of the Military Commanders.
Chapter six describes the politics of memory in Uruguay. It is shown how 
President Sanguinetti's slogan ‘no hay que tener los ojos en la nuca’ (you should not 
have eyes at the back of your head) characterised the politics of memory in 
Uruguay for fifteen years. During this time, the Uruguayan state was the most 
successful in the Southern Cone in minimising discussion about the crimes 
committed in the past. Until the late 1990s, debate over these questions was 
effectively limited to the reduced sphere of HROs and those directly affected. By 
the end of the millennium, however, the human rights question effectively 
returned to the public and social agendas, thanks to the efforts of HROs. The 
chapter has the same format as chapter five for the first two sections. Likewise, the 
third part focuses on memory knots, looking at the two attempts, in 1987-89 and
2007-09, to subject the Expiry Law to popular referendum, and the work of former 
female political prisoners, and remembrance of symbolic dates like April 14, May 
20, and June 19. Finally, the interplay between TJ and memory is exposed, 
examining the work of the Peace Commission of 2000-03 and the 'Uruguayan Style 
Two Demons Theory' (my term).
The conclusion returns to the research questions, and reflects on the principal 
points made in the thesis. Finally, further research questions are raised both on TJ 
as an expanding subject, and the specific TJ trajectory in Argentina and Uruguay.
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The Politics of Transitional Justice
Transitional societies, defined by David Little as 'those moving from 
authoritarianism, and often violent repression, to democracy' have been a defining 
feature of the past three decades. (Little, 2006:65) Samuel Huntington famously 
pointed to the existence of several waves of democratisation in the twentieth 
century. (Huntington, 1991) The first involved countries from Southern Europe in 
the mid-1970s, the second came from Central and South America in the 1980s and 
1990s, and finally from Eastern Europe and Africa during the 1990s.
Despite local differences, all of these societies had to face similar challenges in 
terms of political and economic democratisation. (Boraine, 2006) In addition to 
this, the question of how to confront gross human rights violations committed by 
previous regimes has recently emerged as an important issue. (Cohen, 1995)
Given the high number of countries attempting to come to terms with the past, it 
should not be surprising that diverse approaches have been adopted. These have 
ranged from prosecutions to the establishment of truth commissions, firstly 
pioneered in South America and Africa, to policies of lustration, amnesty, 
reparations and memorialisation.
Two interrelated questions are at the heart of this chapter. How do policies of TJ 
originate? What accounts for their variation and evolution over time?
Policies of TJ is taken here to refer quite loosely to the different ways in which 
successor (mainly democratic) regimes tackle a past characterised by human
rights violence. They include not only official policies, i.e. those devised and carried 
out by state or governmental bodies, but also those sponsored and undertaken by 
civil society and/or international organisations.
As many approaches to the past exist as there are cases of transitional societies. 
In fact, accountability policies do vary considerably from country to country, to 
reflect the unique context and particularity of each case. In this author's opinion, 
several social, political, historical and institutional variables, as well as the role 
played by internal and external actors serve to account for differences in 
responses. It is contended here that the emergence and evolution of TJ initiatives 
lays at the intersection among three levels, the local, national and international.
At the outset, this chapter briefly considers four TJ mechanisms, namely 
amnesty, prosecutions, truth commissions and reparations, that are most relevant 
for the later case studies. Second, the key phases and actors involved in the politics 
of TJ are identified. They have all played a role in both the emergence and the 
evolution of TJ policies over the years.
1.1 Mechanisms of Transitional Justice
The twentieth century undoubtedly proved the state's unrivalled power in 
mobilising force against its citizens. From the Holocaust, systematic 
disappearances in Central and South America, to Cambodia's killing fields and, 
more recently, genocidal violence in Rwanda and Darfur, there is little doubt that 
the state has horrific potential for meting out bloodshed.
But what happens once the violence subsides? What should be done to 
torturers, members of death squads, their collaborators and superiors? Should
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their deeds be investigated and exposed? Or is it better to forget the past 
altogether, letting bygones be bygones?
The key challenge for often incomplete and fledging democracies is indeed how 
to deal with past evils without opening Pandora's Box. In the words of Francisco 
Panizza, 'the central dilemma [...] was how to balance demands for justice and 
retribution with the need to safeguard the democratic transition itself. (Panizza, 
1995:176)
The peace vs. justice impasse was a stark reality in many countries that had to 
ponder whether to strengthen the new democracy at all costs, including oblivion, 
or journey down the winding and uncertain road to accountability. Young 
democracies have developed several (even creative) mechanisms to respond to 
past burdensome inheritances of torture, murder and brutality. These include 
amnesty, truth commissions, reparations, prosecutions, lustration, public access to 
(police) files, apology, memorialisation, and grassroots approaches.
In striking an often difficult balance between demands for justice by victims and 
their families, and those for impunity by members of previous regimes, a whole 
range of what are now labelled TJ mechanisms have taken shape. These strive to 
address various interrelated obligations and the diverse needs of transitional 
societies, including truth, justice, reparations, guarantees of non-repetition and 
memorialisation. (Fletcher & Weinstein, 2002)
Increasingly, a local focus has also been adopted, paying more attention to 
grassroots alternatives. This has been typified by initiatives like Rwanda's gacaca 
courts, Mozambique's traditional community healers -the curandeiros, the Acholi
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[Luo] traditional reconciliation mechanism of mato oput in Uganda or Guatemala's 
houses of memory, community-sponsored projects based on Mayan methods.
For a long time, confronting the past simply meant turning the page. Amnesties, 
adopted in dozens of countries as Brazil, El Salvador, Guatemala, South Africa and 
Spain, often served this function.
Despite recent jurisprudence from international human rights bodies and courts 
consistently considers amnesty laws incompatible with state obligations under 
human rights treaties, amnesties and pardons were for long the norm in a context 
of impunity. See e.g. [HRC, 1994,1995,1996; IACHR, 1992a, 1992b; IACtHR, 2001) 
Essentially, amnesties and self-amnesties officially absolve human rights violators 
of their crimes, eliminating the possibility of criminal and civil prosecution against 
former repressors. [Walsh, 1996) Likewise, pardons are executive actions that 
mitigate or set aside punishment for a crime. [Huyse, 1995)
Amnesties are generally granted by the Executive or the Legislature, and reflect 
the volatile position in which several governments often find themselves in. 
Despite transition, former violators frequently retain significant authority and 
influence in the new democratic settings, and are able to pose a real threat to the 
country's stability and consolidation. [Cohen, 1995) Thus, unsurprisingly, 
democratic administrations sometimes do not have enough power to initiate 
accountability processes. For example in the cases of Chile or Guatemala, still 
powerful military establishments, at the time responsible for the majority of 
crimes, were not simply going to sit back and watch their comrades face judicial 
proceedings. [Agiiero, 1992)
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Consequently, impunity was presented for years as the price to be paid to end 
violence, secure the transition and guarantee democratic consolidation. In the 
name of national pacification and stability, human rights repressors usually 
escaped being held to account for their deeds. Since the 1980s, however, a new 
trend has unfolded.
Ellen Lutz and Kathryn Sikkink label it as 'a justice cascade' that has occurred 
within the context of a larger human rights norms cascade. (Lutz & Sikkink, 
2001:4) Lutz and Sikkink contend that human rights have recently been 
recognised as legitimate, pointing to increased international and regional action 'to 
effect compliance with those norms'. [Ibid.) The consequences of the justice 
cascade are not simply limited to Latin America but reverberated internationally.
We follow here Kathryn Sikkink and Carrie Booth-Walling (2007:430) 
distinction between three types of prosecutions: domestic, foreign and 
international. The goal, in all cases, is to attribute individual criminal responsibility 
for human rights violations. (Sikkink & Booth-Walling, 2007)
Domestic trials are 'those conducted in a single country for human rights abuses 
committed in that country' (emphasis in original). [Ibid.) Significant examples 
include the 1985 Trial of the Military Commanders in Argentina, ongoing 
prosecutions in Chile against members of the 1973-1990 regime, and cases against 
former-President Fujimori in Peru. In fact, despite its long tradition of impunity, 
between 1979 and 2004, 54% of domestic trials for human rights abuses occurred 
in the Americas. [IbidA32)
Since the 1990s, foreign and international fora have become significant in 
obtaining accountability, especially when chances of achieving justice at home
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were closed. Foreign trials are 'those conducted in a single country for human 
rights abuses committed in another country'. [IbidA30) In this case, the judicial 
system of a state other than the one where abuses occurred is employed. This 
occurs by relying on either claims of universal jurisdiction as in Spain, or the 
passive personality principle in proceedings in Italian, French, German and 
Swedish courts. Examples are the case of former Argentine Navy officer Cavallo, 
the sentence to 640 years in prison for Adolfo Scilingo in Spain and the Pinochet 
cases in London.
International trials refer instead to prosecutions 'for individual criminal 
responsibility for human rights violations in a particular country or conflict and 
result from the cooperation of multiple states', typically the UN. (/bzd.430] The 
International Tribunal for Ex-Yugoslavia (ICTY] set up in 1993 and for Rwanda 
(ICTR) in 1994, the Hybrid Courts of the late 1990s in Sierra Leone, East Timor and 
Cambodia, and the International Criminal Court (ICC], illustrate this type. The ICC 
finally became a reality in July 2002, and began hearing its first case against the 
Congolese militia leader Lubanga in January 2009. (Coleman, 2008; Walker & 
McGreal, 2009]
Why have trials proved so popular?
Miriam Aukerman outlines how, although most scholars disagree as to whether 
trials are possible in practice, they all share the basic assumption that prosecuting 
perpetrators of injustice is the 'optimal method' for dealing with past atrocities. 
(Aukerman, 2002:40] Likewise, Juan Mendez contends that trials are 'a necessary 
and even desirable ingredient in any serious effort at accountability'. (Mendez, 
1997a:257]
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Jon Van Dyke and Gerald Berkley (1992:244), drawing upon Diane Orentlicher 
(1991), delineate several benefits of prosecutions. They deter future violations and 
reassert the rule of law, by fostering respect for democratic institutions, advancing 
the transition to democracy, and clearly distinguishing between the previous and 
the new government. They also reassert the inherent dignity of individuals, 
especially victims and their families. Finally, they provide a complete and 
irrefutable record of what happened in the past, avoiding future revisionism, while 
simultaneously complying with obligations under international law. (Van-Dyke & 
Berkley, 1992) Similarly, Fletcher and Weinstein (2002:586) emphasise how 
advocates of international criminal trials believe that prosecutions support the 
following goals: the discovery and dissemination of the truth on past atrocities, the 
punishment of perpetrators, and the promotion of the rule of law and 
reconciliation.
This prosecution preference has recently been criticised, as to whether in fact 
trials are the best method to achieve accountability. Jack Snyder and Leslie 
Vinjamuri have gone as far as suggesting that prosecuting perpetrators according 
to universal standards actually risks causing more abuses, as it does not pay 
sufficient attention to political realities on the ground. (Snyder & Vinjamuri, 
2003/2004) Other scholars stress how trials are necessarily selective. Aukerman 
(2002:51) aptly points out how often entire societies are implicated in the 
commission of atrocities. But, in fact, only a small number of even the worst 
perpetrators ever stands trial. Aukerman also suggests that prosecuting 
perpetrators could in fact be destabilising, socially and politically, as well as being 
logistically and economically unsustainable. Gary Bass (2000:298) shares this
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assertion on the extent of social complicity, stating that prosecutions only allow for 
the conviction of 'actual perpetrators and that there will always be a wider circle of 
bystanders and collaborators, who may not bear actual criminal culpability but can 
reasonably be said to bear a moral taint'. (Bass, 2000] Along these lines, Laurel 
Fletcher and Harvey Weinstein (2002:579) emphasise how criminal trials indeed 
have a limited focus on individual responsibility, and cannot therefore account for 
the role of other groups involved in the violence. Finally, Stephan Landsman 
suggests that prosecutions raise issues of fairness and can sometimes be charged 
with being nothing more than "victors’ justice” 'a settling of scores by those who 
have won the contest1. (Landsman, 1996:85)
The predominance of prosecutions for a long time fostered the belief that 
alternative approaches were just 'inferior substitutes', justified only by the 
inadequacy of the judicial and legal systems after times of repression and the 
possible political consequences of criminal trials in still fragile societies. 
(Aukerman, 2002:40)
Nonetheless, since the mid-1990s truth commissions have attracted rising 
interest. The use of this mechanism has lately proliferated, particularly in the 
Americas and Africa. Archbishop Desmond Tutu notably defined them as a ‘third 
way' between trials and blanket amnesty or national amnesia. (7n; Chapman & Ball, 
2001:2)
The first commissions to be ever set up were in Uganda in 1974, to investigate 
accusations of disappearances at the hands of military forces, and in Bolivia in 
1982 with the National Commission of Inquiry into Disappearances. (Hayner, 
1994) It was, however, Argentina's 1983 National Commission on the
39
Disappearance of Persons the first to complete a final report and receive 
widespread international attention. (Grandin, 2005)
Since then, over thirty commissions have been established throughout the 
world. Most recently, in Canada in April 2008, where a Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission is considering the legacy of forced cultural assimilation of Aboriginal 
children and other human rights violations. In parallel to the justice cascade, Erin 
Daly thus suggests that a 'truth cascade' has been unfolding, with truth 
commissions being 'fashionable' in times of transition. (Daly, 2008:23) Similarly, 
Naomi Roht-Arriaza argues that truth commissions have become 'a staple of the 
transitional justice menu'. (Roht-Arriaza, 2006:4)
Truth commissions, according to a textbook definition, are 'bodies set up to 
investigate a past history of violations of human rights in a particular country -  
which can include violations by the military or other government forces or by 
armed opposition forces'. (Hayner, 1994:600)
Truth commissions focus on truth-finding, more exactly the official 
documentation and acknowledgement of past crimes. (Chapman & Ball, 2001; 
Garton-Ash, 1998) Over time, truth commissions have adopted different formats, 
mandates, time limits, staff, budget, resources, and structure. Chile's National 
Commission for Truth and Reconciliation was, for instance, composed of eight 
members, four were Pinochet's supporters and the remaining four from the 
opposition. The Commission on the Truth for El Salvador was brokered, staffed 
and administered by the UN. The commissioners, three highly respected 
international figures, were appointed by the UN Secretary General (UNSG). The 
Historical Clarification Commission of Guatemala was a hybrid that combined
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domestic and international personalities. It was chaired by a non-Guatemalan, 
appointed by the UNSG, while the other two members were from Guatemala. 
Despite different formats, truth commissions are normally established in countries 
where successor governments feel secure enough to take cautious steps towards 
accountability. (Dimitrijevic, 2006)
Priscilla Hayner, the most renowned scholar on truth commissions, suggests 
that these bodies share four characteristics. They focus on the past. Second, they 
investigate a pattern of abuses over a period of time, rather than a specific event, 
attempting to sketch the overall picture. Third, they are temporary bodies that 
exist for a limited, pre-defined, period of time, and cease to function upon 
submission of their final report. Finally, they are officially sanctioned, authorised, 
or empowered by states or international organisations, with such authority needed 
to have greater access to information. (Hayner, 2002:14)
Truth commission have been assigned numerous broad-ranging goals, from 
advancing healing for victims and national reconciliation, to ending impunity and 
preventing future abuses. Hayner (2002:24-31) contends that truth commissions 
may have any or all of the following five aims:
• clarify and acknowledge the truth, establishing accurate and authoritative 
records of past abuses, to officially recognise and expose this legacy;
• respond to the needs and interests of victims, listening to their stories, and 
publishing a report describing wide-ranging experiences to give victims a 
public voice, and bring their suffering to the awareness of the public;
•  contribute to justice and accountability;
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• outline institutional responsibility and recommend reforms, as truth 
commissions are often well positioned to evaluate institutional 
responsibilities for extensive abuses and expose weaknesses in structures 
(like the judiciary or police) or existing laws in need of reform;
• promote reconciliation and reduce tensions resulting from past violence.
Truth commissions have also, however, been fiercely criticised, it being unclear 
what effects truth-telling exercises really have in transitional situations. (Brahm, 
2007; Mendeloff, 2004) Jonathan Tepperman aptly summarises the state of affairs, 
suggesting that 'almost everything about truth commissions -including their 
missions, compositions, and outcomes' has been the subject of intense debate. 
(Tepperman, 2002:129) Significant problems include the fact that truth 
commissions generally lack prosecutorial powers, namely they are unable to 
subpoena witnesses, bring cases to trial or investigate specific individuals accused 
of crimes. Moreover, they cannot examine the present situation of human rights. 
Audrey Chapman and Patrick Ball (2001) particularly emphasise how the work of 
these commissions can not only be affected and limited by the terms of their 
mandates, but also by the perceptions and priorities of commissioners and staff, as 
well as the methodology used and the resources allocated. All of these affect the 
quality and type of truth that is uncovered and produced. (Chapman & Ball, 2001) 
Finally, there are significant charges of partiality and politicisation in an 
environment where there are sharply conflicting and politically freighted versions 
regarding a past of violence. Is there really only one truth to be told? Or are there 
several truth(s) co-existing? (Mamdani, 2000; Rotberg & Thompson, 2000) As Daly 
correctly emphasises, the truth 'is not as monolithic, objective or verifiable as we
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would like it to be': indeed, 'no period of a nation's histoiy can be described by a 
single, elegant truth narrative'. (Daly, 2008:23,25)
South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission, for instance, was among 
the most self-conscious about its conception of the truth, distinguishing in its 
report between four types: factual or forensic, personal or narrative, social or 
dialogue, and healing and restorative. The Commission considered these as goals 
to be achieved, not alternative or competing forms: narrative, social and healing 
and restorative truths were seen as complementing the objective and analytical 
approach to truth finding.
Rather than dealing with the micro-truth (i.e. the specifics of particular events, 
cases and people), truth commissions are better suited at establishing a macro or 
global truth, that is to say broad patterns of facts, contexts, and causes. (Hayner, 
2002; Mendez, 2006) They also expose what I like to define as institutional truth, 
namely the extent of social complicity and responsibility in the perpetration of 
human rights crimes at societal and institutional level. This encompasses the role 
played by the judiciary, the police or other agents, like doctors and journalists, who 
by their inaction or omission, became passive bystanders.
Despite its healing, restorative and cathartic qualities, the truth alone is often 
insufficient. Pablo De-Greiff rightly stresses that 'in the absence of other positive 
and tangible manifestations truth, by itself, can easily be considered as an empty 
gesture, as cheap and inconsequential talk'. (De-Greiff, 2006b:2) Truth, in reality, 
only constitutes one form of closure for individuals. (Hamber & Wilson, 2003) 
Reparations programmes have recently been adopted in several countries like 
Malawi, Brazil and Peru. Given the direct impact reparations have on victims, they
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occupy a unique space among transitional measures, by virtue of recognising 
individual suffering, while also seeking to attain national and individual 
reconciliation. (De-Greiff, 2006b)
In international law, the term reparations comprises of all the measures used to 
remedy the harm victims may have experienced as a consequence of crimes. Four 
types exist: restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, and satisfaction and 
guarantees of non-recurrence. (De-Greiff, 2006a)
Here, reparations is taken to refer to sets of coordinated measures that are 
normally adopted in the aftermath of violence, and endeavour to provide direct 
benefits to victims. Reparations programmes can have an individual and/or 
collective nature. They usually consist of material elements (namely cash 
payments or service packages, provisions for education, health and housing), and 
symbolic initiatives (like official apologies, commemoration days, the creation of 
museums, memorials or parks to the victims' memory, and changes to street 
names). (Brett et al., 2008; Hamber & Wilson, 2003)
The right of victims to reparations is widely recognised in international law, and 
derives from the doctrine of state responsibility. Accordingly, 'the state has a duty 
to compensate victims for breaches of state obligations', regardless of leadership 
changes. (Walsh, 1996:112) Reparations do demonstrate the willingness of the 
state to accept liability and acknowledge human rights crimes, while also satisfying 
the need for justice for victims and societies, helping them rebuild their lives. 
(Laplante & Theidon, 2007)
Nevertheless, reparation programmes have been subjected to criticism. First, 
reparations and truth-telling must be linked, as otherwise the state is seen as 
simply buying silence from victims, with the benefits portrayed as 'blood money'
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paid to stop the search for truth and justice. [De-Greiff, 2006a:461) Second, 
reparations are not substitutes but are imperative in complementing other 
mechanisms of TJ in a particular way, 'namely by helping to keep those other 
measures from fading into irrelevance for most victims', (/b/d.)
Despite growing consensus regarding the necessity of reparations, developing 
such programmes is not easy. Which groups should benefit, in cases where almost 
the entire population can claim to have suffered unjustly? Moreover, quantifying 
harm is problematic and, in situations of massive violence, attention has also to be 
paid to the collectivity, working to reconstruct the rule of law and institutions. 
[Calhoun, 2004)
1.2 The Key Phases and Actors of Transitional Justice
In this section, attention focuses on identifying relevant social, political, 
historical and institutional variables that play a role in the materialisation and 
later progress of policies of TJ. Specific internal and external actors are also 
examined, in endeavouring to explain the variation of TJ initiatives in various 
countries.
Pre-Transition
Authoritarian Rule and Repression
In coming to terms with past crimes, TJ strategies are likely to be affected not 
only by current political dynamics and power balances, but also by the intrinsic 
features of the repression: its nature, length and the intensity of the violence. 
[Adler, 2001; Elster, 2006) Judging previous regimes is no easy task, given that
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authoritarian rule often pervaded large segments of society. Thus, responsibility 
for abuses can be widely dispersed, and this explains why confronting the past can 
be an ambiguous task. (Huyse, 1995)
The duration of authoritarian rule and repression is significant. In cases like 
Brazil, Spain or the former-communist countries, repression was hardest early on. 
At transition, the passage of time had blurred the memories of what had happened 
and/or direct victims or their families were no longer around to galvanise the 
momentum for accountability. (Nino, 1996)
The intensity and the magnitude of repression also has an impact on the 
unfolding of TJ demands. (Acuna & Smulovitz, 1996b) In cases where repression 
was particularly bloody, the outgoing regime has generally little to offer in return 
for escaping prosecutions. As a consequence, pacts between opposing actors are 
less likely. In Latin America, Panizza (1995:169) pertinently highlights how 'the 
massive and unprecedented nature' of the abuses 'made human rights a crucial 
component of public debate in the region'.
The type of violence (public vs. hidden) can also impinge upon later attempts to 
demonstrate that crimes have indeed occurred, given that most information may 
be unknown, and abuses were routinely denied. Then again, secret repression can 
catalyse families into action to find out the fate of missing loved ones, spurring the 
development of human rights activism. Finally, was repression selective? The 
randomness of the brutality, with terror used as a mechanism for social control, 
can produce either a culture of fear hard to eradicate, producing passivity and 
apathy, or generate strong opposition against the regime, that may result in strong 
demands for accountability.
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Guatemala witnessed a 36-year-long internal armed conflict, resulting in unprecedented 
human rights abuses that claimed the lives of thousands of people, including 50,000 
disappearances.3 Since the mid-1950s, ever-increasing violence was used to suppress 
popular demands for change. The practice of detention-disappearances was established in 
the 1960s for the first time.
Throughout the 1970s, the military engaged in an all-out war against left-wing and 
centre opposition, students, trade unions, Christian organisations, journalist associations 
and community activists. In the early 1980s, repression targeted the civilian population, 
with over 70,000 killed, especially in the western highlands. One million indigenous 
peasants were forced from their homes, a deliberate policy of genocide against the Mayan 
population.
The conflict's most destructive element was the forced involvement of civilians in 
counterinsurgency violence, through the local Civil Self-Defence Patrols. Numbering some 
800,000 in the mid-1980s, these patrols were responsible for serious abuses, giving state 
violence a highly localised dimension and effectively fracturing the civilian population. 
Violence continued until the UN-brokered the 1996 peace accords.
The brutality and length of authoritarian rule played a role in pushing for TJ policies. In 
December 1996, the government and the National Guatemalan Revolutionary Unity 
guerrilla (URNG) agreed the Law of National Reconciliation that protected perpetrators 
from criminal responsibility, but did not apply to torture, genocide and disappearances. 
Several accountability initiatives took place. A UN-sponsored Commission fo r Historical 
Clarification (CEH) was agreed in June 1994. Additionally, the Human Rights Office of the 
Catholic Archdiocese documented the extent of atrocities, releasing the Nunca Mas report 
in April 1998. On the basis of over 6,000 collected testimonies, it registered 55,000 victims 
as well as over 25,000 murders, attributing 80% to state security forces and 9% to the
3 Section based on (McSherry & Molina-Mejia, 1992; Molina-Mejia, 1999; Roht-Arriaza & Arriaza, 2008; Sieder, 2001a, 
2001b)
URNG. In February 1999, the CEH published its report, Guatemala: Memory of Silence. It 
recorded 42,275 cases and 658 massacres, estimating the total number of victims at over 
200,000. The military was found responsible in 93% of all cases whilst the URNG in 3%. 
Since 1993, civil society groups also promoted grassroots alternatives and conflict 
resolution based on Mayan methods in local communities, including exhumations of mass 
graves and the building of monuments.
Similarly, during the 1980s, the Honduran military forces committed widespread human 
rights violations, in the endeavour to defeat guerrilla groups and suppress civil society 
sectors that had demanded social reform.4 Violence was however more limited, with the 
military often attempting to tackle popular discontent through cooptation rather than 
repression. Unrest was so defused and people were given a stake in the existing system, 
preventing polarisation and political instability like in El Salvador and Guatemala.
During the 1980s, as the violent conflict engulfing Central America started to affect the 
Honduran military, the armed forces adhered to the national security doctrine and 
bypassed the executive. They set up counterinsurgency networks, and employed systematic 
torture, selective assassinations and disappearances. As a consequence of the 1979 
Nicaraguan revolution, Honduras became strategically important to the US and thus 
enjoyed unprecedented levels of military and economic assistance. Various guerrillas 
groups emerged but failed to secure a civilian support base. Therefore, repression always 
specifically targeted left-wing members of popular opposition and Salvadoreans suspected 
of providing support for the guerrilla Farabundo Marti Front for National Liberation (FMLN).
TJ initiatives were substantially different here. The Human Rights Commissioner Leo 
Valladares, proprio motu, announced that the recently established office of the National 
Commissioner for Human Rights (CNDH) would carry out a thorough investigation into the
4 Section based on (Kaye, 1997; Lutz & Sikkink, 2000; Popkin & Bhuta, 1999; Sieder, 2001a)
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fate of the disappeared, and the violence between 1980 and 1993. The report, The Facts 
Speak for Themselves, released in December 1993, documented 179 disappearances, 
attributing responsibility for 99 cases to the military or paramilitary death-squads, and 37 to 
the Nicaraguan Contras. In February 1996, compensation was also paid to the victims' 
families, amounting to USD 302,000. Furthermore, clandestine cemeteries were located and 
bodies exhumed. In December 1995, Colonel Blas-Salazar was the first member of the 
military to be convicted for past violations. Further prosecutions, however, proved 
problematic.
Guatemala and Honduras adopted contrasting strategies to tackle the legacies of 
their pasts. In Guatemala, the country with the highest number of victims and 
brutal waves of violence, two truth commissions were established, and several 
local groups carried out grassroots initiatives. Conversely, Honduras had more 
modest policies, with only one report investigating violence and prosecutions with 
limited outcomes.
Transition
Modes of transition
The type of transition, that is to say the way in which a country moves from 
authoritarianism to new democratic settings, is quite significant. The way in which 
the transition unfolded helps to account for differences in later accountability 
processes, often directly determining their scope and boundaries. (Aguilar- 
Fernandez et al., 2001)
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Transition modes have a direct impact on democratisation processes, as well as 
the nature and prospects for the consolidation of the new democracy. Resulting 
power balances between old elites and their successors, as well as political 
constrains, shape the way in which a country is likely to confront past crimes, at 
least during the first democratic administration. (Karl & Schmitter, 1991) Power 
dynamics originating from transition are, in fact, not cemented. Rather, they are 
likely to change due to social demands for truth and justice, international variables 
or internal political agendas. (Skaar, 1999)
Recent waves of democratisation have followed three patterns: collapse, 
negotiation or transformation.5
Situations of collapse are generally the most favourable under which 
accountability flourishes, in that they often produce positive conditions for wide- 
ranging TJ policies. Indeed, few political constraints exist, therefore facilitating the 
fulfilment of demands for truth and justice.
Under this scenario, the old regime has often been weakened to the point of 
disintegration, giving the opposition the opportunity to seize power. (Mainwaring, 
1992) These transitions are normally the least problematic. There is a clear break 
with the past and the weakness of previous elites lends itself to the creation of new 
institutional frameworks without preconditions or limitations. (G. Munck & 
Skalnik-Leff, 1997)
The collapse of regimes can be attributed to several factors notably foreign 
intervention or force (Nicaragua; Bolivia), loss of internal legitimacy, loss of 
control of key powers or defeat in an external war (Argentina; Greece),
5 Huntington (1991) uses replacement, transplacement, and transformation; Nino (1996) and Calhoun (2004) rupture, 
negotiated (pacted) and transformation.
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revolutionary action by military forces (Portugal], or incorporation as East 
Germany. (Aguilar-Fernandez et al., 2001) Regardless of the motivation for the 
collapse, the old regime is discredited, and its leaders have to relinquish office. 
Consequently, TJ initiatives are less likely to suffer from constraints, given that 
former incumbents are unable to prevent investigations into past abuses. 
(Calhoun, 2004)
The Portuguese dictatorship repressed the opposition for decades, through censorship, 
the banning of political parties and trade unions, by requiring political loyalty in education 
and public administration, and using special courts and police for political offences.6
A grave economic crisis, together with exhaustion due to the colonial wars in 
Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea Bissau, provided the motor for the military coup of April 
1974 that signalled the return of democracy. The military became the protagonist of the 
political transformation, orchestrating a transition without pacts.
Three stages of transition and democratisation occurred, each with a corresponding TJ 
phase. The revolutionary period (April 1974 to March 1975) encompasses the fall of the 
regime and the crisis of the state. It was characterised by expropriations of private 
enterprises, agrarian land reform, nationalisation and widespread, often a-legal, purges. A 
normalisation period (1976 to 1982) saw democratic consolidation, with the rise of more 
moderate parties who lobbied for the establishment of constitutional democracy. The 
military retreated from power and steps were taken to reverse the effects of expropriations, 
nationalisation and purges. In the last phase, since 1982, there has been a process of 
democratic consolidation.
The defining feature in Portugal was the process of purges, saneamentos. The first 
institution to be affected was the military: by late 1974, 300 officers from all ranks and
6 Section based on (Costa Pinto, 2001, 2006; Nino, 1996)
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services had been removed from active duty, replaced by a new generation. Purges were 
often spontaneous, also affecting businesses and education, especially universities. By 
November 1975, 20,000 people had been removed from their posts. Purges did not follow a 
coherent strategy. The civil service was particularly targeted, though not uniformly. At the 
end of 1974, around 4,300 public servants were dismissed. Members of economic elites, the 
media, and censorship services were also affected.
From 1982, various initiatives emerged as a means of confronting the past, including 
legislation to address compensation issues and access to police files. Others related to 
amending street names, the public rehabilitation of opposition figures like General Delgado, 
the creation of exhibitions, films and documentaries, and changes to national holidays, with 
the view of allowing the country to examine its past, and understand the legacies of both 
authoritarianism and the revolutionary period.
Transitions by negotiation as in Chile, Spain, Hungary and Poland, or by 
transformation like Bulgaria and Brazil, are considered the least conducive to 
accountability. Successor regimes are unlikely to prosecute or investigate past 
crimes, as their predecessors often retain sufficient power to threaten democratic 
consolidation, oppose TJ policies or influence their remit. (Calhoun, 2004]
In instances of negotiation, pacts, whether formalised or not, between the 
regime and the opposition normally address crucial features of transition. In cases 
of military dictatorships, it is highly likely that accords firmly guarantee that the 
past will be overlooked and secure the broad participation of the military in the 
civilian government. (Mainwaring, 1992; O'Donnell, 1992) Under this scenario, the 
old regime is weakened but is still able to dictate the terms of transition, and later 
may undermine democratic consolidation, given that the new elites only have
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limited options. The relative power of these two groups of actors 'hang in an often 
wobbly balance'. [Calhoun, 2004:14) Outgoing authorities may receive favourable 
terms in exchange for handing over power, and successor governments are usually 
too vulnerable to provoke still powerful elites.
Chile's democratisation was largely a top-down affair.7 Despite losing the 1988 
referendum and the 1989 democratic elections, the armed forces retained substantial 
power, legitimacy and autonomy, reinforced by an economic boom and unprecedented 
growth rates, and they were effectively the arbiters of transition. Given this, Chile's 
transition was the region's most restricted. The regime had successfully institutionalised 
itself through the 1980 Constitution, protecting the military and ensuring 'a step-by-step 
passage to a protected dem ocrac/. (Brito, 2001b:133)
The loss of the 1988 referendum marked the beginning of the transition. Henceforth, 
several phases unfolded, including negotiations between the regime and opposition on 
constitutional reforms, the strengthening of authoritarian political and institutional enclaves, 
and finally the electoral campaign and elections in December 1989.
Between December 1989 and March 1990, when the democratic government of 
President Aylwin was inaugurated, additional last-minute leyes de amarre (tying-up laws) 
were adopted, limiting the new government's powers. These laws granted security of tenure 
to civil servants and created nine appointed senatorial positions, later filled by Pinochet 
supporters. The January 1990 Organic Constitutional Law of Congress forbids Congress from 
investigating the old regime and bringing constitutional charges for corruption and treason 
committed before March 1990. Both the Constitutional Tribunal and the Supreme Court 
were reshuffled, obstructing future reform and increasing the number of Justices favouring 
Pinochet. Just before transition, the secret police was dissolved with no civilian oversight and
7 Section based on (Brito, 2001a; Roniger & Sznajder, 1999)
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incorporated into the Army intelligence unit. The regime also modified the electoral law, 
guaranteeing the overrepresentation of the Right in the legislature.
The Concertacion de Partidos por la Democracia, a coalition of parties led by Patricio 
Aylwin, shared the common goal of re-establishing democracy, and were committed to 
working for accountability. Aylwin's famous promise to obtain truth and justice 'as far as is 
possible' exposes the obstacles that Chile faced in the shadow of the dictatorship. (Ibid. 132) 
The main pillar of accountability was the multi-partisan National Commission for Truth 
and Reconciliation of April 1990. It focused on the most serious abuses that had resulted in 
death or disappearance between 1973 and 1990. The Commission examined 3,400 cases, 
reaching conclusions on about 2,279: 2,115 had died as a result of violations by state agents 
and 164 from political violence. The government also set up an autonomous public 
corporation to further investigate unsolved cases and adopted a Reparations Law in 1992 
that provided a monthly salary of USD 380 to affected families, and offered health and 
education benefits, as well as exemption from military service.
Due to the restrictions imposed, the first democratic administration limited its policies 
vis-a-vis uncovering the truth. More recently, further progress has been achieved. In 1999, a 
Mesa de Dialogo was convened with representatives of the Catholic Church, human rights 
lawyers, armed and polices forces, and politicians, holding a pluralistic and public debate 
about the past, with the military implicitly assuming responsibility. Furthermore, several 
judicial proceedings for past crimes have started and in 2004 the government-sponsored 
Informe Valech was published, which recorded the testimonies of over 30,000 torture 
victims.
Transitions by transformation occur when authoritarian regimes decide to 
gradually open up, attempting to transform themselves into democracies. A 
process of democratisation is initiated, with slow political change orchestrated
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from above that normally culminates in free elections. (Calhoun, 2004) In this 
scenario, authoritarian incumbents remain decisive actors throughout.
The decision to open up may arise because the authoritarian intervention was 
always only ever meant to be a short parenthesis in a crisis situation, or more 
frequently because the costs of retaining power have increased whilst 
concurrently the costs associated with democratisation have decreased. 
(Mainwaring, 1992) Political openings are created through a steady process of 
political change and stakes in the new system are invested by both old and new 
elites. (G. Munck & Skalnik-Leff, 1997) Here too, accountability prospects are 
limited, given the inherited constraints.
Brazil's military regime began in 1964.8 Repression worsened since October 1969, with 
thousands of people killed or tortured. In March 1974, a slow and gradual process of political 
liberalisation (aberdura) started, reducing systematic repression. Negotiations with the 
opposition agreed a mutual amnesty that covered those accused of political crimes and state 
security agents of human rights crimes perpetrated between 1964 and 1979.
The aberdura can be divided into two phases as suggested by Scott Mainwaring (1986): 
political liberalisation (March 1974 to October 1983) and the struggle for democracy 
(October 1983 to January 1985). The first period witnessed constant struggles and 
negotiations, with the opposition trying to fight for democracy, and the regime attempting 
to contain it. The government reduced the incidence of torture, granted an amnesty to exiles 
and abolished Institutional Act No. 5 which had eliminated civil liberties. At the elections in 
1974 and 1982, the opposition claimed significant victories, winning most of the major states 
in 1982. Nevertheless, the regime still remained strong. The regime showed continuity in 
policies and leadership, with sporadic repression against popular movements and the Left. It
8 Section based on (Brito, 2001b; Cano & Salv^o-Ferreira, 2006; Mainwaring, 1985, 1986; Nino, 1996; Weschler, 1998)
institutionalised itself through regular presidential succession and the aberdura was 
particularly slow, because the government could control and contain the scope of political 
change.
From October 1983, the government lost the ability to develop a sound political strategy 
and control presidential succession, thus opening the way for an early transition. 
Notwithstanding, the government managed the transition with good political skills, 
circumventing the quick loss of legitimacy and rise in political mobilisation.
Until Cardoso's election in 1995, the executive mainly ignored the cause of the relatives 
of the disappeared. An important achievement was President Collor-de-Mello's order to 
open police archives. However, only in 1994 did a new phase begin, when presidential 
candidate Cardoso signed a manifesto calling for the truth regarding the fate of the 
disappeared. In December 1995, Law 9140/95 was enacted, officially recognising the death 
of 136 political militants disappeared between 1961 and 1979, and stipulating economic 
compensation for their families and efforts to locate their remains. By 1999, indemnities of 
approximately USD 100-150,000 were paid to each family. Two new laws were issued in 
2002 and 2004, extending compensation to apply to all cases between September 1961 and 
October 1988 and also to victims of police repression, and those that had committed suicide. 
Finally, official attempts to locate remains of missing victims in Araguaia occurred.
Dealing with the past has been complicated, given the military has remained united and 
unremorseful. Despite advances, prosecutions are unlikely, due to the blanket amnesty and 
possible military resistance.
These mini cases demonstrated the impact that the type of transition is likely to 
have on the width and scope of accountability. In Portugal, where the regime 
collapsed, the scope for action was greater than in Brazil and Chile where the
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terms of transition were established early by outgoing regimes or negotiated 
during transition.
Transitions by collapse see broader accountability policies, as new democratic 
forces are in a stronger position to call the old elite to account for past actions. In 
contrast, in transitions by negotiation or transformation, members of previous 
regime are able to impose limitations on the terms of democratisations, its 
consolidation and investigations into the past.
Democratisation processes
Although the type of transition has important predictive value on later 
accountability policies, it is far from decisive. An interrelated factor is the type of 
democratisation processes that Carlos Nino (1996:120) categorises, according to 
legal status, as continuous, legal breakdown/rupture, and legal restoration.
When the new regime is legally continuous with the old, violations of human 
rights tended to have been legally protected at the time of commission, and 
afterwards by amnesty laws or other provisions. Accountability is much harder but 
still possible, most often through truth commissions.
The easiest path usually occurs in cases of legal breakdown/rupture as in post­
war Germany and Japan. Even acts lawful under the previous system can be 
criminalised retrospectively and norms against 'ex post facto changes in criminal 
definitions, procedures, and statutes of limitations are not applicable' and any 
amnesties can be disregarded. (Nino, 1996:120) TJ policies acquire an 
'intermediate degree of difficulty' in cases of legal restoration, as in Austria and 
Greece. Previous legal restraints can be overcome but new ones may arise as a 
consequence of the restoration of earlier democratic laws. [Ibid.)
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Post-Transition
Accountability policies emerge from the struggles among the various actors that 
co-exist in the new democratic environment which can influence the ways in which 
the past is addressed. Rarely are accountability policies easily agreed upon and/or 
imposed unilaterally, even in circumstances where theoretically the new 
government has a wider scope to directly implement such initiatives. Invariably, 
other actors still need to be involved in the drafting of policy.
The new government
Upon democratisation, successor governments have to tackle various issues, 
from the state of the economy to other political and legislative matters. Despite 
transition, it is hard for democratic authorities to totally operate free from the 
shackles of the past, particularly in the sphere of human rights accountability.
If one looks at the transitions that have occurred over the past decades, it is 
usually the case that incumbents find themselves constrained in their actions by 
many social and political actors, most notably the members of the former regime, 
their loyal followers and collaborators. It is within this restricted setting that one 
has to consider and assess the acts of new governments. An important question 
which warrants attention is whether, despite the facade of transition, have any real 
changes in the political environment actually occurred.
Brazil is a good example, as notwithstanding democratisation, no transition really took 
place.9 A large degree of continuity existed between the government of President Sarney
9 Same references as footnote 8.
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and the previous regime. The Sarney administration was drawn from the National 
Renovating Alliance which was the pro-military party during the dictatorship. As such, the 
government kept close ties with the intelligence services and the military, which retained all 
their functions, including what amounted to a veto over civilian rule. Sarney effectively 
governed in association with elements of the Armed Forces to whom it was beholden. Due 
to the regime's internal transformation since 1974, the military maintained a high degree of 
power throughout the mid-1990s.
The transition occurred with the consent of significant sectors of the military regime and 
thus, immediately, constraints became evident. The new Congress included individuals 
elected under the authoritarian regime's electoral legislation, which underrepresented 
liberal parts of the country, and six ministers had served under the previous regime.
Far beyond hampering agrarian and new labour law reforms, these residual elements of 
the former regime also prevented investigations and prosecutions for past crimes. Given 
this, it is unsurprising that efforts in pursuing accountability were postponed until the mid- 
1990s.
Though often operating in constrained circumstances, some governments, 
especially individual political figures, rose to the challenges posed by 
accountability initiatives, at times rather successful in denouncing past crimes and 
officially acknowledging systematic terror. David Pion-Berlin (1993) rightly 
suggests that it is essential to look at the deeds and decisions of specific Presidents, 
particularly in Latin American where the executive tends to be strong. (Pion- 
Berlin, 1993) Nino (1996) concurs, maintaining that strategic considerations and 
moral evaluations play a pivotal role when political leaders decide to proceed with 
TJ policies. Similarly, in a recent article, Terence Roehrig claims that 'determined
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executive leadership may be crucial for a society that wishes to pursue some level 
of accountability'. (Roehrig, 2009:747)
Honduras is a case of partial success.10 In the 1980s Honduras experienced grave human 
rights violations and broad amnesty laws were adopted in 1987,1990 and 1991.
The Human Rights Commissioner, Leo Valladares, played a central role in championing 
the cause for accountability. The CNDH was created in June 1992 by President Callejas to 
address widespread military impunity, and was also charged with defending human rights. 
Valladares surprised the national and international communities, announcing that his office 
would carry out a thorough investigation into the fate of the disappeared. Valladares had 
close ties with national human rights organisations and victims' groups, that had long been 
campaigning for the investigation and prosecution of past crimes. Valladares received 
support from the Truth Commission of neighbouring El Salvador and other international 
organisations.
The final report constituted a decisive departure from the past. The text documented 
cases of disappearances and highlighted how the violence had been characterised by extra­
judicial executions, arbitrary detention, and torture. It also indicted the judiciary for 
encouraging a state of impunity, particularly condemning US involvement and that of 
Argentine military officers that had trained the Honduran military in dirty war techniques.
The report was the first and only comprehensive attempt to shed light on
disappearances, with Valladares stating explicitly that the existing amnesty laws did not
prevent criminal prosecutions.
The new government and its actions are fundamental in explaining the 
development of TJ policies. In Brazil, despite a newly installed democratic
10 Same references as footnote 4.
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government, there was a still a high degree of political continuity with the previous 
regime that effectively delayed accountability. Conversely, in Honduras, 
notwithstanding the existence of amnesty laws, truth and justice were pursued, 
helping to satisfy the victims' needs and officially condemning systematic violence.
The previous regime
In many instances of transitional societies, former elites and members of the old 
regime retain enough power to continue to play a role in the politics of their 
respective countries. Previous authorities can frequently influence political 
agendas and dynamics. In collapse transitions, they have a more limited scope, as 
in the case of the Greek colonels. However, often, in cases of negotiation or 
transformation, former incumbents maintain significant authority and the ability 
to directly influence policy choice, with notable examples being Chile, Brazil and 
Uruguay where they even held government positions in democratic 
administrations. (Agiiero, 1998]
On the road to achieving accountability, former elites explicitly and openly 
attempt to shape, more often hinder, these efforts. In some extreme situations, 
further violence may be perpetrated to prohibit investigation into past crimes.
In cases of transition from military rule to democracy, particularly in Latin 
America, many successor regimes went to unusual lengths in their alliances and 
policies to stave off the possibility of further coups. (Agiiero, 1992; Karl & 
Schmitter, 1991] In many cases, the military still retained significant power, it 
being in a position to bargain with the civilian government over several policy 
areas, and compel officials to contemplate possible military consequences before 
making decisions. (Hunter, 1998]
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This is often the scenario during the early days of transition. When democracy is 
consolidated, through institutional structures and stronger political parties, 
civilian power is likely to be more assertive. Therefore, initial constraints are not 
everlasting, and the more distant the transition becomes in time, it is highly likely 
that military influence upon democracy recedes. (Hunter, 1997)
In Chile, even before transferring power back, General Pinochet took particular care to 
adopt various protective measures to shield members of the armed forces, as himself, from 
accountability for their deeds.11 Pinochet's stand can be summarised by his famous 
statement dating to October 1989, two months before Chile's first free elections since 1973: 
"No one touches anyone" [...] The day they touch one of my men, the rule of law ends. This I 
say once and will not say again." (Rosenberg, 1995:134) This threat should not be 
underestimated. Military autonomy and the 'Pinochet factor, the popularity of the General 
and his continued position as Commander-in-chief [until March 1998]', constituted 'real as 
well as psychological obstacles to the pursuit of truth and justice'. (Brito, 2001b:133)
The General's threats were not only verbal. Before leaving office, Pinochet had firmly put 
in place a self-amnesty law in 1978, under which the military forgave itself for all crimes 
committed between September 1973 and 1978. After transition, the armed forces still 
showed substantial autonomous initiative, effectively mobilising against TJ policies. The most 
famous case, the boinazo (boinas are black berets worn by mobilised troops) occurred in 
May 1993, when President Aylwin was in Europe. The army assembled troops in battle dress 
in central Santiago to protest against the investigation and possible trial of military officers 
for human rights violations. (Wilde, 1999)
Pinochet's 1998 London arrest renewed impetus towards accountability, shattering the 
General's image. Since then, Chile has attempted to redress past impunity. In addition to the
11 Same references as footnote 7.
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already mentioned Mesa de Dialogo and Informe Valech, the General's immunity has been 
lifted by the country's courts in numerous human rights cases relating to his 17-year rule and 
several other crimes are being investigated. (BBCMundo, 2008; BBCNews, 2006)
In contrast, widespread military impunity persists in Guatemala despite democratisation. 
Notwithstanding the two truth commissions, few people ever faced justice. Furthermore, 
people trying to investigate on past violations have been intimidated and threatened, with 
some even been killed.
A famous case is that of Bishop Juan-Jos6 Gerardi-Conedera, the coordinator of the 
Archbishop's Office for Human Rights, that produced the 1998 Nunca Mas. Two days after 
the report was released, Bishop Gerardi was brutally murdered in his home, possibly to 
prevent him from testifying in future trials. Although three army officers and a priest were 
sentenced for the murder in 2001, their trial highlighted the fragile nature of Guatemala's 
politics and judiciary, where intimidations and threats are routine. Two investigating judges, 
three key witnesses and at least one prosecutor fled the country in fear of their lives. 
Furthermore, the investigating magistrate constantly received death threats and, on the eve 
of the trial, a bomb exploded outside the house of one of the judges.
Despite the existence of a vibrant civil society, many obstacles still stand in the way of 
accountability. Particularly, members of the previous regime have proved exceptionally 
successful in ensuring continuing impunity. Of the hundreds of massacres documented by 
the CEH, only three have been successfully prosecuted, the third conviction dating May 
2008, when five former members of a paramilitary patrols were convicted for the murders of 
26 of the 177 civilians massacred in Rio Negro in 1982.
The government and the police fail to provide necessary protection for witnesses, 
investigators, prosecutors, judges, and the latter also lack adequate training or resources.
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The army and other state institutions resist cooperation with investigations into abuses 
committed by current or former members. (HRW, 2009b)
Human rights organisations
Civil society, especially HROs, play crucial roles in accountability. (Becker, 2003; 
Bonner, 2005} HROs have raised awareness on human rights crimes during 
authoritarianism, called for TJ policies upon democratisation, as well as carried out 
'unofficial truth projects', geared towards uncovering the truth about past crimes. 
(Bickford, 2007:995}
Some examples include the Argentine Madres and Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo, 
Chile's Vicaria de la Solidaridad (Vicariate of Solidarity} and Guatemala’s Mutual 
Support Group. (Loveman, 1994; Schirmer, 1988} Their role has not been easy. On 
Christmas Eve 1977, for instance, the founding members of Argentina's Madres 
were abducted, tortured and disappeared, with their remains only recovered in 
2005. (Verbitsky, 2005}
In addition to advocacy and lobbying, Louis Bickford (2007:1004-1005} 
suggests that unofficial truth projects have contributed to accountability in at least 
three ways. They can replace official initiatives in cases where these were unlikely 
to occur despite the existence of social demands for investigation, e.g. Uruguay in 
1985 and Northern Ireland in 1998. They can precede official investigations, as the 
Iraq History Project whose specific mandate was heralding a formal truth 
commission, or the work of Chile's Vicaria that for years amassed documents for 
future criminal proceedings. Lastly, they can complement state-sanctioned efforts, 
as in Guatemala where the Catholic Church's Recovery of Historical Memory 
Project added to the work of the CEH. (Bickford, 2007}
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In Brazil, two religious leaders and a small team of collaborators were the only ones to 
embark on a thorough investigation into past crimes, especially systematic torture.12 The 
Brasil: Nuncas Mais project resulted from the work of over thirty people, but for security 
reasons only Cardinal Paulo Evaristo-Arns, the Archbishop of Sao Paulo, and Presbyterian 
minister Jaime Wright were the only contributors openly identified at the time of the 
book's publication.
The idea originated in 1979 when, after the amnesty law, lawyers had permission to 
access military archives in the preparation of petitions for their clients. Wright and other 
members realised that this was a unique chance to attempt to photocopy a sample of the 
archives, to form the basis of a study on torture. The project started in 1980 and was run 
as follows. Lawyers checked out files from the Supreme Military Court's archives. These 
were photocopied and originals later returned. Photocopies were immediately transported 
out of Brasilia, processed and stored in Sao Paulo. The archives contained around 707 
cases, involving over 7,000 defendants. By 1983, the team had photocopied the entire 
archive.
The first half of the project is a 6,946-page long survey of material, consisting of twelve 
volumes, that addresses issues like torture methods, and victims. It convincingly 
demonstrated that torture was an essential part of the military justice system, and that 
judicial authorities had explicit knowledge that it was employed to extract confessions. In 
late 1983, the archdiocese team approached two journalists, asking them to develop a 
summarised version to be subsequently published as the Brasil: Nuncas Mais. The book 
combines samples testimonies of human rights crimes with the historical background and 
context of the violence. The book was a bestseller, hitting bookstores in July 1985. 
Moreover, in November, the list of 444 torturers was released. Until the mid-1990s, the
12 Section based on (Bickford, 2007; Weschler, 1998)
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Brasil: Nuncas Mais was the only methodical investigation into one of the darkest pages of 
Brazilian history.
International context
The development of TJ policies is influenced not only by domestic political, 
social and cultural factors, but also international pressures. As Jose Zalaquett 
correctly contends, already 'by the early 1980s, the values of human rights and 
democracy had gained unprecedented international legitimacy'. (Zalaquett, 
1999:342) In Latin America in particular, Panizza suggests that it was during the 
years of authoritarianism in the 1970s that for the first time human rights 'gained 
unprecedented centrality and became the dominant language of public debate', as 
well as 'a political issue'. (Panizza, 1993:209; 1995:169)
Further, since the end of the Cold War, there has been increasing consensus and 
observance of human rights standards by states and international bodies, as well 
as the recognition that actions like torture, disappearances, and other violations of 
human rights are no longer legitimate state actions, but constitute international 
crimes.
According to Roht-Arriaza, international factors may shape human rights 
accountability on three levels. (Roht-Arriaza, 2001) First, human rights institutions 
consistently emphasise states' obligations in providing accountability for past 
crimes. Through their jurisprudence, norms were developed, strengthening the 
case against impunity and the use of domestic amnesties or statutes of limitations. 
International organisations also actively participate in brokering peace 
agreements or drafting amnesty laws in accordance with international human 
rights norms exemplified by Guatemala.
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Second, transnational networks of human rights activists, and the norm 
diffusion processes they unleash, put pressure on various countries, encouraging 
them to learn from each others' experiences in confronting past abuses. Moreover, 
activists often recur to foreign legal institutions when human rights violators 
reside abroad initiating civil lawsuits for survivors to receive compensation, or 
criminal proceedings resorting to external courts when the possibility of justice is 
closed at home.
Third, new international institutions have been created since the early 1990s, 
like the ICTY, ICTR, and the ICC. This plainly demonstrates how the international 
community is no longer willing to passively tolerate impunity as was previously 
the case.
In El Salvador and Guatemala, the UN sponsored the search for truth and justice.13 In 
both, human rights crimes had a similar nature, including assassinations, disappearances, 
systematic torture, rape, massacres, destruction of villages and communities, and mass 
displacement. The vast majority were committed by military and security forces as well as 
paramilitary death squads, whose impunity was guaranteed by the complicity and 
ineffectiveness of the judiciary.
The Commission on the Truth fo r El Salvador, created in April 1991, was part of the peace 
accords between the government and the FMLN. It was charged with investigating and 
reporting serious acts of violence which occurred between January 1980 and July 1991, 
making recommendations in order to prevent the repetition of such acts and promoting 
national reconciliation. In Guatemala, an agreement was signed in June 1994 to create the 
UN-sponsored Commission, CEH, to investigate violations committed during the armed
13 Section based on (Kaye, 1997; McSherry, 1992; Molina-Mejia, 1999; Sieder, 2001a, 2001b)
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conflict, clarify the conflict's causes and consequences, and produce specific 
recommendations on how to avoid future abuses.
The Salvadorean Commission was unique in many aspects. It was the first to be entirely 
sponsored, paid for and staffed by the UN, and its international composition, and 
recognition by the government and the FMLN, ensured its authority and the legitimacy of its 
findings. The Commission received 22,000 denunciations, mainly dealing with extra-judicial 
executions, forced disappearances, massacres and torture. The final report, published in 
March 1993, attributed 85% of violations to armed and security forces, paramilitary groups 
and death squads, while the FMLN was deemed responsible for 5%. After assigning general 
responsibility, the report examined thirty-three cases in detail, and where sufficient proof 
existed, individuals involved were named. Around 80 were identified for planning, 
committing, or covering up abuses. The list included around a dozen FMLN members, but a 
large majority were members of the security forces.
In February 1999, the Guatemala's CEH released its Memory of Silence report. Filling 
seventeen volumes, it covered the years of the internal armed conflict. Based on over 8,000 
testimonies, detailed analysis of paradigmatic cases as a historical analysis of the causes and 
consequences of the conflict, the report concluded that political violence had been a direct 
result of acute socioeconomic inequalities and a history of racism. It also pointed to 
significant US government and CIA involvement in supporting repressive structures. It 
particularly emphasised the role of impunity, a key tool and precondition for a state policy of 
terror, with the judicial system tolerating, and even facilitating, violence.
Despite limitations and weaknesses, these UN-sponsored commissions officially 
acknowledged and publicly documented the extent of crimes, morally condemning and 
sanctioning institutional and individual responsibility.
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The judiciary and legal obstacles
The judiciary's potential role in accountability has often been overlooked in TJ 
literature. For Elin Skaar, this is possibly because, during the early stages of 
transition, many judiciaries were subservient to the executive, and had limited 
independence to consider human rights abusers. (Skaar, 2001) Nonetheless, over 
time and through reforms, national judiciaries are no longer passive actors, but 
have become key players in TJ.
Several countries including Chile, Brazil, Mexico, and Peru have recently 
undergone substantial judicial reforms in order to establish independent 
judiciaries and guarantee the rule of law as a necessary pre-condition for 
democracy. Judicial reforms aimed at increasing independence, to reduce possible 
power abuses by the Executive, to enhance efficiency, to facilitate access to justice 
and to eliminate corruption. (Skaar, 2003; Sousa, 2007)
The recent verdict by a three-judge panel of the Peruvian Supreme Court in April 
2009 exemplified the increasing role that the judiciary has lately played in TJ. 
Former-President Fujimori was found guilty of serious human rights violations, 
including two massacres in 1991 and 1992, and the kidnappings of a journalist and 
a businessman in 1992. The judgment is particularly significant, given that until a 
few years ago Fujimori had near-total control of Peru's judiciary. (HRW, 2009c)
Particularly relevant here are the actions and the verdicts of judges and 
tribunals, and the existence of legal obstacles, mainly amnesty laws that limit the 
possibilities of justice.
As discussed above, amnesties have been a familiar feature in most countries 
emerging from authoritarianism. Generally, amnesty laws are adopted by
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successor regimes and cover all the crimes committed during authoritarianism or 
conflict, as was the case in Mozambique, South Africa, and Uruguay. By contrast, 
self-amnesties are enacted when authoritarian governments are still in power. 
Accordingly, these regimes forgive themselves for crimes committed, as in Chile 
and Guatemala. At times, these laws may also cover abuses committed by 
subversives or terrorists as in Brazil.
Mozambique was engulfed in a civil war between 1975 and 1992, when the General 
Peace Accord was signed.14 Ten days later, the government declared a general amnesty 
covering acts committed by both sides. Although over a million civilians had been killed, 
thousands tortured and many horrendous and barbaric acts had been committed, the peace 
accord never authorised an inquiry commission or prosecutions. There were no calls for 
accountability, justice or punishment and no official investigation was ever undertaken. 
Some unofficial local level initiatives have been carried out, to deal with the past through 
traditional African ceremonies of healing. Traditional healers, the so-called curandeiros, 
widely used and respected in every town and village, were charged with defusing the culture 
of violence, seen as a pathology to be cured, an illness brought about by the war. These 
traditional ceremonies emphasised the importance of reconciliation and the reintegration of 
both perpetrators and victims into their communities. They are founded on a clear break 
with the past and are based on spiritual reconciliation between the living and the dead.
In addition to amnesties, other legal provisions, contained either in the 
constitution or other pieces of domestic legislation, directly or indirectly influence 
accountability.
14 Section based on (Graybill, 2004; Hayner, 2002)
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In Chile, during the dictatorship and upon transition, General Pinochet succeeded in 
limiting the scope of TJ policies.15 The General enacted various legal provisions that ensured 
the permanence of loyal authoritarian political and institutional enclaves, and curbed the 
powers of the democratic government. Pinochet acted early to guarantee future impunity. 
Already in 1978, Decree Law 2191 covered all violations committed between September 
1973 and March 1978. Between February 1974 and August 1977, clandestine repression had 
reached its peak, with approximately 3,000 disappearances and countless incidents of 
torture. During transition negotiations, the opposition successfully gained fifty-four 
amendments to the Constitution. Nonetheless, Pinochet successfully imposed a number of 
leyes de amarre, that limited the powers of the President and Congress, secured the 
authoritarian character of the Supreme Court, and broadened military powers. The 1989 
elections were won by democratic opposition, but a biased electoral law and system 
awarded the Right a critical number of seats in both houses, securing forty-nine out of the 
120 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and sixteen out of the thirty-eight in the Senate. The 
existence of nine appointed senators changed the balance of power in favour of the Right, 
guaranteeing an ant\-Concertacion majority. Thus, the Right could veto legislation, 
particularly constitutional reform bills that require a two-thirds majority in each house.
In terms of accountability, any significant reforms or human rights policies required 
constitutional changes, and from the outset this biased legal framework blocked many 
initiatives, including to the Amnesty Law, and reforms to the military and the judiciary. 
During the early years of democratisation, Pinochet could ensure political immunity, but 
since the mid-1990s, human rights cases began reaching courts. The Supreme Court was also 
reformed in 1997. Eventually, in August 2000, the Court stripped the General of his 
senatorial immunity. Before his death, the General was facing hundreds of charges for 
torture, disappearances, tax evasion, and forgery. As of July 2008, 482 former military
15 Same references as footnote 7.
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personnel and civilian collaborators were facing charges for disappearances, extrajudicial 
executions, and torture: 256 were convicted (83 had their conviction confirmed on appeal), 
and thirty-eight were serving prison sentences. (HRW, 2009a) Most judges sitting on the 
Supreme Court's criminal chamber ruled that the Amnesty Law is inapplicable to crimes 
against humanity, and these are not subject to statutes of limitations. However, not all 
judges concur and, given that court rulings are only binding in cases under review and the 
Supreme Courts' composition changes by case, legal obstacles still remain. In 2007 and 2008, 
the Court reduced sentences and applied a law allowing those convicted to benefit from 
sentence reduction, recognising the time elapsed since the criminal act. This effectively 
meant that several former military personnel sentenced to prison by lower courts are not 
serving time.
This chapter focused on the politics of transitional justice. It has been suggested 
that accountability, its emergence and evolution, is a rather convoluted and 
unpredictable process. Several variables and actors come to play a role in its 
development over time. In fact, the progression of TJ can witness triumphs and 
failures, pauses and sudden developments. As the mini cases show, TJ policies 
rarely follow clear and conventional paths. Diverse mechanisms are generally 
employed at different times and their adoption, as variation, reflects internal 
political, historical and social dynamics unique to each particular context. 
Nonetheless, external actors and influences have also to be taken into account It 
was concluded that in order to fully comprehend the politics of TJ, factors and 
actors on at least three levels (local, national, international} have to be examined.
Chapter two now moves on to examining the politics of memory of past human 
rights crimes.
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2The Politics of Memory of Human Rights Violations
The legacy of past human rights abuses is not limited to just direct victims. 
Rather, political violence affects, to different extents, the entire societies in which it 
occurs, often scarring them for years. How do individuals and groups remember 
past violence? Are memories different, depending on whether they were victims, 
perpetrators or bystanders? More importantly, does the memory of past crimes 
matter now in the present?
It is argued here that the memory of past human rights violence is significant for 
several reasons. First, it raises interesting questions regarding which political 
agendas tend to be furthered through official memory, as well as the links between 
memory and identity in political communities. Second, in countries facing 
questions of TJ, official memories are usually produced. 'Politically-selective 
remembering', as Michael Humphrey claims, tends to harmonise into a single 
official narrative the often disparate memories that individuals hold. (Humphrey, 
2002:109}. Why is that often the norm? What roles do governments play in the 
construction of memory?
This chapter addresses these questions, suggesting that the memory of past 
human rights violations serves to better understand the present and its politics, 
particularly helping to shed light on the politics of TJ.
Initially, the chapter provides a background on memory studies. Second, it 
develops a framework of analysis to deconstruct the politics of memory. This
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consists of three parts. The first focuses on some of the key actors involved in 
memory construction. The second investigates specific cases of memory debates 
relating to dates, places and people. Finally, the link between memory and the role 
of TJ mechanisms is examined.
2.1 What is Memory?
The last decades have been characterised by an unprecedented concern, 
sometimes an obsession, with memory. (Huyssen, 1995; Traverso, 2007) 
According to Susannah Radstone, memory has become a central concept for 
research within both humanities and the social sciences. (Radstone, 2000) In a 
recent article, Radstone suggests how the publication of the first issue of the 
journal Memory Studies in 2008 points to the consolidation of memory research 
'into what is fast becoming institutionalised as the new academic field of memory 
studies'. (Radstone, 2008:31)
This interdisciplinary subject, developed in the 1980s and 1990s, held war as 
one of its core concerns. (Ashplant et al., 2000; Winter & Sivan, 1999) Work on 
memory however dates back to the nineteenth century, but only recently has 
attention been paid to the category of victims, recognising in particular the 
significance of the memory of traumatic events. (Winter, 2006)
Henry Roediger and James Wertsch rightly contend that ‘the topic of memory 
seems to touch nearly every academic field, at least in the humanities and social 
sciences'. (Roediger & Wertsch, 2008:12) The memory literature indeed draws 
upon numerous academic disciplines. Nonetheless, so far, it has received little 
attention from either TJ or IR. (Brito, 2008; Rosoux, 2004) This is surprising given
that issues of memory are important for both subjects. Myths and hatreds 
constructed around distorted memories of the past can be used by individuals 
and/or groups to motivate and incite populations towards committing atrocities. 
(Hirsch, 1995) The 1990s wars in the Former Yugoslavia, and the 1994 Rwandan 
genocide, are only two vivid reminders of the dynamic relationship that exists 
between memory and violence. The construction of specific memories of the past is 
very often used by various actors to garner authority and legitimacy in the present, 
clearly with political goals in mind.
Additionally, events to which traumatic memories refer do not generally occur 
in isolation. State terrorism in Latin America, for instance, cannot be fully 
understood if detached from the Cold War. Thus, memories of past traumas are 
deeply influenced by dynamics in the international realm, like the evolution of 
international human rights, the role of global civil society, and key events as 
General Pinochet's arrest.
Memory as a Narrative
Alice remarked, 
'I can't remember things before they happen'.
'It's a poor sort of memory that only works backwards',
the Queen remarked.
Lewis-Carroll 
In: (D. Bell, 2006:1)
Memory is an elusive concept but the literature abounds with definitions. Still, it 
is necessary to delineate what is meant by memory here. The definition by David 
Bell (2006:2) of memory as 'the process or faculty whereby events or impressions 
from the past are recollected and preserved' seems the most appropriate.
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For this author, to have a memory entails, at an individual level, the ability to 
recall an event, person or emotion from the past, and recount it through a personal 
narrative in the present. K. M. Fierke aptly argues that memories are always 
constructed 'by combining bits of information selected and arranged in terms of 
prior narratives and current expectations, needs and beliefs'. (Fierke, 2006:119) 
These narratives do not simply represent particular events or emotions, but also 
'connect, clarify and interpret them', (/bzd.125)
Memory 'travels across time' (my term). In fact, it depends upon past events or 
experiences but it is always also connected to the circumstances in which it is 
produced, including elements of the present. (Huyssen, 1995) Memory is in a 
permanent state of flux. Every time a past memory is evoked, it passes through the 
filters of the present and of later acquired experiences and knowledge. (Aguilar- 
Fernandez & Oakley, 2002) Memories are constructive acts. They do not simply 
recall past events and associated emotions, but also confer meaning to what is 
being remembered in the present. (Schudson, 1992; Stern, 2004)
In this thesis, memory is understood as a narrative. This approach underscores 
the fact that not all our past experiences necessarily and automatically become 
memories. Rather, those which are transformed into memories emerge because 
individuals have engaged and connected with recollections from the past, 
bestowing meaning upon them in the present. This is a key point. The past does 
not simply exist in memory but must be articulated. The past, for Elizabeth Jelin, 
'leaves traces', but these need to be evoked and placed in a context giving them 
meaning to constitute memory. (Jelin, 2003:18)
Understanding memory as a ‘narrative social construction' enables us to grasp 
several important points. (Jelin, 2003:23) First, if memories are communicated to
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others, it is necessary to consider who narrates them and which institutions give 
or refuse speaking power to narrators. Second, memories are both personal and 
social. Individual memories do not exist per se, but reveal themselves, through 'the 
shared narrative act', recounting and listening. {Ibid.24) Third, memory is 
selective, marked by a constant tension between remembering and forgetting. 
Each memory is always incomplete, privileging certain aspects while obscuring 
others. Indeed, as Michael Lazzara rightly suggests, 'rather than confront difficult, 
painful realities, people often prefer to remember in ways that alleviate cognitive 
dissonance'. [Lazzara, 2006:2]
A key aspect of memory is the strong relationship between past, present and 
future. Memory is as much about the present and the future, as it is about the past 
[Pennebaker et al., 1997] Memories are seen here not as simple recollections; 
rather, their meanings are fiercely contested. Both public and private memories do 
make claims about the past that are not acceptable to everybody. In these contests, 
questions are posed about what the past means in the present, the meanings of the 
present itself and ways of taking the past forward. [Hodgkin & Radstone, 2003] 
Present circumstances affect which events are remembered as significant and 
how they are recalled. The past is subject to being reconstructed and rewritten 
according to present views and needs, 'a flexible process of composition and 
recomposition, of casting and recasting the past in its relation to present 
circumstances and future expectations'. [Lazzara, 2006:2]
However, the past opposes resistance and cannot be reconstructed at will. 
Although it is not immutable, the past cannot be freely recreated in the present 
[Aguilar-Fernandez & Oakley, 2002] Indeed, individuals, groups and nations wish 
and attempt to reshape the past through the lenses of the present Given this,
collective memories have often been distorted. William Faulkner famously 
asserted that 'The past is not dead. In fact, it is not even past'. In: (Schudson, 
1992:218) Still, there are obstacles to the reconstruction of the past in the present 
and confines to its manipulation for present interests and needs. {Ibid.)
Levels of Memory
It is easy to encounter a colourful vocabulary when talking about memory: 
national memory, public memory, social memory, counter-memory, and habit- 
memory. Three types of memory are discussed here, notably individual, collective 
and institutional.
Although valuable in theoretical terms, empirically it is difficult to draw clear 
boundaries among these categories. All three co-exist and should therefore be 
regarded as interdependent and interrelated, mutually relying upon each other to 
maintain their existence and sustainability. Thus, this author considers that 
memory encompasses all these three levels. Further, I agree with Jenny Edkins 
when she states that 'it is only the person as social being that can remember' and 
how 'remembering is intensely political'. (Edkins, 2003:54)
Individual memory is 'what individuals remember, or think they remember, 
about their past'. (Lebow et al., 2006:11) These narratives are not static, but they 
are constantly evolving and changing every time they are retold. Moreover, human 
memory is not objective. As Gabriel Ricci pertinently claims, what one remembers 
and how one recalls events very much depends on social conditions. (Ricci, 2003) 
In fact, the only true representation of an event is the event itself. Any memory of it 
is incomplete, biased and reconstructed: memory is a subjective recording of the
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past that cannot be separated from observers with their motivated viewpoint(s). 
0Ibid. 85-90)
Personal memory is only a starting point. Individuals do not live in isolation and 
most of their actions take place within a societal setting. Thus, remembering never 
occurs in a vacuum but is a social and collective phenomenon, with individual 
memory filtered through emotions and group experiences. (Hirsch, 1995) 
Consequently, processes of remembering are informed by individuals as social 
agents whom are defined by their social networks. The shift from the individual to 
the social and interactive level is accordingly 'unavoidable'. (Jelin, 2003:10-11) 
Individual and collective memories are not mutually exclusive, but coexist, 
reciprocally influencing each other. In sum, they cannot be divorced.
Collective memory has been defined as ‘widely shared perceptions of the pasf, 
which shape 'the story that groups of people tell about themselves, linking past, 
present and future in a simplified narrative’. (D. Bell, 2006:2)
Maurice Halbwachs claimed that all memories were formed and organised 
within a collective context. Events, experiences and perceptions are shaped by 
individuals' interactions with others, with society as the framework for beliefs, 
behaviours, and recollections. (Pennebaker & Banasik, 1997:4) Halbwachs 
stressed the deeply social and constructive nature of memory, pointing to how 
individuals always remember a world in which other people also live. Memories 
therefore relate to an inter-subjective past, 'a past time lived in relation with other 
people'. (Paez et al., 1997:152) Collective memory does not however refer to a sort 
of 'group mind', but to individual remembering as a process with a shared 
collective nature. (Devine-Wright, 2003:11) Individuals can evoke their past
precisely because they belong to a certain social group. The interests and 
experiences of the group shape members' memories, while group membership 
enables individuals to remember and recreate their own experiences collectively. 
(Aguilar-Fernandez & Oakley, 2002]
Collective memories particularly tend to arise in response to intense social 
events. Thus, examining collective memory of traumatic events is a subject that has 
recently attracted significant attention. In particular, credence has been given to 
examining how and why some collective memories reach hegemonic statuses.
Finally, institutional memory refers to attempts by political elites, supporters or 
opponents 'to construct meanings of the past and propagate them more widely or 
imposing them on other members of society'. (Lebow et al., 2006:13) Institutional 
memory is an appropriate analytical category for studying the politics of memory. 
Although struggles over different representations of memory exist at individual 
and collective levels, they are more clearly played out at an institutional level. In 
this arena, memory debates taking place within collectivities are thus exposed in 
these institutional spaces, where competing groups attempt to impose their 
particular memory on the rest of the society.
This is particularly relevant in the context of the memory of traumatic events. 
Social actors seek to define what is truthful and meaningful about a significant 
collective trauma and, in doing so, they are invariably selective. Social conflicts 
concerning representations of the past mirror struggles for power, legitimacy, and 
recognition. Furthermore, they involve different actors adopting strategies to 
officialise their own narrative of the past These contests aim to expand the group
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that accepts and legitimises a given narrative, incorporating it as its own or 
identifying with it. [Jelin, 2003)
Examining the level of institutional memory is important in understanding 
memory contests. It is interesting to look at the endeavours of various groups to 
establish an official narrative of past trauma. Often this takes the form of national 
trials or truth commissions, while also serving to further political agendas and 
objectives.
Memory is strongly linked to other similarly elusive concepts, like identity, 
history, and forgetting.
Memory plays a central role in virtually all conceptions of identity. Group 
identities necessitate a shared understanding of history and its meaning, a 
constructed narrative linking past and present, contextualising self and society in 
time. Such understandings facilitate a sense of belonging to unfold, creating 
obligations and loyalty to the imagined community. [D. Bell, 2006)
Shared experiences and memories, together with the values and commitments 
they create and sustain, provide distinctive identities for individuals and 
communities. Identity and memory mutually define and depend upon each other. 
[Lebow et al., 2006)
Memory and identity are not fixed, but are highly selective and inscriptive 
subjective constructions of reality, serving particular interests and ideological 
positions. They support one another, while simultaneously sustaining certain 
subjective positions, social boundaries, and power. Identity and memory are best 
understood as political and social constructions: in the words of John Gillis, 'not as 
things we think about, but things we think with '. [Gillis, 1994:4-5)
Memory and history were long regarded as being diametrically opposed. Their 
relationship is more helpfully conceptualised by considering memory as both 
integral to and separable from history, with the exact boundaries between the two 
being elusive. (D. Bell, 2006) Recently, history and memory have become 
problematic concepts. Peter Burke argues that recalling and documenting the past 
are no longer deemed the 'innocent' and objective activities they once were 
considered to be. Both include socially conditioned processes of 'conscious or 
unconscious selection, interpretation and distortion'. (Burke, 1989:100) Historical 
knowledge, like memory, includes interpretative processes, the construction and 
selection of facts and the adoption of narrative strategies on the part of the 
historian. (Traverso, 2007)
At a first glance, remembering and forgetting seem mutually exclusive. 
However, their relationship is much more complex and subtle. Memory 
necessitates forgetting, even presupposes it.
Memory is highly and intrinsically selective, comprising acts of recovering and 
'practices of suppression'. (Meskell, 2006:174) As Maja Zehfuss contends, 
remembering by its very nature entails forgetting and forgetting is possible only 
where remembering occurs in the first place. (Zehfuss, 2006:213) In the 
constitution of memory, both processes co-exist. Eveiy memory is necessarily a 
forgetting, since 'it is a choosing of what, among a multitude of possibilities, to 
keep in mind'. (Schudson, 1992:220)
Memory without forgetting is impossible. Forgetting is best seen as an 
inevitable part of remembering and not as its opposite. Remembering is
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structurally dependent on forgetting; it is always already defined by forgetting. 
(Zehfuss, 2006:226-228]
If forgetting is inseparable from remembering, the claim of official memories to 
provide a final reconstruction of events appears fundamentally problematic. As 
selective constructions, official memories embody only one of many possible 
memories on a disputed past.
2.2 Analytical Framework
The term 'politics of memory* is a rather fashionable addition to several recent 
academic titles. See e.g. (Aguilar-Fernandez et al., 2001; An-Na'im & Amadiume, 
2000; Ashplant et al., 2000; Dawson, 2005; Lazzara, 2006; Lebow et al., 2006; Ricci, 
2003] Nonetheless, the phrase is rarely expanded upon and it is often unclear what 
it actually refers to. Here, the politics of memory is taken to encompass all the 
actors and processes that are involved in disputes about different representations 
of a shared but contested past (of violence].
The analytical framework used to untangle the politics of memory in chapters 
five and six is outlined here. Its basic structure rests on three concepts. 
Communities of memory refer to the actors that are engaged in memory contests 
and the associated narratives held to make sense of the past. (Irwin-Zarecka, 1994] 
Memory knots relate to dates, places, individuals or groups that have the power to 
evoke memory and trigger discussion. (Stern, 2004) Finally, illusions of memory 
(my term) alludes to the pivotal role played by the state vis-a-vis memory 
construction and the use of TJ mechanisms to champion specific readings on the 
past
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This author believes that narratives over a contested past emerge. Henceforth, 
disputes among these competing versions and the actors that are involved in their 
creation unfold. Each agent (namely private individuals, civil society, the state, etc.) 
enjoys different access to resources and the capacity to mobilise in order to 
achieve recognition for the memory endorsed. The politics of memory are central 
in instances of TJ: as David Bell correctly claims, perceptions of the past have been 
essential in de-legitimising previous regimes and establishing new claims to 
political authority. (D. Bell, 2006)
Traditionally, the state enjoyed a privileged role in commemoration, especially 
regarding war. It has been able to sponsor specific memories thanks to its 
privileged access to resources and capacity to mobilise. Although still important, 
the state is neither ubiquitous nor omnipotent. Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan 
(1999) point to how civil society has especially grown, as the locus where many 
groups develop their own strategies of remembrance, sometimes in tandem with 
the state and other times against it. (Winter & Sivan, 1999)
Jelin (2003) aptly emphasises how controversies over the meaning of a shared 
past surface as soon as events take place. The politics of memory begin then, and 
continue into the present and future, for as long as events remain subject to 
contestation. Given this, it is likely to span decades, even affecting several 
generations. Therefore, it is necessary to look at memories of events both as they 
are articulated now and how they were portrayed when these occurred.
Communities of Memory
Struggles over memory revolve around opposing representations of a common 
but disputed past. This process generally involves a multiplicity of unequal
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partners. Their impact on constructing memories depends on their resources, 
legitimacy, and the ability to extend the acceptance of their narrative within wider 
society.
The first part of our framework is premised on the concept of community o f 
memory. (Irwin-Zarecka, 1994:47-49) It identifies actors that partake in memory 
struggles. A community of memory is created by 'one memory', in the sense that 
people develop and feel a sense of connection due to a shared experience, often of 
extraordinary, if not traumatic nature. The shared meaning attributed to the 
experience creates the bonding within the community, which comes to be defined 
by the personal relevance of the traumatic memory, rather than personal witness 
to the trauma. It is the meaning given to the event, not the event itself that may 
create and sustain a community of memory. [Ibid.)
Given that collective memory can exist at various levels (families, professions, 
political generations, ethnic and regional groups, social classes), individuals can 
simultaneously belong to several communities of memory. (Kansteiner, 2002) 
Bearing this in mind, it may be beneficial for analytical purposes to distinguish 
specific communities. In cases of human rights crimes, at least five can be 
identified: perpetrators, victims, relatives and families of the victims, bystanders, 
and external/international actors. These tend to emerge and differ in terms of 
their experiences of the traumatic event(s) and the various meanings attributed to 
them.
This list is neither complete nor exclusive. Communities of memory may persist, 
change, and be supplemented and/or replaced by new ones, all battling for the 
recognition of their versions of the past (Kaiser, 2005) Post transition, another 
community may be added, namely that of the state. It is often the case that the
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community of the perpetrators coincides with that of the state, as state agents 
usually carry out repression. However, a caveat is needed. Though in most 
instances of repression in both Central and South America, state agents committed 
the majority of crimes, abuses were also perpetrated by guerrilla groups, as was 
the case in Argentina and Uruguay, and notably in Peru.
The community of the state becomes relevant upon transition, fundamental if 
one wishes to consider issues of official memory. Additionally, the community of 
former militants, whether activists or guerrilla members, acquires importance, 
though they are generally marginalised.
The case of Quatro clearly exposes the struggle of former African National 
Congress (ANC) prisoners to include their voices and memories into the official 
narrative of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). Ex­
prisoners and members of the ANC formed two communities of memory that 
embodied diverse representations of a common past.
Officially opened in 1979 on a deserted Angolan farm, Quatro was a brutal detention 
centre, which until 1988 housed ANC members who violated the organisation's regulations 
or were accused of being apartheid regime infiltrators.16 Abuses began on the way to the 
camp and continued during detention.
In 1984, the ANC initiated investigations into camp violence, establishing three 
commissions. They concluded that the ANC was responsible for maltreatment, with the 
1992 Skweyiya Commission particularly noting how it was violence for the sake of it.
Victims later gave testimony before the TRC, and the accounts of their horrific 
experiences in ANC detention centres challenged the official narrative. Although their
16 Section based on (Cleveland, 2005)
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testimony was limited compared to that of other apartheid victims, it was potentially more 
damaging to the ongoing national healing process, as it implicated the ANC in behaviour 
reminiscent of that of the apartheid regime.
As the new ruling party, the ANC was reluctant to accept accountability for alleged 
human rights violations. Its leaders admitted that violence at Quatro was extreme, but 
denied that it had been ignored at the time or that it was part of standard operational 
policy. Party officials sought to rationalise transgressions, characterising them as 
unfortunate corollaries of the violent political struggle, whilst simultaneously attempting to 
bury them under the heroic nationalist narrative.
The ANC leadership had intended that the primary function of the TRC was to expose the 
atrocities committed by the apartheid regime. Failing to anticipate that its own conduct 
could be subject to scrutiny, the party evasively and defensively answered questions 
concerning own transgressions. It tried to link excesses to the political struggle, by 
combining them with the apartheid's regime many crimes. In doing this, it hoped to 
diminish their significance and downplay their seriousness in an environment where 
violence was an everyday and unavoidable occurrence.
The ANC vehemently confronted ex-prisoners' allegations, fearing that their crimes 
would be equated with those of apartheid. These testimonies threatened to challenge this 
distinction. In politicising and justifying detention abuses, the ANC resembled more and 
more the apartheid regime. In sidetracking political damage, the ANC failed to understand 
the significance of ex-inmates' testimonies and the nation's search for reconciliation.
The TRC provided former inmates with a forum to communicate their suffering. 
However, these could not be included into the national narrative that the Commission was 
shaping, even if they were legitimate constituent parts. The TRC's mission of forging a single 
collective memory based on a large pattern of events relating to human rights violations for 
a new South Africa left little space for the narratives of Quatro's former inmates. The ANC
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endeavoured to prevent these narratives from being embraced, thus distorting the nation's 
collective memory, by attempting to erase accounts challenging its official version of 
events.
Each community of memory rests on a shared experience of and meaning 
attributed to a past event, what Steve Stem defines an emblematic memory. 
Emblematic memory does not refer to a single remembrance of a specific content 
nor to a concrete and substantive 'thing'. (Stern, 2004:104) It is instead a 
framework for collective remembrance, imparting 'broad interpretative meaning 
and criteria of selection to personal memory, based on experiences directly lived 
by an individual, or on lore told by relatives, friends, comrades, or other 
acquaintances'. {Ibid. 105-106)
Emblematic memories emerge from multiple human efforts, conflictual and 
competitive, to give meaning to 'a great collective rupture, trauma, or turning point 
-an experience perceived as decisive or transformational and therefore 
"historical". {Ibid. 120) They circulate in public or semi-public domains like the 
mass media, government events, street demonstrations and protests, music, books, 
and television. Although socially constructed and selective, they are neither 
arbitrary inventions nor manipulations.
In Chile, for instance, four emblematic memories recollect and impart meaning 
to the 1973 coup, the ensuing military regime and associated repression. {Ibid. 108- 
113) The perspective of salvation sees the times of Allende's coalition as a 
nightmare that brought society to the brink of disaster. The military coup is 
presented as a new beginning that rescued the national community. The 
framework of unresolved rupture (in diametric opposition) presents military rule
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as a personally-experienced violence by the state. It emphasises the loss of 
relatives and companions, and how the military government brought the country 
to an unprecedented hell of death and torture that continues into the present 
Persecution and awakening recalls the regime as a time when society and 
individuals endured a long winter of repression and self-discovery, with the 
military regime testing one's deep values and social commitments, provoking a 
process of awakening. Finally, closed box considers military rule and violence as 
greatly troubling, divisive, and even a dangerous affair that is best put away and 
forgotten, not to jeopardise the chances of social reconciliation and progress.
Communities of memory frequently originate from the actions of memory 
entrepreneurs. (Jelin, 2003:33-34) Applying Becker's concept of ‘moral 
entrepreneurs', Jelin (2003:33) defines them as enterprising moral leaders or 
social agents who mobilise their energies for the sake of a cause they strongly 
believe in. The contest among different memories in fact presupposes social actors 
creating, sustaining and fighting for them. These agents look to achieve social 
recognition and political legitimacy for their own interpretation of the shared past. 
(Jelin, 2003)
Memory entrepreneurs clearly resemble what Martha Finnemore and Kathryn 
Sikkink have labelled as 'norm entrepreneurs'. (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:896) 
Norm entrepreneurs are essential for calling attention or creating issues 'by using 
language that names, interprets, and dramatises them'. [Ibid.897) Memory 
entrepreneurs follow a similar dynamic to that of the 'norm life cycle' in creating 
narratives of memory. [Ibid.895)
89
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998:897] describe how norm entrepreneurs construct 
cognitive frames that, when successful, 'resonate with broader public 
understandings and are adopted as new ways of thinking about and understanding 
issues'. Norm entrepreneurs co-exist in an environment in which there are ‘firmly 
embedded alternative norms and frames that create alternative perceptions of 
both appropriateness and interest'. Thus 'new norms never enter a normative 
vacuum but emerge in a highly contested normative space in which they must 
compete with other norms and perceptions of interest'. [Ibid.)
As we have seen, the social construction of the past is a site of intense conflict 
Memory is not a given, a natural consequence of historical experience but rather it 
derives from vast amounts of work carried out by numerous actors, all 
endeavouring to secure public articulation for their past(s]. (Irwin-Zarecka, 1994]
All aspects of remembrance are open to challenge, from the construction of 
collective memory, its successive employments, to revisions and dismantling. The 
idea of memory projects underscores how what is being remembered is neither 
automatic nor natural. [Ibid. 133) Rather, all memory is constructed and 
maintained. Memory projects assert the power to define the past, especially 
seeking to counteract any absences deemed important.
The case of Spain exemplifies how individuals acted as memory entrepreneurs, 
in re-opening the debates over the crimes of the past, challenging the official 
version of events imposed since the transition to democracy.
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During the Spanish civil war (1936-39) and Franco's dictatorship (1939-75) thousands of 
people were killed, imprisoned, tortured or disappeared.17 Spain's confrontation of its 
repressive past was characterised by a deliberate and tacit agreement to forget, a pact of 
oblivion (pacto del olvido), that was based upon an 'erasure of memory7 and 'collective 
amnesia'. (M. Davis, 2005:863-864)
During the transition, risk-aversion and collective guilt inhibited the implementation of 
accountability initiatives: fear of a right-wing coup, even a return to civil war, led Spaniards 
to prioritise peace, order and stability. It has been suggested that this dominant perspective 
presented the civil war as a conflict between two Spains, Republican and Nationalist. As 
atrocities had been committed on both sides, the war was best forgotten. This became the 
accepted wisdom of transition. [Ibid.)
Recently, a campaign spearheaded by the Asociacion para la Recuperacion de la 
Memoria Histdrica (Association for the Recuperation of Historical Memory, ARMH), 
focusing on efforts to locate and identify the bodies of republican non-combatants as well 
as demanding official recognition of Francoist crimes, has gathered momentum. (M. Davis, 
2006) The pacto del olvido began to crack. (Blakeley, 2005)
The initial impetus came from a private initiative, the exhumation of a grave in the 
province of Leon in October 2000, containing the remains of thirteen Republican non- 
combatants killed by Francoists in 1936. Emilio Silva wished to discover, identify and rebury 
his grandfather, who was amongst those killed. From this, a broader objective progressively 
emerged. The ARMH, established in December 2000 by Santiago Macias, Emilio Silva and 
other grandchildren of the disappeared, coordinates investigations and exhumations, and 
collects stories of suffering. By 2007, some 900 bodies had been exhumed. Numerous
17 At least 300,000 were killed in the civil war; some 440,000 Republicans went into exile; mass trials and executions 
were commonplace after the war ended; some 400,000 people spent time in prisons, camps or forced labour battalions. 
Thousands more were killed in secret.
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unmarked mass graves, containing approximately the remains of 30,000 people have so far 
been located.
The ARMH aims to establish the truth about the fate of Spain's disappeared, giving them  
dignified burials. It does not seek to blame or punish surviving perpetrators. Since its 
creation, it has received around 2,500 requests for information. Numerous other 
associations dedicated to historical memory have since surfaced, and together they have 
restored debate firmly within the public realm. The reactivation of social memory has 
received support and attention from politicians and regional authorities alike.
Despite the pacto del olvido, Spaniards had not really forgotten their past. Rather, a 
collective decision was made to develop a particular construction of the past that 
suppressed memories likely to endanger stability and consensus, and fore-grounded those 
promoting reconciliation. The pacto was reinforced by dominant political and cultural 
discourses, marginalising the stories of those on the losing side of the war.
Memory Knots
The second part of the framework rests on the concept of memory knots. (Stern, 
2004:120-121) The idea comes from a metaphor inspired by the human body. A 
knot in the stomach when one is nervous or a lump in the throat breaking the flow 
of everyday life and routine that are experienced as demands to be noticed and 
acted upon.
Memory knots on the social body similarly disrupt normal social routines and 
habits, forcing charged issues of memory and forgetfulness into a public domain, 
making claims or causing problems, heightening attention and consciousness. 
Theoretically, they can be considered as sites of society, place, and time so 
bothersome, insistent, or conflictive to move human beings, temporarily, beyond 
daily routines. They are sites where the social body 'screams'. [Ibid.)
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Memory knots are multidimensional, with 'specific human groups and leaders, 
specific events and dates, and specific physical sites all seem to stir up, collect and 
concentrate memories, thereby "projecting" memory and polemics about memory 
into public space or imagination.' [Ibid.121) They have three dimensions. 
[Ibid. 121-124)
Sites of humanity refer to particular human groups (state officials, human rights 
networks, religious groups or victim organisations) that develop intense 
motivations to project particular emblematic memories into the public domain. 
Examples include the Vicaria de la Solidariedad in Chile, figures like Paulo-Evaristo 
Arns and Jaime Wright in Brazil, Desmond Tutu in South Africa, political leaders as 
Nelson Mandela in South Africa, and HROs including Guatemala's Mutual Support 
Group or Peru's Association for Human Rights.
The organisation HIJOS in Uruguay met for the first time in July 1996. Unlike their 
Argentine counterparts (5.3), the word HIJOS simply refers to their condition as sons of the 
desaparecidos, which was what brought its members together. The name has another 
specific connotation, as Diego Sempol points out. The J, always in red, alludes to justice and 
is written as falling over the letter 0  'to express the idea that justice fights oblivion'. 
(Sempol, 2006:187)
Gabriela Fried emphasises how HIJOS confronted a reality of extreme silence and 
forgetting that had been championed by the state for several years, aiming to directly silence 
the memory of past violence. (Fried, 2001) Only a very small public space existed in which to 
think, remember, and act in relation to the recent past.
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HIJOS fought against oblivion, and attempted to reintegrate the disappeared into the 
Uruguayan community, by re-claiming their humanity and identity, for society to see the 
disappeared as 'one of us'. (Sempol, 2006:197) For the organisation, disappearances had 
various levels: a physical disappearance, another relating to the disappeared's role as social 
fighters and a third as human beings, with their ideas and mistakes. Differences however 
existed on who the disappeared really were. The younger members of HIJOS, that had had 
little direct knowledge of their parents, tended to build an image that vindicated them as 
social fighters, while the older members did not share this stance, focusing more on family 
relations.
HIJOS worked to construct what Sempol (2006:200) defined as a 'reflexive memory'. It is 
a memory that never settles, that always stimulates analysis and personal development, 
through discussion and understanding of the inherited past. Everyone involved has a right to 
talk about and express an opinion, for memory to be 'an object of critical reflection, to go 
beyond oblivion and silences, and open the way to a plurality of actors, to "democratise 
memory". {Ibid.)
As the H.I.J.O.S. of Argentina, escraches were one of the ways employed to deal with the 
question of disappearances. These street demonstrations endeavoured to denounce people 
and institutions linked to past crimes. They aimed to make public where former repressors 
lived, to shatter their invisibility within neighbourhoods and society. A particularity of 
Uruguayan escraches was that the preparatory phase working in the neighbourhoods did not 
centre on repressors, but on the victims instead, trying to give back life to the desaparecidos, 
telling their life stories, the events surrounding their disappearance and only finally outlining 
who was responsible. One of the consequences of escraches was that the group seeing their 
parents as social fighters became hegemonic within the organisation. Several members thus 
left.
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HIJOS has been particularly critical of the work of the Peace Commission (4.2). They 
contested the Commission's 'possible truth', talking instead of a 'real truth'. {Ibid.211-215) 
For the organisation, a real truth would place the question of the disappeared in its historical 
context, consider all past human rights violations (including torture and political 
assassinations), and address collaborators of impunity under democracy.
HIJOS does not share the vision of a war that took place in Uruguay in the 1970s and 
1980s (6.2). Rather, they contend that several governments and the state itself were 
responsible for the events of state terrorism and the policies of oblivion and impunity that 
were implemented over the last decades.
Sites in time are particular events and/or dates that have the symbolic power to 
convene or project memory. Such anniversaries demand human efforts of 
interpretation, control and projection, widening the circle of attention to 
remembrance. (Stern, 2004)
In every country, Jelin contends, there are symbolic dates in which the past 
becomes present through public rituals, when feelings from the past are activated 
and meanings investigated, memories constructed and renovated. (Jelin, 2002) 
Some dates like 11 September for Chile, 31 March for Brazil, and 3 November in 
Paraguay were and, still are, so emblematic to be significant nationally. (Carvalho 
& da-Silva-Catela, 2002; Gonzalez-Vera, 2002) Others are only relevant locally, 
while others still are personal and private, like the anniversary of someone's 
abduction or the birthday of a loved one no longer around.
Various social and political actors attempt to impose specific meanings on these 
markers of time so they become objects of dispute. Analysing commemorative 
dates shows how, over time, there have been transformations in both the actors
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that remember, and the meanings attributed to commemorations, depending on 
the cultural and political climate in which they occurred. (Jelin, 2007b, 2002)
On 11 September 1973 (11/9), the Chilean Armed Forces led by General Pinochet 
carried out a coup against Allende's Popular Unity government.18 Since then, 11/9 has 
become a date of political and social controversy, when different understandings of the 
dictatorial past are openly, and even violently, debated. (LaNacion, 2008a, 2008b) Looking 
at commemorations over the last thirty years demonstrates how various actors tend to 
bestow different meanings on this controversial anniversary. Despite evolutions and 
changes, two trends persist. Key confrontations occur between Pinochet supporters and 
opposition groups, and police repression is a rule.
Between 1974 and 1977, the government organised public and massive celebrations, 
emphasising the recuperation of internal peace and freedom, and the popular support 
enjoyed. 11/9 was presented as a heroic date, to thank the Armed Forces for the recovered 
peace. Two Chile(s) existed then: one triumphant and conservative, the other private and 
silenced.
The years 1978 to 1981 were characterised by official discourses which still focused on 
anti-Communism; the date was declared a national holiday in 1981. However, news of 
human rights crimes began appearing in the media. At this time, the opposition started to 
commemorate 11/9 as a date of mourning, with women dressed in black and visits to 
cemeteries, grieving not only for the loss of loved ones, but also democracy and freedom. 
The panorama of national peace and economic stability ended in 1982. At this point, 
conflict over 11/9 became violent. Anti-regime protests from opposition parties, HROs, 
trade unions, students and popular-urban sectors were no longer silenced and fragmented, 
but massively mobilised, showing how divided Chilean society really was. Until 1987, every 
September was characterised by increasing violence from both the government and the
18 Section based on (Candina-Polomer, 2002; Jelin, 2007c, 2002).
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opposition. Between 1983 and 1987, approximately 47 people died, several were wounded, 
and thousands were arrested, with damage to public and private property.
Early during the transition, in 1988 to 1990, further memory conflicts emerged. At the 
end of the regime, Pinochet was presented as the founder of the new democracy and past 
crimes were human errors that had to be forgotten and pardoned.
Since 1990, a clear-cut demarcation has existed between the government's 
conciliatory discourses that label 11/9 a sad day of reflection and those struggling for 
justice. Three central features have characterised remembrance since 1991. Political elites 
distance themselves from the date, which was removed from the national calendar in 1998. 
The left and social movements continue to fight for justice, while hard-line Pinochet- 
supporters vindicate the heroic date.
In 2006, a new commemorative day, 30 August, the day of disappeared-detainees, was 
added to the official calendar. However, 11/9 continues to be commemorated, always 
accompanied by violence. In 2007, the Army commemorated the first anniversary without 
Pinochet with a mass in the Military School, while President Bachelet called for never again 
living 'through what happened in the past'. (LaNacion, 2007a, 2007b)
For three decades, 11/9 has been a date in which interpretations of recent Chilean 
history are fought over. Despite attempts at reconciliation from political elites, the date is a 
time when fragmentations within Chilean society over the past and its several meanings are 
exposed. The death of young protestors on 11 September 2009 demonstrates how the 
issue of memory continues to transcend generations.
Sites of physical matter or geography refer to particular places or artefacts that 
evince a power of connection to the past, stirring up and projecting controversies 
about memory. (Stern, 2004) They can be divided in two categories. Projects that 
establish new physical markers, like museums or plaques that commemorate
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specific events. Or sites that are already charged with 'history, memories, public 
meanings and private feelings', to which new connotations are added. (Jelin & 
Langland, 2003:5)
The establishment of public markers of the past can trigger political 
confrontations among various actors. These sites are important, often not for their 
own sake, but for embodying a specific meaning and a historical message that is 
charged upon them. They are 'vehicles of memory', material supports for personal 
memory introspection, collective action and identities, where memory is 
'activated'. (Jelin, 2007b: 146-147)
In the context of state terrorism in the Southern Cone, sites of memory do not 
transmit unique messages, but are places where debates over different meanings 
and distinct memories unfold, frequently between those that wish to eliminate 
them and their connection with the past, and others that hope to convert them into 
supports for memory into the future. (Jelin & Langland, 2003)
Notable examples include in Chile, the Paine Memorial, the Nunca Mas 
Monument, the Monument to Disappeared and Politically Executed, Villa Gramaldi 
and Londres 38 detention centre as well as Santiago's General Cemetery and 
Estadio Victor Jara, or in Brazil the Tortura Nunca Mais in the city of Recife. 
(Bickford, 2005; Jelin & Langland, 2003; Wilde, 2008)
Peru lived through an internal armed conflict in the 1980s and 1990s. The 2003 Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) confirmed 69,280 deaths, attributing responsibility for 
54% to the Maoist Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) guerrillas.19
19 Section based on (APRODEH, 2007; Hite, 2007; Theidon, 2006)
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Following the TRC's recommendation, several HROs worked to establish memorials 
throughout the country. The Eye that Cries, inaugurated in August 2005, commemorates all 
the victims of the violence, whose names appear on the TRC's list of dead and disappeared.
It is composed of a representation of the ancestral goddess Mother Earth, that is 
shaped from an ancient pre-lnca stone. Another rock is affixed with water running 
continuously from it as an eye that cries, mourning the violence. Surrounding the stone is a 
labyrinth path made of bands of rock, with 27,000 names, ages and years of 
death/disappearance in alphabetical order. Visitors have to walk the labyrinth from the 
outside in, looking at inscriptions, finally arriving at the centre, face to face with the grief of 
Mother Earth.
The memorial became controversial, exposing Peru's politics regarding the past. In 
November 2006, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights ruled against the government 
in the 1992 Castro-Castro penitentiary case, when 41 prisoners were killed and others 
brutality tortured by the military. The court suggested that the names of these Sendero 
Luminoso militants be included in the memorial, only to find out they were already there.
Therefore, the Monument included as victims not only men, women and children, but 
also combatants. The sun had already erased most names. Still, Lima's Jesus-Marfa 
municipality, where the monument is located, voted to remove the names in January 2007, 
while HROs and novelist Varga-Llosa mobilised to defend the Eye. Judging who was a victim 
of the internal violence became a political and a moral issue, exposing the difficulty in 
coming to terms with the violent past.
In September 2007, as ex-President Fujimori was extradited to Peru, a group of twelve 
people attacked the Eye, smashing stones, damaging the central Mother Earth, pouring all 
over neon-orange paint, the colour of Fujimori's political movement. The Monument 
became again a site of contestation over who should be recognised as victim and 
perpetrator.
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Villa Grimaldi was one of the Pinochet's regime primary sites of repression from mid- 
1974 to 1978.20 More than 4,500 Allende's followers were harshly interrogated and 
tortured there, with approximately 226 killed or disappeared. There were over eighty 
torture centres in Santiago but few have been formally recognised.
Villa Grimaldi was sold in 1987 to a construction company planning to flatten the site to 
build a modern apartment complex, in a sort of politics of destruction, erasing the torture 
centre from the urban landscape. By 1990, the site had been cleared.
Between 1991 and 1995, a group of survivors, local residents and HROs lobbied to 
establish a Park for Peace, as a space to gather and commemorate victims, as well as reflect 
on past human rights crimes. In the early 1990s, debates ensued among survivors and the 
relatives of the disappeared on how best to preserve this location. Several options were 
discussed: the ruins should be left as they were, adding a simple sculpture to the victims' 
memory; the site should be restored as it was during its functioning as a detention centre 
or totally redesigned as a Peace Park, a symbol of life and hope replacing death and 
destruction.
The latter option ultimately prevailed and the Park was inaugurated in 1997. The project 
however combines symbols of reconciliation (vegetation in tribute to the triumph of life, 
the park's design as a cross, a pilgrimage from the entrance gate to the central fountain 
symbolising life and hope) with reminders of the past horror (a swimming pool used to 
torture and kill a prisoner, the barbed wire surrounding the park and a wooden replica of 
isolation cells).
The Peace Park, conceived as a space of reconciliation, life, hope, unity, is in line with the 
government's agenda of consensus-based politics of reconciliation that dominated official 
discourse in the post-dictatorship years. However, the contrast between the beauty of 
trees, flowers and coloured mosaic sculptures and the world of darkness, fear and violence
20 Section based on (Collins & Hite, 2009; Lazzara, 2006)
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prisoners lived through, exposes the difficulty of transmitting meanings of the past violence 
and the narration of memory.
Studying memory knots provides us with the raw materials on which 
contestations and debates among alternative memories of a disputed past focus. 
They are similar to Nora's lieux de memoire, namely places like museums, archives, 
anniversaries or monuments, where 'memory crystallises and secretes itself. 
(Nora, 1989:7) Nora suggests that they are 'created by a play of memory and 
history' but the essential precondition is the ‘will to remember'. (Nora, 1989:19) 
As Lazzara rightly underscores, these 'sites of memory are open to critical 
interrogation precisely because of their dynamic quality, their "capacity for 
metamorphosis”, the "endless recycling of their meaning", and the "unpredictable 
proliferation of their ramifications". (Lazzara, 2006:34)
It is through memory knots that the politics of memory and their inherent 
conflicts are played out in the open within society. Through memory knots, the 
evolution in memory discourses, actors and material supports can be traced.
Illusions of Memory
The final part of our framework rests on two ideas: first, the role played by the 
state in terms of memory construction, and second how TJ mechanisms (trials, 
truth commissions) often both reflect and endorse a specific reading on a disputed 
past of violence.
In instances of transition, official memory becomes significant given that 
governments tend to construct and/or select a narrative over the past violence as 
the leading memory. According to Timothy Ashplant et al., official memories are
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dominant or hegemonic narratives that underpin and help to organise 
commemorations at state level. They are often articulated through permanent 
memorials and/or a calendar of ceremonies, repeatedly recalling important events 
and pondering on their meaning. (Ashplant et al., 2000:22)
Official memory differs from other types of memory because of its 
institutionalisation at state level and its endeavours to be the dominant 
representation of a particular event. In attempting to attribute a specific meaning 
to a contested past, the state enjoys a privileged position, having a special power in 
establishing and developing official memory.
Jelin (2003) underscores how official memories offer reference points for 
framing the memories of groups. Through them, the past is adjusted to present 
circumstances. Therefore, official representations rarely aim to simply give a 
factual account, but more often than not also embody the authors' position about 
these contested events. In this respect, Valerie Rosoux correctly claims that 
‘references to the past are rarely made per se' and that ‘their importance derives 
from the intentions of the speaker'. (Rosoux, 2004:160) Given that the past is 
malleable, not an immutable narrative, it can therefore be chosen, with policy 
actors consciously deciding which particular historical episodes should be recalled, 
according to their objectives. [Ibid.)
Very often, official memory is the story of victors, but this does not prevent 
other stories, alternative readings of the past, from existing. These directly or 
indirectly challenge the homogenisation of memory which is often the ultimate 
goal of official narratives. As Jelin (2003:xviii) rightly maintains, at any given
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moment and place, 'it is impossible to find one memory, or a single vision and 
interpretation of the past shared throughout society'.
Official memories are 'exclusive' (my term}, in that they are unable to account 
for the myriad of experiences and stories relating to past human rights crimes. As a 
consequence, they are unacceptable to everybody and will accordingly be subject 
to contestation.
Counter-memories are those memories that 'challenge or rework official 
versions of memory'. (Saunders & Aghaie, 2005:21} Particularly in the context of 
traumatic events, their memory becomes the locus of conflict and competition 
among different narratives of that past, with opposing interpretations being 
suppressed, contested or subverted.
According to Rebecca Saunders and Kamran Aghaie (2005}, counter-memories 
generally arise from informal, private or socially marginalised contexts, and 
normally coexist with, or overtly dispute hegemonic (official} perspectives. For 
Enzo Traverso, they are alternative narratives, at times hidden or prohibited, that 
emerge and counter any official memories that may exist. (Traverso, 2007} 
Counter-memories dispute the claims of official memories to providing the only 
all-encompassing narration, and endeavour to rework and dispute official versions.
The attempt by the state to establish official narratives of past violence, often 
through institutionalisation via investigatory and legal bodies of TJ, is problematic 
for several reasons.
Trauma is a very frequent concept within the literature on memory studies and 
TJ. The original meaning and connotation of the word trauma was physical, with 
xpaupa in ancient Greek signifying wound, invasive bodily injury. It has more 
recently acquired a psychological connotation. (Saunders & Aghaie, 2005}
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There is normally no language to account for trauma. Fierke accurately claims 
that traumatic events are 'beyond representation', as traumatised people are 
unable to communicate and/or speak about such incidents to others. (Fierke, 
2006:121) Trauma defies notions of time. Traumatic experiences are usually 'fixed 
or frozen in time', as they refuse to be represented as past, but are perpetually re­
experienced 'in a painful, dissociated, traumatic present'. (Leys in: Edkins, 
2003:43)
Edkins' idea of 'trauma time' is particularly interesting. Edkins (2003:229) 
defines it as 'the disruptive, back-to-front time that occurs when the smooth time 
of the imagined or symbolic story is interrupted by the real of "events"'. Edkins 
further elaborates that trauma and traumatic memory 'alter the linearity of 
historical, narrativised time, time which has beginnings and ends'. (Edkins, 
2003:40) Traumatised people in fact live 'a sort of parallel existence', in the sense 
that they live in the 'realm of trauma and the realm of their current ordinary life'. 
[Ibid.) Traumatic events in fact defy normal conceptions of time and cannot be 
easily placed into narrativised accounts. Given this, communicating trauma is 
extremely difficult. For Edkins, people re-live traumatic events in their full horror 
and they cannot control the way in which trauma is recalled. [Ib id A l)
This may be why traumatic events are 'beyond memory' (my term). If memory 
implies recalling something from the past in the present, traumatic events can 
hardly be located within memory. The traumatic past is generally not recognised 
as such. Distressing occurrences are so devastating to be continuously re-lived in 
the present. Traumatic events thus pose an even greater challenge to memory than 
normal occurrences, since they cannot be easily placed within i t  Furthermore, as 
Lazzara (2006) argues, post-traumatic memories provoke an ample assortment of
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responses and narratives, from silence to the adoption of orderly and predictable 
tales.
It seems therefore almost counterproductive and a vain desire to hope to create 
official memories regarding past human rights crimes. Trauma is clearly 
disruptive of settled stories', Edkins asserts, as it cannot be located within prior 
schemes or frameworks. (Edkins, 2006:107) But still, after a traumatic event, the 
state usually moves in to close down any openings by putting in place as quickly as 
possible a 'linear narrative of origins’. [Ibid.) This is however often unsettling and 
resisted, as people might want to hold on to the 'openness that trauma produces'. 
[Ibid. 108) Either they may either not want to forget or express 'the trauma in 
standard narratives that might include a form of forgetting'. [Ibid.) Edkins (2006) 
points to how trauma is 'something that unsettles authority', hence making settled 
stories impossible in the future.
In recent instances of TJ, investigatory and legal mechanisms, set up to look into 
past crimes like the Special Panels to try Serious Crimes of the Dili District Court 
and the Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation in East Timor, have 
been mandated to 'accumulate, synthesise, and interpret individual memories so as 
to offer society as a whole an official interpretation of its shared past'. (Lanegran, 
2005:111) Similarly, in South Africa, the ANC government entrusted the TRC with 
the making of a specific account of apartheid horrors, in line with the objective of 
national reconciliation.
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South Africa's TRC was groundbreaking, its model has been subsequently adopted in 
several countries including Nigeria and the Congo-DRC. (Nytagodien & Neal, 2004) To 
appreciate the kind of official memory that the TRC endorsed, the conditions leading to its 
establishment and its political goals need to be examined.
The TRC was a result of negotiations that ended apartheid in 1994. The vision for the TRC 
was that of a nation-building instrument to uncover details about the past regime. It was 
given various nation-building tasks, the principal one being to study the causes, nature and 
extent of gross violations of human rights occurred between 1 March 1960 and 10 May 
1994. Its most controversial aspect was the granting of amnesty to people who made full 
disclosures of relevant facts relating to the crimes.
The TRC, divided into the Human Rights Violations Committee, the Reparations and 
Rehabilitation Committee, and the Amnesty Committee, held several hearings where 
thousands of citizens testified about past abuses. Proceedings received wide media 
coverage and brought ordinary, mostly black, experiences into the national public arena. 
(Wilson, 2001)
However, focusing on the political nature of past violations immediately restricted the 
scope of the investigation to acts linked to state rule, excluding actions without political 
motivations. Thus, routine abuses, legal under apartheid, were excluded. The commission's 
non-retributive nature allowed the state to install a process through which it could 
denounce past crimes, without breaching the negotiated settlement of the apartheid. This 
created a false distinction between 'the normative aspects of a racial authoritarian order 
and illegal forms of violent coercion, when in fact one implied the other'. {Ibid.217)
By concentrating its attention solely on excessive cases, and not the normal banal violent 
reality of apartheid, the TRC excluded from its investigation land dispossession, the pass 
laws, the policy of segregation, and the Bantu education policy. This overemphasis on 
quantifiable acts of violence prevented the consideration of levels of pervasive social and
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symbolic violence that were embedded in everyday life, as opposed to its formalised state 
dimensions. This reduced the TRC's ability to articulate a clear break with the past. 
Additionally, the selection of witnesses favoured non-black Africans who were 
disproportionately represented to demonstrate how people of all racial groups had 
suffered, in line with the government's goal of reconciliation, but without recording 
apartheid's reality. (Chapman & Ball, 2001)
South Africa's post-apartheid memory was moulded primarily by political constraints and 
balances of power. The TRC was a compromise solution due to the fact those who had 
power were not going to give it up unless they had guarantees that they would not be 
prosecuted. (Rosoux, 2004) The Commission, a clear political settlement, was conceived as 
a bridge between past and future, healing the wounds of a deeply divided nation. Simply 
one of many components in creating the new South Africa, it institutionalised a great 
national narrative to reconcile a devastatingly fragmented society. The TRC confirmed that 
apartheid was a crime against humanity, incorporating into national history the view the 
system was based on a vicious ideology justifying economic and social privilege, with 
enormous and unjustifiable human costs.
The truth of the TRC was an institutionally produced truth, the outcome of a process of 
truth-seeking. The TRC's raison d'etre was so narrowly defined and committed to 
reinforcing the new state that the boundaries of the political compromise turned into the 
analytical boundaries of the truth-seeking investigation. (Mamdani, 2000:177-178)
The TRC's commissioners did recognise the limitations of the truth that they produced, 
stating that the TRC's report is not and cannot be the whole story, but simply 'a perspective 
on the truth about a past that is more extensive and more complex than any one 
commission could [...] have hoped to capture'. (Lanegran, 2005:119)
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This author argues that TJ bodies only create ‘illusions of memory'. Official 
memories suffer from inherent limitations and are unlikely to be accepted and 
shared by all of society, given their selective and exclusive nature. Given this, what 
is the role of TJ mechanisms in memory construction?
Truth commissions and tribunals can profoundly affect the collective memory of 
traumatic events. Molly Andrews significantly suggests that truth commissions 
allow the people of a country to decide what shall be incorporated and what left 
out in the story that a nation tells itself about a traumatic past, mediating 
memories and intertwining a nation's post-traumatic identity. (Andrews, 2003) 
Their proceedings often come to frame the national experience. Thus, truth 
commissions are not just mere conduits for collective memory, but significantly 
influence 'which stories are told and how they are to be interpreted', (/b/d.46) 
These bodies 'both produce and are produced by grand national narratives, and 
must be understood in the particular context(s) in which they emerge and the 
particular goals, either implicit or explicit, which guide their work', (/b/d.)
Truth commissions elucidate the conflictual nature of collective memory, 
through the different voices and stories that are heard and recollected within 
them. Indeed, the struggle over memory within truth commissions is mainly 
'interpretative': most facts are usually uncontested and, once revealed, what 
remains is 'the challenge of deciphering meaning' behind them, (/b/d.49)
This author believes that TJ mechanisms directly influence the memory they 
produce. As Tepperman (2002:140) pertinently suggests, the truth can be an 
elusive goal and historical narratives 'are partly constructed rather than merely 
discovered', and how 'power and interests affect the process'. In particular, truth
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commissions 'have a bad habit of reflecting the prejudices and agendas of their 
framers'. (Ibid.) Kimberly Lanegran (2005:113-119) highlights, in this respect, 
numerous specific dangers we should keep in mind when examining TJ bodies, 
warning us from taking their reports and/or judgements as final and exhaustive.
Political factors are ever-present. Governments (and other actors) desire to 
control TJ initiatives, frequently wishing to keep investigations from outlining their 
own errors. Power balances and competing interests of relevant actors have to be 
considered, together with the endeavours to use interpretations of the past to 
achieve present political goals.
In the cases of East Timor, South Africa, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Cambodia, 
truth-finding efforts were largely influenced by the political processes and 
dynamics on the ground. It is usually difficult for these mechanisms to be bias-free 
and several risks are associated with the official adjudication of memory. First, 
mandates, powers, structures, and budgets of TJ bodies are generally decided by 
deliberations by international and/or national actors, during which each agent 
attempts to further its own political objectives. Second, the manipulation of 
memory can be a powerful tool in the hands of influential actors, who regularly 
embark on and endorse such initiatives to further current goals, hoping to 
influence which features of a violent past are remembered and which forgotten. 
Third, if actors succeed in influencing the mandates, powers and eventual 
outcomes of TJ bodies, the memory that is consequently sanctioned is likely to be 
the one most favourable to them. Here, the past is sought to clearly serve present 
needs and goals, not for its own sake. Official memories necessarily remember and 
include some atrocities, while others are forgotten and excluded, in the interest of 
one or more groups. In selecting and constructing their narrative as the official
memory, TJ bodies indirectly (or purposely) favour one representation of the past 
over others. Their narratives should thus be seen as the outcome of political 
bargaining among the different actors who orchestrate the establishment of TJ 
mechanisms.
Given the influence of political variables, what is likely to be the nature of the 
official memory that results from TJ mechanisms?
The truth about the Rwandan genocide revealed by the ICTR, for instance, 
officially captures only a fraction of the sorrow and horror experienced. The 
Tribunal is at best likely to prosecute around 100 individuals, woefully inadequate, 
considering the thousands of victims and survivors. Due to political machinations 
and bargains that shaped the Tribunal's mandate, scope, and budget, a bias was 
injected into the 'official assessment of the genocide', affecting collective memory. 
(Lanegran, 2005:119) The genocide is portrayed as an internal tragedy, with no 
responsibility attributed to external actors: the resulting collective memory is 
consequently incomplete.
East Germany is another example that reveals how the country's truth 
commission backed a definite outlook on the Communist past, in line with the 
government's goals of national reconciliation and unification.
East Germany's Enquete Kommission was one of various mechanisms through which 
unified Germany confronted its communist past. It was created by the German Bundestag 
in March 1992 under the chairmanship of East German pastor Rainer Eppelmann to deliver 
a judgment on Communism and its methods. (Andrews, 2003; Muller, 2001)
Designed as a scholarly investigation into the history of the GDR, it drew upon academic 
opinion. There were 148 reports commissioned on ninety-five questions, and the
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commission collected 759 academic papers on all aspects of the regime, publishing its 
findings in a fifteen volume compilation. Overall, the Kommission collected 15,378 pages of 
testimony and expertise, trying to produce a 'didactic public history*, but could only present 
contending narratives and selective memories organised along party lines. {In: Muller, 
2001:268) Establishing didactic public history created space for only some stories to be told 
about daily life in the GDR. Only 327 witnesses (out of a 16-million population) gave 
testimony and the Kommission often amounted to little more than a rehearsal of well- 
known positions.
The Kommission made a mindful endeavour to understand the history of the GDR as part 
of a common German history. Its report provided important historical documentation but 
did not really generate new information. It recommended that more research was required 
and the Bundestag established a second Enquete Kommission in May 1995, with an explicit 
agenda. This second Kommission was to consider the thousands of people who did not 
succumb to the criminality or immorality of the regime, individuals that complained and 
protested. Attention was paid to personalised accounts of life under communism, but again 
such interest was selective. The Kommission heard testimony from individuals, including 
teachers, journalists, students, who had to face significant obstacles in leading fulfilled lives 
under communism, and who had made substantial sacrifices to remain true to their 
convictions. These stories were useful in embracing the new national identity.
This second report highlighted the plight of the victims of Communism, at a time when 
memories of the horrors of the dictatorship were weakening in the face of "GDR nostalgia". 
(Andrews, 2003:52) The narratives endorsed have to be appreciated within the peculiar 
context of unification. The Kommission's ultimate goals were to help cement democratic 
consciousness and foster a common political culture for united Germany.
In selecting certain kinds of stories, the commission established a national memory and 
identity, part and parcel of the new Germany. Overall, it worked as a means of establishing
in
a shared history for newly united Germany but in doing so silenced the stories of the 
majority of East Germans, 'for whom state socialism was not the focus of resistance but 
merely a fact of daily life'. (Ibid.62)
To recap, politically selective remembering is risky. First, using public testimony 
to produce memory does recognise individual suffering, but it is the state that 
often determines who the victims are. Who is identified as a victim is a process 
shaped by the purpose of the official story to be told. For example, the mandate of 
the TRC that only investigated gross human rights violations in practice meant that 
not all the suffering produced under apartheid was regarded as such by the TRC's 
definition. Similar issues also emerged in Germany.
Second, the memory of traumatic events is hard to express, as it is often not 
encoded through verbal narratives, but rather through sensations and images. 
Memories become socially embedded through their employment in narrative, and 
when that does not occur, memories remain inaccessible and tend to be retrieved 
in fragments. Traumatic pasts are therefore difficult to be communicated and 
shared with others.
Third, the need to produce a stored collective memory as a defence against 
atrocities is problematic, given that memory is exclusionary. As we have seen, 
remembering also entails forgetting, it being 'a process of simultaneously 
constructing some subjectivities and doing violence to others'. (Taylor in: 
Humphrey, 2002:123) The homogenisation of disparate individual memories to 
create an official version limits access to other kinds of remembering, restricting 
them to private memory. As Brandon Hamber and Robin Wilson (2003) correctly 
point out, truth commissions usually aim to construct memory as a 'unified, static
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and collective object, and not as a political practice or struggle over the 
representation of the past that will continue to be strongly contested after their 
existence'. (Hamber & Wilson, 2003:145) In doing so, truth commissions may fight 
against denial and public silence. However, this can concurrently establish a new 
regime of forgetting, which inhibits other memories and forms of psychological 
closure. [Ibid.]
The creation of a collective memory archive of the past is not in itself a sufficient 
protection against horrors. What is more crucial is ongoing moral engagement and 
dialogue. (Humphrey, 2002) Michael Ignatieff suggests that truth commissions can 
only provide a frame for public discourse and memory, facilitating new public 
spaces in which debate and discussion can unfold, defining the acceptable limits of 
argument over what happened, and reducing the range of permissible historical 
revisionism, (in: Hamber & Wilson, 2003:146) What in fact must be recognised and 
accepted is that the past is and will be subject to debate: memory is not static. 
There is the need to acknowledge that the past 'is a site of struggle', not a fixed 
object to which all members of the nation must identify. (Hamber & Wilson, 
2003:165)
Fourth, the collective memory produced by trials is similarly limited by legal 
framing, the selective nature of prosecutions, and the translation of legal argument 
and judgment into accessible and compelling narrative for the public. For instance, 
the ICTR and ICTY's contributions to memory is likely to be of the form and 
substance that best serve the interests of the international elite according to Julie 
Mertus. Since legal institutions attempt to discover the truth, they are often 
incapable of hearing competing versions that may exist, generating at best an 
'incomplete truth'. (Mertus, 2000:159)
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Both truth commissions and trials are symbolic, given their necessarily selective 
methodology. The sheer scale and nature of mass atrocity effectively implies that 
neither all the perpetrators are prosecuted nor all the victims heard.
Political variables should, however, not undermine the positive contributions 
that bodies of TJ can make, in terms of bringing justice to some victims and 
punishment to perpetrators, as well as uncovering some of the truth about 
atrocities, and informing collective memory. They should nevertheless avoid 
presenting their findings as exhaustive and definitive. (Lanegran, 2005)
Truth commissions, and other TJ mechanisms, are channels for collective 
memory. The struggle for possessing and interpreting memory is rooted in and 
reflects social, political, and cultural conflicts within societies. Thus, truth 
commissions and trials are not only simple methods of remembrance and ways of 
developing shared memories. They can be extremely political projects, bridging 
between the traumatic past of a nation and its future. They clearly embody the 
dynamics of the making of collective memory, as well as its tensions and 
ambiguities. (Andrews, 2003)
Truth-telling and justice initiatives are accordingly best seen as 'only the first 
step towards coming to terms with a traumatic violent past'. (Aguilar-Fernandez et 
al., 2001:35) They cannot provide definitive closure, whether in the form of a 
report, a judgement or an official memory. There are too many truths and too 
many memories associated with traumatic events for them to be captured and 
compressed into a single narrative. The past is and remains contested, regardless 
of the mechanisms developed and employed to address it
Truth and memory are too elusive to be closed into a box, written and recorded 
into a single report or contained in a legal judgement There are too many truths 
and too many memories of past crimes that the desire to harmonise them into a 
single memory appears to be both reductive and wrong.
Why is there a need to have an official memory? Might it be that some memories 
and some truths are too horrific and painful to defy both human understanding 
and the ability to accept them as part of our past? Are official memories just cover- 
ups for uncomfortable pasts?
This chapter contended that the memory of past human rights crimes is highly 
disputed within transitional societies. Struggles over memory are carried out by 
several social and political actors, and are closely interlinked to issues of power, 
legitimacy and recognition. The politics of memory is a helpful framework to 
understand many of the dynamics that occur during and after processes of 
transition. From the above discussion, it should be clear the desired path does not 
entail imposing one interpretation of the past or building a consensus among 
various actors. Rather, legitimate spaces for the expression and controversy about 
different memories should exist.
The framework (communities of memory, memory knots, and illusions of 
memory) is later applied to the cases of Argentina and Uruguay, to illuminate the 
struggles about memory which have spanned three decades.
Beforehand, chapter three provides a historical overview on the events of the 
twentieth century in Argentina and Uruguay, particularly the military dictatorship 
and associated human rights violence.
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3Twentieth Century History of Argentina and Uruguay
Until the mid-1950s Uruguay was an unusual polity in Latin America, perceived 
as one of the few real democracies in the region. Due to this, Uruguay was often 
labelled as the 'Switzerland of Latin America' and the 'Sweden of the South'. 
(Gonzalez, 1991:3; Weinstein, 1988:23) This description is widely accepted in 
literature, with the country generally regarded as the 'Great Exception'. (Weschler, 
1992:xviii)
In fact, Uruguay’s experience during the twentieth century with liberal, pluralist 
and participatory democracy was distinctive and outstanding, and starkly 
contrasted with the turbulence and authoritarianism that characterised its 
neighbours. (Sondrol, 1992) However, the civic-military regime that took over in 
1973 fundamentally undermined such a view. By the late 1970s, Uruguay had 
earned a new title as the Torture Chamber of Latin America, due to the brutality of 
human rights repression. (Pearce, 1980)
Similarly, Argentina was one of South America's most advanced and modern 
societies in the early twentieth century. Nevertheless, it acquired international 
notoriety in the 1970s for bearing witness to some of the highest levels of human 
rights violations in the region. (Brysk, 1994a) As Ernesto Sabato wrote, the 
desaparecidos (missing or disappeared) became 'a sad Argentine privilege', the 
Spanish word known throughout the world. (CONADEP, 2006:13)
The Argentine armed forces had a long history of interventionism in political 
life. However, as Patrice McSherry contends, the regime they installed in 1976 was
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qualitatively different. The military assumed total control of the country, by using 
unprecedented levels of violence and terror. (McSherry, 1997a)
How did Argentina and Uruguay, countries that at first glance were generally 
prosperous, become vulnerable to violence first from guerrilla movements, and 
later from the armed forces?
This chapter reconstructs their history in the twentieth century, highlighting the 
reasons why they became engulfed in unprecedented levels of political 
confrontation and brutality. First, key events which provided a catalyst for the 
emergence of military rule are considered. Second, the essential features of the 
military regimes are outlined together with an account of the human rights 
repression. Finally, the transition to democracy is examined.
3.1 Argentina and Uruguay’s Recent History, 1800s to the 1970s
Argentina and Uruguay could not be any more different, or any more similar. 
Uruguay, a flat and green land with rocky beaches and hills, is a small country of a 
few million people, sandwiched between Argentina and Brazil. Argentina is a 
continent in itself, with tropical, temperate and polar climates. Similarly, their 
political cultures are also diverse. Argentina has had a turbulent history of violence 
and polarisation, while Uruguayans are renowned for their politics of negotiation, 
with pacts between political parties being a constant feature of its history. 
[Weinstein, 1988)
Despite this, both countries shared a similar trajectory in the twentieth century. 
Starting from the mid-1950s, against the backdrop of the Cold War, a combination
1 1 7
of economic crisis, social conflicts, weak political systems, and extreme right and 
left-wing violence resulted in the establishment of military regimes in the 1970s.
Argentina's recent history has several phases. The early years of independence, 
1810 to 1860, were characterised by recurrent civil wars between Buenos Aires 
and the interior, prominent popular leaders [caudillos] and largely unsuccessful 
endeavours to establish a constitution, which was finally achieved in 1853.
Buenos Aires' victory over the provinces prompted a period of political calm 
with limited democracy between 1860 and 1930. After the 1880s, a dramatic 
increase in immigration from Europe coupled with economic progress profoundly 
transformed society. Before 1900, Argentina's income per capita equalled 
Germany's, and was higher than most Western countries. Between 1800 and 1913, 
Argentina was indeed one of the fastest growing economies in the world. Economic 
growth continued even during the Depression and the Second World War (WWII), 
declining only from the late 1940s. (Marchak & Marchak, 1999) At the beginning of 
the twentieth century, Argentina was the seventh largest economic power in the 
world, and constitutional rule prevailed. Significant reforms were then undertaken, 
including free mandatory education, and the 1912 electoral law that introduced 
the secret ballot and universal male suffrage.
Nevertheless, authoritarian tendencies were already apparent Participatory 
democracy was limited, with a third of the population unable to vote. Repressive 
measures were also employed, as for instance during the January 1919 Tragic 
Week when over 100 workers were killed by the army in a mass uprising in 
Buenos Aires. Similarly, the 1921-22 Patagonian Rebellion in which soldiers killed 
1500 workers who had revolted against British and Argentine sheep ranchers
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exemplify the increasing use of violence. (Nino, 1996) From 1930, increasing 
military involvement in political life began, together with rising social, economic 
and political instability.
The armed forces entered the political arena in September 1930, overthrowing 
President Yrigoyen. Thereafter, they became a central actor. Politics then were an 
alternation of authoritarian rule and democratic administrations, with 
constitutional governments often mere transitional spells between military 
regimes.
Military intervention took different forms and lengths. (Norden, 1996) In 1930, 
General Uriburu installed a fascist-type corporatist regime that was modelled on 
Mussolini's Italy. Trade unions were dissolved and a state of siege imposed; 
socialist and radical party leaders were arrested. Less than two years later, a 
civilian president returned to power, but this first intervention hallmarked a 
persistent trend.
The coup in 1943 ended the infamous decade of conservative rule, and opened 
the way for Juan-Domingo Peron's election as President in 1946. (Nino, 1996) For 
twelve years, Peron profoundly marked society and politics, forging a new political 
doctrine, Peronism (Justicialismo), and becoming a key figure, able to influence 
internal politics even from exile. (Romero, 2007) Inspired by his time in Italy, 
Peron established a ‘populist dictatorship with democratic trappings'. (Nino, 
1996:42) He was strongly supported by organised labour, but never by the Church 
or the Military which eventually overthrew him in 1955. (Marchak & Marchak, 
1999)
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Peron centralised government, concentrating power in the Executive and 
initiating a new style of political participation through social mobilisation. He paid 
particular attention to the workers' movement that had largely been ignored until 
then. In particular, Peron improved the living standards for the poorest, 
institutionalising a welfare state, and extended voting rights to women. 
Simultaneously, however, Peron created a police state. Political opponents were 
persecuted, killed, and tortured. Corruption was unchecked and the judicial system 
dismantled. (Romero, 2007) For decades, the militaiy would unsuccessfully 
endeavour to eliminate Peron's influence from politics. (Norden, 1996)
The civilian-military rebellion, which ended Peron's government in September 
1955, triggered a new period of instability. Between 1955 and 1983, politics were 
dominated by repeated cycles of civilian and military governments, each differing 
from the previous only by increased violence. (Cavarozzi, 1986) In 1962, the 
military overthrew the constitutionally-elected government of Frondizi. During 
these military interregnums (1955-58 and 1962-3), the armed forces did not 
intend to replace democracy. They in fact allowed the constitutional process to 
resume after a while, but they wished to eradicate Peronism, which was viewed as 
intrinsically opposed to democratic values and institutions. (Lopez, 1994)
From the late 1950s, the military gradually changed its style of intervention, 
adopting a tutelary role, restricting democratic practices and principles, and 
deposing of constitutional authorities if demands were unmet. (Cavarozzi, 1986) 
The armed forces then adhered to the national security doctrine that endowed 
them with the exclusive responsibility to interpret the nation's interests and 
guarantee its values, acting to defend them whenever threatened. (Romero, 2007)
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The doctrine spread throughout Latin America and, although interpreted 
differently, it essentially combined a cataclysmic vision of a global East-West 
struggle in which the armed forces were the bulwarks against Communism. It 
rested on a theory of counterrevolution and counterinsurgency and its key 
hypothesis of conflict emphasised internal enemies, especially Communism. 
Throughout the region, the doctrine provided the ideological foundation and 
rationale for the military regimes of the 1970s. (McSherry, 1997a)
By 1965, relations between the government and the military deteriorated anew. 
Military intervention occurred as a consequence of President Illia permitting 
Peronist participation in congressional elections. The June 1966 coup qualitatively 
differed from previous one. In contrast to retaining power for only a limited period 
of time, on this occasion the regime initially led by General Ongania, and later on 
by Levington and finally by Lanusse, lasted until 1973, effectively suspending 
politics in practice. (Corradi, 1982) The armed forces remained in power for a long 
period in order to achieve the political and socio-economic changes required for a 
stable democracy. (Lopez, 1994)
During the so-called Argentine Revolution, the military governed through strong 
reliance on technocrats. This type of regime has been famously labelled by 
Guillermo O'Donnell as "bureaucratic authoritarianism", (in: Roehrig, 2009:726) 
Congress and political parties were dissolved, certain mobilised social sectors 
were excluded from politics and opponents were detained under a state of siege. 
The suppression of communism affected all sectors, especially the University, and 
censorship was widespread. (Romero, 2007)
121
While deaths and human rights violations had until then been rare and isolated 
episodes, from the mid-1960s Argentina spiralled into an era of political violence. 
Several factors foretold of the impending brutality.
First, various guerrilla groups, whose origins date back to 1959, consolidated 
and became increasingly violent. From 1970, kidnappings, assassinations, bank 
robberies and raids on military posts became commonplace. The most noted 
guerrilla groups were the Ejercito Revolucionario del Pueblo (The People's 
Revolutionary Army, ERP), formed in the late 1960s, which was anti-Peronist and 
originally Trotskyite, but later turned to Guevarism. Second, the Montoneros were 
the militant arm of the Catholic Peronist Youth that in May 1970 kidnapped and 
murdered General Aramburu. Adopting a cellular and militaristic structure, both 
organisations, largely composed of idealistic and middle-class students, carried out 
kidnappings and assassinations of trade union and business leaders, typically to 
gain funds. These organisations sought to remove the military government and 
establish a socialist society. (Marchak & Marchak, 1999]
Second, authoritarian governments progressively then resorted to brutality. For 
example, the May 1969 Cordobazo, a general strike by students, the urban poor 
and workers that took control of Cordoba, was violently repressed by the military. 
Similarly, the Trelew Massacre in August 1972, in which several imprisoned 
guerrilla leaders attempted escape and those recaptured were murdered by 
military guards. Moreover, the economic climate gradually deteriorated. Public 
debt rose to more than USD 4 billion and domestic capital worth USD 8 billion left 
the country; inflation sky-rocketed. (W. Davis, 1995]
An explosive mix of economic crisis, institutional instability and widespread 
political hostility thus existed. Facing progressive internal opposition and a
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situation of violence, the military decided to hand over power and elections were 
held in March 1973, with Peronists allowed to run. Peronist candidate Campora 
won, paving the way for Peron's return after eighteen years in exile. Peron himself 
became President in October 1973, following Campora's resignation.
Peron adopted austerity policies that, combined with extremely high inflation, 
caused widespread strikes and demonstrations by workers and activists, as well as 
clashes with the police. (Roniger & Sznajder, 1999) His government was short­
lived. Peron died in July 1974 and his third wife Isabel, the Vice-President, 
inherited the presidency.
Right and left-wing terrorism had by then created an unstable and violent 
environment The Alianza Anti-Comunista Argentina (Argentine Anti-Communist 
Alliance, AAA), a right-wing death squad allegedly created by Welfare Minister 
Lopez-Rega, murdered leftist guerrillas, priests, intellectuals, lawyers and 
politicians. In response, the Montoneros, numbering 5,000 in 1975, stepped up 
activities, targeting members of the security forces. (Nino, 1996)
Peron's administration fought violence with violence. In August 1974, the army 
joined the police's crackdown on the guerrillas and in November, a state of siege 
was imposed. Between February and May 1975, the military carried out anti­
subversive operations against the ERP in Tucuman, while in June they were 
authorised to fight subversion nationally. Consequently, threats from the guerrillas 
substantially diminished. Nonetheless, the army pressed for Peron's resignation 
and by early 1976, with a deteriorating economy, political deadlock, continued 
violence and corruption, the armed forces took control of the government amid 
'immense relief and high expectations' from the majority of the population.
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(Romero, 2007:214) The darkest period in Argentine history had begun. (Nino,
1996)
Similarly to Argentina, Uruguay spent the first decades of independence since 
1828 in turmoil. Until 1903, politics remained chaotic, with several governments 
ousted or liquidated by assassination. (Weinstein, 1988)
An important and enduring feature of Uruguayan political life developed early 
on. Its famous two-party system in fact dates back to the 1836 Battle of 
Carpinteria, when warring factions differentiated themselves by wearing coloured 
hatbands, white for the Blancos and red for the Colorados. Another key feature was 
established, namely co-participation, a peaceful power-sharing system seen as 
fundamental for the containment of political conflict. It ensured the presence of the 
opposition party in government, and therefore legitimated the notion that 
traditional parties have the right to share power. (Arteaga, 2000; Weinstein, 1988) 
Civil war between the Colorados and the Blancos, representing respectively 
commercial urban sectors and rural interests, exploded for the last time in 1903. 
The Colorado's victory ended violence that had spanned six decades. During the 
presidencies of Jose Batlle-y-Ordonez (1903-1907, 1911-1915), the Executive was 
reinforced and the double simultaneous ballot law enacted. (Weinstein, 1988) 
According to that legislation, the winning presidential candidate is not simply 
whoever has the majority of votes, but the candidate with most votes from the 
party that gains most votes at elections.
A welfare state, with progressive legislation, was set up. In 1915, working days 
were limited to eight hours a day, while in 1918 night shifts were prohibited in 
bakeries. Provisions were introduced to enhance the welfare of workers. Social
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insurance covering accidents also existed, as well as minimum wages, child care, 
unemployment benefits and paid holidays. [Heinz & Friihling, 1999)
For Batlle-y-Ordonez, the state had to intervene in social and political problems, 
mediating between capital and labour, and bring about social justice. Important 
changes also occurred in state-economy relations, industrialisation, fiscal and 
agricultural policies, and social and labour legislation. The latter in particular 
improved the living conditions of society's poorest sectors, through the 
introduction of health provisions, and secondary and university education. 
(Arteaga, 2000; Caetano & Rilla, 1994) The party political system was 
strengthened and democratic life reinforced by the political consciousness which 
had developed among citizens after the adoption of secret universal male suffrage 
in 1916.
The 1920s Golden Decade of 'triumphant democracy' saw the adoption of the 
1919 constitution, which separated the state and church, opened the possibility of 
political rights for women, and set up a two-headed Executive, composed of the 
President and a National Administration Council. (Caetano & Rilla, 1994:128) After 
1929, the Great Depression affected Uruguay, notably sparking a decline in export 
earnings. In 1930, Colorado leader Terra was elected at a time when the economic 
crisis exposed Uruguay's economy structural problems, amongst them rising 
unemployment. (Caetano & Rilla, 1994; Weinstein, 1988) In March 1933, the first 
breakdown of constitutional rule since the 1903-1904 civil war occurred in a 
situation of institutional crisis. In a pattern later to be repeated, a democratically- 
elected President closed Parliament, and declared emergency rule. During Terra's 
dictablanda (soft dictatorship), March 1933 to 1934, the democratic system was 
temporarily suspended but the armed forces only played a secondary role.
(Caetano & Rilla, 1994) Between March 1933 and 1935, approximately 700 people 
were detained and there were several cases of torture, but a 1937 parliamentary 
commission nevertheless concluded that no ill-treatment had occurred. (Heinz & 
Friihling, 1999)
In 1934 Terra's new constitution replaced the National Administration Council 
with a Senate, whose members came exclusively from the dominant factions of the 
traditional parties. (Arteaga, 2000) The so-called good coup, February 1942 to 
March 1943, by Colorado leader Baldomir was also short and without military 
participation. It was informed by total respect for human rights, no closure of the 
press or prosecution of opposition politicians. Again, a new constitution was 
enacted, through which all political groups returned to government. (Weinstein, 
1988)
At the end of World War II, a new reformist phase, neobatllismo, saw economic 
prosperity, euphoria for the end of the war, a stronger state, rising GDP, and the 
development of urban society. (Caetano & Rilla, 1994) The 1945-1955 ‘glorious 
decade' saw the economy rise by 8% a year. [Ibid. 174) Economic prosperity 
produced a renewed consolidation of the welfare state which participated directly 
in the economy and industrial production, monopolised public services, and 
developed advanced social policies. Uruguay was then a prosperous and middle- 
class country, whose citizens enjoyed high levels of social services and welfare 
protection. This golden era however proved fragile.
In a context of rising trade union conflicts, the Prompt Security Measures (MPS), 
emergency powers within the Constitution, were used for the first time in 1952, as 
a response to strikes by workers from the public health, transport, and textile 
sectors. Initially, the economic crisis was eclipsed by remarkable political events,
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namely the Blanco's electoral victory, their first triumph at the ballot box for 
ninety-three years. In reacting to the growing crisis, the government firstly 
adopted liberal economic policies in coordination with the IMF. However, a new 
constitution in 1966 marked the return to the presidential system, which had been 
replaced in 1952 by a nine-member collegiate executive. (Heinz & Friihling, 1999) 
Nonetheless, these measures were ineffectual. From the mid-1950s, Uruguay 
plunged into a spiral of economic crisis and decline, inflamed by social and political 
tensions, ideological divisions, the erosion of civil liberties and rising violence from 
the guerrillas. Since the mid-1960s, political life became vicious. Torture was not 
new, long practiced against criminals and lower classes. (Demasi, 1999) 
Nevertheless, it began to be employed by the police as a counterinsurgency 
technique against revolutionary organisations. (Corti, 2003)
Sustained economic stagnation, combined with the country's vast social welfare 
system, produced high inflation, and incrementally economic pressure destroyed 
the country's political balance, polarising class conflict and reinforcing economic 
decline and political problems. (Weinstein, 1975) Additionally, an urban guerrilla 
group, the Movimiento de Liberation Nacional-Tupamaros (National Liberation 
Movement-Tupamaros, hereafter the Tupamaros) escalated operations. In the 
1960s and 70s, other minor groups had emerged, including the Popular 
Revolutionaiy Organisation 33 and the Oriental Revolutionary Armed Forces. 
However, neither of them had the same impact as the Tupamaros. (Lessa, 2002) 
Originally the armed wing of the Socialist Party and founded around 1963, the 
Tupamaros eventually became Latin America's most successful urban guerrilla, 
garnering widespread support and sympathy. They believed that an independent 
and integrated national community could only be achieved through socialism. As
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political and economic elites would not relinquish power peacefully, armed 
revolution was therefore necessary, and violence was an essential revolutionary 
tactic. (E. Kaufman, 1978) The movement's slogan during its most triumphant 
period was 'there will be a fatherland for all or a fatherland for none'. (Weinstein, 
1988:39)
In 1968, dictatorial features were already being displayed. The economic, social 
and political crisis unfolded against the background of a long period of 
deterioration. (Caetano & Rilla, 1987) The authoritarian Colorado governments of 
Areco (1966-71) and Bordaberry (1971-73) increasingly adopted repressive 
policies, leading to growing military intervention in political life. Areco instituted a 
limited state of siege in 1968 and 1969, and invoked the MPS to repress strikes, 
allow the implementation of a ruthless programme of economic stabilisation and a 
policy to counter the guerrillas. These actions restricted the right to hold meetings, 
freedom of speech, the right to due process, habeas corpus, and increased police 
powers. (Brito, 1997) A freeze on prices and wages was declared and the military 
was charged with anti-guerrilla operations in 1971. (Broquetas & Wschebor, 2003) 
At this time, social conflicts polarised further and government's repression of the 
opposition deepened. Leftist parties and political organisations were declared 
illegal, opposition newspapers closed, and public and private officials militarised. 
Trade unions and even student movements witnessed assassinations, kidnappings, 
disappearances and torture. (Caetano & Rilla, 1994)
A state of internal war against the Tupamaros was declared in April 1972 by 
President Bordaberry. Later on, State Security Law 14.068 granted jurisdiction 
over civilians to military courts, limited public assembly rights, introduced 
repressive press legislation, and established martial law, effectively suspending
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constitutional guarantees. (Martinez, 2007) Before the coup, individual liberties 
had already irremediably been undermined, with torture by then an accepted 
police practice. (Weinstein, 1988) Bordaberry continued the policies of his 
predecessor, and proposed legislation to abolish university autonomy, as well as 
increasing military and police powers. Nonetheless, the armed forces became 
irritated by civilian government and set about its downfall. The military takeover 
occurred in slow motion, as the Armed Forces had progressively been involved in 
politics since 1964.
February 1973 marked a key moment of political rupture, as civilian power 
succumbed to the might of the military. The Boisso-Lanza Pact, signed by 
Bordaberry, accepted policy supervision by the newly-created National Security 
Council and effectively incorporated the Armed Forces into government, sealing 
their hegemony. (Brito, 1997; Caetano & Rilla, 1994) The Pact occurred after the 
army and the air force rebelled against President Bordaberry’s selection of Antonio 
Francese as minister of defence.
On 27 June 1973, a military-backed presidential coup took place. Bordaberry 
dissolved both legislative Chambers. As in previous cases, it was again a civilian 
President who executed the coup. The most totalitarian military regime of the 
Southern Cone had been launched.
3.2 Military Rule and Human Rights Repression
Political violence in Argentina and Uruguay cannot simply be explained by 
reference to internal causes and dynamics. The regional and global contexts were 
essential ingredients. (Arteaga, 2000) In fact, local events unfolded within the 
context of the Cold War and the spread of urban and/or rural guerrillas in Latin
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America in the 1960s, influenced by the experience of the 1959 Cuban Revolution. 
The national security doctrine was at this point adopted throughout the region, 
informing the ideology and behaviour of the armed forces. Several other factors 
are also relevant, namely the dominant role of the US, the formation of Communist 
inspired popular fronts, and high levels of military involvement in internal 
problems.
The Argentine and Uruguayan military regimes of the 1970s went through 
roughly three phases. (Acuna & Smulovitz, 1996a; Caetano, 2008) In the early 
years, the fundamental objective was the subordination of society to state control, 
often achieved through an iron grip and the repression of all opposition. Second, 
the armed forces attempted to set the basis of new institutional orders, a model of 
a strong democracy. Finally, in a context of crisis and retreat, the Argentina Junta 
could only pursue limited objectives, while the Uruguayan military managed to 
negotiate agreements with moderate politicians to guarantee its return to the 
barracks.
The 1976 takeover saw the Argentine armed forces rule as an institution. They 
aimed to radically transform state and society, according to a messianic vision of 
national security. (McSherry, 1997a) The removal of Peron's weak government 
initially appeared similar to previous interruptions of political life to which 
Argentina was accustomed. (Aguila, 2006) However, it soon became clear that the 
regime was fundamentally different from past exercises of military rule.
The military openly aspired to transform the state, economy and society, and 
employed systematic violence and terror to do so. The new dictatorship, called the 
Argentine Process o f National Reorganisation (the Proceso as normally shortened
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to), combined reactionary defensiveness, sweeping totalitarian aspirations, and 
high levels of personal corruption. (Brysk, 1994a) Juan Corradi suggests that the 
regime had resolved to become 'more impersonal, autonomous, permanent, 
repressive' than anything before. (Corradi, 1982:65) As in Uruguay, the Proceso is 
not identified with a single individual. Rather, there was an explicit attempt to 
institutionally represent the armed forces, illustrated by the six Presidents and 
four juntas in power during this period.
Military rule in Uruguay similarly wished to demobilise and depoliticise the 
political environment. Military officers and civilian technocrats adopted a military 
approach to politics, emphasising hierarchy, authority, and discipline. They ruled 
the country without a caudillo, the generals remaining a faceless junta. (Sondrol,
1997) The dictatorship most closely resembled a totalitarian regime, as the 
country's small size and population enabled infiltration into public and private life.
The armed forces saw themselves as playing an active role in the country's 
economic and political affairs. In their view, sovereignty no longer resided with the 
people, but derived from the requirements of state survival. (Weinstein, 1988) The 
early years were characterised by chronic uncertainty, disagreements and 
improvisation as officers had little practical and intellectual preparation for 
government. The armed forces had been largely marginal in political life as 
Uruguay had experienced (almost) uninterrupted civilian rule until then. (Gillespie, 
1991)
The two regimes shared several common elements. Censorship ruled. In 
Argentina, the regime assumed control of public radio, television and the press.
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Editors and reporters were arrested and imprisoned, even disappeared, while 
several journals and newspapers were closed down. Correspondents of foreign 
radio and press agencies were expelled, and books and magazines burned. The few 
remaining newspapers had their content controlled. Additionally, songs and music, 
that were considered too political, were banned. In Uruguay, between 1967 and 
1984, eighty-six newspapers, radio and television stations were subject to varying 
degrees of restrictions. Journalists were regularly persecuted and many arrested. 
By the early 1980s, only three morning papers and two evening papers remained.
The military paid particular attention to education. Universities were especially 
perceived as the stronghold of subversive ideologies. In Argentina, teachers and 
students were persecuted and disappeared, and all political activities eradicated 
from campuses. (Aguila, 2006) The military strived to reshape the educational 
system and the cultural foundations of society, imposing Western Christian values. 
A course called Moral and Civic Formation was instituted in all public schools, to 
instil values and warn schoolchildren of the dangers of subversion. Likewise, in 
Uruguay, intellectuals were persecuted, and education controlled. University were 
seized in October 1973, with members of staff dismissed or imprisoned. Education 
came under military supervision. Thousands of secondary and primary school 
teachers were removed from their posts. Educational content was controlled 
through the censoring of textbooks, and a rigid syllabus was imposed. A 
compulsory course entitled Moral and Civic Education was introduced, to 
encourage patriotism and traditional values.
132
Political and trade union activities were prohibited in Argentina, with citizens 
losing basic political rights. In Uruguay, political life was put on hold. The right of 
assembly for political purposes was limited, and all left wing parties and two 
student federations were banned in 1973. Political elections were suspended and 
anyone who had stood for a political post in the past was proscribed from political 
activity for fifteen years, so depriving about 10,000 former politicians of political 
rights. The country's biggest trade union, the National Confederation of Workers 
(CNT), was declared illegal in July 1973.
In Argentina and Uruguay, the remedy of habeas corpus was ineffective, 
suspended in practice. (AI, 1983b} Thousands of petitions presented by families 
and relatives of the disappeared on a daily basis in Argentina were unsuccessful. 
The standard reply was that the person had not been found in detention. One of 
the few cases resulting in the release of missing persons was that of Jacobo 
Timerman, the director of daily La Opinion, but only after strong international 
pressure. (IACHR, 1980} Supreme Court justices and other judges were replaced 
with trusted individuals. (Helmke, 2005} Civilians were subjected to military 
jurisdiction and detention at the disposition of the Executive.
In both countries, economic policy became pre-eminent. Argentine Economy 
Minister Martinez-de-Hoz launched an unparalleled free market crusade to 
eliminate inflation and set free the economy. Austerity plans resulted in de- 
industrialisation, sharp decreases in workers’ salaries, and the accumulation of 
external debt totalling over USD 45 billion by 1983. (Nino, 1996} In Uruguay, 
economic performance also became the regime's ultimate claim to legitimacy and
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justification for its harsh rule. Economic growth was identified as a surrogate for 
the authority that the regime lacked. Economy minister, Harvard-educated Vegh- 
Villegas, wished to dismantle the economy's protectionist structure, cut the budget, 
reduce employment, and reintegrate Uruguay into the world economy. (Caetano & 
Rilla, 1987; Gillespie, 1991]
Human rights repression was largely inspired and influenced by the national 
security doctrine, but also by French and Brazilian counterinsurgency techniques. 
Human rights violations had common elements. First, the state was 'Janus-faced' 
(my term]. An invisible and clandestine terrorist structure tasked with repression 
co-existed with a government that was subject to norms and legal scrutiny. In this 
dual system, the visible state, a facade of legality, masked the invisible, 
characterised by expediency, arbitrariness, and military security overriding all 
laws. (Romero, 2007:233] Second, cultures of fear and inxile dominated. Lastly, 
cross-border repression -particularly strong between Argentina and Uruguay, 
however extended to Brazil, Chile and Paraguay. The framework of Operation 
Condor (Plan Condor] effectively established a borderless area of terror.
'If need be, as many people as necessary will die 
in Argentina to achieve the country's security.'
General Videla -1976
Tirst we will eliminate subversives, then their accomplices, 
then their sympathisers and finally the indifferent and the undecided.'
General Saint-Jean -1977 
In: (Dussel et al., 2003:55)
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In Argentina and Uruguay, human rights violations predated the coup. As 
Francisco Panizza rightly emphasises, 'these did not start with the military 
regimes'. (Panizza, 1993:210) In considering Latin American military regimes, 
Panizza stresses how 'it would be consoling to think of the atrocities of 
authoritarian regimes as an aberration by a group of fanatical men in uniform 
brainwashed by the national security doctrine and trained in counterinsurgency\ 
Rather, impunity 'is inbred in societies in which the principle of equality before the 
law has never been honoured in practice', and where the judiciary 'has historically 
been subordinated to the Executive', (/b/d.)
Soon after the takeovers, policies of terror were implemented systematically to 
intimidate and demobilise society. (Brysk, 1994a; Demasi, 1999) In Argentina, 
state terror was applied as a political means to further economic and social 
projects, ensuring that no collective resistance was possible. Subordination was 
produced through the institution of a permanent state of terror and emergency, a 
culture of fear, to bring about support or at least passivity. (Corradi, 1982) Luis- 
Alberto Romero (2007) suggests that the regime's policies of fear and terror 
served a dual purpose. Indeed, direct victims of the repression also worked as a 
constant reminder to wider society of the potential and deadly consequences that 
non compliance could bring.
The suppression of terrorism was a top priority: in both countries the category 
of subversive was broad and blurry. For General Videla, a terrorist was not only 
someone with a gun or bomb, but also anyone who disseminated ideas 
incompatible with Western Christian civilisation. (Dussel et al., 2003) In Argentina, 
subversion was perceived as a highly contagious social disease. Subversives were 
seen as unsalvageable and as long as they were alive, they would continue to infect
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others. Accordingly, the neutralisation of the enemy was not enough, only physical 
elimination would do. (Acuna & Smulovitz, 1995; Hodges, 1991) This approach 
reflected the national security doctrine and its organic conception of the nation. 
The elimination of the enemy was justified since no organs or cells should be 
allowed to deviate from the basic parameters of national values and traditions. 
National well-being had primacy over individual rights and needs that were to be 
subordinated to national aims when necessary. (Roniger & Sznajder, 1999)
This strategy of physical elimination of subversive had already been decided 
upon by high-ranking Argentine military officers between August and September 
1975. It was considered the only solution, particularly after President Campora's 
1973 extensive amnesty that had freed the guerrillas and allowed them to 
reorganise. To the military, this had demonstrated how only permanent physical 
eradication would terminate guerrilla activities. (Heinz & Friihling, 1999; Norden, 
1996)
Though in both countries the guerrilla movements were specifically targeted, 
Peter King rightly suggests that repression in Argentina had an element of 
randomness that was absent in Uruguay. (King, 1989) Violence in Argentina 
touched almost all the sectors of society, especially the middle-classes, while in 
Uruguay it was plainly directed at political opposition.
'Uruguay does not torture, humiliate, 
or ill-treat even the most dreadful of criminals.'
Uruguayan regime propaganda -1976 
In: (Caetano & Rilla, 1987:56)
Repression in Uruguay was characterised instead by totalitarian control over 
the population, ensured by the widespread use of mass, prolonged imprisonment
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and systematic torture. Between 1970 and 1978, this led to an increase in police 
and military personnel from 42,000 to 64,000.
The country's small size and population permitted levels of surveillance and 
control reaching the upper limits of the authoritarian ideal type. A unique feature 
of the regime was the A,B,C classification of political reliability. Every adult was in 
fact investigated and given a letter of designation of democratic faith. [A] citizens 
were politically trustworthy and could be employed by the state. [B] were deemed 
ideological suspect, and of questionable loyalty, i.e. to be watched carefully. They 
could only be employed privately and their travel privileges were severely limited; 
they also faced continuous harassment by the security services. [C] were pariahs, 
deprived of their rights and the possibility of employment; they were not even 
issued passports. At any one time, anyone could suddenly find himself/herself 
reclassified as C. (Gillespie, 1991:50)
The regime created an oppressive atmosphere to paralyse society, and instil 
passivity and compliant behaviour amongst the public. (Perelli, 1992b) Paul 
Sondrol describes how the regime installed a 'culture of fear characterised by 
inxile: a sullen wariness, self-censorship and longing to maintain anonymity 
against the brooding omnipresence of the state'. (Sondrol 1992:194)
Previously active lower middle and working classes were demobilised and 
terrorised into avoiding politics. Around 500,000 Uruguayans, of a population of 
less than three million, fled into exile. Uruguay lost approximately 20% of its 
economically active population between 1968 and 1979 which was an enormous 
social cost. (Weinstein, 1988)
Repression followed clear political lines: in fact, 62% of those detained were 
active militants, 18% were political leaders and 9% trade unionists. There were
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two major waves of detentions: the first, between 1972 and 1974, primarily 
targeted the Tupamaros. The second, between 1975 and 1977, was directed at the 
Communist Party and the trade unions. Overall, more than 60,000 people were 
arrested and detained. [Weinstein, 1988) Sondrol suggests that between 1973 and 
1977, 'more than 1 in every 30 adults, were detained, interrogated or imprisoned, 
giving Uruguay the highest percentage of political detainees per capita in the 
world’. [Sondrol, 1992:196)
Repression in Argentina and Uruguay had comparable features and types of 
crimes, including systematic disappearances, extensive and methodical use of 
physical and psychological torture, extremely inhumane conditions of detention, 
and extrajudicial executions. Nonetheless, each country had a distinguishing 
method for which it became renowned.
Repression was most intense in Argentina between 1976 and 1979. It peaked 
again between 1980 and 1981, but disappearances were reported as late as 1983. 
Repression was implemented under orders from highest military authorities, and 
coordinated through the military hierarchy. Operations followed a territorial 
scheme and were carried out by task forces (grupos de tareas), composed of 
members of the armed and security forces. These had a permanent membership 
but officers also rotated to strengthen the blood pact. Though centrally 
coordinated and planned, repression was decentralised as every service, zone, 
even task force had considerable scope in deciding whom to detain, release, 
torture or execute, and how to dispose of their property.
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The distinguishing mechanism of state terrorism in Argentina was the policy of 
disappearances. Thousands of people fell under this distressing category. 
Desaparecidos are persons apprehended at home, work or on public thoroughfares, 
by armed men in operations and conditions indicating that they were state agents. 
After abduction, seized persons disappeared: nothing was ever known of them. 
(IACHR, 1980) According to statistics, 30.2% of the disappeared were blue-collar 
workers, 17.9% white-collar workers, and 21% students; 30% were women (10% 
of which pregnant) while 70% men. (CONADEP, 2006) They were mostly men and 
women but children were also kidnapped with parents. The latter were sometimes 
released and delivered to relatives, abandoned in the street or remained as 
disappeared. A new crime also existed. Detained pregnant women were kept alive 
until they gave birth. Afterwards, they were killed and newborns were illegally 
adopted by military members, their friends or given to Church-related 
organisations. (Brysk, 1994b)
Romero (2007:215-220) suggests that the Argentine repression was a ‘true 
genocide'. The initial estimate of 9,000 disappeared has been updated to 
approximately 14,000. However, HROs claim the figure is around 30,000. 
Notwithstanding exact numbers, the repression clearly embodied the state's 
resolve to exterminate all opponents through secret and clandestine methods. 
(Crenzel, 2008a, 2008b) David Pion-Berlin and George Lopez significantly point 
out how there were no clear ethnic, religious or racial patterns to the atrocities 
committed in Argentina. Rather, most victims ‘had never engaged in any political 
activity, let alone activity of a clandestine, violent or radical nature'. (Pion-Berlin & 
Lopez, 1991:64)
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Compared to the rest of the region, Uruguay's list of disappeared and dead is 
relatively short. In fact, there was no specific policy of disappearances like in 
Argentina. This mechanism was mainly used to cover up the death of prisoners, 
often during torture sessions. (Heinz & Friihling, 1999)
Several explanations have been suggested as to why this was the case. Pion- 
Berlin contends that the lower number of deaths was 'part of a strategy to prolong 
the suffering of detainees in order to facilitate the extraction of information'. (Pion- 
Berlin, 1993:110) These repeated cycles of torture and recuperation were 
employed to break 'the will of prisoners [...] to acquire information'. [Ibid.) One of 
my interviewees, lawyer Graciela Romero of the Peace and Justice Service, 
contended that a policy of massive disappearances could not have been sustainable 
in Uruguay, 'a small country, where everyone knows each other' (interview, 
7/09/2007). Additionally, Romero points to the fact that 'Uruguay has a long and 
solid culture of respecting life'. So Romero continued, ‘rather then wiping you off 
the face of the earth, they wanted to break you, to destroy your spirit through the 
use of torture, to annihilate you morally' (interview).
Another element that this author sees as relevant is the fact, as Lawrence 
Weschler contends, that Uruguay did not have any 'military to speak of, rather the 
one they had 'bore no resemblance whatsoever to that of any of its Latin 
neighbours'. (Weschler, 1992:xviii) The military's lack of experience of holding 
power may have played a role in its choice of repressive mechanisms.
Interestingly, Luiz Gonzalez points out how 'the majority of political kidnapping 
that involved the military and whose victims remained "desaparecidos" occurred 
between 1975 and 1978'. (Gonzalez, 1991:53) Gonzalez further suggests that, 
during those years, the Uruguayan regime entered a second phase in which
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political repression increased, 'probably in order to clear the way for the future 
regime' that the military was planning to establish. [Ibid.]
Finally, the Nunca Mas report suggests that disappearances were 'used with 
increased frequency over time', becoming a preferred method between September 
1981 and January 1982. (SERPAJ, 1992:216] The report further distinguishes 
between disappearances of Uruguayans which occurred in Argentina and those in 
Uruguay. Of the latter, the investigation claims that 'it is generally assumed that 
prisoners died as victims of abuse', with the authorities not wanting these cases to 
become public knowldge. [Ibid.217]
The exact number of the disappeared remains unknown. The Peace Commission 
of 2003 claimed that twenty-six Uruguayans disappeared in Uruguay, 182 in 
Argentina, eight in Chile, two in Paraguay. (TomoIV, 2007] On the other hand, 
more recent research suggested that 167 adults disappeared, thirty-two in 
Uruguay, 125 in Argentina, eight in Chile, one in Colombia and one in Bolivia, while 
three minors, kidnapped in Argentina, continue to be classed as disappeared. In 
addition, there were twenty-six people executed extra-judicially. (Rico, 2008] 
Notwithstanding precise numbers, what is well-known is that most Uruguayans 
in fact disappeared in neighbouring Argentina between 1976 and 1978, courtesy of 
Operation Condor and the actions of Uruguayan officials in Automotores Orletti 
detention centre. Clear evidence of cooperation between the Argentine and 
Uruguayan militaries is the fact that 'only 5 had disappeared before the coup [in 
Argentina]' while the vast majority was arrested when both countries were 'under 
military rule, a situation favouring joint operations'. (SERPAJ, 1992:224] Exiled 
members of the Partido por la Victoria del Pueblo (Party for the Victory of the 
People, PVP] and the Grupos de Accion Unificadora (Unifying Action Groups] were
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targeted in Buenos Aires, the first between June and September 1976, and the 
latter in December 1977. Disappearances also affected other organizations 
including the Tupamaros, the Communist Party, and the Revolutionary Communist 
Party. (Heinz & Friihling, 1999; SERPAJ, 1992) For Aldo Rico, disappearances in 
Uruguay were mostly politically motivated: 133-136 of adults disappeared due to 
their militancy in leftist political organisations, 36 because of the trade unions 
links, and 23 for their involvement in student organisations. (Rico, 2008)
Torture against political prisoners had been commonplace for decades in 
Argentina. (Crenzel, 2007a) It was an essential element in the repressive 
methodology from 1976, as the military considered it as an indispensable 
condition for victory against subversion. Indeed, those abducted were taken to 
various locations for interrogation, where they were almost invariably subjected to 
ill-treatment to obtain confessions, information about other persons, planned 
operations or simply for the purpose of intimidation. Generally torture aimed to 
break people's resistance, and crush their defences, obliterating their dignity and 
humanity. (IACHR, 1980) Graciela Fernandez-Meijide of the CONADEP explained 
that the 'half-hour interrogation' method was commonly practiced on the 
guerrillas (interview, 17/08/2007). Upon abduction, the person was immediately 
beaten and humiliated, in order to supply as much information in the shortest 
possible time. This tactic was employed to prevent the rest of the cell from 
realising that one of its members had been detained, as otherwise they would have 
disbanded and gone into hiding.
142
Q: Prisoners are always tortured, or are there exceptions?
A: One can say that everyone arrested in Uruguay is tortured.
There is no one who is not tortured.
Army counterintelligence deserted soldier Garcia Rivas
In: (SERPAJ, 1992:79)
Torture was similarly widespread and routine in Uruguay. As a 
counterinsurgency technique, it intended to generate terror and facilitate the 
disarticulation and defeat of armed organisations. (Corti, 2003) In the 1960s, it 
started to be applied to political prisoners and was primarily used to extract 
confessions of crimes. (Heinz & Friihling, 1999)
Torture in Argentina and Uruguay was scientific and systematic. Medical staff 
assisted or advised in sessions. Doctors examined detainees before interrogation, 
made medical information available, and were on hand to revive victims, provide 
temporary relief, and advise officers when the victims' life was at risk. (AI, 1983a) 
Torture did sometimes result in deaths but in neither country it was ever 
intended as an execution method. Techniques routinely employed included: 
forcing prisoners to wear hoods, beatings, enforced standing for prolonged periods 
(planton), electric shocks [picana electrica, electric rod), the submarino and dry 
submarine (progressive asphyxiation brought on by wrapping the head in a plastic 
bag or sack, similar to water-boarding), and sexual abuse. Psychological methods 
comprised simulated executions, forcing detainees to witness the torture of others, 
and techniques of sensory disorientation. Such a variety of techniques 
demonstrates how torture was a policy systematically planned and executed, 
rather than the aberrant behaviour of crazed individuals.
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The policy of disappearances in Argentina relied on an extensive network of 
clandestine detention centres. The Human Rights Secretariat confirmed the 
existence of 498 centres throughout Argentina. (Ginzberg, 2006] They were 
employed for the first time during the army's campaign against the ERP in 
Tucuman in 1975. (Malamud-Goti, 1996] These centres were an indispensable 
precondition for disappearances, as they were purposely set up for torture to be 
carried out without interruption. (Crenzel, 2008b] A noteworthy feature was the 
fact that, though some were located in isolated areas, the vast majority was 
established in neighbourhoods and central locations in cities. For Martin Hernan- 
Fraga, this was not casual but planned. These centres in fact served the double 
purpose of dealing with prisoners, while at the same time installing fear in society 
at large, as people living in their vicinity easily ‘saw what was happening there' 
(interview, 16/09/2008].
'We did not dare to kill them all (the political prisoners]
when we could have done so 
and one day we shall have to release them.
We must take advantage of the available time 
in order to make them go mad' 
Major Arguimides Maciel -  1976 
In: (Pearce, 1980:53)
Prolonged imprisonment was a deliberate long-term strategy in Uruguay. 
Former prisoners, upon being freed, knew they were closely watched and could be 
re-imprisoned at any moment. Prisoners were held in fifty-two centres, most of 
them official military sites. From 1975 onwards, due to overcrowding, the use of 
clandestine detention centres increased. Their location was not officially 
acknowledged, and this effectively placed them outside any control.
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About 3,500 of the 4,993 people prosecuted between 1972 and 1985 were held 
at the military prisons of Libertad (men) and Punta de Rieles (women). 
Overcrowding was a fundamental problem and inmates were confined to indoors 
for most of the day. Conditions of detention were inhumane. Hygiene was poor, 
and water scarce. When prisoners met during recreation period, communication 
was absolutely prohibited. They were also subject to unreasonable restrictions on 
communications with families: visits and correspondence were strictly controlled, 
regulated, and subject to censorship. Inmates faced apparently arbitrary 
punishment for trivial offences, were intimidated and harassed by prison guards. 
Women and Jewish prisoners, like in Argentina, received particularly brutal 
treatment. (SERPAJ, 1992) A special category of prisoners existed, whom 
experienced harsher imprisonment. These seventeen hostages, the Tupamaro 
leaders, were moved to undisclosed locations immediately after the coup, 
remaining under constant threat of execution for over a decade.
Although the Argentine Junta had re-introduced the death penalty, it was never 
legally employed. Rather, all executions were carried out in secret. The decision on 
the fate of detainees was taken at high levels, based on a consideration of the 
person's background, possible usefulness and chance of rehabilitation. (Romero, 
2007) The euphemism 'transfer' actually meant death in military jargon. Prisoners 
were told they would be transferred to other centres or rehabilitation farms. They 
were given injections to render them drowsy, unconscious, unable to resist. They 
were then loaded into trucks: some were thrown into the Atlantic or the River 
Plate from military airplanes. (Verbitsky, 2005) Others were murdered in open 
fields or left on streets in supposed exchanges of fire with security forces. In the
majority of cases, bodies were hidden and interred in unmarked section of 
cemeteries or mass graves, often dug beforehand by the victims themselves.
3.3 The End of Military Rule and Democratic Transition
The Argentine and Uruguayan military regimes endeavoured but abysmally 
failed to design and establish future institutional orders that would ensure military 
oversight over internal politics. The Argentine junta, totally humiliated by defeat in 
the Falklands, retreated largely powerless to the barracks. Their Uruguayan 
counterparts, despite having lost a plebiscite on the democradura (hard 
democracy) that they had wished to impose, could at least negotiate a way out and 
a (temporary) guarantee of impunity.
Conventional accounts of the Argentine transition take their starting point from 
the loss of the Falklands War in June 1982. Though this event signalled the 
beginning of the end of the dictatorship, it was not in itself a sufficient cause. 
Rather, it acted as the catalyst of a pre-existing situation. (Pion-Berlin, 1985)
In 1978, the Argentine junta had accomplished what it perceived as military 
victory against subversion. Efforts then focused on designing and constructing a 
political order in which the military would retain a major tutelary role. (Acuna & 
Smulovitz, 1997) Thus, the armed forces debated several questions, including the 
length of the exclusive military hegemony and possible political allies. (Gonzalez- 
Bombal, 1991)
In the eyes of the armed forces, the legitimacy they had acquired from winning 
the war against subversion bestowed upon them a new historical and political role. 
Military leaders then discussed various political projects that had two common
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elements: civilians had to (retroactively) endorse the repression, and future 
scrutiny of the past had to be avoided. (Acuna & Smulovitz, 1991)
The Junta began a political dialogue to obtain the backing of political leaders. 
The first round of these restricted discussions with political figures began in 1980 
under President Videla. The debate centred around possible political solutions and 
the required legislation for political parties and their normalisation. (Gonzalez- 
Bombal, 1991)
The failure of the government's economic policies and the collapse of the banks 
in 1980 was a critical juncture. It was against this backdrop of economic crisis and 
declining public support that General Viola became president. Similarly, Viola was 
also unable to achieve progress. Nationwide dissatisfaction with the government 
grew, together with mounting demands for change.
Several factors serve to explain why the regime was losing momentum. First, 
there were marked internal division surrounding economic plans and the political 
goals to be followed. Second, after years of silence, international and domestic 
support for HROs, together with rising accusations of human rights violations, 
deeply questioned the regime's legitimacy. Finally, escalating pressures arose from 
politicians, labour unions, the press and the judiciary to open up the system. 
(Arceneaux, 2001; McScherry, 1997a)
Under President Viola, a second round of dialogue occurred. Communications 
with political parties now became the norm, and suitable negotiators were party 
authorities, no longer individuals personally invited by the regime. Finally, the 
Peronist party was allowed to participate. At this stage, the government never hid 
the fact that its intention was to establish a political plan for transition, not just 
merely the discussion of technical questions on electoral legislation. (Gonzalez-
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Bombal, 1991) Viola's government lasted less than nine months, as in December 
1981 he was overthrown in an internal coup by Army Commander Galtieri. This 
act further exposed the deep internal power struggles that were unsettling the 
military, while simultaneously highlighting the inability of the regime to ensure 
stability.
In a context of profound military disagreements and rising social protests, 
President Galtieri took the ill-fated decision of invading the Falklands in April 
1982. The rationale for the invasion hinged on an attempt to unify the country and 
the armed forces, regain legitimacy and resolve the increasing economic and 
political unrest. (R. Munck, 1985) As it is well documented, this action ended in 
disaster, opening the way for transition. In fact, military defeat exacerbated the 
already existing internal conflicts and clearly exposed the government's lack of 
authority within society. (Acuna & Smulovitz, 1995; Romero, 2007)
Galtieri was forced to resign in June 1982 and Major General Bignone 
subsequently became president. At the time, the navy and the air force temporarily 
left the Junta, which was only re-established in September 1982. Meanwhile, 
political parties recovered their right to function and in July 1982, the 
Multipartidaria (uniting five parties, including the Peronist and the Radical) was 
created to devise a transitional programme to be agreed by civilian and military 
leaders. (Gonzalez-Bombal, 1991) The ban on political rallies was removed and 
social opposition grew stronger: around 100,000 people gathered in May Square in 
December 1982 to call for the restoration of civilian rule.
As a result, the government was forced to re-define its political strategy. It no 
longer sought to generate its own party, but was forced to negotiate a way out with 
political opposition. Taking advantage of a lack of resolve and consensus among
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political parties regarding the re-establishment of political institutions, the regime 
was able to retain control over the timing and the unfolding of the transition, 
imposing new statutes regulating political parties, electoral rules and attempting 
to limit the civilian government (McSherry, 1997a; Romero, 2007)
Unlike Uruguay, the military did not achieve a negotiated exit, but nonetheless 
unilaterally imposed some intransigent conditions. The April 1983 Final Report on 
the War against Subversion and Terrorism contended that the 1975 constitutional 
government had authorised the war against subversion and all the disappeared 
were either terrorists or had gone into hiding/exile. The Institutional Act affirmed, 
on the other hand, that all military operations had been ordered by the high 
command and so should be considered as acts of service, i.e. not subject to 
punishment. Third, the September 1983 Law of National Pacification was in fact a 
self-amnesty enacted for members of both armed groups and the armed forces, 
covering the crimes committed between May 1973 and June 1982. Finally, Decree 
2726/83 ordered the destruction of all documents relating to the repression.
National elections, held in October 1983, saw the victory of Radical Party 
candidate Raul Alfonsin who had been the most vocal in stating his desire for the 
return to the rule of law, as well as a commitment to investigate the truth and 
provide justice regarding the events of the past. (R. Munck, 1985)
The seeds of transition in Uruguay were planted rather early into the 
dictatorship. In June 1976, a fundamental event occurred, labelled by the journalist 
Alfonso Lessa as 'a key historical juncture' (interview, 17/09/2007).
For some time, President Bordaberry had been discussing his political plans 
with the armed forces. Bordaberry believed that new institutions were needed for
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the country. Political parties were the source of all ills and should be eliminated 
once and for all. (Caetano & Rilla, 1987; Lessa, 2007) However, his proposals were 
rejected and Bordaberry deposed. The armed forces did not want to share ‘the 
historical responsibility of suppressing the traditional political parties'. (Zubillaga 
in: Gonzalez, 1991:59) The military instead believed that it was not the political 
parties that were problematic, but its leaders (Lessa interview). Thus, they 
favoured reforming the parties and political lists. The military's approach was 
indeed consistent with its view that its participation in political life should be 
exceptional, effectively limited to a transitional phase (Demasi interview, 
28/08/2008).
In August 1977, the government released a political cronograma (timetable) 
that provided for a national plebiscite on a draft constitution in November 1980, 
the reintroduction of political parties in 1981 and elections with a single candidate. 
(Martinez, 2007) The proposed Constitution was a hybrid that combined 
traditional roots and the national security doctrine. It was drafted by the 
Commission on Political Affairs (COMASPO) without consultation with political 
parties or the public. Amongst its main provisions, it included the application of 
military jurisdiction over civilians for subversive crimes, direct responsibility in 
national security for the armed forces, the concentration of power in the Executive 
and a reduced role for trade unions and political parties. It also guaranteed direct 
military presence in key decision-making bodies and provided for the conversion 
of all the institutional acts decreed during the regime into constitutional law. 
(Caetano & Rilla, 1987; Weinstein, 1988) Had the text been approved, it would
have effectively entailed the acceptance of all the previous actions of the military 
and the creation of a new type of authoritarianism. (Crespo-Martfnez, 2002]
With a turnout of 85.2%, the constitutional project was rejected by 57.9% of 
votes. This result demonstrated beyond doubt a popular dismissal of the 
foundational attempt, and constituted one of the few instances in the world where 
the military lost a plebiscite and accepted its outcome.
This electoral defeat is normally taken as the conventional beginning in 
accounts of the Uruguayan transition. Nonetheless, this author agrees with Alfonso 
Lessa that, had the military accepted Bordaberiy's proposal of eliminating the 
parties, events would have invariably been different
Losing the popular consultation did create what has been defined 'an expected 
opening' for democratic actors. (Gonzalez, 1983:63) Nonetheless, it did not 
produce a rapid transition.
In Uruguay there are purportedly two speeds, slow and very slow, according to 
MP Diego Canepa (interview, 13/09/2007). It should thus not surprise us that, 
despite the victory of the NO, it still took another four years of negotiations, during 
which the military was able to hold on to power, despite lacking both internal and 
external legitimacy. (Achard, 1992; Arteaga, 2000)
The plebiscite only reduced restrictions but it did not automatically produce 
democratisation. In December 1980, the government declared the 1977 
cronograma null and void, and a new political plan was to be devised. Eight months 
of political and military silence passed before a new political cronograma was in 
fact announced (Demasi interview). According to Demasi, 'it was a period of great 
uncertainty, [...] without a clear trajectory and no objective conditions to say
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whether the regime would go or stay'. Significantly, the idea of transition itself only 
emerged in 1981, when General Alvarez became President.
In July 1981, the new cronograma put political parties at the nucleus of the 
transition, set up a dialogue with non-proscribed party leaders21, the appointment 
of a transitional President, internal party elections in 1982, national elections for 
November 1984, and the new president who would take over in 1985.
1982 was characterised by the return of political parties, with the opposition 
finally re-legalised. Fundamental Law n°2, the Statute of Political Parties, legalised 
the Colorado, Blanco and the small Union Civica (Civic Union]. Nonetheless, several 
political authorities still had their political rights suspended, including Blanco 
leader Ferreira-Aldunate. The internal elections of November 1982 yet again 
produced a disastrous political defeat. Anti-military candidates received 91% of 
Blanco votes and 72% of Colorado votes. (Weinstein, 1988] The military was for a 
second time massively repudiated and this legitimised political opposition, 
transforming it into a privileged interlocutor of transition. (Caetano & Rilla, 1994]
s. The regime loosened restrictions on political movements, and protest against 
the dictatorship was led by the new trade union, the Assembly of Inter-Union 
Workers (PIT-CNT), the students association, the Social and Cultural Association of 
Students of Public Education, and the largest human rights NGO, the Peace and 
Justice Service (SERPAJ]. There were two key events. The first, on May 1, was 
organised by the nascent trade union movements under the slogans freedom, 
work, pay, and amnesty. The second on November 27, saw a substantial 
congregation of around 400,000 Uruguayans gather at the feet of the Obelisk in
21 All the parties constituting the Frente Amplio coalition in 1971 continued to be banned.
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Batlle Park of Montevideo, calling ‘for a Democratic Uruguay, without exclusions', 
and an immediate return to the 1967 Constitution, and free and fair elections open 
to all. (Caetano & Rilla, 1994; Martinez, 2007)
Talks ongoing from May 1983 between military commanders and 
representatives of the Blanco, Colorado and Union Civica at the Parque Hotel 
collapsed over issues of national security in July. Among the major points of 
contention were the length of time that subversive suspects could be held without 
trial, the jurisdiction of military courts and the definition of national security. 
(Gillespie, 1991)
At this time, a tension existed between two competing exit strategies. The 
approach of the Colorados focused on moderation and was less confrontational. It 
perceived the regime as strong and, hence, unrelenting mobilisation was seen as 
only delaying the transition. The Blancos were supportive of negotiations but 
called for a stronger approach. They wished to weaken the regime through 
continued mobilisation, pressure and radical opposition. This would accordingly 
produce a situation in which political parties would be stronger when sitting at the 
negotiating table and thus permitting them to make fewer concessions (Heber 
interview, 3/09/2008).
The transitional process, hesitant at first, became much more efficient and 
coherent by early 1984. In March, Frente Amplio leader Liber Seregni was freed 
from prison, and his plan for the Left focused on mobilisation, negotiation and 
compromise. At the same time, the military gave up its project of a party, softening
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some of its requests. (Martinez, 2007) Finally, in July 1984, the regime also re­
legalised the Frente Amplio and its constituent parties.
The military was then internally split. Hardliners, like Alvarez, wished to hold 
on to power and did not feel that enough guarantees were being provided 
(Sanguinetti interview, 21/08/2007). A more conciliatory sector favoured instead 
an exit from power that protected the institutional unity of the armed forces 
(Gonzalez-Guyer interview, 29/08/2008). The pro-negotiating faction was 
strengthened when General Medina became Commander-in-Chief. Medina skilfully 
led the military's exit in a context of economic crisis, international pressures and a 
substantial risk that retaining power may result in the break up of the institution 
(Gonzalez-Guyer). His political counterpart was Julio-Maria Sanguinetti of the 
Colorado Party who has been regarded as 'the great architect of the transitional 
moment' (Lessa interview). Likewise, the journalist Bleier pointed to 'the political 
wisdom of Sanguinetti that coordinated the transition for his own personal benefit 
as he had ambitions of becoming President'. 'Of all the leaders, Sanguinetti was the 
most knowledgeable on the military question and this enabled him to be 
personally efficient in dealing with the military' (interview, 29/08/2008).
In late July 1984, the Colorado, Union Civica and Frente Amplio parties meeting 
with the Commanders, agreed the Acuerdo del Club Naval that set up a timetable 
for the return of democracy. It restored the pre-existing political system (including 
the 1967 Constitution), called for national elections for November 1984, and the 
new president to take over in March 1985. As in Argentina, dealing with the legacy 
of past human rights crimes proved to be a thorny issue for this newly established 
democratic administration. It is to these questions that we now turn.
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4The Politics of Transitional Justice -  Argentina and Uruguay, 1980s to 2009
In the early 1980s, Argentina was one of the first countries to emerge from 
military rule, second only to Bolivia. Kathryn Sikkink aptly defines Argentina's 
human rights trajectory as one from ‘pariah state to global protagonist'. This 
description is forged by the remarkable evolution witnessed from the years of 
systematic disappearances in the 1970s to Argentina's pioneering developments 
with accountability for past crimes since the 1980s. (Sikkink, 2008:1) On the other 
hand, Uruguay, despite being a regional model for democracy, chose a rather 
different path in coming to terms with its legacy of human rights crimes upon 
democratisation. Uruguay's transition was possibly less exciting than the 
disastrous defeat of the Argentine Junta in the Falklands conflict. Nonetheless, the 
Uruguayan path of amnesty and oblivion -so strikingly different from Argentina's 
own efforts, offers an interesting comparison when looking at various ways to 
confront past evils.
In many respects, Uruguay's experience of TJ was very much Uruguayan. 
Negotiations, pacts, concern with stability and governability, slow and conciliatory 
attitudes have been enduring features of this tiny state. Conversely, Argentina 
required a clear break with a long heritage of military interventionism -six coups 
in just 46 years. As former President Raul Alfonsm highlights, the issue was really 
one of ‘establishing new foundations for an authentic democratic system', 
generating new institutions, routines, habits and novel ways for people to learn to 
live together. (Alfonsm, 1993:15)
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This chapter contends that three phases of TJ can be identified in the wake of 
transition. In the first phase, Argentina and Uruguay adopted almost opposite 
approaches. Argentina, under the leadership of Alfonsm, confronted the 
inheritance of human rights violations head on via a truth commission and 
prosecutions. Uruguay, conversely, followed the lead of President Sanguinetti who 
successfully imposed oblivion and silence over matters relating to the past. In the 
second stage, Argentina and Uruguay's positions became increasingly aligned. In 
both countries, by the early 1990s a mantle of amnesia had been spread over the 
years of military rule and associated crimes. Or so the respective governments 
wished. In the background, HROs and committed individuals such as the Michelini 
brothers worked relentlessly to ensure that the issues of the past remained, in 
some way, under consideration. However, it was not until the beginning of the 21st 
century that issues of accountability forcefully returned to the social and political 
arenas. It is during this third and current phase that these two countries have 
adopted similar stances, attempting to explore their pasts from the perspectives of 
truth, justice and memory.
The progression of these three phases can be explained with reference to a 
number of factors. Particularly relevant were the following: the differing 
Presidential leaderships and the diverse approaches they adopted to the question 
of the past. Second, the attitude of the armed forces that, despite being politically 
defeated, had retained a significant amount of power. With this continuing 
influence, the military attempted to control TJ initiatives, enjoying more success in 
the early years and less so as time went by. Third, HROs were constant and 
persistent actors in Argentina and Uruguay that, notwithstanding defeats and
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numerous obstacles, kept the flame of truth and justice burning over the years. 
Fourth, the judiciary was also essential; capable of influencing the momentum 
towards accountability or restraining it. Finally, equally significant were the 
developments on the international stage. When Argentina and Uruguay originally 
emerged from authoritarianism, human rights concerns were not a priority on the 
international political agenda. The end of the Cold War however prompted a move 
towards international justice. Especially significant for the region was the arrest of 
General Pinochet which sparked a renewed concern with issues of the past that 
reverberated throughout the Southern Cone, galvanising local actors.
4.1 Truth and Justice vs. Silence (1983 to 1990)
According to Ricardo Gil-Lavedra, judge at the 1985 Trial against the Military 
Commanders, Argentina is 'one of the most important examples in the world' for 
TJ. It had a truth commission, the 1984 CONADEP, it paid reparations to the victims 
of state terrorism and carried out justice 'in two phases', first against those with 
maximum responsibility -the Commanders, and then the cycle was completed 
twenty years later, culminating with the re-opening of the trials brought to an end 
by the amnesty laws adopted in the late 1980s (Gil-Lavedra interview, 
22/08/2007].
On the other hand, there is the feeling that Uruguay is a kind of 'laggard' (my 
term] when it comes to questions of accountability. The lack of up-to-date 
scholarly material on Uruguay is evidence of this.
Argentina and Uruguay emerged from military rule within just over a year of 
each other, December 1983 vs. March 1985. As some of my Uruguayan 
interviewees told me, Uruguay is always a keen observer of events in Argentina
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and there is a strong relationship between the two countries (Demasi, Miranda 
interviews, 28/08/2008; 29/08/2008).
So it should not come as a surprise that in framing its approach to TJ, Uruguay 
kept an eye on what was occurring just next door. On the other hand, this author 
concurs with David Pion-Berlin who contends that this 'contagion effect' should 
not be overestimated. Indeed, in this early phase, the spill-over from Argentina 
into Uruguay was limited. (Pion-Berlin, 1993:123-125) In fact, Uruguay was 
already set in its path of amnesty from the early days of transition. Events taking 
place in Argentina, particularly the military rebellions of the late 1980s, were 
neatly used by President Sanguinetti to prove the point that his approach to the 
past was the correct one. But let us start from the beginning.
In accounting for the different ways in which Argentina and Uruguay decided to 
confront their past evils, several factors should be considered. Both within the 
literature and my interviews disagreement abounds, clearly demonstrating how 
such complex processes of TJ cannot be reduced to mono-causal explanations 
relating solely to either specific actors or factors. Instead, several elements need to 
be explored in order to create a panoramic view of the processes of TJ.
With regard to Argentina, the decision to directly confront the crimes of the past 
can be explained with reference to the following: the collapse nature of transition, 
the legal strategy adopted by the government of President Alfonsm, the role of 
HROs, and the initial weakness of the armed forces.
When discussing the early years of transition in Argentina, most of my 
interviews pointed to different actors and events that shaped the way TJ policies 
were implemented. The mode of transition is an essential factor which makes the
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Argentine case exceptional. Unlike neighbouring countries, the Argentine regime 
retreated from power in what I like to define as a case of 'peculiar collapse'.
Although there were no negotiations like in Uruguay, the military was not 
totally defeated either. Indeed, over fifteen months passed between the defeat in 
the Falklands War in June 1982 and the take-over of the democratically elected 
president in December 1983. This shows how the armed forces still retained 
sufficient power to supervise democratisation, whilst organising quite an orderly 
retreat. On the other hand, politicians were unable to fully exploit the situation, 
supporting instead the last junta of General Bignone that implemented a controlled 
and limited decompression of the dictatorship. (Agiiero, 1998; Lopez, 1994)
As Gaston Chillier, executive director of the Centro de Estudios Legales y 
Sociales (Centre for Legal and Social Studies, CELS) suggests, the defeat at the 
Falkands exacerbated an already existing situation in which the inefficiency of the 
regime was already under the spotlight, given the denunciation of human rights 
violations and the economic crisis (interview, 30/08/2007). Luis Fonderbrider of 
the Equipo Argentino de Antropologia Forense (Argentine Forensic Anthropology 
Team, EAAF) concurs, pointing to the fact that the defeat in the war, the economic 
crisis and international denunciations triggered a series of circumstances that 
were conducive to the development of social mobilisation against the regime -even 
by those that initially had supported it, that forced the military to accept free 
elections (interview, 24/08/2007). In sum, the Falklands War, in the words of 
Pion-Berlin, was not in itself a sufficient cause, but acted as the catalyst of a pre­
existing situation. (Pion-Berlin, 1985)
This unusual end to the regime is an essential building block for later TJ policies. 
For the academic Catalina Smulovitz, the adoption of a legalistic approach to the
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question of the past is 'totally related to the exit from military rule’. Indeed, the 
collapse of the regime permitted the selection of this legalistic path and its 
strengthening over time (interview, 23/09/2008]. Having said that, it is also 
important to emphasise how the elections were won by the candidate who had 
demonstrated a greater commitment to human rights. While the Peronist 
Candidate Italo Luder had contended that he would respect the amnesty law 
enacted by the outgoing junta, Alfonsm promised instead to investigate human 
rights violations. (Nino, 1991) The theme of human rights was indeed at the heart 
of Alfonsin's electoral campaign. His position was that Argentina could not achieve 
a full recovery without responding to the military's crimes. For Ricardo Gil- 
Lavedra, in selecting the path of justice, Alfonsm proposed something innovative: 
democracy could not be restored on the basis of immorality, it was necessary to 
work for truth and justice (interview).
It is highly likely, as the historian Vera Carnovale contends, that Alfonsin's 
victory was very much linked to his electoral platform and the promise of 
prosecuting the military (interview, 12/09/2008). Alfonsin's personal 
commitment to human rights is essential. He was a founding member of the 
Asamblea Permanente por los Derechos Humanos (Permanent Assembly for Human 
Rights, APDH), established in 1975 to respond to systematic human rights 
violations. Moreover, he had defended political prisoners throughout the 
dictatorship. As Pion-Berlin rightly suggests, had another candidate won, 
accountability policies would have been rather different. (Pion-Berlin, 1993) The 
sociologist Marcos Novaro agrees, stressing how the question of human rights in 
Argentina largely existed thanks to Alfonsm who introduced the idea of a revision 
of the past during transition, opening 'a judicial way that few really trusted in the
beginning and feared would end badly' (interview, 10/09/2008]. Indeed in 
February 1982, when the Junta was looking for a negotiated exit from power, 
conditional on a commitment not to carry out revisionism, Andres D'Alessio, judge 
at the 1985 trial against the Military Commanders and personal friend of the 
President, recalls how Alfonsm already believed that the judiciary could not refuse 
to provide answers to the question of the disappeared (interview, 17/09/2008).
For Catalina Smulovitz and the politician Graciela Fernandez-Meijide (also 
member of the CONADEP) Alfonsin's selection of a legal strategy for the past was 
facilitated by the existence of organisations like the CELS and APDH that had 
adopted such a perspective on human rights during military rule. Furthermore, 
several lawyers such as Rabossi, Nino and Malamud-Goti -later presidential 
advisers, had previously been working on the human rights question from such a 
perspective (Smulovitz, Fernandez-Meijide interviews, 23/09/2008,17/08/2007).
Alfonsin’s legal strategy had three elements. It was to equally condemn state 
terrorism and anti-state political violence. In fact, Presidential decrees 157 and 
158 of December 1983 respectively ordered the trial of seven guerrilla leaders for 
homicide, illicit association, public instigation to commit crimes, apology of crime 
and other attacks against public order, and that of nine military commanders for 
homicide, unlawful deprivation of freedom and torture. Second, prosecutions 
would be carried out by the military itself, a policy of self-judgment or self­
purification so that the institution could be rehabilitated into the democratic arena. 
Third, trials were to be restricted in duration and scope to officers in a position of 
command. This was to be achieved by applying the concept of due obedience and 
the three levels of responsibility. Both Raul Alfonsm and Andres D'Alessio recall
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how it had been Jorge Sabato' idea (later State Secretary for Foreign Affairs and 
son of Ernesto Sabato that chaired the CONADEP) to distinguish between different 
degrees. The scheme was endorsed by all of the President's advisors as a way of 
reconciling demands for truth and justice from society and consolidating 
democracy at a time when the military still had enough power to destabilise the 
new government (Alfonsm, D'Alessio interviews, 7/11/2008; 17/09/2008).
Accordingly, different responsibility had to be attributed to first those who had 
planned, had the supreme authority over the repression and given the 
accompanying orders; to those who, regardless of whether they were acting in 
compliance with orders, had committed atrocious or aberrant acts; and, finally to 
those who, in the situation of general confusion and compulsion, complied with 
orders perpetrating lesser offences. (Roehrig, 2002:61) Only offenders falling into 
the first two categories would be prosecuted. Although the government had this 
rather clear vision of how accountability was to be achieved, the eventual outcome 
was, according to Fernandez-Meijide, beyond its control. Once the policy interacted 
with society, it took a dynamic of its own, changing from the original idea 
(interview, 17/08/2007).
Within a few days of taking over, President Alfonsm established the extra- 
parliamentary Comision National sobre la Desaparicion de Personas (National 
Commission for the Disappearance of Persons, CONADEP). Created by presidential 
decree 187 and part of the Interior Ministry, the Commission was tasked with 
clarifying the facts relating to the disappearances that had occurred between 
March 1976 and December 1983. Composed of highly reputable public figures, the 
CONADEP worked for nine months collecting testimonies and inspecting former
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detention centres. In September 1984, it concluded that during military rule 
human rights had been violated in a systematic and organic manner with similar 
features on a national scale.
As the first truth commission to ever complete its final report and receive 
widespread international attention, the CONADEP has attracted both criticism and 
praise. Alba Lanzillotto from the Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo (Grandmothers of May 
Square, hereafter Abuelas) contends that 'the CONADEP was not what was being 
requested [by the HROs]' that was instead a bicameral commission, as the latter 
would have more power to investigate (interview, 3/09/2007). Similarly, the 
Mothers were the only organisation that in 1984 requested their members not to 
give testimony before the Commission, although some did so in the end. (Crenzel, 
2006) Many other groups and individuals were dissatisfied with Alfonsin's 
decision, in what some saw as an attempt to limit the investigation. (Asociacion- 
Madres interview, 30/08/2007) The Executive, on the other hand, was against a bi­
cameral commission, fearing possible adverse reactions and rebellions from the 
armed forces (Fernandez-Meijide interview).
Fernandez-Meijide, in charge of the CONADEP's office for denunciations, 
emphasises how the work of the Commission 'awakened' society by providing a lot 
of information. Several of its members gave an impetus to the investigation and 
'we worked as if we were public prosecutor', something the government could not 
anticipate (interview, 17/08/2007). Despite the fact that the CONADEP was clearly 
mandated to investigate only the crime of disappearances, its work, according to 
the sociologist Emilio Crenzel, was fundamental in gathering information and 
constructing a corpus of evidence that was later used in the Trial of the 
Commanders (interview, 18/08/2007).
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For Gaston Chillier, the CONADEP, together with the Trial, was one of the means 
employed by the President to comply with his electoral promises on human rights 
(interview]. Overall, as several interviewees agree, the CONADEP was instrumental 
in lifting the veil of secrecy that surrounded the repression. Thanks to it, a vast 
majority of society is familiar with the events of the repression and, as Patricia 
Valdez (director of NGO Memoria Abierta, Open Memory) points out, the average 
Argentine citizen, unlike in other countries, has a good knowledge of what 
disappearances and clandestine detention centres were like. The CONADEP, and 
later the Trial, played a key part in this, raising awareness and challenging denial 
over events of the past that had prevailed during the years of military rule (Valdez, 
D’Alessio interviews).
The Executive eventually proved unable to contain the scope of the trials as 
originally planned. Amendments already introduced by the opposition to Law 
23.049 (reforming the Code of Military Justice in February 1984) proved fatal in 
precluding the indiscriminate use of the concept of due obedience, so thwarting 
Alfonsin's strategy to limited trials from the start. (Acuna & Smulovitz, 1995)
The 1985 Trial of the Commanders still represented a noteworthy policy 
success. The trial was unprecedented in Latin America, where amnesia was 
traditionally the norm, capturing much public attention and scrutiny at home and 
abroad. (Pion-Berlin, 1997) Furthermore, the trial established a sort of 'global 
truth on the illegal methods of repression’, disseminating information about the 
secret systematic violation of human rights, and endorsing the accounts of the 
survivors (D'Alessio interview). The Trial constitutes an emblematic moment in 
Argentine history: having produced parallels with Nuremberg (Pastor interview,
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1/9/2007), it has acquired an almost mythical dimensions, coming to constitute a 
sort of'founding scene of the Argentine democracy' (Carnovale interview).
Nevertheless, critiques do exist. The most outspoken are the Mothers from 
Asociacion Madres de Plaza de Mayo (Mothers of May Square Association, 
Asociacion-Madres) who labelled the Trial 'a parody for the world to compliment 
on the bravery of Argentina' (interview). Their position on accountability is 
extremely retributive, as they would like every single person who participated in 
the repression to be prosecuted, unlikely to ever happen both logistically and 
morally. Alba Lanzillotto further points to how the armed forces were never 
actually prosecuted for usurping power, which 'is the first of their sins', and were 
only tried for the crimes that they perpetrated (interview, 3/09/2007).
A more solid and interesting critique comes from Jaime Malamud-Goti, senior 
presidential advisor between 1983 and 1987. Malamud-Goti sees the Trial, and 
human rights trials more generally, as recreating the bipolar interpretation of the 
world of guilty vs. innocent that prevailed during state terrorism. Accordingly, 
society shifted its focus to the military as the sole explanation for their suffering, 
contributing to the widely shared perspective that those that were not prosecuted 
were simply innocent. By pinning blame only on the security forces, trials 
inevitably over-simplify history, as no middle ground exists between innocent and 
guilty. (Malamud-Goti, 1996, 2005) These two categories eclipse more nuanced 
understandings, blurring the social and political context that contributed to the 
state of affairs during state terrorism (interview, 3/09/2007). In sum, most 
Argentines refused to accept that terror had originated from the very entrails of 
their community.
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By 1986, thousands of criminal charges against security forces were presented 
to the courts and prosecutions risked spiralling out of control. Consequently, the 
Executive took several measures to prevent this. Instructions to Military 
Prosecutors were issued, in order to radically reduce the number of proceedings 
and speed up trials. Outstanding cases were to be merged together according to 
repressive agencies or territorial jurisdiction as under the Proceso, and then all 
charges were to be dropped for those following orders, dismissing as many cases 
as possible. (Acuna, 2006; Lee-Crawford, 1990) However, the move totally 
backfired when the civilian judiciary decided to take over the case loads from 
military courts.
Over 6,000 cases had been presented to the courts by December 1986. It was 
then that, according to Malamud-Goti, the ‘whole process was going astray' and the 
feeling was ‘to secure what had been achieved or risk jeopardising everything if we 
carried on' (interview). It was in this context of rising charges, increased military 
restlessness and disputes to the authority of the Executive that the Full Stop Law 
was approved. It established a 60-day deadline for summoning alleged human 
rights offenders, otherwise all cases would be extinguished after 22 February 
1987. The enactment of the law again had a boomerang effect, triggering a flurry of 
judicial activity. While it had been hoped that additional indictments would be 
minimal, 30 to 40, by the deadline almost 500 new cases had been filed. (Roniger, 
1997b) The government's move was not enough to prevent the occurrence of the 
Holy Week military uprising of April 1987. For Gil-Lavedra, it is clear that 
continuing with the trials of lower-ranking officers triggered military rebellions 
that, in turn, led to the enactment of the amnesty laws (interview). Likewise, 
Malamud-Goti believes that 'we should have stuck to the top [leadership] and not
gone after the lower ranks' (interview]. But, as he contended, where do you 
actually draw the line?
In light of the events, the Executive adopted, in June 1987, the Due Obedience 
law effectively ending prosecutions. It instituted the legality of following orders, 
exonerating chief officers, subordinate officers, sub-officers, and troops in armed, 
security, prison forces; rape, economic crimes and disappearance or identity 
forgery of minors were not covered. Although, according to Alfonsm, this proposal 
reflected his initial approach on levels of responsibility (interview), the fact that 
the Law was adopted so soon after the rebellion strengthened the perception that 
it had been a concession to the military. (Pion-Berlin, 1997) It goes without saying 
that the Full Stop and Due Obedience laws, despite their nice wording, were widely 
perceived as amnesty laws and thus forcefully rejected by the HROs. Alba 
Lanzillotto emphasised 'how the laws destroyed everything that had been 
achieved' (interview, 11/9/2008). For Gil-Lavedra, the laws were ‘amnesties under 
cover' which 'reflected the military's dissatisfaction and the difficulty for the 
civilian government to continue progressing with the trials' (interview).
It is clear that, as time progressed, the armed forces recovered from their initial 
situation of political and military defeat. The military had in fact emerged from 
military rule vertically broken, due to inter-branch disagreements and power 
struggles. However, by the mid-1980s when human rights trials, seen as attacking 
the military's corporate identity, began reaching further down the hierarchy, the 
armed forces began to come out of their previous state of shock. (Gillespie, 1989) 
Although all the military rebellions were eventually suppressed, they still 
demonstrated how the use of force could bring results, with the number of judicial 
proceedings dropping from 450 to 20. Nonetheless, these uprisings led to
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horizontal fracturing within the institution. For the academic and human rights 
activist Carlos Acuna, increasing tensions and factionalism arose, predominantly 
between junior officers and senior-level commanders. The former believed they 
were facing the brunt of prosecutions, when the commanders, who had given them 
orders, escaped all responsibility (interview, 18/09/2008).
Alfonsm was forced to resign six months ahead of schedule in July 1989 due to 
the poor state of the economy. Just a few months before, events at La Tablada had 
boosted military and right-wing's suspicions of connections between left-wing 
terrorism and human rights. This strengthened the position of the armed forces, 
weakening the government's image and the case for trials and justice. (Acuna & 
Smulovitz, 1991; Wright, 2007)
In such a context, President Menem set about his policy of forgiving-and- 
forgetting the recent past. The enactment of two sets of presidential pardons 
effectively reversed all the advances achieved under the previous administration, 
setting Argentina on a similar footing to Uruguay.
Responses to Menem's policy were mixed. Several of my interviewees pointed 
to the massive rejection by society. Alba Lanzillotto recounted how she could still 
remember demonstrations against the President's decision with people filling 
blocks and blocks (interview, 11/09/2008). Likewise, Vera Carnovale described 
how usually demonstrations in Argentina are loud and cheerful, with singing and 
dancing. However, during the marches against the pardons, silence prevailed, only 
interrupted by the word 'NO' being shouted (interview). Conversely, Malamud-Goti 
felt that 'people were not that depressed' or distraught over the end of the trials 
(interview).
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Although it might appear prima facie that, through the pardons, impunity 
prevailed, this was not the case. As Ines Gonzalez-Bombal rightly contends, the 
truth of the trials persisted and the pardons could not invalidate the crimes 
committed, but could only suspend punishment. (Gonzalez-Bombal, 1995) 
Moreover, even though the pardons did minimise some of the punishments 
received by the military, the situation of Argentina still cannot not be compared to 
other cases where, from the very outset, amnesty laws or amnesia prevented any 
investigation or judgement. (Acuna & Smulovitz, 1995) Overall, as the academic 
Hugo Vezzetti explained, one needs to distinguish between Alfonsin's amnesty 
laws that did not apply to the military commanders and other symbolic chiefs like 
Camps, and Menem's strategy. With the latter, 'it was a different approach' as 
Menem was unwilling to establish any distinction, thinking it was simply necessary 
to forget and move on' (interview, 17/09/2008).
Uruguay's trajectory in TJ is very Uruguayan, reflecting the country's traditional 
culture of reaching consensus. The way in which the legacy of military rule was 
confronted resulted from a unique combination of factors: the negotiated nature of 
transition, the policy of oblivion endorsed by the government, the low profile and 
limited weight of HROs, and lastly, the residual power of the Armed Forces.
As human rights lawyer Pilar Elhordoy-Arregui points out, Uruguay is 'a country 
of pacts', where you can find a long tradition of negotiations and agreements 
(interview, 11/09/2007). Indeed, several other interviewees concurred on this 
point. Particularly, President Sanguinetti (1985-1990; 1995-2000) underscored 
how 'the uniqueness of Uruguay is in fact the long negotiation' that produced a 
different transition compared to Argentina (interview, 21/09/2007). The
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President further outlined how the Navy Club Pact (NCP) had been an 'excellent' 
outcome, ‘a fortunate agreement' that produced a democracy free from 
institutional limitations or military shackles unlike Chile's (interview).
In fact, the NCP stood at the heart of Uruguay's transition and directly affected 
the way in which the question of the past was addressed. Much mythology 
surrounds the NCP and the question of whether the amnesty for the military was 
agreed then. Sanguinetti vehemently denies that: 'we never talked about 
amnesties' (interview). The President recognises that it is now 'fashionable' to say 
that the amnesty was negotiated but he contends that at the time there were no 
denunciations against the military so the issue was not raised. 'The subject was 
another', he continued, 'what to do with political prisoners, and yes that was a 
subject that was there', but 'we kept our mouth shut, as it would have been stupid 
to talk about it\ 'We were not going to say, gentlemen hand over power and then 
we will set free those guerrilleros you were fighting against'. The military were not 
ingenuous and they knew something like this could occur: but they were the ones 
that wanted to leave, so they did not mention it either (interview).
The historian Gerardo Caetano concurs, saying that he does not believe that the 
future amnesty law was negotiated, similarly claiming that the subject was left on 
the side (interview, 4/09/2008). Alexandra Brito recounts how General Medina, 
the Army Commander sitting at the discussions, stated that 'we all knew that the 
issue of revisionism and trying the military was pending. We all knew as well that 
if these issues were placed on the negotiating table things would be complicated 
and we were all extremely interested in finding a way out'. (Brito, 1997:76-77)
Conversely, Graciela Romero, lawyer at the Servicio Paz y  Justicia (Peace and 
Justice Service, SERPAJ) suggests that judicial protection was agreed then, to later
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be crystallised in the Expiry Law (interview, 7/09/2007). Senator Luis-Alberto 
Heber of the Blanco party agrees, asserting that his party always denounced -to its 
own detriment, that the question of the amnesty was on the negotiating table, 
looking ‘like the ones that did not want an exit from the regime' (interview 
3/09/2008).
Whatever the truth on the matter is, the academic Jose Rilla summarises the 
state of affairs well. Despite there being no concrete proof or evidence that the 
amnesty was decided then, it is important to recognise that the logic of negotiated 
transitions presupposes concessions and silences from both sides (interview, 
26/08/2008). Moreover, the NCP did generate some conditions, like the 
proscription of symbolic Blanco leader Ferreira-Aldunate at the 1984 elections 
that later converged in the amnesty law and complicated the revision of the past 
(Caetano, Michelini interviews). The NCP restored the previous political system 
and implied a tacit recognition of the military's institutional autonomy, 
legitimating them as political actors. It was therefore highly unlikely, according to 
Brito (1997), that the future executive would break the rules of the game, by 
promoting the trial of one of the parties to the pact.
Unlike Argentina where President Alfonsm won the elections thanks to his 
human rights manifesto, the election of Sanguinetti in Uruguay 'limited the chances 
of doing justice from the very beginning' for Maria-Elena Martinez, Director of the 
Human Rights department of the Ministry of Education and Culture (MEC) 
(interview, 21/08/2007). Luis Gonzalez rightly argues that Uruguay's transition 
was a restoration, where the political regime existing before the authoritarian 
parenthesis was basically reinstated. (Gonzalez, 1991)
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Diego Canepa, MP for the Nuevo Espacio-Frente Amplio coalition, remarked how 
Sanguinetti's emphasis was on the Cambio en Paz [peaceful change) which is very 
Uruguayan. Accordingly, it was important to know which direction was being 
taken, clearly 'defining where we are going', while the rhythm is less significant, 
'taking more or less time' is not a problem, and radicalism or sudden changes are 
to be avoided [interview, 13/09/2007). Thus, the government argued that to 
render effective this peace, it was necessary to turn the page on the past and look 
to the future. The consolidation of democracy involved steering well clear of 
revisionisms of the dictatorial period. Claims of truth and justice were 
incompatible with this strategy, as they would provoke the military and cause 
institutional destabilisation. [Demasi & Yaffe, 2005)
Indeed, as Diego Achard highlights, the prevailing logic during transition and 
afterwards was that of coexistence. [Achard, 1992) For the journalist Gerardo 
Bleier, 'stability is a cultural factor': all the major political leaders of the time 
[Sanguinetti, Seregni and Ferreira-Aldunate) were fully aware of the importance of 
governability to avoid internal conflict [interview, 29/08/2008). Unlike its 
neighbours, ‘Uruguay cannot afford conflict' and so the vocation of building 
stability 'is part of the national democratic culture' [Bleier interview). Indeed, 
when Blanco leader Ferreira-Aldunate was freed from imprisonment after the 
elections, he promised to support democracy and work for governability together 
with the winning Colorado administration [Heber, Demasi interviews)
Sanguinetti showed an ambiguous attitude regarding accountability, contending 
he would not undertake official policies to ensure justice, but neither would he 
prevent individuals from presenting cases to the courts. [Brito, 2001b) His main
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emphasis was instead pacification, enacting Amnesty Law 15,737 for political 
prisoners. His administration adopted further provisions to facilitate the return of 
exiles and their reintegration, as well as targeting all those that had been unfairly 
dismissed under the regime. None of the political parties really took up the 
banners of truth and justice, as the Radical Party did in Argentina. (Brito, 1997)
Nevertheless, given the government's failure to make advances on the question 
of the past, in April 1985, the Frente Amplio and the Blancos -the two parties most 
committed to human rights, set up three investigative commissions22 in the 
legislature. Although this was a significant initiative, these commissions failed to 
produce a national truth and were unable to find conclusive proof of an 
institutional decision-making process which led to human rights violations. 
Additionally, the military neither responded nor provided explanations. Even 
worse, the reports were never officially announced or acknowledged, but rather 
Sanguinetti disqualified their findings, stating that the investigations neither 
clarified the authorship of the crimes nor produced credible conclusions. (Brito, 
1997)
Throughout 1985, denunciations of past violations continued to increase, with 
cases being taken to courts as early as April 1985. The Executive was forced to 
respond and Sanguinetti immediately ruled out Argentine-style trials, contending 
that the past is best left to the historians. (Gillespie, 1991) The question of amnesty 
proved very controversial. Between October 1985 and December 1986, three bills 
were presented to limit or prevent prosecutions, but all failed to pass. By
22 These were the Investigative Commission on the Situation of Disappeared People and Its Causes of 1985; the 
Investigative Commission on the Kidnapping and Assassination of National Representatives Zelmar Michelini and 
Hector Guti6rrez-Ruiz also of 1985; and the Investigative Commission in relation to the Conduct of Dr. Juan-Carlos 
Blanco Heading the Ministry of External Relations in the case of Ms. Elena Quinteros of 1990.
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December 1986, 734 cases of past abuses were under investigation and the 
military became increasingly restless.
Unlike their Argentine counterparts, the Uruguayan military entered the 
democratic phase with a large dose of residual power that allowed it to shape and 
directly influence the government's policy on past abuses. Additionally, the 
military enjoyed a close relationship with the government. When General Medina 
became defence minister, this ensured a sort of continuity, producing a feeling of a 
democracia tutelada (guarded democracy), a veiled but present threat (Demasi, 
Navarrete interviews). The military initially rejected the idea of an amnesty, 
believing that they had committed no crimes. However as cases proliferated, the 
situation became increasingly risky, as summoned officers made it clear that they 
would not participate in trials and would resist any subpoenas to do so.
Opinions vary as to whether there was an actual risk of a military coup, but 
what is beyond doubt is that the government used this situation to enact the 
Expiry Law. For the journalist Alfonso Lessa, the fear was of ‘a technical coup in 
case the military did not comply with orders to appear before courts' (interview, 
17/08/2007). For Martin Weinstein, a full-blown constitutional crisis between the 
military and the Executive could break out. (Weinstein, 1988) Senator Heber talks 
instead of a ‘situation of institutional instability' where no one really knew what 
would happen and there was the possibility that the President would become a 
'puppet', if the military did not comply with judicial orders (interview). It was not 
really 'a threat of a golpe, but of disobedience to the judiciary and the President' 
(interview).
This peculiar situation generated the legend of Medina's safe, in which citations 
to appear before courts were supposedly stored. For the human rights activist
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Margarita Navarrete, 'it did not really matter whether such a safe existed', as the 
fact remained that the military would not go to court to be held to account 
(interview, 19/09/2007). On the other hand, for academic Carlos Demasi who has 
been able to establish that in reality no such safe existed, it still 'had absolute 
symbolic reality', 'it was so solid as if it were real' and was 'central to the events' 
that unfolded (interview, 28/08/2008).
The enactment of the amnesty law for the military directly responded to the 
logic of stability according to Bleier. For Sanguinetti, there was no distinction 
between types of violence and terrorism, so after adopting the amnesty for 
political prisoners, the second had to be adopted: 'we cannot be discriminatory', he 
asserted. The military felt it had been sort of 'tricked': they had handed over 
power, the Tupamaros were pardoned, and the judiciary was now going after them 
(interview).
Law N° 15,848 Derogating the Punitive Capacity o f the State (hereafter Expiry 
Law) of December 1986 protects military and police forces from prosecution for 
human rights violations committed before March 1985. Economic crimes, abuses 
before the period of the de facto government, and by members of the high 
command before and/or during the dictatorship are not covered.
For human rights activist Javier Miranda, the adoption of this Law constituted 
'the defeat of hope' (interview, 29/08/2008). If upon transition, the return to 
democracy had been celebrated across the political spectrum, for Miranda the 
amnesty law represents the crushing of this joy, 'a sign that impunity had 
prevailed'. Indeed, the Expiry Law has affected political life until present
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constituting a real and symbolic obstacle to the advances in truth and justice 
(Olivera interview, 30/08/2008).
Unlike Argentina, HROs in Uruguay developed rather late. Several reasons 
account for this. For Marisa Ruiz, from Amnesty International-Uruguay, the human 
rights movement did not exist until 1981 because repression 'was seen as a 
political problem', not really a human rights question (interview, 2/09/2008). 
Mara Loveman points to additional reasons. First, Uruguay is an extremely secular 
society in which the Catholic Church has little influence outside a limited religious 
sphere. Indeed, the traditional Colorado and Blanco parties are secular and most 
allegiances in Uruguay are of a political nature. (Loveman, 1994) Second, the 
country's geography and demography enabled the armed forces to develop a 
deeply repressive and monitoring apparatus that persecuted and paralysed all 
opposition. In fact, Uruguay was 'the closest approximation in South America of the 
Orwellian totalitarian state', (/b/cf.503) Finally, Vania Markarian highlights how 
potential spaces for organised resistance had already been restricted or eliminated 
by 1973, and the repression remained until the very end of the regime (interview, 
27/08/2008)
Nonetheless, important HROs were active by the early 1980s: since 1981 
SERPAJ and in 1983 the Mothers and Relatives of Uruguayan Disappeared- 
Detainees (MFDDU) became a significant voice on human rights. During transition, 
HROs maintained a low profile, except for 1983 when, with other groups, they 
played a key role in turning popular discontent into systematic mobilisation 
against the regime, calling for democratisation, respect for human rights and better 
standards of living. (Markarian, 2005) HROs acquired greater significance during
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the first democratic government, given the failure of the political class to find a 
suitable way of dealing with the past. (Brito, 2001b]
As Priscilla Hayner suggests, despite significant limitations due to the lack of 
government support and military cooperation, partial human and financial 
resources, the "Never Again" report published by SERPAJ in early 1989 was far 
stronger than the earlier parliamentary inquiries. (Hayner, 2002] In fact, until 
2003 the report was the only existing document that provided a complete 
overview on the repression, collecting victims' testimonies, and preserving them 
for the future (Romero, Elhordoy-Arregui interviews].
The second noteworthy initiative was the campaign to subject the Expiry Law to 
a referendum. The campaign aimed to use for the first time the provision contained 
within the Constitution, according to which referenda can be held if 25% of the 
electorate signs to support the initiative within a year of a contested law’s 
promulgation. The Pro-Referendum Commission did manage to achieve the 
required number of signatures but the Expiry Law was upheld at the ballot box. 
For Senator Rafael Michelini of the Frente Amplio, this loss amounted to 'a bucket 
of cold water' on those that worked for human rights, that only recovered several 
years later (interview, 3/09/2008]. Human rights activist Cristina Mansilla labels 
it 'a moral blow' for all human rights and political militants (interview, 
27/08/2008]. For Sanguinetti, the plebiscite was instead an important popular 
pronouncement and an adequate end to the matter, ‘a fair moral decision’ 
(interview).
Despite very different starting points, by the early 1990s Argentina and 
Uruguay found themselves in a similar situation regarding the issue of
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accountability. In both countries, the executive was able to temporarily close off 
the discussion about the past, limiting advances in terms of truth and justice. 
However such terrible crimes as those committed under state terrorism cannot be 
covered up for long. Rather, at some point 'people will want to know why and what 
happened' even if it is a generation or two later, as former political prisoner 
Guillermo Reimann contends (interview, 10/09/2007].
In the 1990s, the mantle of silence started to be lifted to reveal some shocking 
truths. This is even more interesting in the case of Uruguay, whose transition was 
seen as exemplary and a model to be exported. As Gerardo Caetano suggests, this 
was not really the case as it rested on weak democratic foundations: how can the 
future be rebuilt on the basis of imposed oblivion? (interview, 4/09/2008)
4.2 Fighting Silence (1990s to 21st century)
The second phase of TJ covers the 1990s. In Argentina and Uruguay, this decade 
was a significant time for accountability. The events that occurred were probably 
not as momentous or controversial as the ones of the 1980s. They nonetheless 
constituted essential building blocks for the third and present stage of 
accountability.
In Argentina, in clear contrast to Alfonsin’s policy that, despite setbacks, 
endeavoured to clarify the truth surrounding the fate of the disappeared and 
achieve limited justice, Menem deliberately worked to move beyond the past.
The President favoured a forgive-and-forget policy regarding accountability. 
Pardons were at the heart of his strategy, seen as necessary to restore the 
military’s faith in the government. They embodied the President's strategy of
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forgiving past crimes, while at the same time punishing present and future 
disobedience by the armed forces. [Acuna, 2006]
The Argentine public did not endorse Menem's policy of pardons. It is estimated 
that 70 to 80% of society opposed this move, but this did not prevent the President 
from going ahead. Indeed, as Hugo Vezzetti suggests, Menem did not encounter a 
strong opposition within the political and institutional system (interview).
During Menem's first term (1989-1994), the subject of past crimes was virtually 
off the agenda and HROs were marginalised. The Executive reduced political costs 
by only making progress in areas of human rights that were deemed less 
confrontational, like economic reparations and the search for missing children.
In complying with the IACHR 1992's decision that had found Argentina 
responsible for compensating the victims of state terrorism, the government 
adopted a comprehensive policy of economic reparations. It initially addressed the 
victims of detentions to later include those that had disappeared or died. As 
Smulovitz rightly suggests, this policy, originally intended to appease those that 
had been upset or were against the pardons, produced repercussions that were 
unthought-of in the beginning. In particular, it provoked an important debate 
regarding who should be considered as 'disappeared', and generated a legal 
discussion as well as the creation of the specific legal category of'absent by forced 
disappearance' (interview).
The question of reparations provoked fissures within the HROs that had already 
been debilitated by the events of the late 1980s. Reparations were especially 
greeted differently by the two associations of the Madres. A Mother from the 
Asociacion-Madres emphasised how accepting compensation from the government 
was like 'selling the blood of the disappeared' and how the Asociacion-Madres were
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the only ones that were standing firm in their position of 'permanent fight for 
memory and for their children' (interview). This situation, she recognised, had 
produced a distancing between the Asociacion-Madres and other organisations that 
accepted compensation (interview).
A Mother from the Madres de Plaza de Mayo Linea Fundadora (Mothers' of May 
Square-Founding Line, Linea-Fundadora) described to me how she applied for 
reparations for her grandchild, given that both of his parents were disappeared. 
The child was in her custody but as she told me, 'I was already over 60, if I died 
who would look after him?' This Mother was visibly upset that the Asociacion- 
Madres coined a slogan, labelling the mothers who accepted compensation as 
'prostitutes' (interview, 22/09/2008).
Indeed, the question of reparations raised not only ethical and moral issues on 
whether or not to accept the money, but people also had to confront practical day 
to day issues of survival and guaranteeing the future of loved ones.
Since 1991 the government directly supported the search for missing children -  
the sons and daughters of the disappeared that had been illegally appropriated. 
The National Commission for the Right to Identity (CONADI) was created in 1992 
to work jointly with the National Bank of Genetic Data, established by the previous 
administration in 1987. Nevertheless, it was the Abuelas, set up by twelve women 
in 1977 to identify and reunite missing children, the "Living Disappeared" or nietos 
(grandchildren) with their biological families, that was instrumental in this task. 
Abuelas estimate that approximately 500 children were appropriated during state 
terrorism of which ninety-eight have so far recovered their true identity.
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The legal basis grounding their work is the right to identity contained in the so- 
called Argentine articles 7 and 8 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
Since the 1994 Constitutional reform in Argentina, international law is directly 
incorporated in domestic legislation. Therefore, these articles allow judges to 
order blood tests to establish the true identity of people who have doubts about 
their true biological background (Sikkink, 2008) Further, Abuelas could prosecute 
those who had kidnapped their nietos, since the crime of child stealing was not 
covered by the Due Obedience Law. (Bonner, 2005) Unsolved cases of missing 
children are in fact considered ongoing crimes, as the forgery of official documents, 
fundamental in the process of changing an identity, has not been corrected.
Having said that their path has not being smooth. Alba Lanzillotto contends that 
through their work, Abuelas gave continuity to justice, despite an uphill struggle. 
Abuelas often used to say that 'the grandchildren were growing up in the boxes and 
dispatches of the judges, because proceedings were left dormant for so many 
years' (interview, 11/09/2008). Nonetheless, all these steps were important in 
advancing knowledge of the truth and HROs took advantage of all the 
opportunities that opened to them (interview).
A breakthrough happened in June 1998, when General (ret.) Videla was arrested 
and detained in connection with the abduction and false adoption of children. Later 
in November, former Admiral Massera was similarly charged with the kidnapping 
three children born in detention. In a landmark decision in October 1998, former 
generals Videla, Massera, Nicolaides and Bignone, and five lower-ranking officers, 
were charged and jailed for 194 counts of illegal abduction and adoption of 
children in seven clandestine centres, leading to the first imprisonments of the 
1990s. (Brito, 2008) Since 1999, courts have been investigating a systematic plan
by the military regime to illegitimately appropriate children, given that this crime 
had not been included in the Trial of the Commanders [Familiares interview 
18/09/2008).
During Menem's second term (1995-1999), concern with the past strongly re- 
emerged. A number of factors account for this. During the 1990s, the military 
remained watchful of TJ developments but it no longer had either sufficient 
political power or operative capacity for collective action to really impact on their 
trajectory (Fernandez-Meijide, Acuna interviews). Just before the second pardon, 
in December 1990, disenchanted with Menem and coupled with declining military 
influence and control over active units, the Special Forces Unit carapintadas made 
a last attempt to gain control of the Army General Staff. This latest rebellion was 
the most violent and bloody, but was forcefully crushed by loyalist forces.
The year 1995 brought produced a watershed event that was mentioned by 
several of my interviewees as one of the factors that helped the question of the 
past return to the public arena. Navy Captain (ret.) Scilingo temporarily broke the 
pact of silence in March 1995, when he publicly confessed to having participated in 
two death flights, throwing 30 people -alive but drugged, into the open seas. HROs 
and survivors of the repression had been denouncing these practices all along. 
ESMA survivor Carlos Lordkipanidse recounted how during his detention, the 
famous repressor Acosta pointing to a world map had told him: 'you will end up on 
the second A of Atlantic’, which was located in the middle of the ocean. For Carlos, 
that was Acosta's way of saying that they would throw him alive into the open seas 
(interview, 22/09/2008).
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For HROs like Abuelas and Familiares de Detenidosy Desaparecidos por Razones 
Politicos (Relatives of Imprisoned and Disappeared for Political Reasons, 
Familiares) until that moment people had not really believed the accounts of those 
that were perceived as 'subversives' or their relatives (interviews). However, when 
a member of the military finally confessed, people 'at least believed him' and 
accepted that what 'we had been saying for so long was indeed true' (interview).
This event triggered not only the mea culpa of Army Chief Balza but also 
developments relating to the right to truth (R2T). Building on the 1992 IACHR's 
report declaring the Full Stop and Due Obedience laws incompatible with the 
American Declaration and Convention, and recommending that Argentina adopt 
measure necessary to clarify the facts of state terrorism, the CELS began working 
on the idea of the R2T in 1995. It argued that, although the amnesty laws 
effectively blocked criminal proceedings, family members nonetheless had a right 
to know the truth regarding the final fate of loved ones and for society to be aware 
of the methodology of state terrorism.
Since the late 1990s truth trials have been ongoing throughout Argentina, 
thanks to the IACHR's intervention that helped broker a friendly settlement. Truth 
trials are judicial proceedings investigating and documenting past human rights 
abuses to find out the truth about the fate of the disappeared. Their outcome is not 
a judgment and there are no defendants. Rather, people -relatives, victims, military 
officers, are summoned to appear and are questioned as if they were ordinary 
witnesses, in order to obtain information about the destiny of the desaparecidos. 
Catalina Smulovitz suggests that all the actions that occurred after the pardons are 
frequently seen as not relevant or with 'contempt', as they did not have a strong 
retributive element. Nonetheless, in her opinion, all the contemporary advances
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would not have been possible without the developments in the 1990s, particularly 
the truth trials that gathered information that was utilised when criminal 
proceedings resumed (Smulovitz, D'Alessio interviews).
For Hugo Vezzetti, the truth trials obliged members of the military to make 
declarations in order to satisfy the R2T of the relatives (interview). Overall, the 
impact of truth trials was quite varied, stronger in places like La Plata and Buenos 
Aires, and less so in other provinces. In any case, they were helpful in collecting a 
wealth of information as a means of discovering what had happened, and for 
Carlos Acuna 'they made sure that the theme of the past remained present in 
public opinion, putting pressure on politicians too' (interview).
The question of the past has been reactivated since the mid-1990s by the work 
of HROs that obstinately explored all available avenues to make advances in truth 
and justice, also using their creativity to open new ways. As Carnovale suggests, on 
the twentieth anniversary of the military coup in 1996 there was an enormous 
mobilisation. Until that moment, attempts to break the situation of silence had 
been unsuccessful. But on that day over 150,000 people participated, when 
normally only a few thousands did. For Carlos Lordkipanidse, this demonstrated 
how support for the question of the past always existed, but was never manifested. 
'Otherwise we do not understand how people suddenly became aware from one 
day to the other, as 24 March is a simply a date'. 'So clearly something that had 
been latent finally came out' (interview).
It should not be forgotten that since 1995, a new organisation, Hijos por la 
Identidad y  la Justicia contra el Olvido y  el Silencio (Sons and Daughters and for 
Identity and Justice against Forgetting and Silence, H.I.J.O.S.) formed by offsprings
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of disappeared, survivors, political prisoners, and exiles was established ‘bringing 
fresh air to the human rights movement, new perspectives, and younger voices to 
the ongoing discussion' (Carnovale interview). The arrival of a new generation was 
indeed significant and their method of escraches was instrumental in fighting 
impunity and making society aware of the consequences of state terrorism (APDH 
interview, 24/08/2007).
International actors worked as a catalyst For Novaro, during military rule, 
international factors such as the Carter administration or the IACHR's visit in 1979 
had drawn international attention to the question of human rights that was at the 
time largely ignored inside Argentina. In the late 1990s, the subject of the past was 
approached 'with all the peculiarities of Argentine politics' but simultaneously 
reflected an attempt to be in-line with an international culture that is worried 
about human rights (Novaro interview). For Familiares, trials abroad, particularly 
proceedings in Italy and Spain, were an important tool in fighting against the 
amnesty laws and pardons. Being prosecuted abroad 'was offensive for the military 
that would rather be prosecuted at home for nationalistic reasons' but also 
because sentences were lower, and they could be granted home detention 
(interview). Hugo Vezzetti emphasises how trials abroad significantly created a 
contrast between local and international justice: trials in France, Italy and Spain, 
together with the arrest of Pinochet, showed that crimes of the past 'could still be 
prosecuted notwithstanding the internal situation in each country’ (interviews).
Finally, although the Chamber of Deputies had derogated the amnesty laws in 
March 1998 (thus preventing them from being applied in the future), their effects
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remained as far as past judicial proceedings were concerned. Given this, the CELS 
began working towards achieving their unconstitutionality, which was finally 
obtained in 2001.
The CELS developed an innovative legal argument. It was built on the case of the 
appropriated Claudia Poblete, daughter of Jose Poblete and Getrudis Hlaczik who 
had disappeared in November 1978. The case was opened by Abuelas in 1998 and 
in 2000 the CELS asked the judiciary to investigate the crimes of enforced 
disappearance and torture of Claudia's parents, demanding that the amnesty laws 
must be declared unconstitutional. The CELS pointed to a fundamental 
contradiction in the judicial system. (CELS, 2002) Lawyers argued that the 
amnesty laws put the judicial system in the untenable position of being able to find 
people criminally responsible for kidnapping a child and falsely changing her 
identity, but not for the more serious original crime of murder and disappearance 
of her parents that later gave rise to the crime of kidnapping. (Smulovitz, 2008) 
However, as Carnovale highlights, judge Cavallo could only declare the 
unconstitutionality in the Poblete case because, as a federal judge he did not have 
the power to declare the unconstitutionality for all the cases (interview).
President De la Rua (1999-2001), who had promised co-operation on human 
rights issues in his electoral campaign, instead opted for a mainly hands-off 
approach, continuing Menem's practices of promoting officers accused of 
participating in the repression. Furthermore, the Executive adopted Decree 1,581 
in December 2001, to reject all extradition requests relating to events that had 
occurred on national territory or territory under national jurisdiction. (CELS,
2002) The December 2001 severe economic, social and political crisis temporarily 
overshadowed the issues of past crimes.
Three days after the 1989 referendum, President Sanguinetti stated that the 
transition was complete in Uruguay. With the plebiscite, the country had resolved 
all the problems relating to the dictatorship and was finally facing its future. 
(Roniger & Sznajder, 2003) Time would however prove that nothing was further 
from the truth.
As in Argentina with the pardons, losing the 1989 referendum marked the first 
half of the 1990s in Uruguay. Members of the NGO Servicio de Rehabilitation Social 
(Social Rehabilitation Service, SERSOC) emphasised how the years after the 
plebiscite constituted 'a second period of silence', the first being the one under 
Sanguinetti’s presidency (interview, 19/09/2007).
The referendum was widely perceived as closing the question of the past. This is 
a peculiarity of Uruguay where, according to MP Canepa, the vote 'is sacred' 
(interview).This was already apparent in November 1980 when the military 
accepted its defeat following the constitutional plebiscite and they made no 
attempts to manipulate the results to their advantage. Similarly in 1989 the 
outcome of the referendum was seen 'as something definitive, we lost and that was 
it' (interview). The feeling was 'brutal, a conviction that impunity was a natural 
state of affairs, that could not be modified and that you had to look at other things' 
(interview). Whether the referendum was lost because of continuing and 
widespread fear (Martinez, Elhordoy-Arregui interviews) or because people 
realised the military had given up power and should not be provoked (Sanguinetti 
interview), the confirmation of the Expiiy Law was politically very strong,
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representing a tremendous blow to those that had supported the campaign (Lessa 
interview}. Most of my interviewees underscored the importance of voting in 
Uruguay where the ballot box is seen as a tool to resolve problems and where 
'nothing has more legitimacy than voting for the citizens' (Canepa interview).
For Miranda, the period between April 1989 and the end of 1996 constituted 
'seven long years of the most absolute silence' regarding the theme of 
accountability that simply 'did not exist' in the public agenda (interview). During 
the Blanco administration of President Luis-Alberto Lacalle, 1990 to 1995, concern 
with past human rights crimes was non-existent, and was additionally notably 
absent during the electoral campaign in 1989.
According to article three of the Expiry Law, the judiciary needs to consult the 
Executive whenever cases relating to past human rights crimes are presented as 
only the latter is empowered to decide whether proceedings fall under the law's 
remit or not. While Sanguinetti had included under the amnesty law all the cases 
for which the Executive was consulted (Rilla, Heber interviews), between 1990 and 
1995 the judiciary never received denunciations and the Executive was 
accordingly not involved. Miranda is rather critical of this perspective, highlighting 
how 'Lacalle pretends that during his government nothing happens [...] but really 
it was because there was no strength to do anything, not because of his policy' 
(interview).
This situation of silence did not change even after the pronouncements of the 
IACHR and the UN Human Rights Committee that recommended effective 
measures to clarify past events and abuses, and locate those responsible. (IACHR, 
1992; UNHRC, 1993) Although these critical reports had no immediate effects, for
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Senator Rafael Michelini the IACHR's decision constituted a symbolic 
condemnation of impunity. 'On the side of the repressors, you had the Colorado 
leader Perti, ambassador to the OAS, and defending the victims you had Felipe 
Michelini [Rafael's brother] from the Left that had presented the case before the 
Commission'. So symbolically 'you could see who was on one side and who was on 
the other' (interview].
The traumatic legacy of the past remained nonetheless present within sectors of 
society, despite the silence imposed from above. MP Canepa recounted during our 
interview how the question of the past affected Uruguayan culture. He highlighted 
how some popular singers composed songs asking for the disappeared: Donde 
estan? Donde esta Simon? Donde esta Mariana?23 The subject was also present at 
the typical murgas during the summer carnival (Canepa interview]. This musical 
theatre, performed throughout neighbourhoods in Montevideo, has traditionally 
been a form of popular resistance, particularly during the dictatorship.
It was during Sanguinetti's second mandate (1995-2000] that concern with past 
abuses resurfaced. The topic was reactivated not because of a government's wish. 
Rather, the Executive had to respond to several events at home and abroad.
The renaissance of the subject partly resulted from the shock of military 
confessions in 1995. Scilingo's declarations reverberated well beyond Argentina, 
also mobilising public opinion in Uruguay. This was not surprising, considering 
that many of the disappeared in Buenos Aires had been in fact Uruguayans in exile
23 Where are they? Where is Simon? Where is Mariana? Simon Riquelo was the 20-day-old son of Sara M6ndez and 
Mauricio Gatti; he was taken away from his mother when both were detained in Buenos Aires in July 1976; he 
recovered his identity in 2002. Mariana Zaffaroni-lslas was kidnapped in Argentina in March 1975 when she was 18- 
months-old with her parents that are still disappeared; she was located in Buenos Aires, recovering her identity in 1992. 
(Demasi & Yaffe, 2005)
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or hiding there. Given this, the confession was so disturbing because 'some of the 
people thrown into the seas could indeed be Uruguayans' (Ruiz interview).
For Demasi, Scilingo 'exposed the dimension of the flights [...], people suspected 
something more artisanal, not something like an extermination camp' (interview). 
This new information immediately catalysed the MFDDU and the Michelini 
brothers that came up with the idea of mobilising people on 20 May (Ferrario, 
Demasi interviews). In the early days of April 1996, when the acknowledgement of 
past human rights abuses continued to be muted, Rafael Michelini decided to call 
the first March of Silence via the press. The Senator argued that people had to 
march in silence, demanding the truth on May 20 [the date of the murders of 
Zelmar Michelini and Hector Gutierrez-Ruiz in Buenos Aires in 1976]' (interview). 
The march was a success, with thousands of people participating. The banner was 
then taken up by MFDDU and other HROs, and the march is a tradition that 
continues every year. For the human rights activists Balsamo and Navarrete, the 
march was a breakthrough, instrumental in unblocking the situation (interviews). 
MP Canepa emphasises how the re-activation of the question of the past cannot 'be 
explained without reference to the work of Rafael and Felipe [Michelini]', that 
through their political actions re-instated the topic onto the public agenda 
(interview).
As concern with past human rights crimes resurfaced, during 1997 several 
suggestions (a truth commission, mediation by the Catholic Church or direct 
negotiations between the military and former guerrillas) were proposed to 
uncover the fate of the disappeared, including by Senator Michelini and Tupamaro 
leader Rosencof. However, none of these proposals were accepted by the
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government, that responded by stating that the Expiry Law made further 
investigation impossible, accusing those seeking information of intolerance and of 
threatening democratic values, or it simply ignored them. (Brito, 2001b) The 
government's position was so intransigent that it even rejected the possibility of 
compensation to the victims' relatives.
For Maria-Elena Martinez, the impact of the momentous arrest of Pinochet was 
significant in Uruguay, creating a new dynamic for human rights (interview). 
Indeed, several of my interviewees highlighted the significance of the General's 
arrest throughout the region (Gonzalez-Guyer, Caetano interviews). For Raul 
Olivera of the Human Rights Secretariat for the Partido por la Victoria del Pueblo 
(Party for the Victory of the People, PVP), whose members account for a large 
number of victims during repression and was one of the few organisations 
working for accountability, 'the ghost of the dictatorships persisted until Pinochet 
was arrested'. This event 'demonstrated that the king of dictators could be 
imprisoned' without major consequences in Chile (interview).
For Vania Markarian, conversely, the arrest of Pinochet 'can be seen as a 
consequence of the reactivation of the theme of the past throughout the region', at 
a time when various events (Scilingo, the consideration of disappearances of a 
particularly aberrant crime, and the march of silence) illustrated that the past was 
already coming back (interview). Indeed, for Markarian, the return of this theme 
since the mid-1990s cannot be solely understood within the internal borders of 
each country. Rather, ‘it was a regional wave' that, as had been the case during the 
onset of the authoritarian regimes in the early 1970s, saw a favourable regional 
climate vis-a-vis the consideration of the past (interview). In fact, a 'conversation'
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was already ongoing between human rights activists across the region, where 
similar strategies were adopted, including the identification of missing 
grandchildren and the attempt to circumvent amnesty laws through exceptions 
like economic crimes and prosecutions of high-ranking officers (Elhordoy-Arregui, 
MFDDU interviews].
The case of the Argentine poet Gelman was particularly important in placing the 
concern with the past back onto the national agenda. Juan Gelman was looking for 
his missing granddaughter who was allegedly born in secret in 1976 and was 
presumed to be in Uruguay. In 1998, Gelman contacted President Sanguinetti, 
asking for help to locate her and find information on the fate of his disappeared 
daughter-in-law. (Demasi & Yaffe, 2005] Sanguinetti denied that any of Gelman's 
missing relatives had disappeared in Uruguay and accused the poet of having 
carried out a campaign that had discredited Sanguinetti internationally. (H. 
Achugar & Caetano, 2005] The question then seemed temporarily muted. 
Unexpectedly, in the beginning of 2000, the newly elected Colorado President 
Batlle announced that he had located Gelman’s granddaughter. Macarena was born 
after her mother was illegally transferred from Buenos Aires to Uruguay and was 
raised by a policeman and his family in Montevideo, until she recovered her true 
identity. This case, together with that of Simon Riquelo, the son of Sara Mendez of 
the PVP who, at the age of twenty-six in Argentina, recovered his true identity, 
deeply moved Uruguay. For Adrianna-Beatriz Yelpo-Vega of the Human Rights 
Commission of the Plenario Intersindical de Trabajadores-Convencion Nacional 
Trabajadores trade union (Inter-trade Workers Plenary-National Workers 
Convention, PIT-CNT], the cases of missing children 'opened the eyes of society'. If
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before that, people saw the victims of the repression as 'communists' or 
'guerrillas', once cases of missing children entered the news, society started to 
doubt and think: what had these children done? How could they be somewhere 
else [Argentina]? These cases had an incredible symbolic impact on society. 
[Yelpo-Vega interview, 9/09/2007)
Under President Jorge Batlle [2000-2005), for the first time, the Executive 
began to show an interest in finding a solution to the question of the disappeared, 
with the President talking about 'sealing peace forever between Uruguayans'. 
[Dutrenit-Bielous & Varela-Petito, 2006:345) President Batlle believed that peace 
had to be achieved. The latter was not a result of justice but rather 'a condition of 
the soul' [Demasi, Rilla interviews). As Miranda recounts, ‘we did not expect 
Batlle's inaugural discourse in which he said he would open doors to the truth'. 
The appearance of Macarena and the fact that the President agreed, for the first 
time to receive a delegation from MFDDU, to initiate a dialogue on the disappeared 
in April 2000, 'marked the beginning of his presidency and was a very strong 
rupture in comparison to previous governments' human rights policy' [interview).
Undoubtedly, Batlle's most important decision was the establishment of the 
truth commission, the Comision Para la Paz [Peace Commission, COPAZ). 
Presidential resolution 858 established that the Commission was to receive, 
analyse, classify and collate information relating to enforced disappearances under 
military rule. Composed of political and religious figures, the Commission worked 
for three years. In April 2003, it released its final report, confirming the 
disappearance of 26 Uruguayans in Uruguay, 182 in Argentina, 8 in Chile, 2 in 
Paraguay. It concluded that citizens that disappeared in Uruguay had been
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detained in official or unofficial actions and submitted to physical torture in 
clandestine detention centres, dying in the majority of the cases as a consequence 
of the torments received.
The Commission received a mixed reception. On the positive side, Rilla outlines 
how the COPAZ was important at the time as, despite its problems and limitations, 
it was 'the first and only instance' when the state recognised and assumed 
responsibility for the crimes of the repression (Rilla, Markarian interviews). 
Similarly, for Elbio Ferrario, coordinator of Montevideo's Memory Museum, 
although the COPAZ only made limited advances in terms of achieving truth, it still 
constituted the first official initiative from the state (interview). For long a time 
'people kept on thinking that the desaparecidos had gone to Spain or had been 
bored with their lives'. At least the Commission discussed openly and publicly the 
themes of disappearance, torture and the kidnapping of children (Martinez 
interview). Overall, the Commission was 'a positive signal representing a change of 
attitude by the Executive' (Caetano interview).
Nonetheless, serious critiques exist. First, human rights activists reject the 
commission's general findings, which concluded that the remains of the 
disappeared had been cremated and their ashes had been thrown into the sea. 
Specific conclusions regarding the fate of individual victims, some of which turned 
out to be incorrect as the case of Fernando Miranda, were also discounted by 
HROs. As Elhordoy-Arregui suggests, 'we were left with an aftertaste': the relatives 
only received a certificate testifying that X had 'effectively disappeared at a certain 
time and place' but provided no other information (also Olivera, MFDDU 
interviews). When incorrect information was given, that was 'not only cruel [...] 
but relatives once again felt they were being lied to and ridiculed', which
discouraged some of them from undertaking prosecutions to avoid further 
disappointment (Elhordoy-Arregui interview]. Second, the commission's work was 
incomplete, given that it only focused on disappearances, and not crimes like 
torture and prolonged imprisonment that in fact characterised repression in 
Uruguay (Destouet, Elhordoy-Arregui, Ruiz interviews]. Third, the Commission did 
not meet international standards, having only been granted limited powers and 
resources. It especially had to rely only on voluntary testimonies -unlikely from 
the military; it was also unable to subpoena witnesses and was not given access to 
state archives (Balsamo, Mansilla, Romero interviews]. Finally, the commission 
was widely perceived as another attempt by the Executive to close the theme of the 
disappeared, by providing a 'dose of truth' to the relatives, and then moving on. For 
SERSOC, with the COPAZ 'the intention was another [...] to close the subject', but 
luckily that did not work out as the topic instead gained media attention 
[interview]. Likewise, Romero suggests that the COPAZ 'had no intention to 
achieve truth and justice and [...] that the President felt he had to respond to 
society's demand' on the past that had been building up. Some interviewees also 
pointed out that the Commission was really the product of a personal struggle 
amongst the leaders of the Colorado party, Batlle and Sanguinetti (Martinez 
interview], a sort of 'political vendetta' to challenge Sanguinetti who had always 
contended that 'you could not know what had happened’ (Elhordoy-Arregui 
interview].
This author agrees with Diego Sempol who suggests that the acknowledgment 
of state terrorism through the COPAZ reflected the search for 'a possible truth', one 
compatible with the goal of national reconciliation. (Sempol, 2006:211] For Raul 
Olivera, this idea of possible truth basically ‘means telling you when your loved
195
ones died' 'but no other information on who is responsible is then given' 
(interview). 'This does not help' he continues 'it simply tells you that the 
disappeared are no longer so, that they are dead or murdered, just to terminate the 
permanent crime' (Olivera interview).
During the 1990s, Argentina and Uruguay's TJ trajectory can be seen as a long 
but persistent process of 'awakening' (my term), during which human rights 
activists employed several means to challenge the silence and amnesia that had 
been imposed. If the 1980s were a time when the Executives could quite 
successfully control TJ policies, their predominance was increasingly challenged in 
the 1990s. In fact, various actors like the Michelinis, HROs such as the Abuelas and 
the MFDDU, and political parties like the Frente Amplio continued working on the 
question of the past, preventing that it 'would be obscured' (Yelpo-Vega interview).
As Caetano rightly suggests, attempts to turn the page on these questions in 
Latin America have not succeeded (interview). Rather, during the 1990s each small 
achievement brought incremental success over time and constituted a 
precondition for further developments. Moreover, the seeds that had been planted 
with difficulty during this decade would indeed bear fruit soon enough -but not 
without problems.
4.3 The Challenge of Transitional Justice in the present.
At the beginning of the 21st centuiy, the third and current wave of TJ started. 
This phase has seen a consolidation of the search for truth and justice that 
continued relentlessly through the dark years of the 1990s, when civil society
196
fought against the Executives' desire to close the door on the past Despite the 
significance of these new developments, the question of the past remains divisive.
As Chillier suggests, the process of TJ in Argentina has been convoluted. The 
situation was initially one that focused on truth and justice; second, there was a 
move away from imposed impunity to truth via the truth trials, and finally a return 
to justice and memory (interview).
In May 2003, the quest for accountability found an unexpected ally in President 
Nestor Kirchner who surprisingly backed efforts to prosecute those responsible for 
state terrorism. (HRW, 2004) As Sikkink and Booth-Walling point out, Kirchner 
belonged to the generation of the Peronist party that had been severely repressed 
in the 1970s. (Sikkink & Booth Walling, 2006) Carolina Varsky and Leonardo 
Filippini outline four major areas in which Kirchner's work is significant. (Varsky & 
Filippini, 2005) The President favoured the recuperation of former-detention 
centres to construct memory spaces. Second, he removed from governmental 
positions those linked to the dictatorship, forcing in particular dozens of generals 
and admirals into retirement. Similarly, Kirchner purged the federal police. For 
Acuna, by doing this, the President removed the last remaining connection with the 
dictatorship. Finally, Kirchner supported the re-opening of trials, and international 
co-operation on these issues. In fact, the President pushed for the effective 
annulment of the amnesty laws. Relying on the precedent of Law 23,040 of 
December 1983 that had declared the self-amnesty law enacted by the outgoing 
junta as 'null and void', in August 2003 Congress adopted Law 25,779, declaring 
the Full Stop and Due Obedience laws 'null, as if they had never existed'. (ICTJ, 
2005)
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The President created a favourable climate to progress on truth and justice, by 
appointing three new judges to the Supreme Court, and repealing Decree 1,581, 
that barred compliance with extradition orders. The President also ratified the 
Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and 
Crimes against Humanity, obliging the government to punish such violations, and 
making extradition possible. In August 2004, the President completed the policy of 
reparations, providing compensation to minors that had been victims of state 
terrorism. (J. M. Guembe, 2006) Exiles are the last group who remain to be 
compensated. Proposals on this issue have been under discussion since 2004 but 
Smulovitz doubts that this will ever be adopted (interview).
Though the amnesty laws were derogated in 1998, declared unconstitutional in 
2001, and annulled by Congress in 2003, a final decision on the constitutionality of 
their annulment was delivered by the Supreme Court in June 2005. (CELS, 2005) 
The Court upheld the constitutionality of Law 25,779 and simultaneously declared 
the invalidity and unconstitutionality of the Full Stop and Due Obedience Laws, 
claiming that they were contrary to international norms of constitutional 
hierarchy. The Court took into account recent developments in international 
human rights law, like the 2001 Barrios Altos case at the IACtHR, to conclude that 
the State was obliged to investigate and sanction crimes committed under the 
dictatorship as the latter cannot be amnestied. The Court considered enforced 
disappearances as crimes against humanity, and continuous and multiple 
violations of international human rights law.
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Since 2004, several federal judges have also denounced Menem's pardons, the 
last legal obstacle to prosecutions. Some of these rulings like the one on the pardon 
of General Riveros were later confirmed by the Supreme Court in 2007, opening 
the way for other pardons to be deemed null and void. (HRW, 2007]
Prosecutions are now well under way throughout Argentina. As of February 
2010, 1.422 people are implicated in crimes against humanity, 280 have been 
charged, sixty-eight condemned, 410 are currently under pre-trial detention, seven 
have been acquitted while 226 have passed away.24
In 2006, the first trials in twenty years were held. In Buenos Aires a former- 
police official received twenty-five years imprisonment for the illegal deprivation 
of liberty, aggravated by torture and the appropriation of a minor, committed 
against the Poblete-Hlaczik family. In September, a former-police official, Miguel 
Etchecolatz, was sentenced in La Plata to life imprisonment for the illegal arrest, 
torture and homicides of six disappeared, and the kidnapping and torture of two 
survivors. (CELS, 2007; HRW, 2007] For the first time, the court in La Plata 
contended that these crimes had occurred within the context of the genocide in 
Argentina between 1976 and 1983. (La-Nacion, 2006]
In 2007, two momentous prosecutions occurred. In October, Von-Wernich, a 
former-chaplain of the Buenos Aires provincial police received life imprisonment 
for involvement in murder, illegitimate deprivations of liberty and torture. 
(BBCNews, 2007] In December, seven high-ranking members of Intelligence 
Battalion 601, including former-Army Commander Nicolaides, and one police 
officer, were sentenced to terms of between twenty and twenty-five years for 
aggravated illegitimate deprivation of liberty. (CELS, 2008]
24 State Terrorism Blog, updated by the CELS, accessed 9 February 2010, http://www.cels.ora.ar/wpbloas/.
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Trials continue in 2008 and 2009. In April 2008, in the first judgment of its kind, 
a couple was sentenced to eight and seven years' imprisonment for the 
appropriation of Maria-Eugenia Sampallo, born to disappeared parents and stolen 
by an ex-Army captain. The latter was sentenced to ten years. (AI, 2009) In 
Tucuman in August 2008, former-General Menendez and former-Governor Bussi 
were condemned to life imprisonment for the illegitimate deprivation of liberty, 
torture and disappearance of ex-Senator Vargas-Aignasse. (La-Nacion, 2008) 
Menendez, and several other military and civilian officials, were also convicted for 
the kidnapping, torture and extrajudicial executions of four people in 1977.
The re-opening of trials has been both welcomed and criticised. For Martin 
Hernan-Fraga of H.I.J.O.S., trials are 'a chance not to be missed', and H.I.J.O.S. is in 
particular working to disseminate information to keep society updated on these 
developments (interview, 16/09/2008). For Alba Lanzillotto recent prosecutions 
constitute a ‘continuation of what was begun in the 1980s'. 'Everything to achieve 
justice should be attempted' she contends, 'as a country without justice is neither 
serious nor real' (interview, 11/09/2008). For Lordkipanidse, absolute justice is 
required 'not only to avoid the repetition of such crimes, but also to stop people 
from taking justice into their own hands'. A particularity of Argentina (but also 
Uruguay) is that there have never been instances of personal vengeance, although 
they could have easily occurred given that 'repressors were free to walk the 
streets' for years. As Lordkipanidse recognises, 'direct victims will run out of 
patience soon' and this risk of personal justice should be avoided through the work 
of the judiciary (interview). Trials are seen as providing moral reparations to
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victims (Smulovitz interview), helping to 'restore their dignity' (Malamud-Goti 
interview).
An intermediate position was taken by former-President Alfonsin, and Judge 
D'Alessio. Alfonsin contended that although the trials were 'a source of personal 
joy', he still pointed to the appropriate implementation of constitutional principles 
and the difficulty of collecting information over thirty years later. He was 
additionally concerned that innocent people may be wrongly condemned. For 
D'Alessio, the revival of the trials 'worries him as a jurist' particularly because it 
looks like it is going to be an extremely long process. Together with Gil-Lavedra, 
D'Alessio tried to develop a proposal to speed up the trials but ‘the government has 
an interest in maintaining the trials as propaganda, the longer they last the better'. 
'This is never going to finish' he continued, 'and this process ends up converting 
these people that were monsters into victims': so 'I think you need to do this very 
quickly, also because some symbolic figures like Suarez-Mason have already died' 
(interview).
The most critical perspective is voiced by Graciela Fernandez-Meijide that, in 
addition to agreeing with D'Alessio on the risk of transforming repressors into 
victims, highlights the limited amount of new information acquired. 'I am sure that 
if you ask victims' relatives what they would prefer, another trial or specific 
information on their missing loved ones, I can tell you that, starting from myself, I 
already had enough with trials' (interview). Similarly, Lanzillotto points out how in 
these new trials it is once again the victims’ voices that are heard: 'now the 
perpetrators’ amnesia is worse than before, they do not know anything, they do 
not say anything and have forgotten everything [...] they are cowards of the worst 
kind' (interview, 03/09/2007). Fernandez-Meijide emphasises that the military
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'will not speak out as the information will be used against them', 'so it will not 
happen'. She suggests instead the development of a plea bargain system, for the 
government to develop a 'special code' according to which if new facts are given, 
like burial locations, appropriated children or archives, lesser sentences can be 
offered to enable progress on the truth (interview, 12/09/2008].
The re-opening of trials had some negative consequences. Several witnesses 
have been intimidated to dissuade them from providing testimony. Some like Luis- 
Angel Gerez and Juan-Evaristo Puthod were abducted and temporarily 
disappeared. The most disturbing case was that of Jorge-Julio Lopez, a key witness 
at the Etchecolatz trial, who disappeared the day before the verdict was delivered. 
He continues disappeared at the time of writing. For Acuna, recent intimidations 
are linked to the police. Around 90% of threatened witnesses are giving testimony 
in cases related to the police, while 10% to the gendarmerie. No-one has been 
intimidated in proceedings against the military, which shows 'that the armed 
forces have little operational capacity, almost none' [interview], 'The most you get' 
Acuna insisted 'are signs of solidarity and loyalty from colleagues, but it is ironic 
that those most annoyed [by recent trials] are the ones with the least capacity to 
do something about it' (interview]. The historian Lorenz shares this perspective, 
contending that 'the military only has symbolic power nowadays', 'they will not 
carry out a coup if they do not like a trial but obviously they collaborate very little' 
(interview].
Overall, Kirchner's human rights policy triggered mixed responses within the 
community of human rights activists and society. For many, the former President
2 0 2
has been instrumental in re-opening the question of accountability. For others, he 
has '(ab)used' (my term] the past for his own political purposes.
After years of fighting against Executives that attempted to strictly circumscribe 
the scope of truth and justice, several HROs rejoiced to have found a President that 
was finally willing to take up their cause. Marcelo Brodsky of Buena Memoria 
Asociacion Civil (Good Memory Civil Association) stresses how, unlike previous 
administrations 'the government facilitated the process of justice' (interview 
30/08/2007). An Asociacion-Madre representative recounted of their meeting with 
Kirchner during which he told them: 'Mothers, I understand your pain. I was also a 
militant while I was a student [...] they took away my best friends, I could have also 
disappeared'. She underscored how there has been a 'friendlier relationship with 
the Kirchner's administration', 'when different winds were blowing', and that the 
'Executive actually listened to our demands' (interview). Vera Jarach from the 
Linea-Fundadora pointed how ‘the Kirchner's administration had a direct interest 
in the matter, given it was made of people who belong to the generation of the 
disappeared [...] that today work for human rights, against impunity and for the 
social changes they desired [back then]' (interview).
However, as this author also agrees, there are several problems with Kirchner’s 
(ab)use of human rights. First, as Enrique Peruzzotti contends, the President's 
policy focuses on the past to the detriment of current human rights issues, 
especially problems relating to the police, the judiciary, governing by decree and 
the separation of powers. (Walger, 2006) Second, how deep really is Kirchner's 
commitment to human rights? Fernandez-Meijide highlighted how Kirchner (and 
now Cristina) was never preoccupied with the subject of the past before. Upon 
being elected, Kirchner was a little known figure in political centres like Buenos
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Aires or Rosario, so he 'selected this topic in the attempt to garner support from 
the middle classes' (interview, 12/09/2008). The academic Daniel Lvovich shares 
this position, suggesting that the Kirchners took up the human rights banner 'as a 
differentiation strategy* within Peronism (interview, 19/09/2008).
Others accuse the President of 'appropriating himself of the question of human 
rights'. Carlos Lordkipanidse criticises how Kirchner credited himself with the 
nullification of the amnesty laws that 'instead resulted from the work of people 
that relentlessly continued to demand' accountability over the years. 'It is in the 
President's power for instance to cancel the pardons through decree law1, 
Lordkipanidse told me, 'to cancel their validity, but that he has not done' 
(interview). Similarly, the academic Vicente Palermo suggests that Kirchner has 
the pretension that policies on human rights ‘began with him, that everything that 
went on before was tantamount to appeasing the military'. 'However key events 
like Balza and Scilingo occured before' (interview, 5/09/2008).
The strong link that developed between the Executive and some HROs, 
especially the Asociacion-Madres, has been criticised as detrimental to activism. 
For Palermo, the so-called 'campo crisis' between the government and the 
agricultural sector that occurred between April and July 2008, saw the active 
participation of the Asociacion-Madres in this political issue displaying behaviour 
'that had nothing to do with the spirit of human rights' (interview). Federico 
Lorenz also emphasises how some HROs participated with Cristina in all the events 
during the crisis, which was 'negative and made people see human rights claims as 
sectarian' (interview, 8/09/2008). For Novaro, this close association caused a 'big 
deterioration in the human rights movement that moved away from a liberal and 
universalist discourse of human rights to become a tendentious group that
vindicates the victims [of repression] as the representatives of a political project, 
not as subjects with rights'. Indeed, Novaro considers that 'recent trials have less 
historical value as they feel like historical revenge, rather than really working to 
strengthen the rule of law'. They 'have been politicised so much' Novaro continues 
that 'the only thing that matters is that the government is using them politically 
and for petitioners to convert them into the vindication of the revolutionary fight 
[of the disappeared]' (interview).
The intertwining of politics and questions of accountability in Argentina is 
complex. Vezzetti underscores how 'you have to recognise that those that voted for 
the amnesty laws in the 1980s are the same that voted to re-open the trials in 
2003, the same Peronist party': 'you cannot say that the governing party really is 
devoted to this question’. 'It is difficult for us to understand' he went on 'so I 
cannot imagine for you!'
Although advances against impunity are important on the long road to achieving 
truth and justice, there are also some risks. As I see it, if the question of past 
accountability becomes entangled with present problems, as during the campo 
crisis, legitimate demands for clarifying the fate of the disappeared and 
establishing responsibility for these atrocious deeds can be overshadowed by 
problems of current interest. As several of my interviewees emphasised, everyday 
there is less interest from the public because people feel they have had enough of 
this topic (Fernandez-Meijide, Carnovale interviews). So the challenge is how to 
capture and sustain society's interest with the past in order to achieve 
accountability for the crimes of state terrorism?
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The reactivation of the past in Uruguay resulted from several local and external 
factors. However, an interesting and convincing argument relates to what Demasi 
calls 'the unfulfilled pact', according to which the Expiry Law did not produce the 
results that were expected from it (interview). Likewise, Caetano adds that the 
logic installed by the Law 'that the cost of truth was allegedly [giving up] justice 
failed: events demonstrated that although we limited justice, truth had not 
progressed' (interview). As Elhordoy-Arregui puts it well, the cambio en paz 
strategy turned out to be a paz de mentiras (peace of lies). The peace that was 
promised 'was never achieved, the disappeared did not return, there were no 
investigations and people still suffer from the consequences of torture'. 'So this 
peace was never real' Elhordoy-Arregui added 'the results that were pledged were 
not obtained and thirty years later people are realising that they have a right to ask 
about what happened, but this is only occurring now' (interview).
The election of Tabare Vazquez of the Frente Amplio in 2005 raised hopes that 
finally the time had come for truth and justice. The President announced he would 
personally manage the question of the disappeared. (Carro, 2005) Caetano 
highlights the four pillars of Vazquez's human rights policy as outlined in the 
President's inaugural speech. First, memory ‘because the past never rests in peace', 
and it is necessary to know and understand it. Second, the truth that is 'the only 
path to overcome wounds and the shady areas that each society has', to obtain a 
better future for all Uruguayans. Third, justice understood as a set of rules and 
norms that enable proper coexistence between people and institutions. Finally, 
reparations understood 'not as a punto fina l (end point)' but as embodying the
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'acknowledgement and responsibility of the State' for the suffering of so many 
Uruguayans. (Caetano, 2008:190)
In terms of justice, the President did not abolish the Expiry Law, as many had 
hoped, but instead worked within its framework. In addition to the procedures 
established under article 3, article 4 entrusts the Executive with the responsibility 
for investigating disappearances. (Skaar, 2007) On this issue, President Sanguinetti 
had delegated his authority to Defence Minister Medina in May 1987, who in turn 
had assigned the task to military prosecutor Colonel Sambucetti. This first attempt 
was largely rejected by HROs. For Miranda, the work of Sambucetti ‘was a joke, 
absolutely a joke and absolutely offensive'. ‘It was a political error' Miranda added 
'that Sanguinetti ridiculed the investigation and in this way liquidated the theme 
for several years' (interview). The relatives of the desaparecidos refused to co­
operate with the Colonel who was an active duty officer and therefore lacked the 
necessary guarantees for independence and impartiality. (AW, 1989; Heinz & 
Friihling, 1999) For the academic Lilia Ferro, 'Sambucetti was trying to justify so 
much to obstruct the investigation' that he ended up almost saying 'yes, these 
things did happen but we are not going to investigate them' (interview, 
03/09/2008).
Vazquez's approach has been more successful in that, by complying with the 
Expiry Law, he has allowed prosecutions to start. Up to March 2009, the 
administration excluded a total of 58 cases from the law's remit. (Fasano-Mertens, 
2009) Some of these include the symbolic cases of the Michelini/Gutierrez-Ruiz 
murders, Marfa-Claudia Garcia de Gelman, mother of Macarena, Simon Riquelo and 
Ubagesner Chavez-Sosa. (LaRepublica, 2009f)
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The President also initiated investigations to establish the fate and burial places 
of the disappeared, ordering several excavations within military sites, including 
the La Tablada compound and the 13th and 14th Battalions. These searches resulted 
in the identification of two disappeared. In 2005 the EAAF confirmed that human 
remains found at the Pando farm belonged to Ubagesner Chavez-Sosa, a member of 
the Uruguayan Communist Party that had disappeared in May 1978. In March 
2006, DNA analysis confirmed that the complete skeleton found at the 13th 
Battalion was that of Fernando Miranda, Javier's father, who had been kidnapped 
by military officers in November 1975. (EAAF, 2007) The President decreed a third 
set of excavations in April 2008, but no further discoveries have so far been made.
Additionally, the administration adopted some significant and long overdue 
legislation. Law 17.894 enacted in September 2005 created the legal category of 
'absent due to enforced disappearance’ for 26 citizens who disappeared in 
Uruguay. (ParlamentoUY, 2005; TomoIV, 2007:47) Law 18.033 adopted in 
October 2006 restored pension rights to all those that, for political, ideological 
reasons or trade union involvement had been forced to leave the country between 
February 1973 and 1985, had been detained, lived clandestinely or had been fired 
as a consequence of Decree 518/973. A special reparatory pension (around 
USD500 a month) was granted to those that had been deprived of liberty. 
(ParlamentoUY, 2006)
In 2007, the Presidency released a detailed publication drafted by several 
academics. The Historical Investigation on Disappeared-Detainees aimed to honour 
the memory of the victims, strengthen tolerance and respect among Uruguayans, 
and to emphasise the importance of democracy as a form of government (Tomol, 
2007:5) Composed of five volumes, the investigation deals with several questions
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relating to the past, including the reconstruction of the repressive context. It 
disseminates data relating to victims of disappearances, missing children and 
bodies washed up on Uruguayan shores during the 1970s. The manuscript also 
gathers documentation such as reports of investigative commissions and 
denunciations presented to international organisations.
For the first time in June 2005, the armed forces were ordered by the Executive 
to carry out investigations into the fate of the disappeared-detainees, to comply 
with the Expiry Law. Their reports, submitted in August, represent a noteworthy 
event. The Army report outlines the cases of twenty-two people detained during 
military operations who subsequently died in detention. Information was provided 
on the site of their burials but the report claims that in 1984 graves were 
disinterred, remains cremated, and the ashes scattered around. No details are 
given on the causes of death.
The Navy distinguishes two periods in its operations. Until 1974, clear 
procedures were in place relating to detentions and those carrying them out. 
Between 1974 and 1985, activities were undertaken by smaller groups, thus 
making information scarce and unreliable. The report states that disappearances 
resulted from death during interrogations under torture, but no specific 
information is given on either detentions or the specific circumstances of death. In 
a later report dating September 2005, the Navy significantly admitted that co­
ordination and exchange of information had existed between the Uruguayan 
Marine Corps Unit (FUSNA) and the ESMA in Buenos Aires.
Finally, the Air Force supplies quite specific information on the fate of two 
disappeared-detainees and the details of their burial locations were also disclosed.
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Additionally, it admitted that two flights occurred, on 24 July and 5 October 1976 
to clandestinely transport political prisoners from Buenos Aires to Montevideo. 
Details of a third flight emerged in June 2007 when a declassified US State 
Department document confirmed the illegal transfer in 1978 of 20 Uruguayan 
exiles that had been kidnapped in Argentina in December 1977. (Rodriguez, 2007) 
Up to twelve flights were mentioned during my interviews; however, I was unable 
to verify this information (Romero, Ferrario interviews).
The reports received a mixed response. For Alfonso Lessa, they ‘constituted a 
historical event' in officially recognising for the first time the employment of 
torture in military sites, the desaparecidos, deaths in barracks, the illegal transfers 
of prisoners back to Uruguay, and the practice of clandestine burials and cremation 
of their remains (interview). For Caetano, the reports assume what can no longer 
be denied, that officers were responsible for detentions and disappearances, but 
interestingly enough they never use the word torture with the Navy using 
‘apremios fisicos (physical pressure)'. 'This is the eternal elusion uruguaya 
(Uruguayan elusion)' Caetano continues, pointing to the name of the Expiry Law 
that does not mention the word 'amnesty', the founding text of the Peace 
Commission that uses four different verbs but not 'investigate', and the use of 'de 
facto regime' instead of dictatorship ‘not to hurt the sensibility of the military'. 
'This is a society of circumvention, where things are not called by their own name' 
(interview). Caetano also points to the limited impact of the reports that were 
incomplete and/or provided incorrect information, as in the case of the supposed 
burial location of Macarena's mother.
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Vazquez's policy on human rights constitutes the first instance since 
democratisation where the Executive takes a real interest in developing the 
question of the past. Several of my interviewees highlighted the positive 
contributions that the President's policy had made. Alfonso Lessa pointed to the 
significance of military prosecutions and the excavations of military sites that had 
never occurred before. Lessa emphasises how the Expiry Law 'has been 
interpreted differently by each president* and that 'Vazquez permitted what had 
never been done before'. What is more significant for Lessa is the fact that the 
Vazquez's administration 'is the first ever government from the Uruguayan Left' 
and thus it also had to manage the armed forces 'that had traditionally been their 
enemy*. Along these lines, Bleier referred to the 'old questions of the stability*, 
contending that 'the Left government was already de-stabilising per se and that it 
had to worry about stability more so than other governments'. Nevertheless, the 
President ‘had the courage to exclude some cases from the Law', generating 
political and cultural conditions to break the silence (Bleier interview). Others 
point to Vazquez's consistent behaviour in not derogating the Expiry Law, living up 
to his electoral compromise to work with it (Rilla, Mansilla interviews). Indeed, 
although some prosecutions had already begun in 2002, notably the case of former 
Foreign Affairs minister Blanco, the beginning of trials is clearly one of the main 
advances in terms of accountability. Senator Michelini emphasises how the current 
Executive represents a change in the fight against the impunity, coupled with the 
championing of human rights. The Senator highlights how the amnesty law has 
been nullified de facto, although some judges and prosecutors continue to apply it 
regardless of what the Executive decides (interview). Indeed, although the current 
government 'has not been as radical as one would have wished', 'it still acted with
intelligence and, by applying textually the Expiry Law, still achieved important 
progress' (Caetano interview).
Symbolic prosecutions are now occurring against important figures of the 
regime, including former Presidents Bordaberry and Alvarez. For Markarian, the 
decision that civilians also had responsibility and therefore need to be prosecuted 
is significant, and is 'a good interpretation of what happened at the time, beyond 
those that were the ones with dirty hands' like the famous repressors Gavazzo, 
Campos-Hermida or Silveira. 'Otherwise' Markarian continued 'it would be easy to 
just dismiss these people as sadists or perverts, their crimes as excesses that were 
too brutal to be justified, and then they become scapegoats' (interview). Rather, 
the prosecution of the civilian and militaiy leaders of the regime is fundamental in 
accurately challenging the justification usually employed by the Armed Forces that 
human rights crimes were simply deviations, pointing instead to a policy of state 
terrorism that was implemented top-down.
Nonetheless, Vazquez's policy has been criticised by HROs that wished for a 
more forceful and aggressive approach. Members of SERSOC do recognise that 
achievements like prosecutions and excavations ‘were unthinkable just a few years 
ago', but still highlight the need of a comprehensive reparations policy' that is still 
absent (interview). Elhordoy-Arregui contends that 'this government is not the 
panacea that I wanted, but I expected more clearly defined steps like the 
immediate nullification of the Expiry Law'. 'From the perspective of human rights, 
we all placed our hopes in this government’ Elhordoy-Arregui asserted 
(interview). Similarly, Romero acknowledges how ‘we thought it would be much 
easier to gain answers with a left wing government, but it has not been so' 
(interview). Caetano, while recognising the significance of current achievements,
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adds 'that they left an aftertaste as, for instance, the military did not carry out 
comprehensive investigations and they provided very little documentation, 
pointing to the fact that only two of over 200 disappeared have actually been 
identified (interview). Lastly Rilla suggests that the President attempted to control 
the past and close the discussion on it, for example through the Historical 
Investigation and the Day of Never Again, but ‘he has not been very successful so 
far' (interview).
Although the current Executive has adopted a much more proactive stance on 
the question of accountability, this does not mean that other actors have taken a 
secondary role. Rather, they have, through various projects, continued to pursue 
the question of truth and justice. Two of the most significant initiatives relate to 
the Expiry Law. First, in October 2008, public prosecutor Mirtha Guianze 
presented an unconstitutionality appeal against the Law relying on, amongst other 
things, the 1992's IACHR report. The appeal, endorsed by the Executive and the 
Legislature in February 2009, is now pending before the Supreme Court. Second, 
another attempt to submit the law to plebiscte has been ongoing since September 
2007. In April 2009, well over the required number of signatures were submitted 
to the Electoral Court, and in June the plebiscte was scheduled for October 25, 
2009.
The unconstitutionality of the Expiry Law remains a source of debate. First, 
several legal problems exist. The category of 'nullification' rests on dubious ground 
in Uruguayan law (Caetano interview). As the Law was voted by Congress, 
declared constitutional by the Supreme Court and ratified by national referendum, 
Rilla suggests that 'talking of nullity is an exaggeration, nonsense from a juridical
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perspective'. 'How can we nullify a law that has been so influential over the years? 
Maybe it can be derogated but not nullified' (interview). Navarrete considers that 
the Law should be nullified by Parliament, as the referendum route already failed 
in 1989. In contrast, Markarian contends instead 'that it is a good idea to have 
another plebiscite as it was firstly confirmed in that way'. Bleier conversely argues 
'that it does not really matter whether the law is derogated by parliament or 
referendum'. 'The law was an instrument adopted by the political system to obtain 
specific objectives at a certain time and therefore it cannot be more than that7 
(interview).
Although many emphasise the symbolic power of the campaign and the removal 
of the law, they still contend that it is possible to achieve justice, as has occurred 
under the Vazquez's administration, namely by working within the law's 
framework. As Miranda stresses, 'pretending that you cannot prosecute because of 
the Law minimises the problem: the question of impunity cannot be reduced to the 
Expiry Law' (interview). Bleier agrees that 'it does not really matter whether the 
Law exists or nof, pointing instead to how impunity is a consequence of the 
attitude of the judiciary and the political establishment (interview). Third, even if 
the Law is nullified, many question how this would change the situation, stressing 
that it would not make the military talk which is a fundamental requirement, 
considering that the majority of information is still missing (Martinez interview). 'I 
do not think it makes a difference' Demasi told me, ‘without the risk of justice, the 
military did not talk; threatening them with trials now will make them talk even 
less!' Finally, Caetano and Trivelli highlighted the risk that the Law may be 
maintained through the referendum, constituting a (second) terrible blow in the 
quest for truth and justice.
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A particularly interesting perspective is suggested by Rilla and Olivera. Rilla, 
referring to the 1989 vote, stressed how 'Uruguayans have not completely realised 
what it means for a political community to renounce truth and justice; you can do 
that but you need to be aware of what you are giving up. Back then, there was still 
a lot of fear, backed by the government and its threats' (interview). Olivera 
underscored how it was an error to use the referendum, 'we did not realise that 
then [1989], how can we submit to plebiscite a right that we own? We were risking 
our right while they [executive, military] did not risk anything1. Losing the 
plebiscite saw several people giving up and terminating their interest in the 
subject, 'it was very demoralising [...] and effectively sealing impunity'. Now 
Olivera stresses that the same is happening, 'we are again subjecting our right to a 
plebiscite so what happens if we fail again?'
Looking at the Argentina and Uruguay's experience with accountability 
highlights how the trajectory of TJ is often unpredictable, its evolution having 
highs and lows, as well as pauses and sudden developments. In both, TJ initiatives 
were cumulative in the sense that they evolved in a 'step-by-step' way (Rilla 
interview), whereby each project was built upon previous achievements and they 
all complemented each other (Fonderbrider interview).
Upon democratisation, Argentina and Uruguay addressed differently the legacy 
of violence. Initially, in the mid-1980s they adopted opposite accountability 
policies, prosecution and truth-telling in Argentina, and oblivion through amnesty 
in Uruguay. By the early 1990s, accountability demands had been exhausted, 
sliding off from the political and social agenda. Since the mid-1990s, a propitious 
combination of local and international dynamics set the conditions in which it was
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possible for TJ to resurface, with renewed and sustained claims for truth, justice 
and memory. This renaissance successfully challenged the situation of imposed 
silence to re-open questions on the past that had been left unaddressed. At present, 
'the regional and global protagonist of TJ' (Argentina) (Brito, 2008) and the 
'laggard' (Uruguay) have reached similar positions, something few could have 
predicted only a few years ago. Nowadays, the biggest challenges are the ongoing 
prosecutions, the October referendum and the construction of memory to which 
we now turn our attention.
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5The Politics of Memory-Argentina, 1976 to 2009
Unlike Uruguay where the state successfully implemented a policy of oblivion in 
relation to the years of political violence, the politics of memory in Argentina were 
a muddled and complicated affair.
This chapter contends that the Argentine state endeavoured, like its counterpart 
across the River Plate, to play a hegemonic role in memory since transition. 
Nevertheless, it never successfully achieved its goal.
This chapter recounts attempts by the state to try to establish an authoritative 
account of what had happened during the years of military rule and human rights 
repression. Differently from Uruguay, the Argentine state faced many challenges in 
its desire to be a hegemonic actor. It was forced to endure a difficult co-existence in 
the landscape of memory with other two players, HROs and the military. In fact the 
state's narrative was always actively disputed, in particular by human rights 
activists.
It is argued here that three phases of memory policies existed. Each democratic 
administration since the mid-1980s has effectively championed, whether explicitly 
or not, a specific narrative over the years of military rule, often through TJ 
mechanisms.
To illustrate this argument, the chapter starts off with a brief introduction on 
questions of memory. Afterwards, it describes the origin and the transformation of 
three emblematic memories (the military, the government and HROs) that tried to 
attribute meaning to the events of the recent past. Second, particular cases relating
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to dates, places and groups are examined to account for the politics of memory that 
unfolded in the social, political and cultural arenas. Third, the interrelationship 
between memory and TJ initiatives is considered, examining CONADEP and the 
Trial of the Commanders.
5.1 The Memory of Military Rule
Carina Perelli suggests that 'has-been countries', like Argentina, are places 
where nostalgia flourishes. (Perelli, 1994:39) Argentines especially use the 
mythologized past as a source of strength. Although the country 'doesn't count any 
more in the roster of the nations', Argentines still obtain a measure of comfort and 
self-esteem from remembering a past in which Argentina was different, better than 
the rest. [Ibid.) In Argentina, a shared account of the past is particularly significant, 
as much of people's sense of worth and identity depends on what is perceived as 
the country's heritage and historical tradition. Nonetheless, the events of the last 
few decades have prevented the development of such a grand narrative.
Ironically, the recent past could not be any more present, easily found in the 
media on almost a daily basis. The past however exists as a fragmentary force, a 
source of constant confrontation. The years of political violence continue to trouble 
society: Argentines have yet to come to terms with such an uneasy heritage. As a 
consequence, the memory of what occurred is constantly being 'constructed, 
destructed and reconstructed', with the process having no end in sight and without 
a definitive image becoming crystallised. (Bergero & Reati, 1997:12)
Over time, Argentina has been rocked by waves of memory that continuously 
reminded an often unwilling society of the heavy burdens of its not so distant past 
In fact, society cannot escape issues of memory. For Marcelo Brodsky, 'human 
rights are part of an ongoing discussion [...] What you think about this matter is 
important [...] it is part of our culture and identity [...] the fact that thousands of 
people disappeared as a consequence of the actions of the state only a generation 
ago, we are still brothers, parents and sons of those people. Therefore it is present 
in everyday life, in one way or another. Of course it is more so in the case of direct 
victims, but I would say that it transcends human rights groups’ (interview). As 
Patricia Valdez, Director of Memoria Abierta (Open Memory) NGO, rightly suggests, 
the landscape of memory is one of 'memories in conflict'. 'In fact' Valdez continues 
‘even within HROs we can see obvious differences as to how the memory of the 
past should be updated and exercised in the public scene, although the object of 
memory is not itself disputed' (interview).
The clash among opposing memories pre-dated transition, having actually 
started under military rule itself. Controversies surfaced as soon as events 
unfolded and discourses were later revised according to different economic and 
political conjunctures.
Two preliminary points can be suggested. First, several narratives circulate and 
exist side-by-side in the public scene (Carnovale interview). The memory of the 
afectados (those directly affected, namely victims and their relatives) rests on a 
portrayal of the crimes and the moral offence caused. It traditionally presents a de­
politicised view of the past, an image of innocent victims. A variant that has 
recently emerged among some sectors focuses on a vindication of the
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desaparecidos’ revolutionary projects. The Two Demons Theory has been 
championed particularly by the executive. Then, two further ideological 
perspectives co-exist. The first is the framework of the dirty war proposed by the 
armed forces and their supporters. The second is the guerrillas' account that has 
recently begun to philosophically and historically reflect on the Left's 
responsibility for the events of state terrorism (Lvovich interview). Finally, there is 
also a juridical memory of the crimes, based on the investigation and proof, and 
embodied in the Trial of the Commanders. (Vezzetti, 2007)
Second, these different representations share public and social spaces, and 
attempt to gain audience and supporters. Still, a sort of consensus prevails within 
society concurring on the fact that human rights were violated by the state and 
that this should not happen again (Brodsky interview). In Argentina, the 
experience of the military dictatorship is widely perceived as a Very harmful 
event' (Valdez). This produces a clear repudiation of the exercise of political 
violence, state crimes and authoritarianism (Crenzel). As Luis Fondebrider rightly 
points out, this common 'floor' is shared by many sectors but then 'if one starts to 
dig deeper, disagreements and different visions start to appear, particularly in 
relation to the reasons behind the [1976] coup' (interview).
An important question that recently emerged relates to the ownership of 
memory (my term). Since transition, HROs and the afectados have played an 
essential role as the guardians of memory. For Hugo Vezzetti, this however created 
an ill-fated situation as policies of memory are largely self-centred on HROs, and 
thus fail to generate a broader social compromise. Although HROs and victims do
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have a direct and close relationship to the past, are they the only owners of 
memory?
As Alba Lanzillotto contends, ‘society has been silent for a long time and was 
terribly scared, but if you give it a chance, it will talk’. 'It is important to gather 
these memories too' she continues 'it should not only be the memories of those 
directly affected but also people from the neighbourhoods that may have not been 
personally involved, but still listened and had to see' (interview, 03/09/2007).
If the memory of state terrorism is not sustained by society as a whole, there is a 
risk that once direct victims are no longer around, it may be lost. In fact, Vera 
Jarach, a Madre, underlines that it is vital to create what she labels 'bridges of 
memory'. 'In the last few years, I see that our need to transmit memory has been 
combined with the necessity from society to listen and receive it [...] this is very 
significant as only then bridges of memory can be established [...] it is not only 
about us talking, but also society discussing its needs and current problems with 
us [...] then you create this civic commitment and participation [...] and this is the 
key goal, because we will die, but the bridges will remain'. Nonetheless, as we later 
examine, this is only partially true.
5.2 Argentine Communities of Memory
Chapter 2 described how several communities of memory are present within 
societies attempting to tackle a legacy of human rights abuses. Although their 
borders can be quite porous, the discussion here focuses on three of them: the 
military, the government and HROs.
As we saw, each community rests on an emblematic memory, namely a 
framework for collective remembrance that assigns meaning to the years of
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political violence and military rule. It is contended here that each memory has two 
features. It has a central nucleus comprising of elements that, since its initial 
creation, have endured over time. Nevertheless, these frameworks are also flexible 
enough to be able to evolve to reflect the new political, cultural and social contexts 
in which they exist Despite this elasticity and variation, they still remain true to 
their essential cores. In the case of the military and HROs, their emblematic 
memories are 'exclusive' (my term), in the sense that their interpretation of the 
past often relies on the negation of each other's position.
The Military
According to Jelin (2006:7) and Marchesi (2005:175), the armed forces of the 
Southern Cone developed comparable narratives when explaining the events 
leading to military rule and human rights violations. These discourses presented 
two actors pitted against each other: Marxist subversives vs. the military. (Jelin, 
2006; Marchesi, 2005)
The Argentine military was no different. In fact, as Heinz and Fnihling (1999) 
suggest, their perspective was quite comprehensive, addressing the reasons for the 
coup, images of the enemy and broad ideological questions. The military shared 
the regional narrative of salvation. There are four key ingredients in the case of 
Argentina: heroism, rationales for the coup, the war against subversion and human 
rights issues.
As in Uruguay, the discourse of the Argentine military was not static. Three 
phases exist: the dictatorship, transition and recent developments. Although it 
effectively adjusted itself to changing environments, the military institution 
remained true to its central narrative, notwithstanding individual exceptions.
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First, this account rests on a heroic image of the military that, being the 
defenders and ultimate guarantors of the nation, protected it from the infiltration 
of international communism. (Jelin, 2006) Indeed, for the military what was at 
stake was nothing less than the nation's future, whose 'unity and national 
objectives' were being threatened. (Agiiero & Hershberg, 2005:4)
According to the Armed Force, military takeovers in the region were due to 
democratic administrations' poor governance and the actions of subversion that 
provoked a power vacuum beyond control. Due to this, political parties and civil 
society had requested the military's participation that accordingly responded to 
'the call of the fatherland'. (Marchesi, 2005:194-195)
The Proclama (manifesto) of the Argentine Junta of 25 March 1976 clearly 
states the rationale for the intervention: 'before a terrible lack of power and the 
inability of the national government [...] in economic management, speculation and 
corruption, the military in complying with an inalienable obligation have taken 
over the control of the state' and this decision 'had the purpose of terminating with 
bad governance, corruption and the plight of subversion’. (Lorenz, 2002:58)
The idea of subversion is a fundamental building block. Marchesi (2005) rightly 
stresses how the notion of subversive conspiracy was important for the 
consolidation of the regimes and the achievement of some type of public 
legitimacy. It acted as an as explanation for those sectors in society that 
experienced a situation of socio-political polarisation and economic crisis that had 
preceded coups in the region.
For the Argentine military, subversion was 'an evil figure that through armed 
struggle and its ideological offensive sought to question the very foundations of the
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nation'. (Jelin, 2003:53) General Videla defined subversion 'as a global 
phenomenon that has a political, economic, social, cultural and military dimension 
that [...] tries to penetrate within a population to subvert its values, create chaos 
and through these means assume power violently', (in: Pion-Berlin & Lopez, 
1991:70) More specifically, Videla claimed that a subversive was 'anyone who 
opposes the Argentine way of life'. (Ibid.71)
Thus, the military was engaged in a war against subversion, more specifically, a 
dirty war. This image of war automatically justified the actions of the military. The 
threat of communism validated the defence of the country, as well as the 
establishment and endurance of the regime. (Marchesi, 2005)
The notions of war and subversion allowed human rights crimes to be 
presented as excesses or deviations. For the military, war was an event where 
ethics were suspended: in such situations of chaos and uncontrolled violence, 
there may be unintended consequences. In the words of the Junta: 'In this period, 
almost apocalyptic, mistakes were committed that, as it happens in all wars, could 
go beyond, at times, the limits of respect of fundamental human rights, and that 
remain subject to the judgment of God in each conscience and to the understanding 
of men'. (Marchesi, 2005:199)
The military argued that human rights violations were the result of a process of 
violence that had been unleashed by the guerrillas. In fact, the fight against 
subversion had implied not only a new type of enemy, but also novel forms of 
struggle that went beyond the classical training that the armed forces received. In 
attempting to explain the problem of the disappeared, the Junta stated: '[...] in 
traditional warfare, where combatants have different nationalities, use uniforms
that differentiate them and are separated by clearly identifiable lines, there still 
exist numerous disappeared. In a war with such unusual features as the one lived, 
where the enemy did not wear uniforms and its identification documents were 
fake, the number of dead not identified increases significantly'. (Marchesi, 
2005:200)
Through strict media censorship and control of education, the Juntas curtailed 
all alternative interpretations, while policies of denial and misinformation created 
mechanisms of rationalisation and disbelief within society. (Brysk, 1994a; Jelin, 
2007a) For instance, General Videla stated in 1977, at the height of 
disappearances: 'I categorically deny that in Argentina there exist any 
concentration camps or prisoners being held in military establishments beyond 
the time absolutely necessary for the investigation of a person captured in an 
operation before they are transferred to a penal establishment' (Heinz & Friihling, 
1999:672) Similarly, General Viola explained in 1978: 'There are no political 
prisoners in Argentina, except for a few persons who may have been detained 
under government emergency legislation and who are really being detained 
because of their political activity. There are no prisoners held merely for being 
political, or because they do not share the ideas of the government'. (Heinz & 
Friihling, 1999:672)
Even when human rights abuses became an international issue, the military 
responded by speaking of national dignity and reaffirming the path taken. The 
Junta adopted the slogan 'Los argentinos somos derechos y  humanos’ (we 
Argentines are upright and humane), playing with the words human rights
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(derechos humanos). (Roniger & Sznajder, 1999:183) Despite widespread 
condemnation, the military kept a monolithic attitude and never accepted any 
responsibility. The Military Junta's Final Document on the War against Subversion 
and Terrorism in April 1983 is exemplary. It states that many of the disappeared 
were guerrilleros that had gone into exile, some had been buried as unidentified 
bodies in an unconventional war, and that any remaining unresolved cases should 
be considered dead for legal purposes. The military added that all operations had 
been conducted under orders, called for national reconciliation and reserved itself 
to the judgement of history.
During transition, when the human rights question dominated, the armed forces 
modified their interpretation of events from the one in which they were heroes to 
another in which they were victims. This was so in two respects. First, they 
presented themselves as innocent victims of subversion: 'the exercise of human 
rights was at the mercy of the selective or indiscriminate violence imposed by 
terrorist actions that resulted in assassinations, kidnappings, revolutionary trials 
[...].' (Marchesi, 2005:201)
Second, a new ideological war was now being waged against the institution. The 
military could not understand why, after it had defeated subversion, sectors of 
society that had asked them to intervene and supported the regime, were 
abandoning them, actually putting them on trial for practices that had also been 
used by the armed organisations. For the military, the return of democracy had 
only been possible because their intervention had neutralised subversion. How 
could society not see that, and even be ungrateful? (Marchesi, 2005)
During the 1990s, challenges to the military account began to emerge; 
nonetheless, the pact of silence continued largely unscathed and, if anything, old 
solidarities and discourses have been recently reactivated.
The most significant test to the unity and strength of the military occurred in 
March 1995 when Navy Captain (ret) Adolfo Scilingo publicly confessed to having 
partaken in death flights. Scilingo estimated that approximately 1500 to 2000 
people were killed in this manner between 1976 and 1977. Scilingo, who had been 
stationed at the ESMA, recounted how virtually every officer partook in the flights 
that were 'considered "a form of communion", "a supreme act we did for the 
country". (Feitlowitz, 1998:196) Scilingo participated in two flights, in April and 
June 1977, and threw thirty individuals to their death. Upon return, Scilingo went 
to confession where he was assured that it had been a Christian death. [Ibid.)
The response to Scilingo's declarations was diverse. On the one hand, several 
leaders sought to discredit him. President Menem branded him 'a crook', and 
'cautioned former militaiy torturers and executioners to keep quiet, telling them 
not to "rub salt in old wounds" by publicly recounting their deeds, but instead to 
confess their actions, if they felt so obliged, privately to priests'. (Di-Paolantonio, 
2004:365) The head of the joint chiefs-of-staff stated that Scilingo had lost all his 
virtues as an officer and gentleman, while the Navy labelled him a petty criminal 
and an untrustworthy individual. (Sznajder & Roniger, 1999) Admiral Massera 
insisted that no crimes had been committed and no-one had been killed illegally.
On the other hand, the response of Army Chief-of-Staff Balza in April 1995 
overturned half a century of Argentine military discourse. (Sznajder & Roniger, 
1999) Balza recognised how major crimes were committed and stressed that
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responsibility laid with the military leadership, implying that criminal conduct had 
been ordered vertically through the chain of command. Importantly, Balza moved 
away from the due obedience justification, asserting: 'No one is obliged to obey an 
immoral order or one that violates military laws or rules [...] It is a crime to violate 
the national Constitution, It is a crime to give an immoral order, It is a crime to 
execute an immoral order, It is a crime to employ unjust, immoral means to 
accomplish even a legitimate objective'. (Feitlowitz, 1998:224) Balza's speech was 
especially significant for what it did not say. He did not mention the fight against 
subversion, nor did he plead for excesses that may have occurred, nor vilified 
perpetrators that confessed. [Ibid.')
Feeling cornered, the Commanders of the Navy and the Air Force were 
compelled to speak. In May 1995, Air Force commander Paulik admitted that 
errors and horrors had been committed in the fight against terrorism, while 
Admiral Pico acknowledged that the Navy had acted with no respect for the 
Constitution, the law or the rules of war, causing unacceptable horrors. (Verbitsky, 
2005)
Balza's mea culpa received a mixed reception. Novaro suggests that 'there are 
two versions, one favourable to Balza, the other not so much' (interview). For 
some, Balza 'took advantage of the circumstances for his own ends, as he always 
had political ambitions'. Through the mea culpa, Balza 'became a modernising 
figure within the military and managed to distance himself from the Menemist 
project, becoming an autonomous actor’ (interview). Others instead see Balza 'as 
an innovative actor that attempted to reconcile the military with society' 
(interview).
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In the aftermath of Scilingo, there were further confessions. Nevertheless, these 
remained isolated and seldom provided specific information on the final fate of the 
disappeared. As Lorenz points out 'Scilingo and Balza received much publicity' but 
'the pact of silence remains strong and confessions should not be idealised'. 'The 
public effect was much more important than the one it had within the institution' 
Lorenz continued 'as Balza was thrown out of the Military Circle, where he is seen 
as a traitor' [interview). Likewise, Acuna stresses how Balza’s expulsion 'shows the 
kind of hegemonic discourse that still prevails within retired officers' [interview).
In the context of the thirtieth anniversary of the coup, additional self-criticisms 
occurred. Admiral Godoy called for redeeming the debts contracted with the tragic 
past, labelling the coup one of the saddest and most emblematic events of 
Argentine history. [Garin, 2006) Army-Chief Bendini condemned the terrible 
consequences, referring to the numerous deaths and the methods employed. For 
the first time Bendini mentioned the ill-fated economic legacy that destroyed the 
productive apparatus, causing poverty and marginalisation, the impact of which 
still resonates in the present. Finally, Bendini pointed to the tragic wounds within 
society that have yet to heal. [Paginal2, 2006)
Even though younger generations have seemingly distanced themselves from 
traditional discourses, retired officers that directly partook in the repression 
continue vindicating their past. For example, during a trial in 2008 the former- 
head of the Third Army Corps, Menendez justified the repression against the 
armed invasion of Marxist terrorism. He talked of a total war in which subversion 
had threatened the soul of the nation and suggested that terrorists continued to be 
present within society and the government. [La-Nacion, 2008)
In fact, the re-opening of judicial proceedings since 2005 has strengthened the 
pact of silence (Carnovale interview). Lorenz contends that recent developments 
under the Kirchners produced a justification of military rule that 'is much stronger 
than just a couple of years ago' and that 'those in favour of the dictatorship are 
becoming much more visible' (interview). Likewise, Lvovich underlined how 'what 
was silenced before is now being said: since the Kirchners took up the human 
rights banner, the Right regained some legitimacy to speak out again' (interview).
Contemporary advances have triggered the development of organisations like 
Argentinos por la Memoria Completa (Argentines for Complete Memory, AMC) and 
publications such as B1 Vitamina para la Memoria (Vitamin B1 for Memory). 
According to Valentina Salvi (2008:7), these groups reconstruct the past in such a 
way as to defend the repression, by establishing a parallel with the insurgent 
violence of the guerrillas. On their website, the AMC describes itself as an 
organisation of young argentines that want to express their gratitude to those that 
fought against subversion in Argentina. They also mention that those who 
combated terrorism are now being persecuted by a minority that is manipulating 
justice.25
Building on precedents of the 1980s, the rhetoric of the AMC focuses on 
remembering the suffering of fallen military officers, and questioning the 
legitimacy and discourses of HROs. (Salvi, 2008) They try to minimise the 
significance of state terrorism and appropriate slogans that traditionally belonged 
to HROs. In correspondence to the symbolic image of disappeared-detainees, they
25 http://www.memoriacompleta.com.ar/Quienes.htm - Accessed 15 July 2009.
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establish that of the terrorist-victim, i.e. soldiers that died a ‘noble death1, martyrs 
killed by armed organisations in the early 1970s. (Salvi, 2009:9-10)
Carnovale outlines how, while the military is still closed up in silence, the Right 
started speaking out through the AMC and its most outspoken representative, 
Cecilia Pando. Carnovale highlights that it had been several years since 'anyone 
had vindicated the actions of the military during the regime.’ The AMC 'not only 
does that, but also has elements of revisionism like for instance regarding the 
number of the desaparecidos and of appropriated children' (interview).
Human Rights Organisations
Argentine HROs need little introduction. Groups like the Madres and Abuelas are 
known throughout the world. As Elizabeth Jelin suggests, however, organisations 
protecting human rights predated the repression. The Liga Argentina por los 
Derechos del Hombre (Argentine League for the Rights of the Man, LAPH) was 
created by the Communist party in 1937, while the APDH was established by 
politicians and intellectuals in 1975. (Jelin, 1994)
HROs are quite heterogeneous but nonetheless share a similar interpretation of 
the events of the past. As in Uruguay, the emblematic memory of HROs in 
Argentina is one of disruption and suffering. It presents repression as years during 
which the state perpetrated systematic violations of human rights. Torture, but 
especially disappearances, created a climate of anguish, fear and insecurity for all 
the families that had loved ones missing. This perspective has endured, largely 
unchanged, but there have been significant evolutions.
Alison Brysk differentiates three categories of HROs. Civil libertarians (LAPH, 
APDH and CELS) collected and reported crimes mainly through legal activity; they
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appealed to universal principles and respect for legal norms. The afectados 
CMadres, Abuelas, and Familiares) used highly symbolic protests (weekly vigils, 
marches, petitions) as their chief tactic and based their action on a sense of loss, 
the right of families to protect their members, and the obligation of the state 
towards families. Lastly, religious movements (SERPAJ, the Jewish Movement for 
Human Rights) emerged because religious activists felt they could not provide 
pastoral services to victims within traditional structures. (Brysk, 1994a)
Under military rule, the ‘politics of silence' reigned supreme. (Jelin, 1994:42) 
Two common lines of action by HROs emerged: dissemination of information and 
national and international denunciation of violations, and solidarity and support 
for victims and their relatives. {Ibid.) Their public activity, especially symbolic 
actions, attempted to challenge the hegemonic paradigm of the dirty war, trying to 
shift the interpretation of what was occurring to 'a framework of human rights 
violations'. (Jelin & Kaufman, 2000:90) An Asociacion-Madres member emphasised 
how they were able to change the terms of the discussion: 'people stopped talking 
of subversives and terrorists, and began discussing instead of disappeared- 
detainees and later just the disappeared' (interview).
The narrative of HROs centres on suffering and the value of human rights. Its 
emblematic figure is the desaparecido, seen as the 'victim of the unimaginable'. 
(Jelin, 2003:53)
Disappearances left families and society in a situation of uncertainty. In the 
words of a Linea-Fundadora mother: 'We did not think they had disappeared. We 
would go to police stations to ask if our sons were being detained there. The pain
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was like that, we did not know immediately, we thought they were imprisoned, 
never disappeared. [...] We did not realise the scope of the massacre [...] until some 
of those freed courageously talked, allowing us to comprehend' (interview). 
Similarly, members of Familiares recalled: ‘Two years into the disappearance of 
our loved ones, we still had the hope [of finding them alive]; we did not know if our 
disappeared was alive, but we knew that several still were. When we went to 
Puebla in 1979 to see the Pope [...] we were still looking for our sons alive, 
although we had no guarantees' (interview).
HROs stressed the randomness of repression and the fact that many of the 
disappeared had no links whatsoever with the guerrillas. They challenged the 
military portrayal of human rights abuses as excesses, claiming instead that the 
crimes committed were part of a 'grand strategy', with the military being fully 
responsible for what was happening. (Perelli, 1994:59) This image of innocent 
victims prevailed for a long time but was not unproblematic.
An APDH member contended: 'those were crazy times, in the clandestine 
detention centres there were people who had nothing to do with the guerrillas. It 
was madness' (interview). The CONADEP later also contributed to this image, 
constructing an inclusive and heterogeneous profile of the disappeared as those 
that confronted injustices, opposed the dictatorship or attempted to change the 
social order, but also 'any of their friends, friends of their friends, people reported 
for personal revenge or by those under torture'. (CONADEP, 2006:13) 'Everyone 
would fall during the raids [...] all, in the majority of cases, were innocent and did 
not even belong to the guerrillas' as the latter normally died during confrontations 
or killed themselves, so only 'a few would reach the hands of the repressors alive'. 
[Ibid.)
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This prevailing image of innocence was sometimes combined with the idea that 
the disappeared were people working for social change. As Vera, from the Linea- 
Fundadora, claims: 'finally people started to understand who the victims were, this 
big generation of youths from all social classes that altogether worked in different 
ways to improve society, to have social justice and carry out important changes' 
(interview).
Carnovale warns of the risks of this perspective according to which 'my son was 
only taking spaghetti to the shantytowns, teaching the poor and was taken away 
for thinking differently'. For Carnovale, the problem associated with this position is 
that ‘if we think that it is wrong to abduct those that are innocent, then what we 
are implicitly condoning is the kidnapping, torture and disappearance of those that 
are not, so that becomes acceptable' (interview). Indeed, this humanitarian 
narrative of the disappeared, glossing over connections with armed violence and 
political activism, is quite extended and widespread. In it, the denunciation of the 
violated rights of the desaparecidos relies only on their moral condition as victims, 
and not the universal and inalienable character of human rights. (Carnovale, 2007)
The space of action of the HROs was the public scene, May Square in Buenos 
Aires and other centres power. Slogans were a key tool, like the famous aparicion 
con vida (appearance alive) that negated the military's discourse claiming that the 
disappeared should be presumed dead, or ni olvido ni perdon (neither oblivion or 
pardon), summarising the commitment to justice and memory. (Jelin, 1994,1995)
Despite these efforts, the wall of silence was strong, as Borges himself admits: 
'We lived in the time of Rosas [Argentine autocratic leader of 19th century], without 
being aware. I was deceived concerning what happened. Some conservative friends
234
made me believe that people had been freed and left the country. But we have been 
able to attest [...] that terrible things occurred'. (Roniger & Sznajder, 1999:183)
Silence, fear but also indifference predominated as these excerpts show: 'Each 
family was scared, my in-laws were dying of fear, they let me stay for a few days 
but not longer. We also had to respect that, I respected the fear. I often walked the 
streets alone as I did not know where to go. My own parents had such sad faces 
that I could not tolerate seeing them when they also took away my daughter. I 
could not cope with that silence' (Familiares). 'My sisters all distanced themselves' 
a Madre recounts 'and even told my mother to keep away. My mum only called 
fifteen days after Irene [her disappeared daughter] was kidnapped. When the 
phone rings, someone asks: Aurora? And I answer, who is it? She responds: your 
mother. And I ask: are you my mother now? My daughter has been missing for 
fifteen days and you call now? She responded that my sisters had told her that they 
could take her away too' (interview).
HROs existed in an environment characterised by denial and disbelief. The 
propaganda of the regime was very strong and difficult to challenge. HROs strived 
to assume a public and political role, acting as 'a lonely voice, persistent and 
stubborn, denouncing atrocities and violations, a voice demanding redress and 
justice'. (Jelin, 1994:46) Despite members of the APDH, CELS and Madres being 
directly targeted and some disappeared, their work continued unabated. Initially, 
efforts were rather limited but finally the idea of human rights exploded into the 
public sphere just before transition. According to Luis Roniger, the language of 
human rights became the tool civil society and politicians used to articulate the 
need to restructure collective identity under democracy, focusing on the
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condemnation of authoritarian rule and the commitment to ethical behaviour in 
public life. (Roniger, 1997b)
The struggle for the construction of memory then became fundamental. The 
need to remember was actively promoted, developing different ways through 
which to preserve the memory of the traumatic experience. Upon transition, HROs 
had to defend their view against other perspectives, especially discourses of 
reconciliation that wished to heal society's wounds and conflicts through 
forgetfulness, focusing on the economic and political urgencies of the present and 
the future. (Jelin, 1994,1995)
The narrative of state terrorism then co-existed in the social arena with several 
others. According to Verbitsky, it was mainly as a consequence of Scilingo's 
confession that the perspective of the HROs finally ceased to be treated as those of 
'pariahs and madmen', and began to reach out to broader audiences, becoming 'the 
common sense of society'. (Verbitsky, 2005:142)
Since the 1990s, the preservation of memory has become central. Lanzillotto 
contends in this regard that 'the human rights movement and large parts of society 
keep memory alive and kicking: 'if we left it on its own, it would end'. However, 
this duty of preserving memory created fissures within HROs in terms of how to 
express and activate it.
A key challenge has been highlighting the connection between individual and 
group experience of state terrorism. Particularly, it has become important to 
emphasise how diverse groups were all affected, to different extents, by the 
violence and encourage individuals to connect their personal history with that of
236
others, reading own experiences in collective terms. (M. L. Guembe, 2008) For the 
CELS, the construction of collective memory also requires reflecting on a complex 
subject, and acknowledging that the existence of different memories can only 
enrich the way people look at the issue, constantly formulating new questions and 
debates. (CELS, 2007) Additionally, one of the main issues is persuading an often 
disinterested society that the repression was not a problem simply limited to those 
directly affected, but everyone, understanding state terrorism as a social problem.
Other challenges are analysed in more detail below and relate to how the 
memory of the past should be transmitted. In this respect, the transformation of 
former-detention centres into places of memory, and the construction of 
monuments and museums have become sources of heated discussion on how best 
to actualise the memory of the past.
Since the 1990s, the image of innocence of the desaparecidos examined above 
has been replaced by some HROs, especially the Asociacion-Madres and H.I.J.O.S., 
with another that presents them as revolutionaries. These extracts are illustrative: 
‘Why were they taken away? Because they wanted revolutionary change, because 
they were politically active, like real patriots' (Asociacion-Madres). For the 
mothers, their sons were militant revolutionaries that died in the struggle for a 
socialist revolution in Argentina. In fact, one of their slogans is vindicating the 
revolutionary compromise of our sons and raising the same banners. The Mothers 
believe that only a revolution can bring about a real democracy with social justice 
and dignity for people.26 Similarly, Enrique Pastor pointed out how H.I.J.O.S. is 
'trying to give meaning and content to those described as the guerrillas'. 'Carrying
26 http://www.madres.ora/asociacion/showit.asp?act=5 -  Accessed 17 July 2007.
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a weapon de-legitimised them, obscuring the fact that it was popular violence, a 
tool in the people's fight for liberation' (interview).
The question of armed violence is mostly sidelined by HROs in favour of the 
humanitarian image. During my interviews, various positions were adopted. 
Fernandez-Meijide of the CONADEP, also the mother of a disappeared, emphasised 
'how terrorism was absolutely ours, yes there was influence from socialism and 
the Cuban revolution, but it was absolutely folkloric, local terrorism [...] Everyone 
had more than one revolutionary in each family [...] I belong to a generation that 
looked to Cuba with admiration, though I never supported armed violence'. The 
use of language is quite interesting, as words like revolutionary and militant are 
always used, but it is generally unclear what the boundaries of the activism and 
militancy mentioned really were. A couple of Familiares members, also mothers of 
disappeared, recounted how they knew about their sons' militancy. An interesting 
position is outlined by an Asociacion Madre who stated 'we did not know what our 
kids did, they had some bad projects, but we knew they did not want a military 
government'.
The Government
In Argentina, every democratic administration has attempted to develop a 
particular understanding of events of the recent past. The essential elements of 
this perspective, despite variations, are the images of war and the existence of 
demons.
Three phases can be distinguished. First, the Alfonsin administration that, in 
wishing to signal a clear break between democracy and dictatorship, largely
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employed the Two Demons Theory (2DT). Second, President Menem endorsed 
narratives of pacification and reconciliation that presented truth, justice and 
memory as threats to the peace achieved. Menem also developed what could be 
called a One Demon Theory (IDT) that attributed responsibility for past events 
only to the guerrillas. Lastly, Kirchner based his human rights policies on a 
vindication of the political activism of the victims of state terrorism. Kirchner 
similarly developed a strand of the IDT, one that placed exclusive blame on the 
armed forces.
In the attempt to move away from past confrontations and repeated cycles of 
military interventions in political life, the Alfonsin government endeavoured to de- 
politicise the question of the past (Lvovich interview). As Novaro suggests, it was 
the only administration that attempted to develop a state-level human rights policy 
(interview).
Hugo Vezzetti suggests that the 2DT actually pre-dated transition. In fact, the 
image of the crisis as produced by two extremisms was already established in the 
early 1970s, particularly among Leftist and progressive sectors that did not 
endorse the guerrillas' armed fight. They strongly condemned the guerrillas and 
their strategy of violence, arguing that it would create fertile conditions, allowing 
the Right to deepen the escalation of brutality, and provide an excuse to perpetrate 
the coup. (Sabato, 2007)
For Vezzetti, it is important to acknowledge the origins of the Theory given that, 
upon transition it was exactly those same sectors (Alfonsin and Ernesto Sabato, 
chair of the CONADEP) that reproduced this approach (interview).
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Alfonsin interpreted the past based on this scenario in which the violent forces 
of the military and the guerrillas confronted each other, while the population at 
large, that favoured peace and democracy, was caught in the middle, unarmed and 
defenceless. This silent majority was external and absent from these struggles, 
suffering from their consequences without being an active participant The 
demonisation of the revolutionary groups and the military absolved society from 
any responsibility both before and after the coup. (Jelin, 2003; Palermo, 2004) For 
Carnovale, the 2DT enjoys wide circulation in Argentina, given the country's 
tradition of binary representation of political conflict (interview).
Fernandez-Meijide suggests how the Alfonsin government never explicitly 
equalised the two demons, but the adoption of decrees 157 and 158 did so in 
practice (interview). In fact, in carrying out parallel trials of members of the 
military and the guerrillas, the executive promoted a vision of Argentina as 
breaking clear from political violence and clandestine actions, a country that was 
returning to normal life and the rule of law. (Vezzetti, 2002) Roniger and Sznajder 
(1999:233-234) recount how this perspective was diffused through the media and 
education as 'a psychological artefact' that limited violence to reduced sectors and 
emphasised the need to marginalise such forces.
Several of my interviewees stressed how the Theory was clearly a political tool 
employed by the President in a climate of tense feelings. For Fernandez-Meijide, it 
was a tool of governability, used to prevent military rebellions. Similarly, Chillier 
highlights how its key objective was to 'deal judicially with what had happened, to 
find a political margin to curb prosecutions so that these would not be without 
limits' (interview).
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Carina Perelli contends that the 2DT solved two political dilemmas for the 
President. First, how to hold the military to account for the crimes committed, 
while simultaneously saving the institution? How to condemn revolutionary 
organisations, without adding to the anguish of many survivors that had suffered 
family losses, torture and disappearance? The theory tried to provide 'an adequate 
frame to reprocess memory without increasing the chasms that separated 
Argentine society*. (Perelli, 1992a:431) For Novaro, this approach produced a clear 
demarcation between a few violent authoritarian elements, a victimised society 
and legitimate democratic actors, establishing in this way the limits of tolerated 
practices and ideas by the new order. (Novaro, 2006)
Although the 2DT attempted to establish a parallel between insurgent violence 
and that of the military, it is generally recognised that one demon (the military) 
was worse than the other, as the crime of enforced disappearances is attributed a 
special status (Crenzel).
Despite its popularity, the Theory remains problematic. First, it strives to 
compare what is really incomparable, namely the crimes perpetrated by irregular 
groups with the State's illicit plan. (Novaro, 2006) Gil-Lavedra correctly points out 
how the state employed 'the same criminal methods of those it was fighting, but 
the state cannot be a criminal* (interview). Second, it exonerates ample sectors of 
society that either supported or practiced violence, reducing widespread practices 
to simply the actions of 'a group of lunatics, bloody bad military and crazy 
guerrilleros' (Lorenz). In doing so, the Theory attributes 'a sort of certificate of 
innocence to society', while state terrorism was a much larger and more 
complicated process. (Vezzetti, 2002:128) Third, the partiality of this view does 
not promote a genuine coming to terms with the complex developments that
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fostered military terror in the first place. One of the deepest crises in Argentine 
history was simply dismissed as merely a succession of episodes in which the 
country was victimised by rival gangs of kidnappers and killers apparently coming 
from nowhere. (Roniger & Sznajder, 1999]
Menem's politics of oblivion and reconciliation, and Kirchner's focus on the 
militancy of the disappeared share two common elements. First, both Presidents 
gave foundational tones to their discourses, as a means of differentiating their 
perspectives from what had occurred before. Second, they endorsed two strands of 
a One Demon Theory [IDT]. In fact, each President attributed responsibility for the 
past violence exclusively on either the guerrillas or the military.
Menem's policies clearly attempted to lay to rest the ghosts of the past once and 
for all. Palermo cites some examples, in which the President exhorted Argentines 
'to look to the future, to forget what divided us in the past'. (Palermo, 2004:173] 
His vision trivialised the past, negating differences and placing everyone on a same 
level of insignificance: 'it was a massive confrontation, a sort of dirty war that 
scattered our land with the blood of young Argentines', (/bzd.]
Pardons for the military and the guerrillas were accordingly justified by this 
necessary pacification, presented at home and abroad as acts of national 
reconciliation, putting the past to rest to address more pressing concerns. (Di- 
Paolantonio, 2004] For Menem, conflicts preventing Argentines from moving 
forward could only be overcome once the memory of past events was switched off, 
a position diametrically opposed to Alfonsin's who had activated memory.
Menem's response to the Scilingo effect is evidence of this. During a TV 
appearance, Menem stated: 'Now I ask, what is the reason to go back to a past that
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leads nowhere?' and, as families and friends of the disappeared gathered for a 
symbolic funeral, dropping flowers into the waters of the River Plate, he insisted: 
'The Argentine people are tired of hearing about the Dirty War'. (Feitlowitz, 
1998:198) Despite requests by several organisations that, as Commander-in-chief, 
the President required each military branch to provide lists of the disappeared, 
this never materialised. However due to the electoral campaign, Menem was quick 
to change his attitude. Given the warm public reception received by Balza's speech, 
the President tried to capitalise on it, announcing that the General had spoken at 
his suggestion and this should be taken into account.
The most emblematic symbol of Menem's policies was his (unsuccessful) 
attempt in 1998 to relocate the Navy institutions from the ESMA, demolish the site, 
and replace it with a green space and a symbol of national union.
Lvovich and Novaro however, emphasise how Menem's policies went beyond 
just reconciliation and oblivion, to actually vindicating the actions of the military. 
For instance, when the Buenos Aires City Council voted to declare the former- 
Commanders personae non gratae, in a radio interview, Menem scorned the project 
as 'pointless', taking issue with the 'biased view of history', insisting instead that 
the 'Dirty War' was begun by leftist opposition: 'What about them? 'Should they 
not be personae non gratae?’ (Feitlowitz, 1998:250) Frequently, the President 
extolled the armed forces, saying it was thanks to them that ‘we had triumphed in 
the dirty war that brought our community to the brink of dissolution'. (McSherry, 
1997b:75) He often publicly praised members of security forces, calling Alberto 
Villar, a notorious police officer linked to the paramilitary death-squad AAA, 'one 
of the greatest police chiefs'. (7h/d.)
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The President not only defended the dirty war on several occasions, but also 
linked worker strikes and protests to a resurgence of subversion. In the early 
1990s, for instance, Menem contended that the ERP guerrilla was behind 
demonstrations by students and teachers, and warned parents not to send their 
children onto the streets as they may become victims of subversion. He stated: ‘Be 
careful... so we don't end up with another contingent of the Madres of the Plaza de 
Mayo clamouring for their children'. [Ibid.)
President Kirchner similarly hoped to re-write history but in an opposite 
opposing direction (Lorenz, Palermo interviews]. Belonging to the 1968 
generation and sharing similar political beliefs as some of the victims, the 
President centred his memory discourse on a vindication of the social and political 
militancy experienced in the 1970s. (Dutrenit-Bielous & Varela-Petito, 2006] 
According to Crenzel, the novelty of Kirchner's discourse is this political and 
generational tone that was absent before (interview]. Nonetheless, some 
continuities endure, especially the authority of the afectados in the public scene.
Kirchner's discourse has two features. First, in describing the repression, the 
President distanced himself from both the military's narrative on human rights as 
excesses and Alfonsin's 2DT. According to Novaro (2006], Kirchner's policies are 
bringing politics back into the picture, especially as the President is recuperating 
the victims' political projects that were persecuted and repressed at the time. For 
example, in his 2004 speech at the ESMA, Kirchner emphasised how there had 
been a systematic plan of imposition of terror and physical elimination of 
thousands of citizens. This had implied 'a repressive model, coldly rational [...] that 
exceeded the characterisation of abuses or errors', with the President directly
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challenging the idea of excesses as the representation of human rights crimes. (N. 
Kirchner, 2004) The President highlighted that he was a member of the generation 
of militants that struggled for a better society, with frequent references to his 
companeros and compaheras (comrades). (Jelin, 2007c) Significantly, as 
controversially, the President asked for forgiveness in the name of the state: 'as 
President, I come here to say sorry on behalf of the State for the shame of having 
kept silent during twenty years of democracy for so many atrocities’. (N. Kirchner, 
2004)
The president's speech was widely criticised, despite it being true that the state 
had never asked for forgiveness before. (Ginzberg, 2006) The Radical Party 
reminded the President about the Trial of the Commanders. (Curia, 2004) Others 
remain critical. Beatriz Sarlo highlighted how there have always been different 
views on the recent past and this is likely to be the case for the future. Thus, the 
State should not be endorsing exclusivist perspectives. (Sarlo, 2004) For Vezzetti 
the event 'looked like one of those you see at university'. 'It was a kind of 
paradoxical situation' Vezzetti continues ‘as if a group outside of the state took 
over the ESMA headed by the President, not in that capacity but just as a leader. 
[...] It lacked all the evidence and the imprint of a state event [...] the state did not 
negotiate or construct some sort of viable proposal' (interview).
In his speech at the National Military College in 2004, Kirchner qualified the 
coup as one of the most painful and cruel moments in Argentine history. He 
stressed how 'the institutional order should never again, be jeopardised', that 
nothing can justify state terrorism, concluding that the weapons of the Armed 
Forces 'should never again be used against the Argentine people'. (N. Kirchner, 
2004) During the event, Kirchner ordered Army-Chief Bendini to remove Videla
and Bignone's portraits from the College walls. (Vernas, 2004) Historian Lorenz is 
rather disapproving of this: 'it would have been much better to keep the portrait 
than creating martyrs so that now the military can say “we are being persecuted". 
'The government sometimes forgets that the military is part of the state, so it 
would have been better to simply put a note underneath the portraits stating what 
this person had done' (Lorenz).
As Palermo rightly suggests, Kirchner's policies have both 'lights and shadows' 
(interview). Palermo underscores how ‘this is a clear case of a government wishing 
to establish a new account on the past, talking in the name of the state'. For 
Palermo, Kirchner's official discourse is almost saying that 'human rights policies 
began with him, that everything that was done before was being condescending to 
the military, but this is not the case, it distorts history and undermines the good 
that was achieved before' (interview). For Palermo, Kirchner's vision ‘is a worse lie 
than the 2DT, for presenting the victims of state terrorism not only as such, but 
also as fighters for democracy'. This portrayal 'gives a blessing, and places all the 
victims in the category of heroes for some ideals and values, as well as using 
methods that were admirable' (interview). Likewise, Lvovich underscores how 
Kirchner 'is not really vindicating human rights in general, but a certain 
revolutionary past'. This perspective is a very selective reading that justifies those 
fighting for national liberation or human rights, but does not talk about political 
violence or historicise events (Lvovich).
For Lorenz, Kirchner is tiying to break the logic of the two demons by asserting 
'that it is not the same when the state violates the law as it is when the guerrilla 
does so'. The result of this is however a 'largely a-historical and a-critical 
representation of the period, where the victims are portrayed as idealist youths
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and militants'. Lorenz points to the ESMA, where now each part of the museum of 
memory has been named after symbolic victims of state terrorism, like journalist 
Rodolfo Walsh or writer Haroldo Conti 'as the saints of this new religion' 
(interview). So the 2DT is now being replaced by a generic vindication of the 
1970s. As Lorenz asks, what does this mean? Does it also justify the element of 
armed violence that the guerrillas employed?
In comparing Menem and Kirchner, Novaro stresses how Menem never 
managed to be hegemonic or as powerful as he wished to. Likewise, Kirchner only 
achieved a rather superficial social consensus that is likely to last less than the 
Menemist one: ‘this is a floating cloud of gas' Novaro claims 'signs of it falling apart 
are already evident as for the majority of people current human rights trials are 
only secondary issues' (interview).
5.3 Argentine Memory Knots
Memory knots are particular dates, places or groups that may trigger debates 
about memory (2.2). They can distract society away from daily routines, to look 
instead at the contested events of the past. Memory knots re-energise the 
discussion, drawing attention to such questions.
Sites of humanity are particular groups or individuals that project specific 
memories onto the public arena. Here we consider two cases, the Madres and 
H.I.J.O.S., that in different ways have called on Argentine society to face up to the 
legacy of state terror.
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The Madres de Plaza de Mavo
The Madres de Plaza de Mayo and their white headscarves have become 
worldwide symbols of non-violent protest. Under military rule, they were an 
emblem of resistance in a country that had lost its voice. Through the use of 
language, with mottos like Prison to the Perpetrators o f Genocide and Judgment and 
Punishment o f A ll Guilty as their peaceful weapon, the Madres captured public 
consciousness, claiming an ethical, political and historical presence by continually 
speaking out. (Bouvard, 1994)
In Buenos Aires, May Square is for many the Square of the Mothers. For 32 years 
since April 30,1977 at 15:30 every Thursday afternoon, the Madres march around 
the Pyramid of May located at the centre of the Square.
Since the time of independence, the Square has been a symbol of power and 
faces the Casa Rosada, the home of the Executive. Every week, and on other dates 
relating to the dictatorship, the square becomes the location where the memory of 
military rule and its denunciation are activated. (Jelin & Langland, 2003) The 
Madres have kept the plight of the disappeared in the public consciousness and 
reclaimed the Square for their children, where they are given 'a social and political 
existence'. (Bouvard, 1994:231,254)
The marches were ironically initiated by the state itself. The Madres 
unsuccessfully looked for their missing children in morgues, prisons, cemeteries, 
offices and military chaplaincies: 'We met while trying to find the missing, to see 
what we could do, like presenting habeas corpus petitions to locate our loved ones' 
(Linea-Fundadora).
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Finally, the Interior Ministry decided to provide office space to receive inquiries 
about disappearances and that became their initial meeting place. (Schirmer, 
1988) In one of those instances, Azucena Villaflor, one of the founders, suggested 
that they ought to be in the Square and 'when there are enough of us, we'll go to 
the Casa Rosada and see the President about our children who are missing'. 
(/bzd.46) As standing around was tantamount to holding a meeting which was then 
prohibited, the Madres were forced to move around the Square in a great circle, 
hence initiating their marches.
As the Madres themselves admit, it was the experience of losing their children 
that drew them out of their houses, forcing them to mobilise -something 
particularly innovative in a patriarchical society as Argentina. 'When they took 
away our sons' an Asociacion Madre recounted 'we knew nothing of politics, we 
learnt afterwards, walking, knocking on doors, hearing denial and negation, and 
we learnt what politics is' (interview). For the mothers, ‘it was "natural" and not 
political [...] to leave the home in search of her missing son or daughter'. (Peluffo, 
2007:82)
The Mothers used a whole range of techniques to rescue the disappeared from 
oblivion: ‘from our ongoing pain, creativity emerged' (Asociacion). In fact, they 
created paper cut-outs shaped like human hands to symbolise the hands of loved 
ones, released balloons with names of the desaparecidos, and paraded wearing 
identical masks symbolising the common plight of the victims of state terrorism. 
(Femenia, 1987)
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If initially the pain and the trauma produced by the loss of the children 
represented a source of strength and common purpose, but by the mid-1980s 
fissures began to emerge, later proving fatal to the unity of the movement. In fact, 
the organisation split in 1986. Initially, conflict originated from disagreements 
over issues of organisation and leadership style, but other questions followed.
A group of fourteen women, led by Renee Epelbaum, left the Asociacion due to 
their disapproval of the increased centralisation and vertical leadership structure. 
(Taylor, 1997] The Linea-Fundadora was so established, claiming that this new 
group was closer to the original intention of 1977. (Bosco, 2004) One of the 
mothers from the Linea-Fundadora recalled with sadness the moment of the split: 
"[in 1977] Hebe [de Bonafini] becomes the leader and we all accompanied her, I 
will always say that she has a big flaw, that you have to do what she wants, and 
that is a mistake so we confronted her [...] But then I always respect her as in the 
worst moments she was always the one fighting' (interview).
In chapter 4, the question of economic reparations was mentioned as one of the 
grounds leading to the split up. Another important issue was the question of the 
death of the disappeared. Exhumations became a matter of contention. 'Hebe is 
very strong willed' Aurora from Linea-Fundadora said 'and she was against 
exhumations, so when the EAAF found some unmarked tombs, Hebe said that 
those found should remain there and not be disinterred'. 'But many mothers held 
that they wanted to exhume the bodies, that they had a right to talk and that Hebe 
could not decide for us all'. Peluffo (2007:91) also recounts how several Linea- 
Fundadora mothers wanted to recover the remains of loved ones, that it was a 
'personal decision' to gain closure by burying their remains.
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Madres Linea Fundadora
Other disagreements related to differing opinions over the question of memory, 
whether it  was right and convenient to commemorate the past and how to do so. 
The Linea-Fundadora argues that remembering the disappeared is a way to keep 
the human rights movement alive. In contrast, the Asociacion claims that 
commemorating, opening mass graves or constructing memorials, is equivalent to 
accepting the death of the disappeared, thus putting an end to the ir struggle.
Additionally, for the Linea-Fundadora, the return to democracy meant that some 
of the strategies used previously were no longer adequate to obtain their goals and 
that it  had then become possible to work w ith  the government. Conversely, the 
Asociacion increasingly saw itself working for social change more generally, 
including but not lim ited to human rights. They adopted a more revolutionary, 
anti-capitalist and anarchist stand. (AsociacionMadres, 2007)
The Madres have different positions on how to remember the disappeared. The 
Linea-Fundadora stresses the importance of making the events of the past visible 
to transmit memory to other generations. They do so through the construction of
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temporary and permanent physical markers in the urban landscape. They have 
created temporary exhibitions with pictures of the disappeared in parks or other 
public places. Standing by, they tell of their struggle and the story of their missing 
ones. They remind people that the desaparecidos were people like everyone else, 
with families, projects and dreams. They favour the creation of permanent 
memorials, including naming streets after the desaparecidos, and are involved in 
efforts to save the location of former-detention centres. Vera Jarach emphasises 
how the past can be remembered in many ways, through the cinema, theatre, 
images, artworks, through school education and symbolically through living 
museums, like one of her latest project, the'paseo de los derechos humanos' (human 
rights walk). A small wood with groups of trees, it represents the relationship 
between the lives of the desaparecidos that were cut short and these trees that 
need to be nurtured.
For the mothers of the Asociacion, the search for the truth is counter to their 
goals and detrimental to their continuous activism. Their official position is not to 
publicly accept that the disappeared are dead, as commemorating death would 
entail the end of their work for social justice. They reject memory strategies and 
commemorations representing the disappeared as dead or as individuals, and 
oppose the creation of permanent landscapes of memory. As one Madre contended 
'the mothers want neither posthumous museums nor statues for our children, 
because they talk of death. We talk of life and defend life. We feel that instead when 
we march, we attract people and their attention, we bring them [the disappeared] 
back to life and they are with us, we do not know where, but the disappeared do 
accompany us’ (interview). She described a recent project, in one of the poorest
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parts of Buenos Aires, Villa 15, Ciudad Oculta that sponsored the building of 72 
houses, a nursery and two schools, by training local men and women in 
construction. Following this success, another 400 houses are to be bu ilt in Villa 
Soldati, Buenos Aires and another 500 in Chaco province.
m^TVCION  OE LA RIQUEZA'if
Asociacion Madres
The split also reflected class differences. Peluffo (2007) suggests that the 
majority of the Linea-Fundadora mothers came from privileged and educated 
middle class backgrounds. Conversely, Hebe de Bonafini was from the working 
class, the daughter of a factory worker. Another difference whose impact is, 
however, d ifficult to establish, is the fact that several o f the Linea-Fundadora 
mothers were Jewish or married to Jewish men. (Peluffo, 2007)
While the Linea-Fundadora Madres remain loyal to the original a-political 
mandate, the Asociacion Madres ‘chose to embrace the revolutionary cause of their 
deceased sons and daughters'. (Peluffo, 2007:94) 'We say that they left us a path 
and we are following it. We continue to fight for what they wanted, [...] for the 
revolutionary change that the country needed' (Asociacion interview).
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Additionally, it is important to note how, despite differences between the two 
groups, differentiation -sometimes bordering on resentment, exists towards the 
mothers that did not mobilise, as in highlighted these excerpts: 'many mothers 
stayed at home, cried and simply said they [the disappeared] will never come back. 
We decided to go out and demand answers, to confront the military' [Asociacion). 
Likewise, a Linea-Fundadora mother asserted how 'several mothers joined after 
1986, after the danger had subsided, this is very nice, to receive the flowers, 
applauses and everything1.
The work of the mothers is indeed really interesting. In one sense, they defied 
the 'traditional maternal roles and called attention to the fact that motherhood was 
a social, not just a biological construct'. (Taylor, 1997:185) Simultaneously, 
however, their unrelenting struggle and mobilisation in a way reinforced their 
traditional role as mothers responsible for their children. They indeed left the 
confines of the household but once again it was women, and particularly mothers, 
who were on the front line, worrying about their sons and daughters. The lack of 
male figures, with the exception of Emilio Mignone (founder of the CELS) is telling 
in this picture. Although it may be true that men would have been targeted and 
responded to differently by the military, it is also certain that several mothers 
disappeared.
The role of the Madres is fascinating in the sense that, although they were able 
to defy the traditional position allocated to them by society, they nonetheless re­
played their duties as guardians of the household. As Diane Taylor (1997:194) 
states, they decided 'to actively play the roles that had traditionally been assigned 
to them: [...] the powerless who cannot speak yet witness and testify to the crimes’.
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Taylor emphasises how their position as mothers was attractive because it offered 
them a certain legitimacy, authority but also protection -or so they believed, 'for a 
military that sustained itself on Christian and family values could hardly attack a 
group of defenceless mothers inquiring after their missing children', (/fc/d.195)
H.I.J.O.S. and their Escraches
Throughout the 1990s, Susana Kaiser suggests that Argentines lived in a climate 
of normalised impunity, where former repressors freely circulated in public 
spaces. In this context, the association H.I.J.O.S. developed a new form of public 
demonstration, the escraches. (Bonaldi, 2006)
The word escrachar, from Italo-Argentine slang, means uncovering, 'bringing to 
light something that has remained hidden'. (Thomas, 2005:92) These protests 
actively remind society of how the dictatorship left behind a bloody legacy of the 
disappeared, dead and political prisoners.
Escraches are acts of public shaming, campaigns of condemnation that target 
former-repressors to expose their identities, break their anonymity and the 
apparent normality in which they live, and publicise their crimes to produce moral 
condemnation. (Taylor, 2003) As Vezzetti puts it well, escraches actualise the past 
and activate memory in the city. (Vezzetti, 1998)
With a clear generational imprint, escraches are festive, loud and mobile 
demonstrations that involve 300 to 2,000 people that invade neighbourhoods 
where ex-repressors live with music and dance. Demonstrators walk around the 
streets carrying banners, giant puppets, or huge placards with photos of the 
desaparecidos, singing slogans like: 'Alert! Alert! Alert all neighbours, there is an
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assassin living next door to you!' or ‘Just like the Nazis it will happen to you, 
wherever you go we will go after you'. [Kaiser, 2002:499)
Martin Hernan-Fraga of the Escrache Commission described to me the three 
typical phases of an escrache. First, the Commission investigates possible targets, 
receiving information and developing a personal file, the so-called prontuario that 
outlines who they are and what they did. The Commission also checks whether the 
person is under judicial investigation as if that is not the case H.I.J.O.S. prefers to 
make a formal report to the judiciary, to prevent the person from later escaping 
justice.
In the second phase, H.I.J.O.S. prepare the community affected, by canvassing the 
neighbourhood in which perpetrators live and/or work, showing their 
photographs and disseminating information. Flyers outline facts about the person 
including a photograph, name, address, position under the regime, crimes, current 
occupation and place of work. Local political and social organisations are also 
invited to participate.
Third, when the escrache occurs, it consists of a march from a pre-arranged 
point to the person's house. This goes on usually for around ten blocks, walking 
around the neighbourhood to involve everyone, convoking people, with singing, 
dancing, and murga (musical theatre). Often the police prevent them from reaching 
the house, but if possible, H.I.J.O.S. paint the repressor(s)' name(s) and crimes in 
yellow paint on the pavement. (Taylor, 2006) Red paint, symbolising blood, is 
usually thrown at the house leaving a mark for all to see even after the escrache is 
over (interview).
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Escraches inform the community about atrocities that repressors committed. 
Hernan-Fraga outlined how 'the ultimate objective is social condemnation*. This 
was particularly significant during the 1990s ‘when given the lack of judicial 
verdicts, we wanted to at least produce social disapproval, so that society 
condemns and rejects former repressors, that people from the neighbourhood no 
longer talk to them or allow them into their shops' (interview]. These theatrical 
and non-violent acts are innovative for drawing attention to both past crimes and 
the continued impunity in the present. For an APDH member, another key 
contribution is that 'society at large is made aware and can participate*. ‘It is of 
course good to have HROs' she continued 'but it is important to engage civil society 
through community organisations, to make society see the continuities between 
the present and the past* (interview). Likewise survivor Lordkipanidse stressed 
how escraches are 'very effective at involving whole neighbourhoods, spreading 
awareness and generating consciousness about the repression' (interview).
H.I.J.O.S. vow to continue until justice has been done: 'Si no hay Justicia, hay 
Escrache’ (If there is no Justice, there will be Escraches). Hernan-Fraga highlighted 
how recently civilian accomplices of all kinds, from the Church, the judiciary and to 
big businesses, are being targeted, to call attention to the fact that 'it was not only 
police or the military, but also sectors of the civilian power that actively endorsed 
the regime' (interview).
Escraches impact on three levels. On a personal level, they enact collective 
trauma, making not only the crimes that were committed visible, but also 
illustrating the lasting trauma suffered by victims and the whole country. (Taylor,
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2003) Escraches challenge the normalised impunity in which former-repressors 
comfortably live, trapping 'torturers and assassins by building metaphorical jails in 
neighbourhoods throughout Argentina'. (Kaiser, 2002:512) On a social level, these 
performances suddenly interrupt the apparently calm of day-to-day life and, being 
disruptive, noisy and provocative, are hard to ignore. They force society to 
confront its own denial, emphasising how everyone suffers from the long-term 
effects of traumatic violence, whether they understand it or not. (Taylor, 2006) 
They compel society to become aware, informing people so they cannot excuse 
themselves by saying they did not know and make people realise that they cohabit 
with repressors, sharing the same streets, neighbourhoods, workplaces, and bars. 
(Banega, 2006) Finally, on a political level, escraches expose the weakness of the 
democratic governments and their refusal to deliver truth and justice. They remind 
that the chapter on the past is still open, by publicly challenging political amnesia 
and impunity, and opposing discourses encouraging artificial and premature 
reconciliation. (Kaiser, 2002) Escraches remind spectators not to forget their role 
in the drama. Even if those witnessing performances may not be direct victims, 
survivors or perpetrators, it does not mean they had no part in the drama of state 
terrorism: the tragedy concerns all Argentines. (Taylor, 2003,2006)
Sites in time are specific dates that evince memory and stir up debate. In 
Argentina, several exist. September 16, the Night of the Pencils, is particularly 
remembered by high school students, especially in La Plata. Other dates are 
commemorated locally as the Jornada de derechos humanos y  culturas (day of 
human rights and culture) in the province of Jujuy. (Jelin, 2002) Others include 22 
August, the date of the 1972 Trelew massacre in southern Argentina and more
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recently, 18 September, when a key witness in a human rights trial disappeared in 
2006. The most emblematic of all is 24 March, the day of the military coup.
24 March
24 March (24/3) was bestowed diverse meanings over time and has been 
continuously commemorated since 1976 with diverse narratives. (Jelin, 2007b)
During military rule, Lorenz (2002) suggests that 24/3 was portrayed as a 
foundational moment in moving beyond the situation of disorder and chaos that 
had preceded the coup. Between 1976 and 1980, this anniversary was 
remembered with a military ceremony in which government representatives and 
Church authorities participated. There were two key events: the militaiy parade 
and the inspection of troops, and a mass in the Stella Maris chapel, the home of the 
military vicarage.
At this time, the Junta completely controlled commemorations. The media 
largely reproduced discourses that stressed how the military had been obliged to 
take power, that their central objective was fighting subversion and that they were 
interpreting the aspirations of all Argentines, to achieve the destiny of national 
greatness. (Lorenz, 2002) During those years, the military's voice was the only one 
publicly talking. Though there were alternative commemorations by trade unions 
and/or private remembrances, these could not openly dispute the meaning of 24/3  
which put forward an unquestioned public image of a country at war against 
subversion. [Ibid.)
Between 1981 and 1983, the dominance of the military discourse was broken. 
Critical and opposing voices started appearing, even from those sectors that had 
initially been supportive. HROs become more vociferous too. By its last year in
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power, the anniversaiy saw a government that had completely lost legitimacy and 
was preparing its exit. During the dictatorship, the regime had successfully 
installed certain icons and symbols that remained in the imagery of 24/3 for some 
time, like the situation of chaos, repression as a response to the guerrillas and the 
idea of subversive conspiracies.
Upon democratisation, the government was largely absent from remembrances. 
It did not really pay attention to the date, with the exception of sporadic messages 
in the media. It left commemorations in the hands of HROs, and only organised a 
small event on 23 March 1984, to commemorate the 100 days of democracy. (Jelin, 
2007b) Lorenz (2002) points out how the government's silence marked a clear 
contrast to previous years, when the Junta monopolised commemorations.
Since 1983, HROs have displaced the military as key actor in commemorations, 
organising marches, performances and various activities. Between 1990 and 1994, 
remembrance had limited appeal in a climate of forgetting and reconciliation 
championed by the first Menem administration. The reduction in attendance was 
however balanced by the development of new ways of protesting, that ranged from 
denunciations, memorials, didactic efforts to outright vindication. (Lorenz, 2002) It 
was at this time that the Asociacion-Madres attributed a new identity to the victims 
of state terrorism, away from the traditional imagine of innocence: they now were 
'30,000 revolutionaries'. (Lorenz, 2004:18)
The year 1995 was marked by military confessions. The two main events 
organised by HROs both took place near the ESMA. Military confessions resulted in 
a widespread diffusion of information on past crimes allowing the perspective of 
state terrorism to be strengthened.
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The twentieth anniversary in 1996 was a momentous occurrence. For the first 
time, HROs combined their mobilisation with that of other social and political 
organisations and began examining the long-term political reasons that had 
triggered the coup (Carnovale interview]. For Lordkipanidse, the massive 
mobilisation in 1996 is what produced a different response by the government on 
'whether this subject can continue to be covered up or not, as popular support is 
what now makes the question much stronger' (interview). Lorenz (2002:85) 
outlines three innovations. For the first time, a democratic president spoke on the 
day. President Menem broadcasted a message, labelling the date 'a day of horror, 
death and intolerance'. Second, H.I.J.O.S. made its first public appearance, 
vindicating the political identity of their parents. Third, the Committee for 
Memory, Truth and Justice held one of the most important rallies, with over 
100,000 people.
During the late 1990s, fragmentations surfaced within HROs. In March 1999, 
while members of Abuelas and Linea-Fundadora were laying the foundation stone 
and erecting a plaque at the Monument to the Victims of State Terrorism, members 
of H.I.J.O.S. and the Asociacion-Madres who opposed the initiative, carried out an 
escrache and a demonstration against the project In 2001, remembrances showed 
a complex panorama of different lines of thought. This year was also characterised 
by the public re-appearance of the Montoneros. Several events were organised, 
including public commemorations, exhibitions, and book and film presentations.
Lorenz argues that commemorations in 2004 constituted a watershed. For the 
first time, the government took an active role, becoming directly involved in the
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dispute about attributing meaning to the past and entered the scene as the 
organiser of the main commemorative event. (Jelin, 2007b) It was on this occasion 
that, through an agreement between the National Government and the Buenos 
Aires City Government, the ESMA was destined to become a Memory Museum.
On the thirtieth anniversary in 2006 different groups like banks, the judiciary, 
and state and health trade unions unveiled plaques or realised acts to 
commemorate the disappeared. Schools arranged events, and written and visual 
media aired programmes relating to the dictatorship and the repression. 
Moreover, special publications were released, and art exhibitions and poetry 
readings were organised. The traditional march was summoned under slogans of 
'Thirty Years, Memory, Justice and Truth', and 'Trial, Punishment and 
Imprisonment for all Perpetrators'. The government sponsored several initiatives, 
including a re-edition of the CONADEP's report and a law declaring 24/3 a national 
holiday.27 (Fernandez-Moores, 2006; Gutierrez, 2006) President Kirchner led 
ceremonies, unveiling a plaque with the words Never Again in Buenos Aires in 
homage to the disappeared. [Bruschtein, 2006) A minute of silence was also held.
2007 commemorations displayed typical features, but there were also 
significant changes. The President once again led commemorations, in this case of 
La Perla in Cordoba, where he announced the creation of a Memory Museum there. 
(Clarin, 2007) HROs organised their annual demonstration in May Square, under 
three banners: '30,000 Disappeared Present', 'Against Impunity, Trial and 
Punishment' and 'Julio Lopez to Appear Alive'. (Pertot, 2007) The march was 
heterogeneous, with members of trade unions, community assemblies, student 
organisations, and individuals and families.
27 In 2002, Law 25.653 had instituted 24 March as ‘National Day of Memory for Truth and Justice’ commemorating the 
victims of the last military regime.
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During remembrances in 2009, traditional HROs demands like the acceleration 
of trials and the end of impunity were combined, for the first time, with present 
human rights concerns, like the inappropriate use of deadly force by the police. 
(LaNacion, 2009; Vales, 2009) This is a welcomed development in attempting to 
achieve a holistic approach to human rights questions, one that is not temporally 
limited to the crimes of the 1970s but that takes into account ongoing human 
rights concerns.
For some, 24/3 is a key date of remembrance, to sustain the memory of the past 
and avoid the repetition of similar deeds (APDH interview). According to Crenzel, 
the date is ‘so emblematic for memory in Argentina to the point that it was 
declared a national holiday' (interview). On this point, Enrique Pastor of H.I.J.O.S. 
however, illustrates how the decision to annex 24/3 to the holiday calendar caused 
a strong debate. First, this decision 'makes the state looks good and allows it to 
shape the date' (interview). Second, there is the risk that 24/3 then becomes like 
any other holiday, a day 'of laziness, not of commitment, a day to go to the beach or 
to the mountains. Over time the meaning associated with the date is emptied'. 'I do 
not know if this will happen' Pastor continued 'as 24/3 is a fundamental day in our 
calendar’, but it is an issue worth bearing in mind (interview).
Over thirty years, commemorations on the 24/3 championed conflicting visions 
of the past. Additionally, an alternation of voices was authorised to speak. While in 
the 1970s the date was covered by silence and commemorations were limited to 
the military, since the 1980s HROs have occupied public remembrance spaces, 
becoming a hegemonic actor. Finally, the executive carved out a role for itself.
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It is interesting to note how, unlike Uruguay where the narrative of the military 
and that of the HROs revolved around two different dates, in Argentina 24/3 
embodied both positions over time. Until the mid-1980s, it was associated with the 
image of a country at war against subversion. Since then, the framework of state 
terrorism has become dominant and remembrance has since focused on a 
repudiation of violence and authoritarianism.
Sites of physical matter/geography are specific to places, old or new that 
have a strong connection with the past. Given this, they can awaken memory 
debates, pushing society to think about these issues. Argentina has a wealth of 
these. Among the most symbolic are the Ford Falcon cars that during the 1970s 
became 'the single most recognisable icon of repression'. (Robert, 2005:12) Since 
then, they have remained in the public imagery as the embodiment of horror, 
disappearances and torture (Mansilla interview). Its emblematic charge is so 
strong that some artists suggested placing one outside of the ESMA premises and 
leaving it there to the mercy of the elements, so that nature and life could take over 
and destroy the horror it represents.
The Desaparecidos
The emblematic figure of the desaparecidos, those forever absent, has been a 
powerful projector of memory. Who were the desaparecidos? How can they be 
represented, given that 'they persist in a limbo between life and death -like 
spectres haunting the living, wanting to be heard, acknowledged and remembered.' 
(Lazzara, 2006:102)
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General Videla's own definition of the disappeared ironically summarises well 
its status: 'the disappeared does not exist; he is neither alive nor dead, he's 
disappeared.' In: (A. Kaufman, 2007:235)
This ghostly figure began haunting Argentina early on. In the mid-1980s, society 
went through what Ines Gonzalez-Bombal labelled 'a horror show'. (Gonzalez- 
Bombal, 1995:204) The media continuously broadcasted the opening of mass 
graves and unnamed tombs, and released the details of thousands of 
disappearances and hundreds of detention centres, irrefutable proof that the 
political confrontation had trespassed all acceptable limits. (Gonzalez-Bombal,
2004) The crime of disappearance violated deep cultural principles and the 
desaparecidos escaped any admissible political logic and justification. [Ibid.) In 
addition to individual suffering and, as Mario Di-Paolantonio rightly contends, the 
bodies of the disappeared reflected the image of a dismembered nation, producing 
a 'crisis of identity [...] [that] questioned post-dictatorship Argentina with the 
limits of its Being'. Argentina did not simply see the bodies of the desaparecidos, 
'but also gawked at its national cadaver'. (Di-Paolantonio, 2001:446)
Coming to terms with the disappearance of loved ones was a traumatic and 
painful process for families, as these excerpts underscore:'[...] in the first months 
of my son's disappearance, I used to say "I will find him, I will find him”, only after 
a long time did the doubt emerged. But no-one said one day "that's it, he died". It 
was something that slowly one came to realise. Even today it is difficult to accept 
and feel the death. One thing is what we rationally know and think, that they 
cannot be but dead, another is feeling it' [Familiares interview). Mabel pointed out:
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'until recently, I could not talk in the past about my son. I could not say: he would 
be... No, I could neither talk in the present because it is ridiculous to talk in the 
present about someone that is not there'. Likewise, another member of Familiares 
emphasises how 'psychologists say that without a body there can be no mourning. 
Mourning cannot exist and it is true. I go to the cemetery where my mother, father 
and husband are, but I never pray for my sons there. I do not place them in the 
cemetery'.
The desaparecidos profoundly mark the political temporality of Argentina, 
forcing people to undertake a difficult and complex memory labour. (Oberti & 
Pittaluga, 2002) In fact, the disappeared rupture traditional spatial and temporal 
categories around which human life is organised. (Crenzel, 2007a) Di-Paolantonio 
captures well this problematic situation, stating that the disappeared are 'neither 
alive nor sufficiently (ever) dead'. (Di-Paolantonio, 2001:446)
The desaparecidos exist in their own time, their images forever frozen in the 
past instant of kidnapping but simultaneously inhabiting the present These quotes 
clearly exemplify how relatives feel about their loved ones and the challenges they 
lived through: 'My son was twenty-five when he was taken away' Mabel said 'his 
son now has two children to whom my son is a grandfather but for me he 
continues to be twenty-five. And I tell you more, the day the Monument to the 
Victims of State Terrorism was inaugurated, my grandchildren came. His little 
granddaughter who is five asked what the plaque [with her grandfather's name] 
said: "Alejandro Rodriguez-Gutierrez, twenty-five". So she questioned: "Why 
twenty-five?" "Because he was twenty-five." She continued: "But grandfathers are 
meant to be old!!!" So we had to explain that her grandfather was killed and could 
not grow old'. Another Familiares member similarly stated: ‘when I remember my
266
partner, I remember him at that time, I cannot imagine him old. None of us do. I do 
not imagine him like at my age now. It is like he's frozen in time, at that time. All of 
our companions that were w ith  me. You have the image of all these people of how 
they were then. You do not see them growing up or at another age'.
The desaparecidos are a testing image as they are a no-place, a presence made of 
physical absence. For Ludmila da-Silva-Catela, the desaparecido has a threefold 
condition: 'there is no body, no moment of mourning or burial'. [da-Silva-Catela, 
2001:121] Very often, they are prisoners of their photographs and beliefs at the 
time of fading away: the disappeared became icons to be venerated. [Vezzetti, 
1996)
Photos of Desaparecidos
Similarly, Mabel points to this: 'Alejandro was twenty-five when he was taken 
away while Ramiro is thirty-one. My grandson [Ramiro] is six years older than his 
own father [Alejandro]. For Ramiro, his father is a photo because he was very small 
when his dad disappeared. So he does not remember him: his father is a photo o f a 
25-year-old person'. Likewise, another interviewee recounted of an event in 2007 
in Trelew, during which photos of those executed there in 1972 were shown.
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'There was a grandmother with a nephew that was five or six years old’ she 
narrates 'and they were showing the photos on the walls and the grandmother was 
saying "wait, wait that now comes your grandpa", and there appears the photo of a 
beautiful youngster in his twenties. I did not talk to the child as I did not know him, 
but I wondered: "what does this child think?" "How handsome my grandpa is!” 
This child probably said I should take him to school with me, what a grandpa!"
The lack of tombs or bodies turned the traditional stages of life and death, 
upside down: 'Those parents that have found the bodies of their missing, between 
ourselves we have this joke, we say that they are privileged. One of our 
companions, Hugo, has found his brother's remains and is also carrying out a trial 
[...] so he feels he is privileged compared to the others' (Familiares). Recovering 
the bodies of the disappeared or having information on their final destiny thus 
becomes a fortunate situation to be, in, given that the vast majority of people never 
reach this stage.
Despite being constituted by a materiality made of physical absence, the 
desaparecidos are present in many ways. HROs have developed a variety of 
methods like the silhouettes and the Thursday marches, during which the 
disappeared are rescued from the fogs of oblivion. Silhouettes were used for the 
first time during the Madres' third March of Resistance and are now a conventional 
representation of the disappeared, in addition to personal photographs. 
(Broquetas, 2008)
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The empty silhouettes represent physical absence and can be found on 
buildings, columns, phone boxes and trees. (Jelin & Longoni, 2005) They are used 
throughout cities, as in this photo outside El Olimpo in Buenos Aires.
On a daily basis, personal notices are also published by relatives in the Buenos 
Aires newspaper Pagina/12 to remember anniversaries of disappearances of loved 
ones. (Dussel et al., 2003) A couple of examples from August 22 and September 9, 
2008 read: '31 years after your kidnapping and disappearance, those who love you 
and do not forget you, we carry on demanding justice. Your son Santiago, your wife 
Sarita, and your grandchild Nicolas.' 'Dear Elena, you continue to live in our 
memories, we w ill never forget you, and so we continue looking for the tru th  so 
those responsible w ill be punished. Your daughters Clarisa and Natalia'.
Moreover, in several universities, schools, streets and squares, plaques 
commemorate the disappeared, as the one below (left) remembering four political 
activists kidnapped in June 1977, or identify the location of former clandestine 
detention centres such as the one outside Garage Azopardo in Buenos Aires (right).
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The song Epoca (epoch) by the band Gotan Project is another example of how 
the preoccupation w ith  the desaparecidos has shaped Argentine culture and 
society. The lyrics28, which sound like a poem, indirectly discuss Argentina's recent 
history and the drama of disappearances. Eduardo Makaroff, the composer, 
emphasised how it clearly endeavours to talk about Argentina in a poetic way 
(interview, 29/07/2009). There are obvious references to some symbols that we 
have already encountered like the panuelo bianco, the white headscarves of the 
Madres and the 25th anniversary of the m ilita ry  coup. According to Makaroff, the 
idea behind the song, came to another band member and related to the fact that 
'everything that dies comes back to life': so in the same way 'those that 
disappeared w ill return' (interview).
Interestingly, the song, over three decades after m ilita ry rule, is try ing to 
challenge discourses claiming the death of the disappeared, calling instead for life, 
as in this line: 'i f  it  disappeared, it  w ill appear in me, they thought it  had died, but 
here life is reborn'. For Makaroff, the attempt by the m ilita ry regime to obliterate 
the disappeared totally backfired. The figure of the desaparecidos has haunted
28 Lyrics in Spanish can be found at http://www.aotanproiect.com/releases.php?id=3&lana=en. Accessed 29 July 2009.
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society to the point that music and culture confronted this question. The 
significance of the song is also the fact that, through music, new generations who 
did not live through the years of the dictatorship can be challenged to look at these 
issues that form part of Argentina's identity and recent history.
The desaparecidos challenge traditional social categories of time, space, life and 
death. They are an open wound that constantly triggers memory and shows no 
sign of healing any time soon. As the Madres said: 'Let there be no healing of 
wounds [...] let them remain open. Because if  the wounds still bleed, there w ill be 
no forgetting [...]'. {in: Di-Paolantonio, 2001:463)
It is interesting to observe how the traditional image of the silhouette, the 
anonymous representation of all the disappeared, now coexists w ith  a very specific 
image of a particular disappeared. Since Julio Lopez's (second) disappearance, his 
iconic hat has been stencilled across Buenos Aires' walls, continuously reminding 
society of the im punity of today and yesterday.
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The Memory Park
The project of a Memory Park, to remember the victims o f state terrorism , was 
approved in July 1998 by the Buenos Aires legislature. (Di-Cori, 2002; Melendo, 
2006) The Park lies on fourteen hectares along the coast of the River Plate, 
between the University Campus and the Costanera Norte, in the immediate 
neighbourhood of the ESMA. Upon completion, there w ill be a Monument to the 
Victims of State Terrorism designed by the Baudizzone, Lestard, Varas Studio and 
associated architects, a Sculpture Park, other memorials and a Centre for the 
Promotion of Education, Research and Memory.29 The Monument was officially 
unveiled by President Kirchner in 2007.
The Monument offers a place of reflection for visitors, to th ink about the 
relationship between history and politics, but also the river and the city, in- 
between which the memory of the disappeared lies. (Huyssen, 2001, 2003; 
Silvestri, 2002)
29 In the centre a database will collect general information on each victim. The public will be able to provide missing data 
or formulate new denunciations.
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The Monument, facing the river, looks like a wound in the landscape. Visitors 
move through the zigzag structure until they reach the river and the shoreline 
walkway. Approximately 9.000 names of the victims o f state terrorism, 
disappeared or murdered are engraved, sequenced alphabetically by year, on the 
structure of four non-contiguous walls of Patagonian porphyry.
t
The Monument provides a site of mourning, personal, familial, social and 
national. For a long time, the victims' relatives particularly longed to see and touch 
the names of the ir missing loved ones. (Tappata-de-Valdez, 2003; Vezzetti, 2005) 
The Park becomes symbolic in the context of ongoing legal struggles, the quest 
for tru th and the attempt to articulate a national memory. (Vales, 2008) Most 
significantly, the state participated for the first time in a project relating to state 
terrorism. Thus, the private drama of relatives was finally recognised as a deeply 
tragic event that deserved the allocation of a space for national mourning. (Di-Cori,
2002)
Nonetheless, its establishment remains full of controversy. First, some HROs, 
like the Asociacion-Madres and H.I.J.O.S. do not participate. For the Madres,
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material metaphors of memory are perceived as consolidating death in stone while 
they would rather be talking about and defending life (interview). Second, 
disagreements relate to the location of the Monument, in a space that is invisible to 
citizens. (Vezzetti, 2005) The out-of-the-way location is perceived as marginalising 
the memory of a national trauma, which should instead take centre stage in the 
city's government or business districts. For others, the present site is fundamental: 
the river is the symbolic tomb of thousands of disappeared, many of which were 
university students; finally, its proximity to the ESMA.
This project split the HROs. Brodsky points to how the project will affect 
everyone who had a missing or murdered relative, but it will of course be 
interpreted differently by each individual who visits the park. For Brodsky, the 
Park together with additional elements like music and literature, 'constitute the 
ground for the construction of personal memory' (interview). Jarach underscores 
the importance of 'living museums that narrate a story and can successfully 
involve people'. Jarach points to the creation of a space that is to be used for a 
number of activities, such as art and culture, 'for people to get involved, 
understand and commit' (interview). On the other hand, H.I.J.O.S. distanced itself 
from the project. Enrique Pastor explained why this was so. ‘What is important is 
the meaning that you attribute to the Park' he highlighted, 'the way it is created 
affects how memory is activated and constructed'. 'If it ends up simply being 
another plaque like many others that we have, then you lose meaning and we 
vehemently want to prevent this, that meaning is taken away from places of 
memory [...] and with the park you have to be very careful that this does not 
happen'(interview).
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The project currently reflects a landscape of social memory that continues to be 
dominated by the afectados and HROs. Although it is important for families to have 
a place for mourning and memory, this initial nucleus needs to be expanded. If the 
memory of state terrorism is to be kept alive, inclusive debates with other social 
and political actors have to be generated to take into account alternative 
perspectives. Only such an approach will prevent the risk that organisations that 
sponsor the project are in effect commemorating themselves, with them being the 
only receivers of memory as Vezzetti (2005) rightly suggested. In our interview, 
Vezzetti expanded on this contending that 'while the judicial path is by now 
established, the problem lies with the politics of memory*. 'The Park is for instance 
managed by some HROs with support from the state, but they do not create 
conditions to convert these spaces into a broader compromise, involving the rest of 
society' (interview). This author agrees with Vezzetti (2005:16) that the worse risk 
for a place of memory is not discussion, but 'indifference*.
The ESMA
In 2004, it was agreed the ESMA would become a site for memory. Thus, HROs 
have since begun considering the opportunities and challenges that locating a 
museum in there would entail. They could not reach a consensus. (M. L. Guembe, 
2008; Tandeciarz, 2007) Debates revolved around three questions. Should the 
museum be located in the whole or just parts of the site? Should its content focus 
exclusively on the ESMA or have a national dimension? Should it be opened in 
stages, given that parts were still being rebuilt and/or were occupied by the Navy?
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Despite strong agreement that the ESMA should a become memory site, two 
different proposals arose. (Vezzetti, 2006) The Association of Ex-Disappeared 
Detainees contended that the objective was the preservation of the ESMA as 
judicial proof and material testimony to the genocide, and its reconstruction 
during its time as a detention centre. No other institutions or public offices should 
be allowed, even if  related to human rights. The CELS conversely proposed that the 
project should go beyond the denunciation of state terrorism, to include reflection 
on its antecedents and consequences, as well as the present reality of human 
rights. (CELS, 2005) Until 2007, another schism erupted. Some HROs considered 
the possibility of sharing the site w ith  m ilita ry schools, hoping to establish a new 
coexistence that reaffirmed respect for human rights as a central theme for future 
officers. Others viewed that as an insult.
The transformation of the ESMA into a place of memory has been rife w ith  
debate. Although the idea is generally perceived as positive, several issues are 
raised. For Gil-Lavedra, the scale of the project is disproportionate: 'i t  is one thing
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to have a museum there [...], another is taking the whole of the area that had 
nothing to do with it' [interview]. Crenzel raises several significant points. He 
highlights the fact that what is lacking is 'a conscience on the historical character of 
constructing a place of memory in the ESMA'. Like Vezzetti, Crenzel points to the 
lack of a public discussion given that 'the debate is closed to other voices that are 
not those of the afectados, [...] though there have been some intellectuals taking 
part this is still insufficient, they are not thinking if the university or other actors 
have anything to say\ Crenzel also underscored how the ESMA 'was a particular 
place where there were different levels of collaboration between the prisoners and 
the repressors', will this be reflected? Will it examine the complicity of civil and 
political society?
For Crenzel, the 'museum should help reflect on what happened and raise 
questions for those visiting it'. Crenzel seems rather sceptical of its success. 'The 
Director of the ESMA is a survivor' he mentions 'she is not someone with 
experience in constructing sites of memory, so she gets this position due to her 
personal story and then becomes an expert [...] this shows the authority of the 
afectados, it is not intellectuals but those that directly suffered'.
Chillier illustrated in this respect the importance for society ‘to appropriate 
these places of memory and contribute to the debate about what happened'. 'The 
process of memory construction is dynamic, and museums have indeed a central 
role in this, but then how these places are used determines the extent to which 
memory is democratic, effective and sustainable, and not one where only one 
sector of society agrees on' [interview]. H.I.J.O.S. member Pastor also points to 
similar issues, especially 'what should be represented in those spaces of memory'. 
'It is good to leave a record that a genocide occurred by transforming former
detention centres, [...] but we are against crystallising a static image of the past, a 
past that still has a lot of relevance in the present'. For H.I.J.O.S., 'when you enter a 
place of memory you should not just see something that happened 30 years ago’ 
Pastor continues 'the repression did not simply kill people [...] but aimed to impose 
specific social and economic policies [...] our key point is that when you enter 
those sites you should see things that happened then are still occurring today, 
there are contemporary effects, it is not something that it is over' (interview).
Abuelas share a similar stand. Lanzillotto emphasised how 'we do not believe in 
traditional museums, we want something alive, based on the past, with 
repercussions in the present and projected into the future'. 'This is exactly what we 
want to do at the ESMA [...] a long-term memory to study the origins of the 
dictatorship, its purpose, but also its current implications [...] this is the story of a 
living museum, where men can recognise their history' (interview).
An overall strategy for memory is still missing at the ESMA. The end result for 
now is that different parts of the site are managed by diverse organisations like the 
Asociacidn-Madres and their Cultural Space Our Children project. Others house 
various institutions such as the National Memory Archive, the Entity Space for 
Memory and the Cultural Centre "Haroldo Conti", where a library, exhibition 
rooms, a cinema, an area for theatre and a space for studies are to be located.
There is no coordination between the different projects and no accountability. 
The irony of this, Vezzetti points out, is that 'Hebe de Bonafini [leader of the 
Asociacion-Madres] who always opposed the idea of a Museum is now the key voice 
of this project [...] with statements like "everyone does whatever they have in 
mind". Some of these HROs effectively have a sort power to veto', Vezzetti asserted,
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so 'as a result you have moderate and well grounded organisations like the CELS 
that are totally left outside of this discussion' (interview}.
This situation is perilous. If compromise is limited to a few HROs and the 
current government, once there is a change of administration, everything may 
evaporate. Vezzetti claims that the state has until now delegated its responsibility 
in memory to HROs, ‘HROs that are so heterogeneous that cannot even agree 
among themselves about the objectives and methods to be used' (interview}. This 
focus on the relatives and survivors has in turn produced a rejection of the 
question of memory by large parts of society (Fonderbrider interview). 
Fonderbrider in fact concluded that Argentina has not yet reached the stage where 
the whole of society is involved: the commitment to memory does not really 
transcend beyond the afectados.
5.4 Argentine Illusions of Memory
Issues of TJ and memory have been closely interconnected in Argentina. In 
particular, the official discourse of democratic administrations has centred around 
two key concepts: war and the demons. We will closely analyse these here.
Two strands of ‘demonic theories' have been popular in Argentina, championed 
and endorsed via TJ mechanisms, especially the CONADEP and the Trial of the 
Commanders.
The prologue to the 1984 CONADEP report is the place where Alfonsin's 2DT is 
most clearly expressed. In it, it is stated how 'during the decade of the 1970s 
Argentina was torn by terror that was coming as much from the extreme right as 
from the extreme left [...]'. (CONADEP, 2006:11)
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The prologue has become the place where different interpretations of the past 
have been put forward. In the original, Crenzel points out how the early 1970s are 
presented without discussing the historical context or attempting to explain 
unfolding events. Rather, the ongoing violence is simply described as transcending 
national borders. (Crenzel, 2008b)
The initial reference to the two demons is soon replaced by a clear qualifier that 
attributes a special status to disappearances: ‘to the crimes of the terrorists, the 
Armed Forces responded with a terrorism infinitely worse than the one they were 
combating, because [...] they relied on power and impunity of an absolute State, 
kidnapping, torturing and assassinating thousands of human beings'. [Ibid.) As 
Crenzel suggests, although the prologue is taken to be the classic exposition of the 
2DT, this stance is actually limited to the first few paragraphs. The rest, as the 
remainder of the report, labels one demon worse than the other. Indeed, Sabato 
(2007) similarly underscores how the repression is explicitly condemned as state 
terrorism and how the State that acted outside the law is considered criminal.
Nonetheless, the prologue still exhibits elements of the Theory, and a specific 
understanding of Argentine society during the violence.
Crenzel emphasises how the foreword and the report propose a reading of the 
past that reflects the perspective held on the events of the past by the Alfonsin's 
administration. The distinction between the dictatorship and democracy is clearly 
emphasised, but a mantle of the silence is then spread over the respective 
responsibility of the government, the military, political and civil society for the 
events before the dictatorship. (Crenzel, 2007b) The characterisation of society is 
in line with the Theory, it being simultaneously presented as both a possible victim
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and a distant observer of the unfolding terror, in any case not involved in the 
violence.
The CONADEP and the Trial were fundamental in revealing the horrors of 
repression. However, they sanctioned a specific construction of collective memory. 
The experience of the dictatorship was presented as something exceptional, not 
only because of the magnitude of the crimes committed. Vezzetti stresses how it 
was acknowledged for the first time that the State had perpetrated terrible abuses, 
effectively eliminating certain groups of citizens. [Vezzetti, 2002) Di-Paolantonio 
[2001:448) further claims that both the CONADEP and the Trial ‘were mainly 
informed and motivated by the protocols for national reconciliation'. Di- 
Paolantonio convincingly argues that the excessive legalism allowed the vast 
majority of Argentines that had remained silent during the years of terror, to be 
described as simply "caught in the middle" of the violence. [/h/d.452) The 'dirty 
war' could accordingly be portrayed as a 'period of "barbarism and chaos" that was 
the result of a "minority" of people', [/h/d.)
The CONADEP was fundamental in signalling a clear departure from previous 
political behaviours and the climate of impunity [Brodsky, Gil-Lavedra interviews). 
The very title of its report, Nunca Mas [Never Again), embodied this commitment 
of change, and the moral position to be taken for the future. Nevertheless, the 
Commission only provided a partial account of the past, one in which many 
relevant issues are missing. These include for instance the national and 
international causes of repression and the role played by revolutionary groups. As 
Malamud-Goti asserted, state terrorism cannot be simply reduced to 'a bunch of
military officers', it being a much larger process that depended on the support of 
large sectors of society (interview). On a similar note, Di-Paolantonio (2001:450) 
correctly contends that the CONADEP ‘reinforced the predominant interpretation 
that frames the period of disappearances as an aberration from the "national 
character", which thus maintains that present Argentina need only to "deal" with 
these "criminals" and reclaim itself.
Similarly, the Trial has come to represent a foundational moment in democratic 
reconstruction, over time acquiring mythical dimensions. (Schorr, 2006) It 
reaffirmed law as the democratic tool to resolve conflicts and constituted a sort of 
point zero for the new democracy. One of its greatest contributions was indeed 
fighting silence, demonstrating the illegal methods of the repression and that 
crimes until then denied had effectively taken place. Judge D'Alessio narrated a 
curious incident that occurred at a conservative club where he had gone for lunch 
with a friend: 'somebody came up and invited us for coffee at their table. When we 
got there, one of them said: "we do not know this gentleman (D'Alessio's friend) 
but we do know Dr. D'Alessio for his work during the Trial. We called you here to 
express our displeasure that you are eating here after your participation in the 
Trial." I responded: "I do not like to hear what you are telling me but it makes me 
happy in a way. I do not like to play around, but please allow me to demonstrate 
that you are talking nonsense. Please tell me whether the acts that were proved by 
the Chamber, that the Commanders ordered the kidnapping of whoever was 
suspicious, their torture to see whether they were in fact the enemy, and then gave 
the freedom to decide whether to kill, free or keep them under legal detention, was 
that true or not? They responded that yes, that was the case" (interview).
Despite its significance, the Trial, like the CONADEP, was limited. First, it 
recreated the bipolar interpretation of the world of guilty vs. innocent that had 
prevailed during state terror. This limited truth released from blame all the actors 
not directly involved and especially allowed society not to face up to its 
responsibilities for its role as passive bystanders or accomplices to terror. For 
Malamud-Goti (2005:641) courts and truth commission are sources of 'narrow 
blame', for merely casting culpability on singular agents or a defined group of 
actors. This is possibly not the best approach for societies in transition. They 
rather need to acquire a richer and more complex view that goes beyond 
establishing simple deeds of specific individuals or collective agents, or exposing 
the suffering of those who bore the brunt of the abuses. A more realistic 
explanation requires a broader perspective including deeper contextualising 
notions of how power and interests combined together to generate conflict and 
dictatorial trends. (Malamud-Goti, 2005:641)
Both the CONADEP and the Trial failed in this respect, presenting only a partial 
picture in which the military was the only one to be blamed. In this respect, Di- 
Paolantonio (2001:454) suggests that 'the trial produced a decidedly disconnected 
and individualised narrative of the event', one in which ‘the collective dimension of 
repression' was lost. Furthermore, 'the way that the trial's narrative framed the 
1976-83 period as an aberrant and isolated episode of state violence dehistoricises 
the authoritarian ethos that has been entrenched in Argentine society since its 
inception'. [Ibid/ASS]
The Nunca Mas report, re-edited in 2006, became yet again the site for memory 
contests, with the Kirchner's government exposing (its own) reading of the past
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that, like in 1984, placed the state as a central actor. (Crenzel, 2007b] The new 
prologue, written by the National Human Rights Secretariat, displays this new 
official memory.
Crenzel suggests how this new foreword no longer rests on the differentiation 
between dictatorship and democracy, but instead between democratic presidents 
since 1983, qualifying the present as a historical and exceptional moment 
(Crenzel, 2008b] Significantly, civil society is described as fighting united against 
terror and impunity. This however is not only incorrect but minimises the difficult 
efforts of those that did denounce the violence under the Proceso. (Crenzel, 2007b] 
This depiction also dismisses the plurality of different narratives that exist in 
relation to the contested past
The new perspective endorsed openly challenges the 2DT of the original 
foreword that supposedly established a "justificatory symmetry" between the 
violence of the state and guerrilla. The 2DT is openly branded as false and a 
validation for the employment of state terror. (CONADEP, 2006:8] The 2006 
prologue plainly sanctions the view of the violence as state terrorism, emphasising 
its scale and methodology. It stresses how 'state terrorism was unleashed 
massively and systematically when [...] the guerrilla had already been militarily 
defeated'. {Ibid.') It furthermore highlights how 'the dictatorship set out to impose a 
neo-liberal economic system and destroy the social achievements made over 
several decades'. {Ibid.)
Similarly to the original, the new prologue describes the disappeared along the 
lines of the humanitarian narrative, which dodges the issue of guerrilla and/or 
political violence. Significantly the report mentions that 30,000 people
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disappeared, the estimate endorsed by HROs, when usually 9,000 is given as the 
official number.
The preface ends by focusing on the role of the state to permanently remember 
this stage of history, to teach present and future generations the consequences of 
illegal violence. It also highlights how democracy continued some of the practices 
installed under the dictatorship, and notably applies the 'Never Again' slogan not 
only to the crimes of the past, but also to 'social injustices that offend human 
dignity'. (CONADEP, 2006:9)
On the question of official memory several positions exist. Regarding Alfonsin, 
Valdez for instance suggests that it is not clear whether his administration 
attempted to impose an official perspective. What is true is that the CONADEP 
'failed to satisfy all and there were enormous critiques to its prologue and the two 
demons' perspective (interview). Others clearly consider Alfonsfn's 2DT as an 
attempt to forge an official memory. For Pastor, the CONADEP was a loyal 
representative of the government's position and was promoted as the official 
version. 'There were crimes for sure, but then the same victims of state terrorism 
were also criminalised. What is even worse is the fact that those that adopted 
armed fight were in fact a very small percentage of the victims. But this allowed 
society to isolate the victims of state terrorism as if they were not legitimate parts' 
(interview). Likewise, Fonderbrider considers the 2DT as an official perspective 
but he suggests that 'it was not totalitarian [...] in the sense that the state never 
explicitly said that we all had to accept it' (interview).
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Examining Kirchner's use of memory, Palermo maintains that the President's 
discourse is characterised by a total absence of criticism and attribution of 
responsibility (interview]. Palermo suggests that the President was in an easy 
situation given that there 'were really no opposing social and cultural 
organisations' that could counter his voice. Lorenz points to how the government 
is still unable to 'overcome this dualist conception of history'. 'Is it possible to ever 
develop a multi-causal explanation at state level, beyond that of the military vs. the 
guerrillas? For Lorenz, 'we are still too close to the events of the past, to be able to 
bring back the complexity' (interview).
Novaro interestingly points to the fact that 'a hierarchy of rights is now being 
established' and that there is 'an offensive distinction regarding which victims we 
can legitimately talk about and the ones we should not'. 'So the guerrillas victims 
for instance' Novaro continues 'they do not matter and the state does not recognise 
them'. For Novaro, this end result is unfortunate as overall it lessens the legitimacy 
of human rights and diminishes consensus surrounding their protection.
In fact, as Gil-Lavedra also points out, what is missing 'is a consideration of 
guerrilla violence, which we also need to condemn together with the terrible 
methods employed by the military' (interview). Indeed, any exercise of memory 
would be incomplete without considering the role played by guerrilla groups that, 
in a setting of indiscriminate violence and institutional chaos, offered a good 
pretext for military intervention. (Vezzetti, 2002)
Explanations identifying either one or two demons are too simplistic, and 
prevent the consideration of several key questions about the past In particular, 
they gloss over the conditions that favoured the coup, and the element of collective 
responsibility for the climate in which human rights abuses became possible. For
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Sabato (2007), these prevailing approaches thwarted further investigation into 
how military rule really involved all Argentines. It was not simply the two 
demons...
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6The Politics of Memory - Uruguay, 1973 to 2009
President Sanguinetti's slogan 'no hay que tener los ojos en la nuca’ (you should 
not have eyes at the back of your head] characterised the politics of memory in 
Uruguay for 15 years. This was a period when the government actively imposed a 
policy of silence and forgetting in relation to the years of political violence, 1973 to 
1985.
This chapter contends first, that the Uruguayan state has been the most 
successful in the Southern Cone in reducing discussion about the crimes 
committed by the dictatorship -at least temporarily. In fact, until the late 1990s, 
several administrations effectively limited debate over these issues to the reduced 
sphere of HROs and those directly affected (relatives of the victims, afectados].
However, this policy proved short-lived. It is later shown how the hegemonic 
aspirations of the Uruguayan state were eventually undermined, as the human 
rights question started to return to the public and social agendas in the mid-1990s. 
Although the vision of the state had always been actively disputed by human rights 
activists, since the late 1990s concern with the past attracted wider discussion and 
attention, reaching out to society as a whole.
To demonstrate this position, the chapter begins with a brief introduction on 
memory debates. Afterwards, it traces the emergence and the evolution of 
different narratives that existed in order to better comprehend the events relating 
to the contested past of violence. It focuses on three communities of memory: the 
military, the government and HROs. It particularly highlights how successive
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democratic administrations wished to impose different interpretations of the past 
Second, specific examples through which the politics of memory were played out in 
the social and political arenas are investigated returning to the idea of memory 
knots. Third, the interrelationship between memory and TJ initiatives is examined, 
focusing on what I like to label a 'Uruguayan style Two Demons Theory' and the 
work of the COPAZ.
6.1 The Memory of Military Rule
As in Argentina, the years of re-democratisation in Uruguay were informed by a 
conflict between the will to remember and the endeavour to forget According to 
Adriana Bergero and Fernando Reati, democratic governments aimed to impose 
collective amnesia on society to anesthetise it from the pain suffered. (Bergero & 
Reati, 1997) Official silence was institutionalised, suppressing from collective 
memory both the culpability of the repressors and the desire for justice of the 
victims. (Morana, 1997) A tension therefore ensued between a majority that 
wanted to forget the burdensome legacy of terror, and a wounded minority that 
was unable to do so. (Vinar & Vinar, 1993)
Coming to terms with the legacies of military rule and state terrorism was 
particularly difficult for Uruguay, a country that until a few decades earlier had 
prided itself with epithets as 'the Switzerland of America' and Montevideo as 'the 
Athens of the River Plate'. (Gonzalez, 1991:3; Rial, 1993:64) According to Juan Rial 
(1993:64), the country's self-perception rested on foundational images like *como 
el Uruguay no hay' (there is no place like Uruguay) and 'el Uruguay feliz’ (Uruguay, 
the land of the meriy). These portrayed Uruguay as a European country, with high
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levels of educational attainment Furthermore, it was peaceful and profoundly 
democratic, characterised by political stability, regular democratic procedures, 
growing financial and economic markets, and a large urban class. (Demasi, 1995) 
For Luis Roniger, this idyllic view started to crumble in the 1960s, but it had 
always implied overlooking some of the least pleasant aspects of the country's 
history, like the lengthy civil wars, the genocide of Indians and the dominant 
violence in the nineteenth century. (Roniger, 1997a)
Upon re-democratisation, the image of 'happy Uruguay' no longer existed. (Rial, 
1993) Rather, the military dictatorship became one of the pending matters of 
transition, to be reflected upon in terms of its genesis and impact. (Roniger & 
Sznajder, 1999) Rial (1993) highlights how components of the previous myths 
were thus reappraised. Civility and consensual mechanisms of conflict resolution 
became particularly cherished in this new setting, especially when confronting 
explosive issues like the human rights question. The basic myth then became that 
of'Democratic Uruguay', where consensus must prevail at all costs. (Rial, 1993:76)
Military rule fundamentally disrupted not only Uruguay's founding myths but 
also social interactions and relationships. For instance, Marisa Ruiz of Al-Uruguay 
pointed out how 'the dictatorship revealed to us as a country something new about 
the ethical reality and the nation's imaginary that we did not know about like, for 
example, that human life was not respected at the time' (interview). Likewise, A 
MFDDU member highlighted the impact and effects of the regime on individuals. 
She recalled how before 'people would drink the mate (a traditional South America 
infusion, national drink in both Argentina and Uruguay) together and would be
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sociable, but this no longer happens, people are much more closed and everyone 
just looks after himself. 'The mentality of the people changed' she added 'and this 
is very much related to the regime and its harshness' (MFDDU interview}.
Roniger and Sznajder (1999} outline several perspectives on the dictatorship. 
Some portray the interregnum of the decada infame (infamous decade as the 
dictatorship is often labelled} 'as a phenomenon of cataclysmic character that was 
imposed upon Uruguayan society "from the outside" and which "victimised" that 
society as a whole'. (Roniger, 1997a:234} Others, like Demasi (1995}, claim that 
this experience was not essentially different from previous ones, it simply being a 
further example of events that occur much more frequently than Uruguayan 
history would like to remember.
Whatever side one takes, one thing was clear: Uruguay was no longer 
exceptional, it had become a Latin American society with recurrent crises. If before 
the 1970s the possibility of military rule was not part of the social imaginary given 
the long tradition of democracy, since then it has entered the realm of the 
imaginable and the plausible. The rupture of the dictatorship not only modified the 
country's self-image, but also produced an intergenerational separation. According 
to Hugo Achugar, for young people the possibility of a dictatorship forms part of 
the real, not that of the speculatively possible. (H. Achugar, 1995:16}
Given that the experience of military rule was so unsettling, how is it 
remembered? What narratives and interpretations exist within society over these 
contested years?
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The politics of memory became more relevant and explicit following transition. 
However, it is important to note that they already existed already under military 
rule when the armed forces attempted to develop and establish an official 
interpretation on what had been occurring since the late 1960s (Lessa interview).
The relevance of memory, as in Argentina, is also the unintended result of state 
terrorism. As Maren and Marcelo Vinar correctly stress, the institutionalisation of 
torture, fear and disappearance produced a situation in which those affected by 
state violence were not only the direct victims, but in fact society as a whole. (Vinar 
& Vinar, 1993:124) This produced what Marcelo Vinar labels as ‘fractures of 
memory'. Political terror created long-lasting effects, resulting not only in 
individual suffering, but also attacks on culture, the way of thinking and the 
community, with state terror tearing apart the social fabric. (Vinar, 1992; 1995:53)
Until 2000, the policy of silence and amnesia imposed by the democratic 
Executives remained unchanged, successfully cloaking the public memory of state 
abuses under a mantle of oblivion. In this context, according to Gabriela Fried, the 
memories of the victims became politically invisible and were only recounted in 
the intimate spaces of private homes. (Fried, 2006)
Chapter 4 outlined how renewed concern with truth and justice had begun to 
resurface since the mid-1990s. In parallel, the memory of the authoritarian spell 
re-emerged more strongly through books, films and citizens' debates (Felipe 
Michelini interview). HROs were an essential catalyst for this. In this respect, 
several new organisations were also established, like the Association of Former- 
Political Prisoners of Uruguay (CRYSOL) in 2000, Memoria para Armar (Piecing
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Memory Together, MPA) in 1997 and HIJOS in 1996, uniting the children of 
disappeared and political prisoners.
For Oscar Destouet, the reactivation of memory is also a consequence of the 
passing of time. In the beginning, victims found it hard to talk, as that often 
entailed re-living their experiences of torture and imprisonment. Additionally 
younger generations played a key role, by asking new questions about the past and 
thus re-opening the discussion. Lastly, Destouet points to the role of the state that 
can either facilitate or hinder debate. While until 2000, the state completely 
marginalised these matters, since then Presidents Batlle and Vazquez started to 
cooperate, encouraging and facilitating discussion.
Although Uruguayans allegedly have a tendency to avoid dealing with 
unpleasant things, pretending that they do not exist (Elhordoy-Arregui interview), 
this proved almost impossible in relation to state terrorism. As several of my 
interviewees pointed out, the consequences of the dictatorship are still present in 
Uruguay today, whether or not this is acknowledged (Romero, Trivelli interviews). 
Laura Balsamo of SERPAJ highlighted the social, economic and cultural 'leftover' 
effects of the regime. She recognises that 'yes, you need to forget some things, but 
you also need to know where we came from and what happened to us as a society' 
(interview). In challenging criticisms that examining the years of state terrorism 
constitutes looking back, Elhordoy-Arregui forcefully contends that 'it is not really 
looking back, but looking at the present we are living in now, a present where in 
the same block the torturer and the person that suffered torture meet and both 
pretend that nothing happened'. 'Why do we need to investigate?, she continues,
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'because we need to know what we were capable of doing as a people, what we 
were able to tolerate and continue accepting, the question of impunity' (Elhordoy- 
Arregui interview, Mansilla).
As in Argentina, more than one memory exists in relation to the recent past. As 
deputy Culture Secretary Felipe Michelini contends, memories are effectively 
'broken' as every one remembers differently, depending on the personal context 
and the experiences they lived through during military rule. Elbio Ferrario, 
Coordinator of the Memory Museum, suggests that there continues to be a struggle 
among competing memories, whose construction entails political clashes and 
disputes [interview]. In this respect, Alfonso Lessa stresses that 'political sectors 
use the past to their convenience, in accordance to their reading of present events'. 
Lessa also pointed to the existence of many 'black and white interpretations, and 
that several sectors attempt to sell the official truth' (interview).
Most of my interviewees nevertheless recognised that there is a shared 
consensus that repudiates the years of military rule, seen as a period without 
freedom, and characterised by strong authoritarianism (Destouet, Martinez 
interviews). It goes without saying that some minority groups still continue to 
vindicate the military intervention, justifying it as a prerequisite for the return of 
democracy.
It is to the more detailed discussion of these different communities of memory 
that we now turn.
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6.2 Uruguayan Communities of Memory
In Uruguay, as in Argentina, each community rests on an emblematic memory 
that shares two essential features. It has a central core of elements that have 
endured over time since its initial establishment. Second, these frameworks are 
also flexible enough to be able to evolve, to reflect the new political, cultural and 
social contexts in which they exist. Despite their elasticity and variation, they 
remain true to the essential core of their position.
The Military
Mariana Achugar recounts how the Uruguayan high command embarked on a 
special effort to document and explain its actions in the fight against subversion. 
More than elsewhere in the region, the Uruguayan military stood out for its 
obsession with justifying itself and undertook a considerable endeavour to 
organise its thought in an intellectually coherent manner. (M. Achugar, 2005)
The military discourse emerged in the 1960s and had three phases: the years of 
military rule, democratisation and recent developments. There are three core and 
enduring elements: the notion of subversion, the role of the military, and the view 
over human rights crimes.
The military shared with other regional dictatorships the common narrative of 
salvation, according to which the motherland was being threatened by external 
forces (Marxism) and their internal allies (subversives). Hence, the Armed Forces 
are portrayed as the 'guardians of the fatherland’ operating to defend it. [Ibid36)
The concept of subversion is the first fundamental element of this narrative that 
provides a justification for action both during and after the dictatorship.
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Subversion was seen as mainly an intellectual and moral problem. In the eyes of 
the military, it had an all-pervasive nature and included 'actions, violent or not, 
with ultimate purposes of a political nature, in all fields of human activity within 
the internal sphere of a state and whose aims are perceived as not convenient for 
the overall political system'. (Heinz & Friihling, 1999:342) The tentacles of 
subversion had no limits, but the military particularly targeted trade unions, 
communist parties and universities as its breeding grounds.
The conceptualisation of subversion as a infection attacking the body of the 
nation enabled the military to present itself as the saviour of the patria  
(fatherland) as exposed here: ‘In facing the aggression of subversion, that 
constitutes a disease of the Uruguayan nation, it must be concluded that the 
primary role of defence is, and always will be, that of protecting the fundamental 
basis of society, [...] against the disruptions that may threaten them, because the 
diseases of the social body are the same as those of human beings: it is necessary 
to prevent them and attack them when they manifest'. (M. Achugar, 2005:47)
Characterising society as a human body and deviations from order as disease 
automatically defended the repression, legitimising its very existence. In their 
discourses, the armed forces appeared as the guarantors of order, people and 
democracy, representing and embodying the traditions upon which the country 
was built, the orientalidad (orientality from Uruguay's full name as Oriental 
Republic of Uruguay).
Second, the military presented itself as responding to explicit requests by 
democratically-elected governments that had placed them in charge of fighting 
subversion during a state of internal war. This quotation is illustrative: 'Our 
enemies [the Tupamaros] avoided a noble fight, but still they pushed us and we
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could not refuse but do so because it was demanded by the country and we had to 
comply with our duty of defending the patrimony of the orientates [People of 
Uruguay]'. [Lessa, 2007:72) This image of war would become particularly useful 
when the military endeavoured to place human rights crimes within such a 
context.
The military assigned particular responsibility for the situation of chaos to the 
political parties and democracy. The former had led Uruguay to economic decline, 
were corrupt and unable, even hindering, the fight against subversion given that 
some MPs were seen as colluding with the terrorists. Liberal democracy, too weak 
and permissive, had been similarly incapable of dealing with communism. [Demasi,
2003) Therefore, a new institutional structure was required with the military at its 
apex, the only one indeed able to handle and detect subversion. [Heinz & Friihling, 
1999) A common saying at the time was in fact that of poner la casa en orden 
[putting things in their place), in a country perceived as on the brink of collapse. 
[Lessa, 2007) The failures of democracy and traditional parties, together with the 
subversive threat, provided a sophisticated justification that, in reality, the armed 
forces had not taken over the government; they had been asked to do so.
Upon democratisation, the Armed Forces employed justificatory elements that 
were similar to those of their Argentine counterparts: the idea of excesses and of 
the military as a victim.
First, when countering mounting accusations of human rights violence, these 
were defended as excesses and deviations that were inevitable consequences of 
the war. The academic Julian Gonzalez-Guyer highlights how the military talked of
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reference points being lost, but that they would not accept anything beyond this 
(interview]. These passages exemplify their stand: There may have been errors, or 
better said, there were errors. But in a war, when are there no errors? If a war is 
constituted by acts of violence, how can there be no errors? All wars are bad and 
there are no good wars [...]'. (Marchesi, 2005:189-190] Similarly, 'in a war the 
winner does not have to pay. In no war, human rights have any priority. I don't 
believe there was torture. There was a war of information. We did not know who 
the enemy was. Some errors were committed, but not abuse.' (Heinz & Fruhling, 
1999:362] Finally, in the words of General Medina: '[...] we have to consider that 
there was an armed confrontation. We recognise responsibilities and [...] that in 
cases of this nature one has lost points of reference with regard to rules to judge 
and to regulate human behaviour [...]'. Heinz & Fruhling, 1999:295] These 
examples show how the armed forces did not contemplate having committed 
crimes. Their view was that they had merely complied with the mission that was 
entrusted upon them by democratic governments. In fact, they actually considered 
their actions extraordinarily humane, especially when compared to Argentina. 
General Medina for instance stated: 'We do not reject the accusation of apremios 
[instances of compulsion] in dealing with prisoners. Because there were apremios. 
But if we had done what they did in other countries [...], if we had given way to 
other kinds of repression, then of the five thousand or so prisoners that there were 
here, four thousand or so might have been killed.' (Weschler, 1998:205]
Finally, Aldo Marchesi outlines how the military portrayed itself as under attack 
from various sources, the victim of unjustified accusations by an ungrateful society 
that neither recognised the necessity of the military's actions nor appreciated how 
they had actually enabled the return of democracy. (Marchesi, 2005]
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Throughout the 1990s, the pact of silence concerning the repression persisted. 
Gerardo Caetano stresses that in many respects the military discourse continued to 
be monolithic. It never expressed a commitment to avoid a repetition of the past, 
but rather continued to represent the military coup as a product of the armed 
subversion and the political vacuum of the time. (Caetano, 2004) Overall, the 
military preserved a high degree of internal solidarity, contending that its actions 
had saved the country from communism and anarchy.
Having said that, according to Sznajder and Roniger (1999), it is important to 
recognise that Scilingo's 1995 confession did re-open the wounds of past 
violations, since most Uruguayans that disappeared were in reality abducted in 
Argentina. Nevertheless, the impact of military confessions was limited and there 
were only two cases when Uruguayan military officers came forward to discuss 
their past actions.
In March 1996, there were anonymous declarations by members of the Marine 
Corps that admitted to human rights violations. (M. Achugar, 2005) Later on, in 
May, Navy Captain (ret.) Jorge Troccoli admitted in a letter to Brecha magazine 
that, although he had not participated in the worst acts of torture and 
assassination, he had still fought a war in which the armed forces had treated their 
enemies appallingly, referring to torture, disappearance and murder. (Troccoli, 
1996) Although Troccoli did acknowledge violence, disappearances and his 
responsibility for inhumane treatment, he nevertheless stressed how at the time 
Uruguayans had hated, killed, and tortured one another.
Despite the significance of his acknowledgement, Troccoli, like Scilingo, 
continued endorsing the thesis that the armed forces did not have an alternative at 
the time, but faced a brutal enemy in the context of a dirty war that was heroic on
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both sides. (Sznajder & Roniger, 1999] Troccoli was exceptional in acknowledging 
his participation in repression, given that no other fractures within military's 
discourse occurred. As Gonzalez-Guyer rightly suggests, 'the narration of what 
happened remains in the hands of the same officers that partook in the repression 
or those that listened to their predecessors, as several retired officers continue 
teaching in military schools' (interview). Additionally, Caetano points out how 
until 2000, the political system 'expressly recommended military members not to 
talk about human rights violations', fearing this would open Pandora's Box 
(interview).
Unlike their Argentine counterparts, the Uruguayan military never assumed 
responsibility for past abuses nor asked for forgiveness. Rather, both retired and 
active officers continue to vindicate the necessity of the anti-subversive war 
against international communism (Ferrario interview). In fact, in 2006 ten former 
commanders assumed total responsibility for the actions of their subordinates 
during the repression, labelling them as acts of service. (LaRepublica, 2006a)
Current Commander-in-Chief Rosales particularly asserted in 2007 that the 
Army as institution does not wish to be judged for eventual incorrect individual 
actions carried out by some of its members. The Commander pointed to the 
existence of a defamatory campaign, highlighting how hatred, revenge and 
incredulity joined up to prevent society from moving beyond revisionisms and 
reaching the real 'Never Again'. (LaRepublica, 2007d) For Caetano, 'the 
Commander should have been dismissed ipso facto1, highlighting how even current 
commanders ‘that are young and could not have been involved in the repression 
simply because of their age, have been pressured by their predecessors and made 
incredible declarations' (interview). Declarations such as the above mentioned are
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not only historically incorrect but also demonstrate how 'the attitude of the 
military has not changed as much as one would have wished, especially because 
young officers have no reason to continue covering up these issues' (Caetano 
interview).
A new feature of contemporary military discourse is the focus on the necessity 
of leaving behind revisionisms on the past, concentrating instead on the future. 
The speech of the Army Commander-in-Chief Daners in 2003 exemplifies this 
perspective: "Living in the present and looking at the future with eyes of the past 
does not seem to be the best option, in that the future runs the risk of remaining 
trapped in that past On the contrary, looking to the future without resentments, 
moving beyond aversions, leaving aside vindications [...] should be the plan 
transmitted to new generations, in that they will be the ones with the hard task of 
consolidating the new Uruguay [...]. (M. Achugar, 2005:58)
For Mariana Achugar (2005), this narrative attempts to achieve a consensus and 
pay off the debts of the past. Despite differences, continuing to debate the past is 
considered unnecessary and, by appealing to common objectives of the nation and 
a shared history, disagreements can be overcome. In this view, different social 
actors with fundamentally diverse ideologies should work to enable harmony in 
the community.
The military's interpretation of the past has evolved, changing depending on the 
political context of the time. Some aspects remained immutable, like the metaphors 
of 'war' and 'disease', and the image of 'human rights crimes as excesses', the latter 
employed as recently as 2007. According to Mariana Achugar (2005), military 
discourse nowadays confronts an international context in which it is repudiated as
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immoral and therefore it now has to appeal to reconciliation and look to the future 
in the name of the Nation and future generations.
Human Rights Organisations
As highlighted in chapter 4, HROs only emerged in Uruguay towards the end of 
the dictatorship and played a more limited role compared to their counterparts in 
the rest of the region. Despite this, similarly to Argentina, they developed an 
emblematic memory that depicted the years of military rule and associated 
repression as a time of disruption and suffering.
The essential element of this perspective was the qualification of political 
violence as state terrorism, a specific type of brutality emanating from the state 
and informed by systematic and methodical crimes that affected direct victims and 
society. In particular, the violence unsettled the victims' world in that it provoked 
the loss and/or imprisonment of loved ones, in this way forever upsetting familiar 
relations and producing a world of horror and misery. Throughout the decades, 
these ingredients have consistently featured in HROs discourse, but over time, new 
elements have also been added.
The perspective of state terrorism arose in response to the military's narrative 
that presented human rights crimes as exceptions or deviations committed during 
a legitimate war fought against subversion. Conversely, the memory of HROs 
pointed to the harshness of repression, particularly to the fact that, even though 
there had been a threat from armed organisations, these had been totally defeated 
by September 1972. As Graciela Romero points out, HROs challenged the 
representation of political violence as a war as suggested by both the military and 
the government, drawing attention instead to the fact that most of the victims were
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defenceless human beings. 'None of the disappeared had weapons and only a few 
of them belonged to guerrilla organisations' (interview). What HROs put forward 
was a view according to which the state used all its powers ad resources to violate 
the rights of the citizens, and later covered up and manipulated this information: 
the state, Romero continues, still 'has to assume responsibility for these deeds' 
(interview).
On the question of the guerrillas, Elhordoy-Arregui contended during our 
interview: ‘let us suppose that the armed groups indeed constituted a threat, why 
did the military not leave when all guerrilla fighters were imprisoned? That did not 
happen. [...] and, after imprisoning them, what was the point of daily torture? I 
really do not comprehend that' (interview).
Although armed organisations in Uruguay, as in Argentina, did play a role in 
triggering the coup, it has however been recognised that by late 1972 these had 
already been totally dismantled. Even President Sanguinetti, a supporter of the war 
vision, admitted during our interview that 'the pretext of the guerrilla was a bad 
one [...] there is no doubt that the guerrilla had been liquidated [...] the coup had 
no justification [...], there may have been some remaining guerrilla elements but its 
leaders had already gone by September 1972' (interview).
How did the discourse of HROs emerge? Between 1964 and 1981, nearly 14% 
of the population left Uruguay. Vania Markarian outlines how from the mid-1970s, 
exiles became pioneers in using the language of human rights to talk about the 
repression, denouncing the methods of state terrorism in Uruguay before the UN, 
the Organisation of American States, Amnesty International and the US. They
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appealed to international public opinion and moral ethics, putting under the spot­
light the repeated crimes of the regime, in the hope that this would stop 
repression. (Markarian, 2005] The impact of their actions is especially important 
as they were the first to employ the language of human rights to press for concrete 
goals. It is important to underscore, as Markarian and Mansilla do, that the 
language of human rights did not really exist until the 1970s. Freedoms and 
guarantees for citizens were indeed mentioned in the Uruguayan Constitution. 
Nonetheless, human rights became mainstream and entered the international 
public agenda largely as a consequence of the grave abuses in Latin America, 
particularly the crime of enforced disappearance (Mansilla, Markarian]. Likewise 
Javier Miranda points out that, although the Uruguayan Parliament had discussed 
accusations of torture in the early 1970s, the concept of human rights had not been 
forged before the dictatorship (interview].
During military rule, a period characterised by denial, silence and disbelief, 
victims of human rights abuses faced a difficult environment. As writer Eduardo 
Galeano puts it: 'For the twelve years of the military dictatorship, the word libertad 
[freedom] referred to nothing but a plaza and a prison. [...] But every Uruguayan 
was a prisoner except for jailers and exiles -three million of us, though only a few 
thousand seemed to be. One in every eighty Uruguayans had a hood tied on his 
head while the rest, doomed to isolation and solitary confinement even when 
spared the pain of torture, wore invisible hoods as well. Fear and silence were 
mandatory*. (Galeano, 1993:103]
This culture of fear created what has been labelled as 'inxile*. Paul Sondrol 
defines it as 'sullen wariness, self-censorship and longing to maintain anonymity
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against the brooding omnipresence of the state'. (Sondrol, 1992:194) Carina Perelli 
further suggests that inxile became as important as exile itself, as for internal exiles 
fear was ever present. (Perelli, 1992b)
For instance, the wife of Leon Duarte, a union leader and member of the PVP 
who disappeared in Buenos Aires in 1976, recounted how when her colleagues 
saw her on the bus or in places outside of the factory where they all worked they 
would tell her: 'I am sorry but I cannot talk to you because you burn (i.e. you are 
dangerous)'. Colleagues were very much afraid to risk being seen talking to the 
wife of an important political and union leader that had disappeared (MFDDU 
interview). Overall, the attitude was generally one of disinterest to the plight of the 
disappeared or other victims, with common sayings at the time being no te metas 
or algo habran hecho (don't get involved/they must have done something).
Several members of MFDDU highlighted the difficulties they encountered in 
coming to terms with disappearances and the impact these had on their families. 
'What story can my son relay about his disappeared father to his own children? 
asked one of the ladies during our interview. 'It is not easy, everyone wants to 
know what happened to their loved ones, you need to have something to tell to 
that the part of your family that continues to exist' 'This is why we cannot stop, 
with the hope that one day we will know'. Another lady that joined us later 
immediately showed me the photo of her disappeared son, that she carries 
everywhere. Although the disappeared are no longer present, they continue to 
exist in some way and are remembered by their loved ones at different moments.
Adrianna-Beatriz Yelpo-Vega of the PIT-CNT Human Rights Commission 
underscored the particular nature of the crime of enforced disappearance, 'as the
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most cruel'. 'When you can bury your loved ones', she continued 'you can go 
through the process of mourning. Without a body, you cannot, you know the 
disappeared are dead but you have not seen or buried them, so you cannot achieve 
psychological closure' (interview).
Until the early 1980s, human rights activism largely occurred abroad. Some 
organisations were established in Buenos Aires to deal with the question of 
disappearances there, but it was only in 1981 that SERPAJ was set up in 
Montevideo, becoming the leader of the human rights movement.
Unlike Argentina, Uruguayan HROs had little experience in human rights 
lobbying and they formed largely as a result of searching for missing loved ones. 
Nonetheless, their activities in the early 1980s were fundamental: in 1982 they 
submitted the first petition by relatives of political prisoners to the government. In 
1983 SERPAJ made the first public denouncement of torture and demanded justice 
for the abducted of members of the youth branch of the Communist Party, and also 
released the first list of disappeared. (Demasi & Yaffe, 2005)
One of the strategies that HROs adopted in the endeavour to counteract the 
apparent apathy surrounding the issue of the disappeared was to focus on the 
plight of missing children. They portrayed the question in terms of a violation 
against the family, the right of children to their legitimate parents, and the fact they 
had been adopted and were living with the same people that possibly disappeared 
their rightful parents. (Perelli & Rial, 1986) This discourse enabled them to reach 
out to the wider public, given the innocence of the victims, and permitted that the 
question remained in public consciousness.
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The death of Doctor Vladimir Roslik in April 1984 openly prompted for the first 
time a discussion on human rights abuses. This development can also be credited 
to the scale of publicity given to the case by the Colorado newspaper Jaque. Even 
though only two members of the military were finally prosecuted, the case 
importantly provoked a response from the Doctors' Union that established medical 
ethics tribunals to investigate possible violations of the Hippocratic Oath by 
doctors who had participated and/or certified actions relating to torture. (Perelli & 
Rial, 1986)
The discourse of human rights further flourished in the context of the 1987-89 
Referendum Campaign on the Expiry Law. The message was simple. Only by 
bringing to justice those responsible for past violations would victims be afforded 
legal redress, such abuses prevented from reoccurring, and after learning the truth 
the country would be finally reconciled. (AW, 1989) The campaign for the green 
vote to revoke the Law appealed to the general principles of truth and justice, 
calling for the clarification of the whereabouts of the disappeared and the trial of 
those responsible. It focused on ethics, hope and the reaffirmation of the basic 
values of society.
During the early years of transition, the discourse and work of HROs focused on 
the slogan of 'truth, justice and never again'. As a consequence of the victory of the 
yellow vote, it changed to 'truth, memory and never again' taking into account the 
new juridical situation. (Demasi & Yaffe, 2005:72)
Despite their attempts, the government and the military were eventually unable 
to prevent the older generations from remembering the past and younger ones
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from reopening all the silenced questions. (Fried, 2001) Thanks to their unyielding 
efforts, HROs could re-introduce the question of accountability on the social and 
national agenda. In addition to the March of Silence (see below), a particularly 
important event occurred in 2005, when human remains found on farmland in 
Pando near Montevideo were identified as those belonging to disappeared 
Ubagesner Chavez-Sosa. This discovery was made on the basis of information 
provided by the Air Force report (4.3) in a location, the farm, that had been under 
the control of the military during the dictatorship. (Clarin, 2005) According to 
Destouet, this event was a 'watershed, marking a sort of before and after in terms 
of memory construction and the search for the truth'. 'You could no longer say 
"presumed disappeared", as this discovery had demonstrated that Uruguayans had 
indeed disappeared'. Destouet further highlights how the presence of the 
President, civilian and military authorities and the victim's relatives at the military 
site that was shown on TV for all to see proved once and for all that these crimes 
did indeed take place, as did their cover up. 'In order to confirm the existence of 
the disappeared' Destouet added 'one's remains had to appear' (interview). 
Similarly, Miranda recounted 'how the appearance of the disappeared totally 
shook national reality1, it being a strong symbolic act that changed the whole 
dimension of the human rights question, 'allowing to touch and to de-disappear'. 
Miranda stressed how the materialisation of the bodies had a profound social 
impact, challenging the crime of disappearance that is normally something that 
cannot be categorised or made sense of. ‘I really should not say this' Miranda 
concluded 'but I personally think that public opinion was affected much more by 
the re-appearance of the desaparecidos than by the imprisonments of Blanco, 
Bordaberry or Alvarez; the latter events were indeed symbolic but they did not
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have the same emotional charge as the discovery of human remains' (Miranda 
interview).
The de-disappearance of two desaparecidos fundamentally undermined the 
politics of memory based on forgetting and denial. Attempts at silencing the past 
with arguments pretending that nothing significant had occurred during the 
dictatorship could not longer be sustained. The disappeared had not gone abroad 
or escaped with another woman, as rumours frequently contended, but had been 
murdered by the state.
Despite the significance of these recent events in reinforcing the arguments of 
human rights activists and their testimonies, HROs continue to fight for truth, 
memory, justice and never again. Activists are particularly critical of the silence 
that still pervades the final fate of the disappeared, as only two bodies have been 
recovered and identified.
In June 2008, Macarena Gelman for instance called for information to be 
brought forward to facilitate the search for the remains of the missing. She stated 
that neither her mother nor she had been a risk to democracy or the dictatorial 
regime in Uruguay and that they had not taken part in any war, if there had been 
one. A MFDDU representative similarly spoke of a kidnapped truth, as the military 
has yet to provide information to locate further burial sites. (LaRepublica, 2008c)
This alternative discourse of suffering and disruption directly challenged the 
official portrayal of events advanced first by the military regime and later by 
democratic administrations. It strived, and continues still, to instead install a 
framework according to which human rights abuses were systematically 
perpetrated by the state.
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The Government
The Uruguayan government strived to be, and successfully was for some time, a 
hegemonic actor in the politics of memory. Over time, it developed and attempted 
to impose specific emblematic memories endorsing particular understandings of 
what had occurred during the years of political violence. The government adopted 
what can be described as a mixed approach: in fact, each executive drew 
differently upon features of both military and HROs discourses. Its enduring 
ingredients are the concepts of war and peace.
The government was successful in its hegemonic aspirations until the late 
1990s, when the HROs eventually started challenging its supremacy, effectively 
displacing the predominant narratives of silence and gaining audience for its 
perspective of state terrorism.
Between the late 1960s to the present, various democratic administrations have 
endorsed different memories. First, before the military coup, the government 
supported the vision of 'war*. Upon democratisation, Presidents Sanguinetti and 
Lacalle encouraged discourses of ‘reconciliation and forgetting* until the late 
1990s. Under President Batlle narratives of state terrorism acquired more space 
while finally, President Vazquez returned to discourses of ‘reconciliation*, but also 
blended this with elements of state terrorism and other narratives, producing an 
ambiguous result.
According to Aldo Marchesi, between 1972 and democratisation, different 
interpretations of political violence existed. They all agreed that Uruguay was 
going through a war, but they presented nuanced understandings: war against
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subversion as suggested by the military, civil war as contended by the Left and 
revolutionary war as presented by the Tupamaros. (Marchesi, 2002:105-108)
The Colorado Party, in power between 1971 and 1973, and especially President 
Bordaberry and Minister Sanguinetti, principally advocated a view that depicted 
Uruguay as engulfed in a war against democracy. The actions of subversion were 
thus portrayed as irrational and alien to the nation, while a heroic image was 
painted of fallen members of the military. This perspective described subversion as 
threatening the traditional harmony of democracy but simultaneously glossed over 
the political violence stemming from the extreme-right. From this outlook, only 
two actors were relevant: the traditional parties and the military that were 
defending the nation, vs. subversion and its supporters that were considered the 
enemies. (Marchesi, 2002)
Julio-Maria Sanguinetti, Education and Culture Minister in the early 1970s and 
later President for two terms, is a key figure in the construction of the memory of 
reconciliation and forgetting that dominated until the late 1990s. Thus, his 
thinking deserves careful consideration.
When looking at the onset of military rule, Sanguinetti identifies several reasons 
such as the economic and social crisis, a confrontational and passionate political 
environment, the role of trade unions, an intellectual climate of confrontation, and 
the phenomenon of political violence that was unusual for Uruguay. (Lessa, 2007) 
Nonetheless, the President attributes particular responsibility to one of these 
factors, as he stated during his interview with the journalist Lessa: 'The incidental 
cause here were the Tupamaros. I do not take the simplistic position that the coup
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is their exclusive responsibility, but there is no doubt that without the Tupamaros 
the Army would not have gone onto the streets and reached the position in which 
it found itself to be to carry out the golpe'. (Lessa, 2007:189) Similarly, in my own 
interview, the President stated: 'here the military did not come out of the barracks 
because one morning they woke up and said: we will carry out a coup. It was the 
guerrillas that drew them out' with the climate of tension, kidnappings and thefts. 
After defeating the guerrillas, 'the military felt like they were the winners, they 
were acclaimed by the people that respected them for the tranquillity they had 
brought about, so the military felt like they were drunk with power', the President 
concluded.
Upon democratisation, the legacy of the repression became potentially 
disruptive, a source of renewed polarisation and destabilisation just like the years 
that had preceded the military takeover. As Roniger and Sznajder (1999) aptly 
contend, in Uruguay, as in the rest of the region, arguments of national 
reconciliation were adopted to reach social peace and achieve a difficult balance 
between demands of impunity by the military and those of justice by victims.
Sanguinetti's stand on these issues is summarised by his famous slogan 'no hay 
que tener los ojos en la nuca’, for which he has become renowned. According to 
Destouet, what the slogan means is that 'you do not need to look at the recent past, 
as it was a dark and bad period, and therefore there is no need to analyse or know 
it. Rather, we should silence and hide what occurred, as if it had never happened'. 
For Destouet this approach had political reasons and was also functional in 
covering up the responsibilities of civilian, economic or political powers that 
cooperated with the regime and that continued with other faces and discourses
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under democracy' (interview). Likewise, for Laura Balsamo, the President wanted 
to forget everything when he was in power and still 'wants to now [2007], he 
would say that talking about these things was like having eyes in the back of the 
head, that people should forget, leave the past to historians and just look forward' 
(interview). Former-political prisoner Reimann also pointed to how Sanguinetti's 
discourse constituted 'a veiled but strong threat not to investigate anything, 
because these things had passed so people should stop looking back to avoid 
upsetting the military and provoke a return to authoritarianism' (interview). In 
this respect, Lawrence Weschler emphasises how Sanguinetti believed his 
approach to question of the past explained why Uruguay was stable unlike other 
places, the bottom line being 'either we're going to look to the future or to the past'. 
(Weschler, 1998:189) For Sanguinetti, it was imperative to live in the present and 
solve current problems. Thus, as Caetano puts it well, ‘there was a clear attempt by 
the state to generate an official history by omission, a policy of imposed oblivion, 
as you can produce a official history not only by writing it but also by leaving the 
page blank' (interview).
When Sanguinetti's policy of silence was being threatened, as during the 1987 
referendum campaign, the President worked hard to protect it. Weschler (1998) 
detailes how, when speculating on the results, the President stated that should the 
law be overturned, he could not promise anything and that it would be like 
entering a blind alley. The campaign was presented by the government as directly 
threatening the stability that had been achieved. Signatures were depicted as being 
for rancour and revenge, and so citizens would be taking the country back to a 
period it had already overcome. (Brito, 1997)
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Sanguinetti's policies of silence continued until 2000. During the 1990s, 
whoever attempted to make progress regarding the truth was labelled as 
disturbing "the waters of the past" and having "eyes in the back of the head": 
"Uruguayan society had already voted for peace". (Caetano, 2004:27; Demasi, 
2003:74)
This changed with the election of President Batlle, who was the first leader to 
begin to undermine the prevailing impunity and lack of information. In his 
inaugural speech, the President stated: '[...] in the next five years we will be 
reaching out to all political and social sectors of our nation, to listen and inform, to 
initiate dialogue and to maintain it, still with firmness and clarity, our ideas and 
points of view, in searching for understandings and agreements that will ensure 
harmony and seal, forever, the peace among Uruguayans. That is our duty. We have 
gone through so many things, and have suffered as many, but no one can affirm 
that somebody is guilty or innocent, this is not the result of a Manichean scheme of 
good vs. evil, we all share the fundamental obligation to seal forever the peace 
among Uruguayans' (original emphasis). (Batlle, 2000) The speech, according to 
Silvia Dutrenit-Bielous and Gonzalo Varela-Petito, can be taken as embodying the 
desire to find a solution to the question of the disappeared. Nonetheless, the words 
of the President still refer to a 'shared responsibility' in relation to events of the 
past. (Dutrenit-Bielous & Varela-Petito, 2006:345) Despite the Presidency 
endorsing COPAZ's final report (4.2) which depicted the years of the dictatorship 
as an instance of state terrorism, several elements of Batlle's discourses still 
revolved around the idea of peace. This emphasis, combined with the limited 
efforts undertaken by the President's administration to achieve truth and justice, 
can be seen as implicitly backing the vision of a war that supposedly existed within
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Uruguayan society in the 1970s. Overall, although the discourses under Batlle 
became closer to the perspective of state terrorism, elements of the previous 
narratives were still lingering. The idea of war and the goal of sealing peace forever 
clearly hint at a project of national reconciliation, which can be achieved via a 
limited disclosure of truth and an even smaller portion of justice.
The current administration under Vazquez has paid special attention to human 
rights concerns. His opening speech in March 2005 already embodied this stand: 
'We want to know what happened, what happened to those citizens [the 
disappeared], if they are buried there or not; if they are, they will be found and 
identified, and their remains handed over to their relatives and if they are not, we 
will have to know why they are not there and where they are and what happened 
to them'. The President talked about the problem of the disappeared as one 
affecting the whole of society:'[...] the citizens that disappeared have transcended 
their families and are citizens of the whole of Uruguayan society, and society in its 
entirety has to know what happened to them'. In this respect, the President vowed 
to release all information for the purpose of advancing the truth but then also 
employed some elements of previous discourses: 'We will publish what we know 
[...] not to fuel hatred, not to prosecute outside the limits of the Expiry Law but [...] 
so that never again these things will occur in Uruguay, never again brothers vs. 
brothers, never again Uruguayans vs. Uruguayans'. These references to brothers 
vs. brothers and a confrontation among Uruguayans are drawn from the 
perspective of war and the two demons theory, presenting Uruguay as engulfed in 
an internal conflict. Furthermore, the President also mentioned the idea of peace 
and reconciliation: 'It is important to confront this burden as soon as possible [...]
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because we all want to live in peace [...] and we need to face the future that we 
want and deserve, [...] so that our children and grandchildren can live through 
better times than the ones we had to endure (Vazquez, 2005b) It is interesting 
to note that the President combines traditional HROs demands like the uncovering 
the truth surrounding the disappeared and elements of previous discourses like 
calls for reconciliation and achieving peace.
In the President's speech before the General Assembly, the President similarly 
pointed out how 'twenty years after recovering democratic institutions, there are 
still dark patches in the field of human rights'. There too Vazquez exposed his 
strategy on questions of accountability 'so that peace can definitely settle in the 
heart of all Uruguayans and our collective memory can incorporate yesterday's 
tragedies with their stories of commitment, sacrifice and catastrophe as indelible 
lessons for tomorrow. And with the truth we shall seek to regain peace for our 
society, as well as justice and above all, that the horror of past times never happens 
again'. (Vazquez, 2005a)
As these extracts demonstrate, the President's discourse is a mix of new and old 
narratives. On the one hand, there is an obvious desire and concern about making 
advances vis-a-vis questions on truth and justice. On the other, the President's 
approach hints at reconciliation and, similarly to Batlle's, at reaching peace within 
society. In this respect, several of my interviewees highlighted this ambiguity: ‘I 
still do not understand what Vazquez is doing1 (Demasi interview). Jose Rilla 
highlighted how the President has attempted through several means, like the 
Historical Investigation and the Day of Never Again, to close the subject but has not 
been very successful. Likewise, Romero criticises this perspective of brothers vs. 
brothers as one that 'dilutes political responsibility and the obligations of the
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state'. 'The message has to be clear' she continued 'you cannot give a confused 
message to people' (Romero interview). Caetano instead defends the position of 
the government, stating that if one reads the Historical Investigation 'you can see 
that it is totally not a type of official history' (interview).
Towards the end of his mandate, there has been a significant change in the 
President's discourse. In a speech in Costa Rica in April 2009, the President 
commented on the upcoming plebiscite on the Expiry Law, stating 'personally, I 
believe that Uruguayans do not deserve an impunity law like the one we have. I am 
absolutely against it'. Distinguishing between his position as President and his 
personal capacity, Vazquez added that he had been against the Law since the late 
1980s but that he remained consistent with his electoral promise of working 
within the Law's framework. Vazquez plainly stated that he considers the law 
'unconstitutional' and that he hopes that people nullify it in the next referendum’. 
It was the first time during his administration that the President, albeit in a 
personal capacity, spoke in favour of nullifying the Expiry Law. (LaRepublica, 
2009e)
6.3 Uruguayan Memory Knots
A consideration of memory knots enables the identification of specific dates, 
places or groups that have the power to stir memory debates within a given 
society, drawing its attention to issues of the past. Although these are always latent 
within Uruguay, the memory of the contested past at specific moments emerges 
with more energy, able to generate debate and heighten attention to such 
questions.
317
Sites of humanity are particular groups or individuals that transm it specific 
kinds of memory into the public arena. Attention focuses here on three such cases 
that at different times over the years called on society to address the legacy o f state 
terror.
The National Pro-Referendum Commission (CNPR)
The CNPR, established in January 1987, launched a campaign to collect the 
signatures required to hold a referendum on the Expiry Law (4.1). The 
Commission counted on the participation of notorious public figures like w rite r 
Mario Benedetti, several human rights activists and was also supported by 
members of political parties, and the Tupamaros.
The CNPR's chief argument was that signing the petition did not im ply how 
citizens would vote on the actual day. But signing would give society a chance to 
decide and express itself on the matter. (Roniger & Sznajder, 1997) The CNPR was 
portrayed as integrating citizens inspired by basic principles of liberty, democracy, 
justice and peaceful coexistence. The goals of the commission were summarised in 
its signature slogans "I sign for the people to decide" and "All equal before the law". 
(Demasi & Yaffe, 2005:67)
Museum of Memory
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Between February and April 1989, the debate extended beyond the referendum 
itself to include broader issues as the type of democracy wanted, the principles on 
which it should be established, its ethics, and the institutions that would 
substantiate it. (Demasi & Yaffe, 2005) Miranda recalls how 'the campaign was a 
significant milestone not only in the fight against impunity but also because it was 
able to divide the country beyond party lines: Uruguay is largely structured around 
such political allegiances but the campaign effectively turned the country into 
yellow vs. green' (interview).
Supporters of the yellow vote to retain the Law (the Colorados, the majority of 
the Blancos and the military) focused on the importance of consolidating and 
strengthening the recently restored democracy. They claimed that this could only 
be achieved by ending confrontations and pacifying the country, through tolerance 
and reconciliation. It was necessary to forget the past and focus on the future. 
Additionally, they also argued that the repealing of the law could provide fertile 
ground for the military to carry out another coup.
Supporters of the green (including SERPAJ, PIT-CNT and the Frente Amplio) 
appealed to general principles of truth and justice, calling for the clarification of 
the whereabouts of the disappeared and prosecution of human rights violators. 
They focused on ethics, hope and the reaffirmation of the basic values of society. 
According to Roniger and Sznajder (1997:67) 'the referendum was part of the 
fundamental process of overcoming fear and learning to trust people's capacity for 
decision making again after the military interregnum'. It was emphasised how 
legitimised impunity would not prevent the repetition of similar events.
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On 16 April 1989, 85% of the population voted: 41.3% cast the green ballot, 
while 56% the yellow. The Referendum constitutes the only instance when a 
society decided through a vote that the country's security forces should not be 
rendered accountable for human rights crimes.
Despite the negative result, the referendum and the signature campaign remain 
significant in that society was given the chance to express itself directly through 
the ballot box. Even though many blamed the persistent culture of fear, the 
campaign placed the human rights question at the heart of the political and public 
arena for a considerable period of time. This allowed society to acquire knowledge 
of the human rights violations, effectively undermining claims by the armed forces 
denying that crimes had ever been committed. As a consequence of the defeat of 
the green vote, the theme of past abuses faded. The result was accepted as 
definitively closing the debate from political and legal points of view. (Roniger & 
Sznajder, 2003)
The National Coordinator for the Nullity of the Expiry Law (CNNLC)
Twenty years later the CNNLC, composed of social, human rights and trade 
union organisations, cultural and public figures, MPs, political parties and the 
Michelini brothers, was established to promote the annulment of the Law.
The CNNLC believes that, despite recent progress, there are still many obstacles 
preventing justice (4.3). The Committee's work is justified on ethical and moral 
reasons, as well as juridical evidence. It contends, as several of my interviewees 
agreed, that the Law was unsound from the start, as it violates fundamental 
principles of international and human rights law that Uruguay voluntarily ratified 
(Martinez, Rilla, Demasi interviews).
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On 4 September 2007, at a historical site of resistance against the dictatorship, 
the Galpon Theatre, the campaign was officially launched. Its goal was to achieve 
nullification via a constitutional reform project that required the collection of the 
signatures of 10% of population registered to vote, around 250,000. Through the 
work of commissions and individuals, who amassed signatures throughout 
Uruguay, the required number of signatories was collected.
Signature Collection Stands, Montevideo, August 2008
According to Luis Puig, a CNNLC member, the principal objective of this 
initiative is not to send more members of the m ilita ry to prison; rather, ending the 
culture of prevailing impunity: ‘we cannot keep on giving the message that there 
are two categories of citizens, those that are prosecuted and those that are not'. 
(LaRepublica, 2007a, 2007e) Similarly, Yelpo-Vega stated that 'we do not want 
revenge [...] but we cannot continue w ith  this im punity law, things need to be 
brought to light, to have prosecutions w ith all the guarantees of the law, something 
that the m ilitary did not respect [during the regime]' (interview).
Over 300,000 signatures were submitted in April 2009, and the referendum was 
finally scheduled for 25 October 2009. The famous Uruguayan w rite r Galeano 
signed in favour of the campaign, contending that 'it  is correct to fight against
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compulsory oblivion and against selfish amnesty1. Furthermore, he emphasised 
that impunity triggers crime at all levels, personal and collective, and that the Law 
'transformed Uruguay into a paradise of impunity'. (LaRepublica, 2008a)
The Committee's work was noteworthy in placing the subject of past crimes and 
the question of legalised impunity again at the core of political and public 
discussion, raising a set of ethical, moral and legal questions that demand answers 
from all Uruguayans. A lot is at stake with this initiative and society is being given a 
second chance to express itself on questions of truth, justice and memory that 
affect all of its citizens
Memoria para Armar
According to Fried (2006), Memoria Para Armar (MPA), established in 1997 and 
which reunited ex-female political prisoners, played a significant part in breaking 
years of silence in Uruguay. MPA pieced together the fragmented memory of a 
society's suppressed history, and recovered aspects of memory that were dormant 
under the seal of oblivion and social silence. (Fried, 2006)
At a time when silence reigned, especially on the subject of women's 
imprisonment, MPA emerged, founding member Isabel Trivelli recalls, from casual 
encounters: ‘what we felt was the need not to be forgotten [...] and we had the 
necessity of recounting our experiences, to leave it written down somewhere' 
(interview).
The organisation was divided into subgroups working on themes like gender, 
life experience, and testimony. Overall, they published four books. Their 
testimonies highlight in particular how female prisoners endured distinctive forms
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of pain specifically imposed because they had broken traditional female social 
roles, as mothers and guardians of the home, venturing instead into the realm of 
militant politics, joining political and/or military branches of revolutionary 
movements. (Fried, 2006)
If the first reason leading to MPA's establishment was the desire to talk, the 
second step was deciding to open up the discussion to society and involve all 
women, not only former prisoners. The goal was to demonstrate how state 
terrorism had produced not only death, torture and disappearance, but how it had 
also affected the whole of society in differing degrees, notwithstanding political 
allegiances (Trivelli). Through piecing memories together, these women were no 
longer 'passive victims' but became 'active political and cultural agents with a 
voice' that rescued the memory of political repression that was slowly fading away, 
bearing witness to future generations. (Fried, 2006:550)
A significant aspect of MPA's work is that the organisation has challenged the 
traditional position of the victims or afectados. 'What troubled us was the fact that 
memory appeared as the property of those that lived through those times, that we 
had to speak when we wanted and others had to listen'. 'This annoyed us' Isabel 
continues 'others did not only have to listen, but also had to discuss and 
appropriate these conclusions, results and assessments, even if they had not live 
through that [time]'. So over time, they invited academics and included more 
analysis into their work; finally, in their last project, they invited young people. The 
goal was to discuss the memory of the dictatorship, but also listening to their 
voices, for them to take possession of the memories of the recent past. (MPA, 2005) 
MPA drew attention not only on the experience of all women under the 
dictatorship but also made a conscious effort to expand the traditional audience of
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the state terrorism narrative beyond the afectados. Its contribution is significant in 
endeavouring to involve the whole of society on the question of the dictatorship 
that in reality affected all Uruguayans.
Sites in time are particular dates that have the power to evince memory and 
stir up debate. In Uruguay, quite a few exist like April 14, May 20 and June 19. It is 
interesting to note that June 27, the date of the military coup in 1973, unlike other 
occasions, generally attracts limited attention, beyond headlines and a few articles 
in newspapers.
14 April
On the morning of 14 April 1972, the Tuparamos perpetrated several attacks in 
Montevideo that caused the death of four people, including a Navy Captain. In the 
afternoon, the armed forces responded, and eight Tupamaros perished.
Since then, April 14 has been vested with different commemorative meanings, 
though all always associated with the vision of a war allegedly ongoing in Uruguay. 
Marchesi distinguishes at least three phases. (Marchesi, 2002:108-124) The first 
period between 1972 and 1975 is defined as 'homage to the victims of insanity*. 
Remembrance emphasised the irrationality of subversion, and stressed the 
suffering of the victims that defended democracy and the nation. After the 1973 
coup, commemorations were limited to the restricted environment of the military.
In August 1975, the official day of remembrance, the Day o f the Fallen in the 
Fight against Sedition, was instituted and a location to mark the day was purposely 
built, La Plaza de la Bandera (Flag Square). The scope of the event extended 
beyond the military and counted upon the compulsory participation of school
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students, and the universities. The population as a whole was also invited. 
According to this view, the Fallen had saved Uruguay and therefore were martyrs 
that had generously offered their blood. In the early 1980s, commemorative events 
continued as normal, without any mention of ongoing negotiations to transition, 
but there was a particular emphasis on the necessity of relaying the experience of 
the dictatorship to younger generations. (Marchesi, 2002)
The return of democracy brought about important transformations. President 
Sanguinetti modified the meaning of the remembrance to achieve national 
pacification, reaffirm democratic institutions and emphasise how all types of 
violence were disruptive to national harmony. All those that had lost their lives 
while protecting democracy and the Constitution would then be remembered and 
a new name was coined; the Day o f the Fallen in the Defence o f Democratic 
Institutions. The President endeavoured so to move away from the strong 
identification the day had with the military at a time when the institution was 
largely discredited. Nonetheless, commemorations did not garner a consensus.
For the Tupamaros, April 14 represented the beginning of the end, as by late of 
1972, the organisation was militarily and politically defeated. Marchesi (2002) 
highlights how the great forgotten of this date are indeed the eight dead 
Tupamaros that were never officially remembered, and were only commemorated 
by private individuals (also Destouet interview).
Two events continue to occur on April 14. Those are the act of commemoration 
amongst right-wing civilians and that of the Military Circle. The latter continues to
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preserve the name of the Day o f the Fallen in the Fight against Sedition and takes 
place every year at 12pm at the Military Circle.
The 2009 act of the Association of Permanent Homage to the Fallen in Defence 
of Democratic Institutions and Freedom was headed by Colorado MP Garda-Pintos 
and former-Army Chief Mermot. SERSOC members pointed out to me how Garda- 
Pintos 'is the spokesperson for the military within his party' [interview].
The act, still in the Plaza de la Bandera, saw the participation of retired officers, 
relatives of the victims and some politicians. According to La Republica newspaper, 
Mermot stated how April 14 constitutes the only opportunity to publicly express 
'the real feelings of love towards the fatherland and its traditions’ remembering 
fellow citizens that were 'victims of the revolutionary insurgency that devastated 
our country1. Mermot further described the date as a 'deep mark, painful and 
indelible, and for this we fight against the deliberate amnesia that is being 
imposed'. In the rest of his speech, the former Chief branded the Vazquez’s 
administration as Marxist that, through an arbitrary interpretation of the Expiry 
Law, 'is inciting resentments and hatred, channelling the political revenge of those 
that were militarily defeated'. Likewise, Garda-Pintos used the occasion to carry 
out a critique of the government, particularly 'the use and abuse of article 4 of the 
Expiry Law1, arguing it is not justice but revenge. The MP further criticised 
presidential candidate and former-Tupamaros leader Senator Mujica for his links 
with the Kirchners and public prosecutor Guianze who is currently challenging the 
constitutionality of the Expiry Law. (LaRepublica, 2009a)
It is interesting to note how this year's act became the outlet for the military to 
vocalise its stance regarding recent progress on accountability. The speeches 
described above employed typical elements of the military narrative, as the idea of
326
war and how the armed forces are now the victims of revenge coming from the 
Marxist administration. As in Argentina, the possibility of justice and advances in 
the clarification of the facts has shaken the military from its comfortable life of 
impunity, catalysing their response and the return to the old images of the past in 
attempting to justify their actions.
20 May
May 20 is a date with a meaning diametrically opposed for its rejection of state 
terrorism and human rights crimes.
As Marchesi (2002) recounts, on 18 May 1976, the ex-President of the Chamber 
of Deputies from the Blanco party, Hector Gutierrez-Ruiz and Frente Amplio 
Senator Zelmar Michelini were kidnapped in Buenos Aires. A few days later, their 
bodies appeared in a car along with the bodies of Tupamaro members William 
Whitelaw and Rosario Barredo. Argentine police attributed responsibility for the 
act to subversive groups. An alternative version, advanced by Blanco leader 
Ferreira-Aldunate, who had narrowly avoided a similar fate, instead stated that 
kidnappers were linked to state security organisations.
Remembrance of May 20 unfolded in politically different contexts, but always 
embodied meanings linked to a repudiation of state terror. Silence prevailed until 
the early 1980s, due to the lack of public space for expressing memory, and the 
strict control over the media, and political and social actors in Uruguay. Abroad, 
remembrance became an opportunity for denouncing violations perpetrated back 
home. In Uruguay, the ex-legislators became the symbols of the democratic sectors 
fighting against the dictatorship. (Marchesi, 2002)
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Upon democratisation, remembrance came to express a feeling of rejection of 
the dictatorial experience, and the hope for the new democracy. The Municipality 
of Montevideo, along with several others local authorities, named streets after the 
legislators. (Broquetas, 2007) In the late 1980s, commemorations were however 
overshadowed by the debate on the question of amnesty for the military and 
eventually lost prominence after the defeat of the Green vote.
The 20th anniversary became a special occasion. As recounted in chapter 4, 
Senator Rafael Michelini, Zelmar's son, called on HROs and political parties to hold 
a demonstration in Montevideo's main avenue, demanding clarifications on the 
situation of the disappeared. This first March of Silence had around 50,000 
participants and the support of the PIT-CNT, the Student Federation, and various 
political parties. Marching under the slogan "Truth, Memory and Never Again", it 
called on the Executive to investigate the fate of the disappeared.
Since then, the March has become a yearly recurrence, with some enduring 
features. It is carried out in absolute silence, a silence however full of questions, 
When? Where? How? Why? People carry candles and photos of the disappeared, 
resembling a funeral procession but no political symbols are permitted, only the 
national flag. The names of around 200 disappeared are read out, with people 
responding with "present" after each name is read out. Finally, it always begins at 
the same location, intersection of Rivera and Jackson, at the same time, 7pm, 
ending in Liberty Square, where the national hymn is sung (Destouet interview).
The March constitutes a broad act of remembrance of past crimes and 
vindication of the disappeared. Every year it is carried out under a specific slogan:
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"End of Impunity, Justice for human rights crimes” in 2006 (LaRepublica, 2006c); 
"Where are they? The Truth continues kidnapped. Never Again State Terrorism" in 
2007 (LaRepublica, 2007b); and "We demand Truth and Justice” in 2008 
(LaRepublica, 2008d). The 14th March, held in 2009, was the biggest ever. Over 
90,000 people walked under the slogan "In 2009 we chose truth, justice, memory 
and never again”, reflecting the successful signature collection campaign for a 
second referendum. (LaRepublica, 2009c, 2009d)
Unlike 14 April, Destouet highlights how May 20 does not generate conflict in 
terms of memory. Instead, what is remarkable is that ‘it is one of the biggest 
demonstrations in the country and there is very little publicity about it' 
(interview). 'It is not advertised on the radio, TV or in pamphlets but you always 
have thousands of people taking part'. ‘In other situations, to gather such a large 
crowd, you require a lot of publicity beforehand, but the march has no press 
coverage until the evening itself (Destouet). In fact, the date is so well known that 
almost all my interviewees mentioned it  The importance of May 20 transcends the 
national borders. In fact, the MERCOSUR selected it as a common date for the 
region to commemorate the violations of human rights that were committed in the 
context of the Plan Condor (Martinez, Navarrete interviews)
19 June
By contrast, a controversial decision has been taken by the Vazquez's 
administration in selecting June 19 as the di'a del Nunca Mds (day of Never Again). 
Resolution 832 of December 2006 established that'[...] for the country to look to 
the future and find paths to national reconciliation, June 19 is to be established as
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the only commemorative date that never again should such episodes occur in 
Uruguay [...]'. (Presidencia, 2006] The President contended in his speech that the 
majority of Uruguayans want to make progress with 'reconciliation and re- 
encounter', 'so that these sad and negative events that have occurred will never 
again take place, never again brother vs. brother'. Vazquez stressed that this 'does 
not imply deleting the past' or a punto fina l (end point). (LaRepublica, 2006b)
Mariana Iglesias suggests that the selection of the date has to be put into the 
context of Vazquez's project for the country, according to which he would work as 
'the President for all Uruguayans'. (Iglesias, 2007:4) In this respect, June 19 is 
another element in working towards the creation of a new Uruguay, 'more 
brotherly, and more human'. (Ibid.) Nonetheless, Iglesias (2007:9-14) emphasises 
that several disputes over the meaning of Never Again have emerged, especially 
between the Left and the Right, and the question of the Two Demons Theory 
(2DT).
Official acts in 2007, 2008 and 2009 garnered good political support from the 
governing coalition and opposition members, but failed in the objective to 
establish an occasion for national commemoration, (/bzd.) Indeed, several key 
figures such as former Presidents Sanguinetti and Batlle, all HROs and retired 
military officers have distanced themselves from commemorations. (LaRepublica, 
2007c) Here are some of the arguments raised.
Luisa Cuesta from MFDDU contended in 2007 that the date does not 'have any 
meaning' and that we still miss 'several years, a lot of truth and will from the state 
before this commitment can become effective'. (LaRepublica, 2007c) Romero of 
SERPAJ underscored how 'June 19 is an imposed date, which has nothing to do
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with the fight against impunity'. Furthermore, Romero suggested that 'the 
government attempted to obtain a consensus and homogenise memory, but human 
rights activists and society do not identify with this discourse'. Romero outlines 
how June 19 triggered much debate over 'what kind of memory and Never Again 
we want'. 'While the government talks of Never Again Uruguayans vs. Uruguayans, 
we respond with Never Again State Terrorism' (interview).
In 2008, the Presidency called upon the citizens to observe a moment of 
reflection so that never again will there be distrust, confrontations and violence 
among Uruguayans, and that state terrorism will never re-occur. The CNNLC did 
not participate in the event, suggesting that the act continues to fuel the 2DT, while 
MP Garcfa-Pintos of the Association 14 April declared that the call from the 
President ‘is not really peaceful but provocative'. (LaRepublica, 2008e)
On the other hand, in 2008 Army Commander Rosales pointed out how the 
Armed Forces 'accompany the decision of the President', while Air Force 
Commander Bonelli expresses his desire that 'the country can start looking 
forward and leave the past behind'. (LaRepublica, 2008b) Finally, Senator Mujica 
commented that 'Today is first the day of Artigas [founding father of Uruguay] and 
possibly that of the grandfathers; and then, what the President is asking is that 
people reflect But there is no punto final.’ [Ibid.)
Carlos Demasi and Oscar Destouet spontaneously admitted that 'they do not 
understand the President's project1. They stress that the date already has many 
meanings attached, notably Artigas' birthday, Flag Day and grandfather's day. For 
Demasi, the President 'should have selected a neutral day, without any history to 
it'. Destouet outlines how, despite there was limited participation, 'not at all like 
May 20', the attendance by young military officials was remarkable: ‘it was a
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private act so they would not be sanctioned for not participating’. Marisa Ruiz 
instead outlines how the President 'wanted to impose a punto fin a l' but it did not 
transpire, as 'Uruguay is not ready for that' (interview].
Debates over the meaning of the past become evident on specific dates that, for 
their symbolism, evoke discussion and challenge the day-to-day routine of life. 
April 14 and May 20 respectively reflect the emblematic memories of salvation, 
disruption and suffering. They constitute key moments during the year when such 
narratives are activated and forcefully transmitted. Conversely June 19 has 
sparked much debate and was significantly rejected by some of its intended 
targets, especially HROs. Given the forthcoming presidential elections in October 
2009, only time will tell what the fate of June 19 will be.
Sites of physical matter/geography are particular places, old or new, that by 
their connection with the past provoke memory debates.
Punta Carretas: from prison to shopping centre
The transformation of the Punta Carretas prison into a modern and shiny 
shopping mall is one of the clearest embodiment of the policies of national 
reconciliation and imposed oblivion that dominated in Uruguay until the 1990s. 
The Punta Carretas prison, in the homonymous neighbourhood in the south of 
Montevideo, was operational since the beginning of the twentieth century. It 
witnessed in 1921 the escape of a group of anarchists and in 1971 the emblematic 
flight of more than 100 Tupamaros via an underground tunnel dug from within the
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prison. Elizabeth Jelin further highlighted how it  was the site of years o f systematic 
torture of political prisoners during the dictatorship. (Jelin, 1998)
Punta Carretas Cell Door, Museum of Memory
Its transformation into a shopping centre occurred between the late 1980s and 
the mid-1990s. The context was one in which various governments, both Colorado 
and Blanco, endeavoured to cancel the memories of recent violence from public 
spaces, to normalise in this way the legacy of the dictatorship.
Magdalena Broquetas (2007:233) aptly emphasises how although prolonged 
imprisonment was the defining feature of repression in Uruguay, nevertheless 
former detention centres have not been recuperated as 'vehicles o f memory'. 
Rather, the transformation of the prison constitutes an obvious example of 'public 
politics of memory that favoured the elimination of these spaces'. (Ibid.)
In 1989 the prison possessed a great economic value and various possible 
functions to be attributed to it  were explored. Between 1989 and July 1994, when
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the shopping centre opened, a new hegemonic discourse of public memory was 
established. According to Hugo Achugar, it  portrayed Uruguay as a democratic 
community w ithout mayor violence. This vision reflected an economic project that 
aimed to transform the country into a place of services, tourism, communication 
and banking. This vision of Eden was sold by the ministries o f Tourism and 
Economy that attempted to promote the country abroad and defended its 
exceptionality as a refuge from crim inal violence and economic instability plaguing 
its two neighbours. [H. Achugar, 2004)
This representation nonetheless glossed over some relevant features that would 
have contradicted such idyllic portrayal. Particularly, these discourses depicted the 
years of the dictatorship as an anomaly that were best forgotten and did not 
deserve the attention of the citizens. This perspective denied that m ilita ry rule had 
constituted a fundamental rupture in the national imagery. In this respect, the 
Punta Carretas shopping centre is part of this idyllic Uruguay, a safe space from 
which the old violence has been eradicated.
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The transformation of the site has been completed with the addition of an 
exclusive hotel at the back. Few people are aware of what the shopping centre used 
to be and what remains of the original site are only the main entrance and one side 
wall. The shopping centre facilitates the act of forgetting for its visitors, a memory 
of absence that trumps alternative memories of military rule and wipes out 
remembrance of the past from this metaphorical space.
Jelin (1998] rightly illustrates that the urban space of Punta Carretas has been 
permanently altered as a consequence of this transformation. An important and 
emblematic legacy of the dictatorial period has been erased and, together with it, 
the materialisation of memory. In contrast, the Shopping Mall embodies a new 
memory of absence that reflects the hegemonic discourse of democratic 
restoration that portrays military rule as an abnormality in Uruguay's past.
It can be suggested that the government has been rather successful in its goal. 
Only two of my interviewees actually mentioned the prison and both were human 
rights activists. Romero stressed how it had been a symbolic place of memory 
where several prisoners had died. She also pointed to the fact that in another 
emblematic prison during the dictatorship, Libertad, 'common criminals now 
suffer in the same place where political prisoners were detained in the 1970s'. 
'They are possibly not tortured [unlike political prisoners]' she continued 'but 
Uruguayan prisons are terrible, a torture in and of themselves'. Unlike Argentina 
where several symbolic detention centres have been transformed into spaces of 
memory, in Uruguay they continue to be invisible and their memory is 
disappearing. According to Mansilla, 'the appropriation of symbols, spaces and 
locations of memory is a more recent development in Uruguay'. In the case of 
Punta Carretas, 'there was really no collective debate that was strong enough to
defend the place as a location of memory'. The discussion was lim ited to some 
former prisoners and activists that 'considered it  despicable that a place where 
people had been detained and tortured' would be a shopping centre (interview).
So the transformation of Punta Carretas, a few years after the defeat of the 
green vote, constituted another defeat for human rights activism.
The Memorial to Disappeared-Detainees
The Memorial to Disappeared-Detainees constitutes an example of 
endeavours to commemorate the memory of state terrorism  via a new physical 
marker of memory. The campaign for the Memorial was launched by MFDDU, 
legislator Singlet and Montevideo Mayor Arana in 1998. (Demasi & Yaffe, 2005) 
The winning project, designed by Architects Kohen, Otero, Sagradini and Dodera, 
was funded by public donations. The collection campaign was led by the Pro- 
Memorial Commission, composed of numerous public figures from the arts, sport, 
politics, journalism and the church. The Memorial, whose construction was 
declared of national interest by President Batlle in August 2000, was officially 
inaugurated on 10 December 2001. (LaRepublica, 2001)
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The location, decided by the Municipality of Montevideo and the Commission, is 
the symbolic site of the Parque Vaz Ferreira in the Cerro. Broquetas (20007:226) 
emphasises how the working-class Cerro neighbourhood was selected for its 
importance as 'emblematic area of popular fights'. The Memorial was clearly 
inspired by the Vietnam War Memorial in Washington, and won awards at the 
Architecture Biennales in Quito and Sao Paulo.
The Memorial is surrounded by trees in a quiet location. High resistance glass 
was used for the two double walls, framed by metal, and the Memorial rests on a 
geometrical concrete structure, on which natural rocks are left visible, as an 
aesthetic provocation. The names of disappeared-detainees are engraved on the 
walls. The specific tranquil location, w ith  a view of Montevideo's bay, calls for rest, 
peace and reflection.
The location and the materials used have specific meanings and symbolisms. 
According to Nelson Di-Maggio, the route to the memorial is like a pilgrimage to a 
place of meditation while surrounding trees suggest the support of society to the 
search for truth. The rocky surface represents truth, from which we cannot
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ultimately escape. The excavations in the land represent the complicated search 
for tru th  and the irregularity of the rocky surface denotes the discomfort the 
theme provokes. The surround of natural rocks represents the collective effort in 
finding the truth; the glass walls symbolise life, its frag ility  and the respect it  
deserves. Finally, the location of the walls, breaking the natural view, indicates 
hiding, the mystery of disappearance. [Di-Maggio, 2004)
Demasi and Yaffe (2005:87) contend that the Memorial represents a 'symbolic 
reparation to victims that 15 years of governmental politics of oblivion wished to 
condemn to oblivion’. Furthermore, the Memorial broadly aspires to contributing 
to collective memory by strengthening the bases of the commitment of "Never 
Again" and the hope for coexistence based on respect, tolerance and justice, 
through the construction of an emblematic representation of state terrorism  in a 
public space of the city. [Ibid.) The Memorial favours a climate o f sober reflection 
on what happened, perpetuating the memory o f state terrorism  through physical 
reminders, not just relying on human actions. (Broquetas, 2007:227)
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Mansilla suggests how the Memorial exemplifies this recent concern w ith  
memory initiatives. However, only a couple of my interviewees actually talked 
about the Memorial when asked about significant places of memory. In this case, as 
in the Memory Park in Buenos Aires, the location o f the memorial is relevant. 
Despite the symbolisms mentioned above, its far-out location results in the fact 
that only those that already have an awareness of these issues w ill make the effort 
to go v is it i t  There is a lack of publicity and there are no guided visits to the site. So 
as in Argentina, here too there is the risk that the Memorial remains lim ited to 
human rights activists, and does not generate memory debates that include society 
as a whole.
The Museum of Memory
Another project, only a year old, has been more successful in extending the 
memory o f state terrorism  to broader society, transcending its traditional audience 
of afectados and human rights activists. The idea of the Cultural Centre Museum 
of Memory [MUME) dates back to the return of democracy but was only finally 
inaugurated on 10 December 2007.
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The MUME works to promote peace, human rights and the memory of popular 
fights for freedom, democracy and social justice; these concepts are seen as socio- 
historical dynamics that are in constant evolution. The museum is a space 
dedicated, as its introductory leaflet outlines, to the recuperation of the memory of 
state terrorism and the efforts of the Uruguayan people in its struggle against the 
dictatorship.
According to Elbio Ferrario, the MUME coordinator, the project was supported 
by both the Montevideo Municipality and the national government through the 
MEC.
One of the debates focused on where to set up the museum. One proposal was 
the former Campomar factory in a traditional working class district. However, 
renovating the factory would have meant further delays to the project, so the 
estate of 19th century dictator Maximo Santos was selected so that it could open 
immediately (Ferrario interview). This choice is significant in combining the house 
of a former dictator with the memory of the recent dictatorship. Further, the park 
is a historical site and the museum can be expanded beyond the house in the 
future.
The museum is organised along six themes: the onset of the dictatorship, 
popular resistance, prisons, exile, the disappeared, and the recuperation of 
democracy and the fight for justice. A seventh theme, to be established in the 
outside space, is unfinished histories and new challenges. Finally, a library for 
public reference is under construction.
The establishment of the museum was endorsed by several social organisations 
and institutions, including MFDDU, SERPAJ, CRYSOL and SERSOC. Elbio Ferrario
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emphasised how the MUME welcomes contributions and testimonies from anyone 
in the community and it is still a work in progress. Mauricio Rosencof, Director of 
the Department of Culture for the Montevideo Municipality, highlights how there 
was ‘the need to have a place where the new generations can know what happened 
to their parents, how they lived, and what they were fighting for'. Rosencof further 
emphasises the spirit of the museum which is not one of revenge. 'We all agreed 
that remembering the resistance does not entail exposing and accusing those 
responsible for altering the constitutional order and the violations of human 
rights'. 'In the museum' he continues 'there is not a single photo or phrase that 
ridicules' them. (MUME, 2008:8)
During my stay, the guide pointed out how 12,000 people have already visited 
the MUME, making it the most visited museum in the country. The museum also 
holds several theatre, murga, literature and cinema workshops in the attempt to 
involve and make people feel part of the museum. The guide emphasised how the 
work of the museum has just started, that it needs to be proactive and build on the 
contribution of everyone that visits. Reimann from CRYSOL importantly 
underscores how the scope of the museum is not to be a 'museum of horrors, but 
rather to collect testimonies to teach to future generations so that we do not forget 
what happened in the past' (interview).
These three examples accentuate how the construction of memory is a complex 
process. Physical markers do not, in themselves, support memory. Rather, they 
need to be lived and shared by society to achieve their goal of establishing an open 
and inclusive debate over the memory of military rule and its various meanings.
3 4 1
6.4 Uruguayan Illusions of Memory
Upon democratisation, one of the leading narratives that existed on the years of 
political violence was, like in Argentina, the Two Demons Theory (2DT). There is 
debate on whether or not this approach was actively endorsed by the government. 
According to Ruiz, the Theory exists in the background, 'it is a kind of latent 
ideological framework that permeates the social fabric, and appears and 
disappears depending on developments surrounding accountability'. While Ruiz 
and Martinez argue that it never came to constitute an official memory, the vast 
majority of my interviewees associated the 2DT with the Presidency of Sanguinetti.
Rilla highlighted how Sanguinetti used the Theory to justify his approach of 
looking to the future, given that society 'had nothing to do with the fight between 
two intransigent demons' (interview). For Bleier, the Theory 'was constructed as a 
convenient formula to re-edit and write the past, where you already see 
Sanguinetti [...] with the exaggeration of impunity and the obsession with covering 
up' (interview). Likewise SERSOC members pointed to the widespread 
endorsement enjoyed by the Theory, not only by the government but also political 
organisations from the Right and the Left. Finally, Balsamo underlines the fact that 
‘it is a politically correct discourse, but that it is not so historically' (interview).
The 2DT adopted in Uruguay was slightly different from its Argentine 
counterpart and can be labelled as 'Uruguayan style' 2DT because of its specific 
features. The theory is, according to Demasi (2003), a classic explanation of 
institutional breakdown but in Uruguay, interestingly enough and unlike 
Argentina, it was constructed post-facto. The theoiy would have been untenable in 
1973 given that the guerrillas had been defeated well before the coup and secondly
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that the civilian government had actually requested the military to deal with 
subversion. In fact, it became popular during the political opening of the early 
1980s.
Since 1985, President Sanguinetti has developed his own version of the Theory 
but the appeal of the 2DT was generally quite broad. According to Sanguinetti, and 
in contrast to Argentina, in Uruguay there was clearly a worse demon. In fact, the 
President held the Tupamaros fundamentally responsible for having directly 
attacked democracy, consequently triggering the response from the military.
For the government, as traditional political parties, the Theory was a valuable 
tool in removing responsibility for the coup from them, allowing them to present 
the political class as unable to carry out any action. (Demasi, 2003) According to 
Demasi, this is particularly striking as at all other times in Uruguayan history, 
traditional parties always tend to be the protagonists (interview). For the 
government, blaming the left-wing guerrilla for the political violence also 
effectively placed responsibility on the Left as a whole (interview).
Importantly, the Theory's appeal extended to civil society as it could present 
itself as a victim of this confrontation. In doing this, it could be exonerated from 
any responsibility, although large parts of population actually accepted the 
military takeover as a solution to ongoing disorder and social unrest. For Demasi, 
even more significantly, the Left similarly championed it because of the lack of an 
alternative discourse and the fear of institutional destabilisation. Interestingly 
enough even the Tupamaros employed the Theory, as it elevated them to 'demon' 
status, so depicted as protagonists of important institutional events in the 
country's history, when these actually occurred well after their defeat (Demasi).
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The parallel amnesties for political prisoners and the military were the clearest 
embodiment of Sanguinetti's 2DT. The rational for the President's policy was the 
following: 'we proposed an amnesty [...] It was a question of moral equivalency: we 
felt that if we were going to have a settling of accounts for the left and the 
terrorists the military should be amnestied, too’. (Weschler, 1998:188) This author 
agrees with Weschler who rightly suggests that the administration did not 
appreciate the fundamental difference existing between the plight suffered by 
political prisoners that endured long prison sentences and psychological and 
physical torture, and the military that administered these torments, while 
submitting the whole of Uruguay to a long reign of terror.
Although between 1985 and 1990, the State was totally absent in terms of 
reparations, truth and justice, it was however extremely active in memory. As a 
matter of fact, the state's enforced amnesia extended beyond simply the judicial 
setting, preventing any discussion of the past in the media and schools (Destouet 
interview). For Destouet, this memory of silence and oblivion blatantly obscured 
aspects of the recent past, limiting the narrative to the actions of 'a few half crazy 
military that lost their way and nothing more. This vision was ‘not only extremely 
partial' but also 'reduced a problem that was much more complex', discounting, for 
instance the civilian element (Destouet interview).
Only in 2000 did a significant shift in memory occurred. The government then 
officially (but only partially) endorsed the interpretation of the past that 
traditionally belonged to human rights activists, the vision of state terrorism.
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The Batlle administration acknowledged for the first time that the dictatorship 
had committed systematic abuses and political crimes but it nonetheless 
attempted to limit once again the clarification of the past and impose an official 
memory through the work of the COPAZ. In fact, government decree 146/2003 
asserted that the Commission had produced a ‘definitive truth  that from now on 
has to be considered the official version of the situation of disappeared-detainees'. 
Further, it stated that the Commission's work had fulfilled once and fo r all what 
had been stipulated under article 4 of the Expiry Law. (Dutrenit-Bielous & Varela- 
Petito, 2005:115) The President's words on that occasion referred to the idea of 
peace, and indirectly backed the vision of a war, returning in this way to earlier 
narratives. In presenting the commission's final report, the President stated that 
the COPAZ had done a wonderful job in consolidating 'peace among Uruguayans', 
emphasising how the country had lived through very difficult and painful 
circumstances. The President pointed to the fact that people had gradually 
resolved their differences and healed wounds. Uruguayans have suffered 'over the 
last forty years many things that made it very difficult to live in peace amongst 
ourselves' but we were able to overcome such a situation and today 'more than 
ever we can build a great country at peace'. (Batlle, 2003)
According to Dutrenit-Bielous and Varela-Petito (2005), although the 
Commission marked an important development, the desire was in fact one to close 
off any further investigation into these matters. Indeed, the scope of the 
commission's investigation was clearly limited to disappeared-detainees and, as 
Sempol (2006) contends, it implicitly endorsed the policy of amnesty to the police 
and military, by not considering cases of torture and political assassinations.
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The position adopted by the President is not only disturbing but also 
ambiguous. First, how could the COPAZ, so severely criticised for its shortcomings 
(4.2), have possibly investigated all that had occurred under state terrorism? 
Second, as Caetano suggests, 'what is regrettable about COPAZ is how the 
administration tried to satisfy the military and leave the waters quiet' (interview). 
Caetano also rightly points to the fallacy that official memories constitute: 'the 
intent of official history is in vain, as you cannot control the cultural fields of 
memory, remembrance and testimonies' (interview).
Debates over the memoiy of the past are far from over in Uruguay. In March 
2009, the University of the Republic released its (second) Historical Investigation 
‘on the Dictatorship and State Terrorism in Uruguay1 that emphasised, in the words 
of its leading researcher Professor Rico, that 'the objective of the dictatorship was 
the whole population, surveillance and discipline'. (Mazzarovich, 2009) The three- 
volume research document emphasised how, beyond the immediate purpose of 
dismantling the opposition, the military regime had the long-term goal of 
restructuring social relations, installing distrust and insecurity. The research 
clearly challenges the Two Demons Theory by contending that the 'repression was 
institutionalised and the State was the central actor'. (LaRepublica, 2009b)
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Conclusion
Transitional justice and memory were the central concerns at the heart of this 
thesis. The research focused on the following questions: How do TJ policies emerge 
and evolve over time? (Ql) Second, what is the connection between TJ and the 
memory of past human rights violence? (Q2)
The Politics of Transitional Justice
In addressing Q l (how do TJ policies emerge and evolve over time?), a holistic 
and multilayered framework was developed in endeavouring to understand the 
emergence and the evolution of TJ policies over time.
As contended in chapter 1, TJ initiatives result from the interaction amongst 
various dynamics, actors and power balances at the local, national and 
international spheres. These three levels have to be taken into consideration when 
trying to account for the origins and later progression of TJ.
In line with recent academic literature, this thesis contended that TJ has to be 
made relevant not only to individuals but to communities as well. This can be 
achieved through the employment of a variety of mechanisms, including judicial, 
investigatory and alternative methods. Recently, the latter have attracted 
increasing attention, with the recognition that in order for TJ to achieve its 
objective(s), it cannot be implemented top-down. Rather, it has to be owned and 
concern the very people to which it is addressed. A long-term perspective also 
needs to be adopted when looking at issues of TJ. Although the word 'transitional' 
in both TJ and transitional societies does imply, in theory, a change from one
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situation to another, it is hardly the case practically speaking that the time frame 
for transition can be fixed or clearly delimited. As a consequence, decisions of TJ 
are never permanent but they constantly evolve and are subject to scrutiny over 
time.
Argentina and Uruguay exemplify all of the abovementioned issues. Looking at 
the trajectory of TJ in these countries clearly demonstrates how the course of TJ is 
frequently unpredictable. In fact, TJ rarely follows conventional paths. Rather, it 
has highs and lows, pauses, set backs and sudden developments. It is this 
unpredictability that makes TJ such an interesting subject to study.
In Argentina and Uruguay, TJ initiatives were cumulative: each initiative built 
upon previous achievements, complementing them. Even during periods when 
there appeared to be little progress in TJ policy, developments -albeit minor were 
still occurring that would bear significant fruit at a later and often unexpected date.
In chapter 4, it was suggested that three phases of TJ could be discerned in 
Argentina and Uruguay: Truth and Justice vs. Silence (1983 to 1990), Fighting 
Silence (1990 to the 21st century), and The Challenge of Transitional Justice in the 
Present. The development of these three stages was explained with reference to 
the following factors. First, the different attitudes of the various Presidents were 
essential in countries like Argentina and Uruguay where the Executive tends to be 
dominant. In fact, every administration tackled the question of the past differently. 
Over the years, every President has brought his own unique approach to this 
matter, consequently shaping TJ policy. Second, despite the transition to 
democracy, the armed forces continued to be an influential and significant political
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actor. Although politically and symbolically weakened by the experience of holding 
power, both the Argentine and Uruguayan military tried to shape, or perhaps more 
accurately obstruct, efforts of TJ. However, their ability to do so decreased with the 
consolidation of democracy.
Third, HROs were often a lonely but unrelenting voice, constantly challenging 
both society and the government not to ignore the nation's past. Instead, they were 
constantly mobilised to keep questions of accountability in the spotlight. Even in 
the darkest years of silence, HRO remained a constant force in the areas of justice, 
truth and memory.
Fourth, the judiciary played an important role due to its ability to either favour 
the momentum towards accountability or restrain i t  Lastly but significant 
nonetheless, the international context provided the necessary background 
conditions against which local and national events unfolded. When Argentina and 
Uruguay initially returned to democracy, human rights questions were emerging 
as issues of concern on the international stage. The end of the Cold War, the move 
towards international justice and, especially significant for the Southern Cone, the 
London arrest of General Pinochet, all triggered renewed attention to issues of the 
past. These events finally laid to rest the symbolic ghosts of past military rule in 
the region.
In Argentina and Uruguay, a variety of TJ mechanisms were used. Argentina 
pioneered several of them that are now regarded as established practices like truth 
commissions. Notable examples of this are the creation of the CONADEP in late 
1983, and domestic prosecutions such as the 1985 Trial of the Military 
Commanders which was unprecedented at the time, especially in Latin America.
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Uruguay was also an innovator, as it was the only country in the world to submit 
an amnesty law to the public ballot, giving society a chance to express itself in 
1989. A second referendum is now scheduled for October 2009.
Argentina also successfully led the way with hybrid mechanisms, establishing 
the truth trials in the late 1990s, combining elements of truth commissions and 
prosecutions. Finally, it challenged the constitutionality of its amnesty laws, 
resulting in them being declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 2005. 
Uruguay is now following these steps.
Both countries employed diverse methods of the 'transitional justice "toolbox". 
(Roht-Arriaza, 2006:5) In the attempt to address the legacy of the evils of state 
terror, Argentina and Uruguay strived to provide truth, justice, reparations and 
memorialisation of the events of their recent pasts.
Finally, these two cases also illustrate how despite the word 'transitional', TJ is 
rarely a situation of 'let's quickly gloss over past injustices and move on' (my 
phrase). Instead what is more likely to occur is that issues of TJ may span over 
several years, even decades as in our case studies. A long-term perspective is 
therefore essential. In Argentina and Uruguay, questions of TJ are still heatedly 
debated and there is no indication that these discussions are likely to subside any 
time soon.
The Politics of Memory
Q2 (what is the connection between TJ and the memory of past human rights 
violence?) was the second concern of this thesis. Studying the relationship
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between memory and TJ was a particularly innovative aspect of this work, given 
the lack of attention paid by current academic research.
This thesis argued that memory is both integral and central to TJ policies. This is 
not only in reference to specific memorialisation initiatives (museums, memorials), 
which are sometimes examined by the literature. This author challenged the 
fictional separation between institutional and symbolic TJ initiatives that is the 
most commonly adopted approach in contemporary works.
Instead, it was contended that TJ and memory are deeply interconnected. 
Indeed, the interaction that exists between memory and TJ is fascinating and 
interesting. Both are slow-burning, dynamic and multilayered: they continuously 
interact, influencing and shaping one another.
More specifically, an interaction, which works in two ways, exists between 
memory and TJ. First, TJ initiatives do not simply result from the various dynamics, 
actors and power balances at local, national and international levels. They are also 
informed and influenced by ideas and representations of the past violence that are 
deemed relevant by social and political actors, labelled in chapters 5 and 6 as 
communities of memory. In this thesis, attention focused especially on the 
government, but also the military and HROs. Additionally, it is possible to argue 
that other agents in different countries maybe of significance in the TJ debate. 
Drawing out and examining these narratives on the past facilitates the 
achievement of a deeper understanding of how TJ policies were implemented and 
evolved.
Second, TJ mechanisms, especially trials and truth commissions, can be (and 
have been) used to produce and endorse specific understandings over what
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happened during the contested years of violence. These perspectives often reflect 
political goals and objectives both from the past and the present. In particular, the 
role of the state and its attempts to develop official memories over the past 
violence become particularly fascinating topics to examine.
When examining the cases of Argentina and Uruguay, the following conclusions 
can be suggested. First, the commitment to TJ in both countries varied over time, 
and was particularly dependent on the Executive in power and the competing 
interpretations held on the past violence.
While Uruguay successfully limited the discussion of past crimes to the reduced 
sphere of human rights activism for over fifteen years, in Argentina, the Executive 
never achieved such a hegemonic position in the landscape of memory and TJ. 
Rather, it was forced to endure a difficult co-existence with the military and human 
rights activists.
More specifically, in Argentina in the early years of democracy, President 
Alfonsin worked to clarify the truth on the disappeared and achieve justice not 
only due to his personal commitment to human rights, but also in light of his 
understanding of what occurred during those fateful years. Reflecting the Two 
Demons Theory, his government held parallel trials of military and guerrilla 
leaders. Only limited attention was however paid beyond those deemed directly 
responsible for the atrocities, considering society as just a passive victim of the 
violence.
President Menem's view on the past is equally mirrored in his policy decisions. 
Convinced that Argentina should be moving forward, the President adopted a 
policy of pardons for the military and guerrillas in the early 1990s.This policy was
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adopted also to ensure the subordination of the armed forces to the constitutional 
government. During Menem's tenure, the possibility of justice remained off the 
agenda and advances were made only in less divisive issues, like economic 
reparations and the right to identity.
Finally, under Kirchner, a third shift occurred. Echoing once again a precise 
perspective on the past, President Kirchner, a member of the 1970s generation 
that had been targeted by the violence, endorsed the view of state terrorism as the 
framework for understanding past human rights crimes. Accordingly, the 
President reopened the option of trials against members of the security forces, 
worked on reparations and favoured the creation of sites of memory.
Likewise, in Uruguay, a clear parallel between the state's policies on TJ and 
specific visions of the past can be highlighted.
President Sanguinetti's strong support for policies of oblivion and silence is 
evidently reflected in his granting of amnesties. While considering the guerrillas 
directly responsible for triggering the dictatorship, the President still resorted to 
the Two Demons Theory with arguments of moral equivalency to justify amnesty 
laws for both political prisoners and members of the security forces. The vision of 
a war existing between these two actors was also shared to different extents by his 
successors. Even though President Batlle finally acknowledged that acts of terror 
had been committed by the state, nevertheless, he focused on the idea of creating 
lasting peace between Uruguayans. In his discourses, the President still hinted to 
the existence of confrontations and disagreements amongst Uruguayans that had 
provoked the violence of the 1970s.
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Similarly, President Vazquez combined ideas on state terrorism with a focus on 
the 'Never Again' discourse and the intolerance between Uruguayans, the two 
approaches clearly at odds with each other. One in fact attributes responsibility to 
the state for past crimes, while the other points instead to conflicts between 
Uruguayan brothers and the need of reconciliation to prevent further in-fighting. 
This ambiguous view is reflected in his policies that simultaneously searched for 
the disappeared while retaining the Expiry Law.
Second, in Argentina and Uruguay, instruments of TJ became preferential tools 
through which specific understandings of the disputed years of past violence were 
championed.
In more detail, it was suggested that in Argentina two strands of demonic 
theories were fashionable throughout democratisation. The 1984 CONADEP and 
the 1985 Trial of the Commanders endorsed the Two Demons Theory. Such an 
understanding was particularly popular for apportioning responsibility for the 
past to only a few extremist, violent and authoritarian elements, the military and 
the guerrillas. Society and political parties were accordingly exculpated of any 
blame for what had taken place during political violence. Over twenty years later, 
the Kirchner administration then developed its own brand of the One Demon 
Theory that, again through the CONADEP, sanctioned the understanding of the past 
as systematic and methodical crimes of state terrorism perpetrated by the military.
Both types of demonic theories reduced the very complex political and social 
events of state terrorism, which trace back to the mid-twentieth century, to the 
actions of a limited number of actors. It is clear that both the truth commission and 
the trial served precise political and social goals of national reconciliation. Still,
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they failed to uncover the multifaceted dynamics and issues of power that were 
behind the origins of state violence in Argentina. By only attributing blame to the 
two demons, disturbing but necessary questions on the past, and especially the 
extent of social complicity, were avoided. However, only disclosing a limited truth 
on the recent past may not bode well for the future.
Similarly in Uruguay, policies of TJ implicitly sanctioned specific representations 
of the years of military rule and human rights repression. The adoption of 
amnesties in 1985 and 1986 by the Sanguinetti administration mirrored the 
President's perspective on past events. His administration further endorsed a 
memory of silence and oblivion, being totally absent in terms of truth, justice, 
reparations and memorialisation on the past. In Uruguay, a specific strand of the 
Two Demons Theory existed. Unlike Argentina where the Theory had been 
developed since the early 1970s, in Uruguay it only emerged in the early 1980s. 
Furthermore, in Uruguay the Theory accorded the guerrillas demon status, when 
in fact they had been well defeated before the military coup. Furthermore, in 
Uruguay, the Theory removed all responsibility for the past from political parties 
and their leaders. In doing so it reduced the violence to a limited sector of society, 
when in fact the picture was much more complex. Finally, in 2003, the Peace 
Commission did portray past violence as state terrorism. Despite this, much of the 
language employed still reflected previous images of war and confrontations 
between Uruguayans.
The battle for the ownership of the past is still ongoing in both Argentina and 
Uruguay.
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Further Research Questions
From a PhD thesis several interesting questions inevitably spring up that cannot 
be discussed and so must be put aside for the moment. However, they may lay the 
ground for future projects. Here, two sets of questions are briefly pondered. The 
first relates to TJ as a discipline, while the second refers to Argentina and 
Uruguay's experience of TJ.
In the introduction, it was highlighted how this author felt that at present, the 
boundaries of TJ were being overstretched as some scholars have attempted to 
have TJ focus on issues as varied as structural violence, social injustice, corruption 
or the economy of war. Indeed, this broadening of the discipline does reflect the 
new nature of violence in the 21st century and therefore such concerns do need to 
be addressed. Nonetheless, it may be a risky endeavour for TJ to undertake.
In this respect, an interesting avenue for research would explore how best TJ 
can be synthesised with other subject-areas (development, IR, conflict studies...). 
The goal is to develop a comprehensive framework that simultaneously addresses 
what Ellen Stensrud defines as the 'backward-looking roles' of accountability 
mechanisms, like punishment, and 'forward-looking' objectives as prevention. 
(Stensrud, 2009:6) Also see (Snyder & Vinjamuri, 2003/2004:44)
Addressing the root causes of violence, often to be found in poverty, lack of 
resources and inequality, is a new and principal challenge that TJ has to confront. 
This is an avenue worth studying further to ensure both the continuity and the 
integrity of TJ as a discipline. This author believes that only by working in tandem 
with other academic subjects, TJ will affirm its status as more than merely an 
instrument of retribution. In doing so, TJ can also be a means of effectively
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safeguarding human rights and preventing future atrocities, by addressing the 
reasons that trigger human rights violations.
Argentina and Uruguay's experience of TJ over the last three decades is a source 
of fascination but also of concern for this author. First, in both countries, there is a 
risk of saturation with the topic. As the historian Carnovale asserted, there is no 
lack of voices talking about state terrorism. 'My fear is' Carnovale states 'that we 
are all talking at the same time and that society cannot really listen anymore' 
(interview). Her apprehension was shared by other interviewees that pointed to 
the cacophony of fragmented and separated discussions that are ongoing and may 
be ineffective in societies where parts of the population are prone to feeling that it 
is time to move on.
Second, a key question is the following: how can the debate on past violence be 
more inclusive, transcending its traditional audience of afectados and HROs, 
reaching out to society as a whole?
As highlighted during discussions in chapters 5 and 6 on the Memorial to 
Disappeared-Detainees in Montevideo, the ESMA and the Memory Park in Buenos 
Aires 6, memory risks fading away once the afectados are no longer around unless 
these traditional guardians of the memory of state terrorism open up to include 
other members of society.
Of course, this is not an easy task and may require some serious reflection on 
how best to achieve participation from younger generations and those not 
currently interested in memory. .One thing is clear: the current approach is not 
successful.
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Third, the present human rights situation in Argentina and Uruguay, namely the 
persistence of impunidad (impunity] see e.g. (Humphrey & Valverde, 2007, 2008) 
and continued violence like torture, excessive police brutality and disappearances, 
significantly calls into question the important advances that have been achieved 
under the rubric of TJ. Focusing on past crimes should not prevent diligence to be 
exercised vis-a-vis the present human rights situation. The two are interdependent 
and need to be addressed in tandem. They are not mutually exclusive.
From Argentina and Uruguay's experience of TJ, a general conclusion can be 
drawn: despite democratisation, there has been a failure to create an inclusive 
notion of human rights. This can be understood on two levels.
First, on a temporal level, the concept of human rights is often understood as 
only referring to the years of military rule and the crimes of state terrorism, 
particularly the desaparecidos. Human rights are not generally regarded as 
applicable to the present, owing to the misplaced perception that the resolution of 
all human rights issues was an inevitable consequence of the return to democracy. 
As the academic Markarian remarked about Uruguay, the language of human rights 
is normally associated with the systematic violations of the authoritarian period. 
'When you mention human rights, people immediately think back to the time of the 
dictatorship. But now that this language is available, it should be used for other 
things too, like state responsibility in relation to women, children and the state of 
prisons' (interview). 'It is a language' Markarian stresses 'to be used to make these 
themes visible, think about and discuss them'.
Similarly, Carnovale suggested that the political culture of human rights in 
Argentina is very superficial and that 'if you dig deeper, you still find strong
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authoritarian components'. This is particularly evident now that Argentina has 
become rather insecure given the high rates of criminality in comparison to the 
last twenty years. The idea of the mano dura (strong hand) prevails and answers to 
problems of rising crimes are usually tougher laws and responses, without really 
comprehending that these are in reality problems related to social exclusion 
and/or poverty. As Carnovale states, the general feeling is that 'human rights are 
for the others, not for common people' (interview).
On a second level that we could define as conceptual, a multi-faceted notion of 
human rights remains absent The term human rights is often taken to refer to 
violations of civil and political rights. What are traditionally called second 
generation rights (namely the right to education, work, etc.) are largely left out. 
This is particularly worrisome, given that in both Argentina and Uruguay problems 
relating to increasing poverty, unemployment and social justice have recently 
increased.
The language of human rights violations continues to be used for crimes similar 
to those of military rule (torture, disappearance, detention) but it has failed to be 
extended to violations of economic, social and cultural rights. The academic Hugo 
Vezzetti, for instance, highlighted the so-called cartoneros situation, referring to 
the thousands of people that basically 'scrap by, living off whatever they can find in 
other people's rubbish' (interview). Vezzetti underscores how society seems 
indifferent and that this does not trigger a political response. Similarly, survivor of 
the repression in Argentina, Carlos Lordkipanidse, told me how several families in 
his neighbourhood live under the motorway, 'without any basic access to health 
care or education' (interview).
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As the Uruguayan human rights activist Javier Miranda emphasised in our 
interview, what is required is the development of tools to think about human 
rights in terms of 'all human rights, not just the consequences of the military 
regime' (interview). 'Otherwise the disappearance of my father' Miranda carried 
on 'would have had no purpose, if it had any sense at all and for it to have any 
meaning, it is to convert this pain into strength [for human rights]'.
'What is the purpose of memory if not illuminating the present, making it 
visible?' asks Ana Cacopardo. (Cacopardo, 2007:4)
Are we able to see the current risks and problems in terms of human rights? 
How can we point to the continuities that exist between the impunity of the past 
and that of our present? How can TJ escape being 'stuck in the past* (my term) to 
impact the present and human rights here and now? Are we able to move beyond 
the traditional distinction of human rights generations, to finally create inclusive 
and complete conceptions that transcend the dominance of civil and political 
rights?
Finally, building on the unquestionable basis that state terrorism in Argentina 
and Uruguay was a systematic and repressive policy implemented top-down by the 
state, how can an inclusive memory of the recent past be achieved?
A memory that is wholly democratic, that is composed of shades of grey, rather 
than being black and white. A memory that does not strive to ensure 
homogenisation, rather that acknowledges, embraces and thrives on difference. 
Disagreements and disputes on the recent past will undoubtedly remain. 
Nonetheless, an inclusive memory will be flexible enough to encompass the full
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spectrum of opinions and perspectives that exist, for the entire society to be able to 
talk about its past. A memory that can look at the experience of social and political 
activism of the 1960s and 1970s, that includes the victims of the guerrillas, that 
discusses all of the aspects of state terrorisms, not only selecting some of them. 
How do we avoid policies of memory that simply become 'attempts at closure, at 
stitching up wounds'? (Cacopardo, 2007:8) How can we generate instead open and 
fruitful debates?
These are the challenges for Argentina and Uruguay in the 21st century.
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Annex 1 -  Chronology of events - Argentina and Uruguay, 1930-2009
Year Arqentina Uruquay
1930 (Sep) The first in a series o f 
m ilitary coups is carried out by 
General U riburu.
1933
(Mar) First breakdown o f constitutional 
rule. In a pattern to be later repeated, a 
democratically-elected President, in this 
case Gabriel Terra, closes Parliament, 
declaring emergency rule. During his 
dictablanda (soft dictatorship until 1934), 
the democratic system is temporarily 
suspended.
1942
(Feb) The Good Coup by President 
Baldomir.
1943
(Tune) A  m ilitary coup opens 
the way fo r Juan-Domingo 
Peron’s election as President in 
1946.
1952
Prompt Security Measures (constitutional 
emergency powers) are used to respond to 
strikes by workers from the public health, 
transport, and textile sectors.
1955
(Sep) A  m ilitary coup led by 
General Lonardi ousts Peron 
from  power.
1962
(Mar) The m ilitary overthrows 
the constitutionally-elected 
government o f Frondizi.
1963
The M ovim iento de Liberation N a tiona l - 
Tupamaros (National Liberation 
Movement Tupamaros, Tupamaros) is 
established.
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Year Arqentina Uruquay
1966 (Tune) A  m ilitary coup 
establishes a permanent 
regime. The dictatorship, the 
Argentine Revolution, is no 
longer a temporary 
interregnum as in previous 
instances.
(Apr) Authoritarian Colorado government 
o f President Pacheco-Areco (until 1971).
1972
President Bordaberry ( I9 7 I- I9 7 3 ) declares 
a state o f internal war against the 
Tupamaros.
fApr 14^ ) The Tupamaros perpetrates 
several attacks in Montevideo and the 
interior, resulting in the death o f four 
people, including a Navy Captain and an 
ex-Interior Sub-secretary. In the afternoon, 
the Armed Forces respond: eight 
Tupamaros perish.
1973
(Mav) Peronist candidate 
Campora is elected President, 
paving die way fo r Peron’s 
return after years in  exile.
(Oct) Peron becomes 
President.
(Feb) Pact o f Boisso-Lanza, signed by 
President Bordaberry, effectively 
incorporates the Armed Forces into 
government.
(June 27YThe militarv-backed presidential 
coup occurs. The most totalitarian military 
regime o f the Southern Cone is launched.
1974
(Tul) Peron dies and his d iird  
wife, the Vice-President, 
inherits power.
1976
(M ar 24) The Argentine 
Process o f N ational 
Reorganisation is launched.
(Sep 16) Noches de los Laoiccs 
(Night o f the Pencils) 10 
secondary school students are 
kidnapped in La Plata.
The ESM A functions as a 
clandestine detention centre 
between 1976 and 1983.
(June) The military deposes President 
Bordaberry.
(Jul 24) 23 Uruguayans detained in 
Automotores Orletti (Buenos Aires) are 
clandestinely transported back to Uruguay. 
They all survive.
fO ct 5s) Five Argentines citizens and 16 
Uruguayans are illegally transferred to 
Uruguay. They are not thrown into the 
open seas, but are later assassinated.
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Year Arqentina Uruquay
1977 (Apr 30) First march o f the 
Madres de Plaza de Mayo.
The Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo 
is established, an offshoot o f 
the Madres.
(Aug) The military releases its political 
cronograma (timetable.
1978
20 Uruguayan exiles kidnapped in Buenos 
Aires in December 1977 are forcefully 
transferred to Uruguay. They remain 
disappeared.
198 0
General Videla establishes a 
dialogue with civilian political 
leaders.
fN ov 30) W ith  a turnout o f 85.2%, the 
population rejects the constitutional reform 
project with 57.9% o f votes.
1981
(Mar) General V io la  succeeds 
V idela as President. A  more 
open political dialogue is 
initiated.
(Tul) The M ulti-party coalition 
is created and calls fo r re- 
democratisation.
(Dec) Internal coup through 
which General Galtieri 
removes Viola.
(Jul) A new cronograma, putting political 
parties at the heart o f transition, is released.
Servicio Paz y  Jusdcia (Peace and Justice 
Service) is established, the first to work on 
behalf o f victims o f repression under 
military rule.
1982
(Apr) The m ilitary junta led by 
Galtieri decides to invade the 
Falklands islands.
(Tune) General Galtieri is 
forced to resign and General 
Bignone becomes President.
(Dec) A round 100,000 people 
gadier in May Square calling 
fo r the restoration o f civilian 
rule.
fN ov) Internal partv elections produce 
another disastrous political defeat: anti­
military candidates receive 91% o f Blanco 
votes and 72% o f Colorado vote.
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Year Arqentina Uruguay
1983 (Apr) The Final Report on the 
W a r against Subversion and 
Terrorism  and the Institutional 
Act are released by the A rm ed 
Forces.
Secret decree 2726/83 orders 
the destruction o f all the 
documents on the repression.
(Sep)The National Pacification 
Law is adopted.
(Oct) Radical Party candidate 
Raul A ifonsfn is elected and 
becomes President on 
December 10.
(Dec) A ifonsfn decrees the trial 
o f guerrilla leaders fo r 
homicide, illic it association, 
public instigation to com m it 
crimes, apology o f crime and 
other attacks against public 
order. Decree 158 initiates the 
prosecution o f m ilitary 
commanders fo r homicide, 
unlawful deprivation o f 
freedom and torture.
Presidential decree 187 
establishes the C O N A D E P  to 
clarify facts relating to 
disappearances between 1976 
and 1983. Composed o f highly 
reputable public figures, it 
works fo r nine months, 
collecting testimonies and 
inspecting form er detention 
centres.
(Jul) Collapse o f Parque H otel talks 
between the military and politicians over 
issues o f national security.
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Year Arqentina Uruguay
1984 (Feb) The Law o f Reform  to 
the M ilitary Code (23,049) 
ends m ilitary jurisd iction fo r 
com mon crimes, including 
human rights abuses. 
Violations during die Proceso 
however remain under m ilitary 
jurisdiction.
(Sep) The C O N A D E P  
presents its findings. Hum an 
rights were violated in  a 
systematic and organic manner 
w idi similar features on a 
national scale.
The Buenos Aires Federal 
Appeals Court (BsAs FAC) 
assumes jurisd iction in the 
T ria l o f die M ilita ry 
Commanders.
fApr 16 j  Doctor V ladim ir Roslik dies as a 
consequence o f torture at the hands o f 
military personnel at Battalion 9 in Fray 
Bentos.
(Aug) The Navy Club Pact, a transitional 
pact between the Armed Forces and the 
Colorado, Union Civica and Frente Amplio 
parties, establishes a timetable for the 
return o f democracy.
fN o v j Colorado Partv candidates Tulio- 
Maria Sanguinetti (president) and Enrique 
Tarigo (vice-president) win national 
elections.
1985
(Apr) The BsAs FAC begins 
proceedings.
(Dec) The BsAs FAC convicts 
commanders as indirect 
perpetrators, having issued 
instructions calling fo r the use 
o f extraordinary measures 
against subversion.
Sentences: life imprisonment 
to General V idela and Adm ira l 
Massera, imprisonment o f 
various lengths to Brigadier 
Agosti, General V io la  and 
Adm ira l Lambruschini, 4 
acquittals.
(Mar) Amnesty Law N ° I5 ,737grants a 
general amnesty to about 210 prisoners, a 
civilian court review and subsequent 
commutation o f sentence to another 62. A ll 
338 political prisoners are later released.
M others and Relatives o f Uruguayan 
Disappeared-Detainees is created, uniting 
three victims’ organisations.
fNov") The Investigative Commission on 
the S ituation o f Disappeared Persons and 
the Facts tha t M otivated i t  confirms 164 
cases o f disappeared Uruguayans: 32 in 
Uruguay, 127 in Argentina, 3 in Chile and 
2 in Paraguay. I t  emphasises serious 
evidence pointed to the involvement o f 
military and police.
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1986 (Tan) The Madres split into tw o 
organisations. The two separate 
due to leadership issues and 
die question o f economic 
reparations.
(Dec) The F u ll S top Law  
establishes a 60-day deadline 
fo r summoning alleged human 
rights offenders. Otiierwise all 
cases would be extinguished 
after 22 February 1987.
The Supreme Court confirms 
the verdict in  the T ria l o f 
m ilitary commanders. 
Defendants are designed as 
necessary participants in the 
crimes.
(Dec) L a w N ° 15,848 Derogating the 
Punitive Capacity o f the State (Expiry 
Law) protects military and police forces 
from legal prosecution for human rights 
violations committed before March 1985. 
Economic crimes, abuses before the period 
o f the de facto government, and by 
members o f the high command before 
and/or during the dictatorship are not 
covered.
1987
(Apr) Easter W eek Uprising is 
triggered by M ajor Barredo’s 
refusal to appear in court to 
respond to torture accusations. 
Rebellion deepens when the 
Campo de Mayo Infantry' 
School in  Buenos Aires is 
taken over by Lt. Col. Rico o f 
the Special Forces Unit. 
A ifonsfn successfully mediates 
the end o f the rebellion.
(Tune) The D ue Obedience 
La  ^ establishes die legality o f 
following orders, exonerating 
chief officers, subordinate 
officers, sub-officers, and 
troops in armed, security, 
prison forces. Rape, economic 
crimes and disappearance or 
identity forgery o f minors are 
not covered.
(Feb)The N ationa l Pro-Referendum  
Commission is established.
Composed o f influential Uruguayans and 
political parties’ representatives, it launches 
a signature collection campaign to hold a 
public referendum on the Expiry Law.
(May) M ilitary prosecutor Colonel 
Sambucetti investigates 6 cases o f 
disappearances. He concludes in none o f 
them it could be proved that security 
services were involved.
(Oct) The Investigative Commission on the 
Kidnapping and M urder o f form er- 
legislators Zelm ar M ich e lin i and H ector 
G utierrez-R uiz concludes that those deeds 
were perpetrated by criminals depending 
from the Argentine Military. It  ascertains 
the existence o f illic it repressive activities 
with joint Uruguay an-Argentine 
participation in a period close to the 
murders.
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1988 (Tan) M onte Caseros Uprising 
led by Lt. Col. Rico.
(Dec) V illa  M artc lli Uprising 
led by Col. Seineldin vindicates 
A rm y’s role in die ‘d irty war’ 
and wishes to secure a pardon 
fo r the convicted 
Commanders.
1989
(Tan) The previously unknown 
M ovim iento Todos p o r la 
Patna (A ll fo r the Fatherland 
Movement) attacks La Tablada 
infantry base.
(May) Peronist candidate 
Carlos Menem wins national 
elections.
(Tul) A lfonsin resigns.
(Oct) President Menem 
pardons hundreds o f people, 
including those accused o f 
human rights violations, those 
sentenced fo r misconduct in  
the Falklands, those diat 
participated in m ilitary 
rebellions, and 64 form er 
guerrilleros.
(M ar) ‘Uruguay: Nunca Mas — In  form e 
sobre la V iolacion a los Derechos 
Hum anos’ (Never again — report on human 
rights violations) is published by SERPAJ. 
Based on collected testimonies and a survey, 
it elucidates past repression countering the 
government’s refusal and silence on this 
matter.
fApr 16") 85% o f the population vote in 
the referendum. 42% cast the green ballot, 
while 53% the yellow to retain the Expiry 
Law.
1990
(Dec) Last m ilitary rebellion 
led by Seineldin is successfully 
crushed.
Menem pardons those already 
convicted fo r human rights 
abuses, including die 
commanders, m ilitary chiefs 
sentenced fo r the Falklands 
war, guerrilla leaders and other 
civilians.
(Sep) The Investigative Commission in  
relation to  the Conduct o f D r. Juan-Carlos 
Blanco Heading the M in is try  o f External 
Relations in  the case o f Ms. Elena 
Quinteros investigates whether Senator 
Blanco had any responsibility in the 
kidnapping and disappearance o f Ms. 
Quinteros. The Senate approves the final 
report, stating there was no basis for a trial 
or to suspend the Senator from his 
functions.
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1991 (Tan) Presidential decree 70 
establishes compensation fo r 
all those that had been in 
custody o f the national 
executive branch under die 
state o f siege.
(Nov) Law 24,043 grants 
benefits to all victims o f 
illegitimate detention (those 
detained by national executive, 
by decision o f war tribunals, in 
m ilitary facilities w idiout being 
sentenced, sentenced 
conscripts, children born in 
captivity, and all those in 
detention centre).
1992
(Oct) The Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights 
(IAC H R ) declares the Full 
Stop and Due Obedience Laws 
incompatible with the 
American Declaration and 
Convention. I t  recommends 
Argentina adopts measures to 
clarify the facts and identify 
those responsible fo r past 
violations and pays just 
compensation.
(Oct) The IAC H R  deems the Expiry Law 
incompatible with the American 
Declaration and Convention. I t  
recommends Uruguay pays just 
compensation to victims, clarifies the facts 
and identifies those responsible.
1994
(May) Law 24,321 o f Absence 
by Forced Disappearance 
creates this unprecedented 
legal status fo r all persons who 
involuntarily disappear ed 
before 12/1983.
(Dec) Law 24,411 sets out US$ 
224,000 compensation to be 
received by parents, children or 
lawful heirs o f those that 
disappeared or died as a 
consequence o f repression.
(Till) The prison o f Punta Carretas in 
Montevideo is transformed into a shopping 
centre.
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1995 H.I.J.O.S. is a H R O  form ed by 
the offsprings o f disappeared, 
survivors, political prisoners 
and exiles.
(Mar) Navy Captain (ret.) 
Scilingo breaks die pact o f 
silence with his public 
confession on death flights.
(Apr) A rm y Chief-of-Staff 
Balza delivers the first 
institutional self-criticism on 
repression.
(May) A ir  Force commander 
Paulik and Adm ira l Pico 
sim ilarly comment on die 
actions o f d ie ir respective 
branches during repression.
1996
(Mav 20) Rafael Michelini, son o f 
murdered legislator Zelmar, and the 
Mothers and Relatives o f Uruguayans 
Disappeared-Detainees NGO, convoke the 
first “March o f Silence” to commemorate 
the murders o f Michelini and Gutierrez- 
Ruiz, kidnapped and later found murdered 
in Buenos Aires on 20 May 1976.
Navy Captain (ret.) Troccoli openly 
recognises the employment o f torture, 
murder and disappearance by the military 
during repression.
(Tul) HIJOS is established.
1997
M em oria para Arm ar (Piecing Memory 
Together) is established by former female 
prisoners to recount their experience o f 
political imprisonment under military rule.
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1998 T ru th  trials begin in several 
Federal Appeal Courts as 
Buenos Aires, La Plata, 
Cordoba, M ar del Plata, 
Neuquen, Jujuy and Bahia 
Blanca.
The first escrache is carried out 
by H .IJ .O .S . Escraches aim to 
expose the identities o f form er 
repressors to society. They 
originate at a time when 
im punity was dominant.
(Tul) The Buenos Aires 
legislature approves the 
construction o f a M em ory Park 
to remember die victims o f 
state terrorism.
(Oct) Generals Videla,
Masscra, Nicolaides and 
Bignone, and five lower- 
ranking officers are charged 
and jailed fo r die illegal 
adoption o f children.
1999
(Sep) A  BsAs FAC rules child 
kidnapping is a crime diat 
cannot be proscribed.
(Nov) A  friendlv setdement is 
brokered w id i the IA C H R . 
Argentina agrees to accept and 
guarantee die right to truth, 
involving die exhaustion o f all 
means to obtain inform ation 
on the whereabouts o f the 
disappeared.
2 0 0 0
(Mar) Jorge Badle o f the Colorado Party 
becomes President.
(Aug) Presidential resolution 858 
establishes the COPAZ to investigate past 
disappearances.
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2001 (Mar) Federal Judge Cavallo 
rules in  first instance the Full 
Stop and Due Obedience Laws 
are unconstitutional, violating 
the Constitution and 
international law obligations.
(Dec) The Memorial to Disappeared- 
Detainees is inaugurated in the Parque Vaz 
Ferreira in the Cerro neighbourhood o f 
Montevideo.
2 0 0 2
(Oct) Former Foreign Affairs Minister 
Juan-Carlos Blanco is charged with the 
unlawful imprisonment o f Ms. Quinteros, 
the first instance anyone is detained in 
Uruguay for human rights violations 
committed during military rule.
In 2005, Blanco is also charged with 
involvement in the murders o f legislators 
Michelini and Gutierrez-Ruiz and activists 
Barredo and Whitelaw.
2 0 0 3
(May) Nestor K irchner 
becomes President.
(lul) K irchner repeals decree 
1,581, barring compliance with 
extradition requests.
(Aug) Congress adopts Law 
25,779, declaring the Full Stop 
and Due Obedience laws null, 
as i f  they had never existed.
(Apr) The COPAZ releases its final report, 
confirming the disappearance o f 26 
Uruguayans in Uruguay, 182 in Argentina,
8 in Chile, 2 in Paraguay.
It concludes that citizens disappeared in 
Uruguay were detained in official or 
unofficial actions and submitted to physical 
torture in clandestine detention centres, 
dying in the majority o f the cases as a 
consequence o f the torments received.
Grave human rights abuses were the 
product o f actions by state agents that, in 
their public function, operated at the 
margins o f the law.
(Oct) Former President Bordaberry (1971- 
76) faces justice for violating the 
Constitution and the murder o f eight 
members o f the Uruguayan Communist 
Party in 1972. He is also accused o f 
participating in the abduction and killing o f 
the two lawmakers and two activists. In 
2006, Bordaberry is also indicted as co­
author o f the murder o f 10 political 
opponents.
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2 0 0 4 (Mar) A  La Plata Federal Court 
sentences a former-police 
commissioner and a doctor to 
imprisonment fo r concealing 
die identity o f the baby 
daughter o f a disappeared.
President Nestor K irchner’s 
speech at the ESMA. Through 
an agreement between the 
National Government and the 
Buenos Aires City 
Government, ESM A is to 
become a Museum.
Under the orders o f President 
K irchner, Arm y-Chief Bendini 
removes the portraits o f ex- 
Generals V idela and Bignone 
from  the walls o f the M ilita ry 
College.
(Aug) Law 25,914 provides an 
AR$224,000 indemnification 
to minors that suffered identity 
substitution and A R $71,288 to 
victims o f odier crimes covered 
by the law.
20 0 5
(May) The remains o f Esdier 
Ballcstrino, Maria Eugenia 
Ponce, and Azucena V illa flor, 
co-founders o f Modiers o f 
Plaza de Mayo, and those o f 
French nun Leonie Duquet are 
identified by the EAAF.
(Tune) The Supreme Court 
confirms the unconstitutionality 
o f die Laws, re-opening judicial 
proceedings against m ilitary 
officers interrupted fo r 20 
years.
(Mar) Tabare Vazquez o f the Frente 
Amplio becomes President.
(Aug) The three branches o f the military 
carry out investigations into the fate o f 
disappeared-detainees. The reports 
recognise and officially acknowledge for the 
first time the use o f torture, the burial 
places o f some disappeared-detainees, the 
illegal transfers o f prisoners and the 
cremation o f their remains.
(Sep) Law 17.894 creates the legal category 
o f ‘absent due to enforced disappearance’.
(Nov) The EAAF confirms human remains 
found at the Pando farm belong to 
Ubagesner Chavez-Sosa, disappeared in 
May 1978 —the first such discovery.
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2 0 0 6 (Mar) The dav o f the m ilitary 
coup is declared a national 
holiday.
(Aug) BsAs Federal Court 5 
condemns former-police 
official Simon to imprisonment 
fo r the illegal deprivation o f 
liberty, aggravated by torture 
and the appropriation o f a 
m inor, committed against the 
Poblcte-Hlaczik family.
(Sep) The unconstitutionality 
o f General Riveros’ pardon is 
upheld by the Cassation Court. 
This is later confirm ed by the 
Supreme Court in July 2007.
La Plata Federal Court 1 
condemns former-police 
official, Etchecolatz to life 
imprisonment fo r the illegal 
arrests, torture and homicides 
o f six disappeared and 
kidnapping and torture o f two 
survivors.
Jorge-Julio Lopez, key witness 
at the trial against Etchecolatz 
disappears the day before the 
verdict.
Three other witnesses 
‘tem porarily’ disappear, one in 
2006, and two in 2008.
fM ar) D N A  analysis confirms the 
complete skeleton found at the 13th 
Battalion is that o f Fernando Miranda, 
kidnapped by military officers in 
November 1975.
(Oct) Law 18.033 restores retirement 
rights to all those that had been persecuted 
for political, ideological or trade union 
reasons between 9 February 1973 and 28 
February 1985. A special reparatory 
pension (worth around USD500 a month) 
is also granted to those deprived o f liberty.
(Dec) President Vazquez decrees the date 
o f 19 June as the D/a del Nunca Mas (Day 
o f Never Again).
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2 0 0 7 (Oct) La Plata Federal Court 1 
convicts former-chaplain o f the 
Buenos Aires provincial police 
V on-W ern ich to life in prison, 
fo r involvement in  murder, 
illegitimate deprivations o f 
liberty and torture.
(Nov 7) President K irchner 
inaugurates the M em ory Park 
in Buenos Aires.
ESM A is open to public fo r 
visits.
(Dec) A  Federal Judge 
condemns seven high-ranking 
members o f Intelligence 
Battalion 601, including 
form er-Arm y Commander 
Nicolaides, and one police 
officer, to terms between 20 
and 25 years fo r aggravated 
illegitimate deprivation o f 
liberty.
(Junej The Presidency releases the five- 
volume investigation titled “Historical 
Investigation on Disappeared Detainees” .
(Sep) The National Coordinating 
Committee to N u llify  the Expiry Law 
launches its signature collection campaign.
(Dec) Ex-President General Alvarez (1981- 
1985) is arrested and charged as co-author 
o f the enforced disappearances o f over 30 
people.
The Museum o f Memory is inaugurated. 
The Library' o f Memory opens. It preserves 
more than 8,000 books and documents 
confiscated by security forces between 
1967 and 1973.
2 0 0 8
(Tul) Former-General 
Menendez, six form er m ilitary 
officials and one civilian, are 
convicted fo r kidnapping, 
torture and extrajudicial 
executions in 1977.
(Aug) Menendez and form er- 
Governor Bussi are 
condemned to life 
imprisonment fo r illegitimate 
deprivation o f liberty, torture 
and disappearance o f ex- 
Senator Vargas-Aignasse in 
1976.
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2 0 0 9 (Sep) 1.358 people are 
implicated in crimes against 
humanity; 290 have been 
charged, fifty-eight condemned, 
400 are under pre-trial 
detention, three acquitted and 
213 deceased.
(Nov 24) Onenine o f the trial 
relating to the form er detention 
centres called El C lub Atletico, 
Banco and E l O lim po.
(Dec 11) O dcnine o f die trial 
relating to die fo rm er detention 
centre called the ESMA.
fApr 24) 340.043 collected signatures are 
submitted to Parliament.
Tune 15s) The Electoral Court announced 
that the required number o f 258.326 
signatures was achieved.
The Referendum on the Expiry Law is 
scheduled for October 25.
fO ct 19s) The Supreme Court considers the 
Expiry Law unconstitutional in relation to 
the case o f Nibia Sabalsagaray.
fO ct 23) Former President Gregorio 
Alvarez is sentenced to twenty five years 
prison term for his role as coauthor in the 
aggravated homicides o f thirty-seven 
people.
(Oct 25) On the dav o f national elections. 
48% o f the electorate votes in favour o f the 
nullification o f the Expiry Law. The 
required threshold for the annulment was 
50% plus one. The Law is thus retained.
2010 (Feb) 1.422 people are 
implicated in crimes against 
humanity, 280 have been 
charged, sixty-eight 
condemned, 410 are under 
pre-trial detention, seven have 
been acquitted and 226 have 
passed away.
Tria ls are well under way, in 
im portant cases relating, fo r 
example, to die ESM A and die 
Campo de Mayo detention 
centres.
(Feb) District attorney M irtha Guianze is 
expected to request Montevideo’s Penal 
Tribunal 11 to condemn former President 
Bordaberry and Foreign Affairs Blanco to 
thirty years prison terms for the aggravated 
homicides o f national legislators Zelmar 
Michelini and Hector Gutierrez-Ruiz.
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Annex 2 -  List of Interviews
Argentina
• Carlos H. Acuna, University of San Andres, Buenos Aires, 18 September 2008;
•  Raul Alfonsfn, President (1983-1989), Email Interview, 7 November 2008;
• Asamblea Permanente por los Derechos Humanos (APDH), Buenos Aires, 
24 August 2007;
•  Asociacion Ex Detenidos Desaparecidos, (Carlos Lordkipanidse), Buenos 
Aires, 22 September 2008;
•  Asociacion Madres de Plaza de Mayo, Buenos Aires, 30 August 2007;
• Marcelo Brodsky, Buena Memoria Asociacion Civil, Buenos Aires, 30 August 
2007;
• Vera Camovale, Memoria Abierta, Human Rights Organisation, Buenos Aires, 
12 September 2008;
• Gaston Chillier, Executive Director, CELS - Centro de Estudios Legales y 
Sociales, 30 August 2007;
• Emilio Crenzel, University of Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires, 18 August 2007;
•  Andres D'Alessio, Judge of the 1985 Trial of the Commanders, Buenos Aires, 
17 September 2008;
•  Familiares de Detenidos-Desaparecidos, Victims' organisation, Buenos 
Aires, 18 September 2008;
• Graciela Fernandez-Meijide, CONADEP, Buenos Aires, 17 August 2007 & 12 
September 2008;
• Luis Fondebrider, EAAF - Equipo Argentino de Antropologia Forense, Buenos 
Aires, 24 August 2007;
• Ricardo Gil-Lavedra, Judge of the 1985 Trial of the Commanders, Buenos 
Aires, 22 August 2007;
•  Martin Hernan-Fraga, H.I.J.O.S -  Escraches Commission, Buenos Aires, 16 
September 2008;
•  Alba Lanzillotto, Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo, Buenos Aires, 3 September 2007 & 
11 September 2008
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• Federico Lorenz, Historian, Cultural Centre 'H. Conti', ESMA, Buenos Aires, 8 
September 2008;
• Daniel Lvovich, Historian, National University of General Sarmiento, Buenos 
Aires, 19 September 2008;
• Madres de Plaza de Mayo -  Linea Fundadora, Victims' organisation, Buenos 
Aires, 22 September 2008;
• Eduardo Makaroff, Gotan Project, London, phone interview, 29 July 2009;
• Jaime Malamud-Goti, Senior Presidential Advisor (1983-1987], Buenos Aires, 
3 September 2007;
• Marcos Novaro, Gino Germani Institute, University of Buenos Aires, Buenos 
Aires, 10 September 2008;
• Vicente Palermo, Gino Germani Institute, University of Buenos Aires, Buenos 
Aires, 5 September 2008;
•  Enrique Pastor, H.I.J.O.S., Buenos Aires, 1 September 2007;
• Catalina Smulovitz, Director, Department of Political Science and 
International Studies, University of Torcuato di Telia, Buenos Aires, 23 
September 2008;
• Patricia Valdez, Director of Memoria Abierta, Buenos Aires, 23 August 2007;
•  Hugo Vezzetti, University of Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires, 17 September 2008;
•  Vera Vigevani-Jarach, Fundacion Memoria Historica y Social Argentina and 
Madres de Plaza de Mayo -  Linea Fundadora, Buenos Aires, 25 August 2007.
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Uruguay
• Laura Balsamo, member of SERPAJ’s Documentation Centre, Montevideo, 7 
September 2007;
• Gerardo Bleier, Journalist and Advisor to the President, Montevideo, 29 
August 2008;
•  Gerardo Caetano, Institute of Political Science, University of the Republic, 
Montevideo, 4 September 2008;
• Diego Canepa, MP for Nuevo Espacio-Frente Amplio of Montevideo, 
Montevideo, 13 September 2007;
• Carlos Demasi, Centre for Inter-Disciplinary Studies, University of the 
Republic, Montevideo, 28 August 2008;
• Oscar Destouet, History Professor and Researcher, Memory area of Ministry of 
Education and Culture, Uruguay, Montevideo, 17 September 2007;
• Pilar Elhordoy-Arregui, Human Rights Lawyer, Montevideo, 11 September 
2007;
• Elbio Ferrario, Coordinator of Memory Museum, Montevideo, 3 September 
2008;
•  Lilia Ferro, Multidisciplinary Unit, University of the Republic, Montevideo, 3 
September 2008;
• Julian Gonzalez-Guyer, Institute of Political Science, University of the 
Republic, Montevideo, 29 August 2008;
•  Luis-Alberto Heber, Senator, Blanco Party, Montevideo, 3 September 2008;
•  Alfonso Lessa, political journalist and writer, Tele Doce, Montevideo, 17 
September 2007;
• Cristina Mansilla, human rights office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Montevideo, 27 August 2008;
• Vania Markarian, University of the Republic, Montevideo, 27 August 2008;
• Maria-Elena Martinez, Director of Human Rights, Ministry of Education and 
Culture, Montevideo, 21 September 2007;
• Memoria Para Armar (MPA - Isabel Trivelli) - victims' organisation, 
Montevideo, 29 August 2008;
379
•  Felipe Michelini, Sub-secretary of the Education and Culture Ministry, 
Montevideo, 11 September 2007;
• Rafael Michelini, Senator, Frente Amplio, Montevideo, 3 September 2008;
• Javier Miranda, Lawyer, Montevideo City Hall and Member of MFDDU, 
Montevideo, 29 August 2008;
• Mothers and Relatives of Uruguayan Disappeared Detainees (MFDDU),
Victims' organisation, Montevideo, 1 September 2008;
• Margarita Navarrete, Executive Director, Observatory of Public Policies of 
Human Rights in the MERCOSUR, Montevideo, 19 September 2007;
• Raul Olivera, Human Rights Secretariat, Partido por la Victoria del Pueblo, 
Montevideo, 30 August 2008;
• Guillermo Reimann, CRYSOL Ex-Presos Politicos, Montevideo, 11 September 
2007;
• Jose Rilla, Director, Cuadernos de Claeh & University of the Republic, 
Montevideo, 26 August 2008;
•  Graciela Romero, lawyer and member of SERPAJ Civil and Political Rights 
Team, Montevideo, 7 September 2007;
•  Marisa Ruiz, Amnesty International -  UY International Justice Group, 
Montevideo, 2 September 2008;
•  Julio-Maria Sanguinetti, President of Uruguay, 1985-1990 and 1995-2000, 
Montevideo, 21 September 2007;
• Servicio de Rehabilitation Social (SERSOC - Miguel Scapusio & Adriana 
Vaselli), Montevideo, 19 September 2007;
•  Adrianna Beatriz Yelpo-Vega, National Coordinator for the Nullity of the 
Expiry Law & Human Rights Commission of PIT-CNT, Montevideo, 9 
September 2007.
W indow s M edia Player Files containing the full interviews  
are available from  the author.
Annex 3 -L is t of Visits
Argentina
• El Olimpo, former detention centre, Buenos Aires, 11 September 2008;
• 'JULIO LOPEZ? Dos anos de impunidad y encubrimiento' March organised by 
Encuentro Memoria, Verdad y Justicia, Buenos Aires, 18 September 2008;
• Memory Park and the Monument to the Victims of State Terrorism, Buenos 
Aires, 10 September 2008;
• Navy Mechanics School (ESMA), Buenos Aires, 6 September 2008;
•  Thursday marches of Asociacion Madres de Plaza de Mayo and Madres de Plaza 
de Mayo -  Linea Fundadora, Buenos Aires, 30 August 2007 & 18 September
2008.
Uruguay
•  Cultural Centre and Musem of Memory, Montevideo, 3 September 2008;
•  Memorial to Disappeared-Detainees, Montevideo, 30 August 2008;
• Punta Carretas Shopping Centre, Montevideo, 15 September 2007 & 24 August 
2008;
•  Remembrance on the International Day of the Disappeared, organised by 
MFDDU and Amnesty UY, Montevideo, 30 August 2008.
Photos reproduced in chapters five and six w ere taken during these visits.
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Annex 4 -  Abbreviations
AI
ANC
CELS
CNNLC
CNPR
CONADEP
CONADI
COPAZ
EAAF
ESMA
FMLN
FUSNA
GDR
H.I.J.O.S.
HROs
HRW
IACHR
IACtHR
Amnesty International 
African National Congress
Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales (Centre for Legal 
and Social Studies, Buenos Aires)
Coordinadora Nacional por la Nulidad de la Ley de 
Caducidad (National Coordinator for the Nullity of the 
Expiiy Law, Uruguay)
Comision Nacional Pro-Referendum (National Pro- 
Referendum Commission, Uruguay)
Comision Nacional sobre la Desaparicion de Personas 
(National Commission on the Disappeared, Argentina)
National Commission for the Right to Identity 
(Argentina)
Comision Para la Paz (Peace Commission, Uruguay)
Equipo Argentino de Antropologia Forense (Argentine 
Forensic Anthropology Team)
Escuela de Mecanica de la Armada (Navy Mechanics 
School, Buenos Aires)
Farabundo Marti Front for National Liberation 
(guerrilla group, El Salvador)
Uruguayan Marine Corps Unit
German Democratic Republic (East Germany)
Hijos por la Identidad y la Justicia contra el Olvido y el 
Silencio (Daughters and Sons for Identity and Justice 
against Forgetting and Silence, Argentina)
Human Rights Organisations
Human Rights Watch
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights
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ICC International Criminal Court
ICTR International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia
MFDDU Madres y Familiares de Detenidos Desaparecidos del
Uruguay (Mothers and Relatives of Uruguayan
Disappeared Detainees)
MPA Memoria para Armar (Piecing Memory Together,
Uruguay)
NSD National Security Doctrine
SERPAJ Servicio Paz y Justicia (Peace and Justice Service,
Montevideo)
TRC Truth and Reconciliation Commission (South Africa)
TJ Transitional Justice
UNHRC United Nations Human Rights Committee
UNSG United Nations Secretary-General
URNG National Guatemalan Revolutionary Unity
(Guatemalan guerrilla group)
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Annex 5 -  Data Collection and Methodology
This thesis relies on various sources for its data. Theoretical chapters, 1 to 3, 
mainly employ secondary resources, particularly scholarly literature from history, 
politics and IR, but the recently established subject-areas of TJ and memory 
studies. Reference to primary materials is also occasionally made.
Empirical chapters, 4 to 6, use both primary and secondary sources. Primary 
documents used include jurisprudence from international human rights bodies 
including the UNHRC, the IACHR and the IACtHR, and reports by international 
organisations, national and international NGOs, such as Amnesty International and 
Human Rights Watch.
Particular attention was paid to integrating material that was collected from the 
two research field trips to the region. Interviews were carried out in both 
Argentina and Uruguay. A first round took place between 15 August and 22 
September 2007, the second between 21 August and 25 September 2008. 
Interviewees include members of victims' organisations and NGOs, academics, 
lawyers, journalists, politicians and judges (see appendix 2 for complete list of 57 
interviews). Additionally, I visited several museums and other sites of memory, as 
well as having witnessed human rights demonstrations and activities (appendix 3).
This project is largely qualitative and its purpose was investigating the various 
opinions and different representations that exist in Argentina and Uruguay on the 
issues of truth, justice and memory on the recent past of political violence.
Qualitative methods, particularly individual semi-structured interviews, were 
selected for several reasons. The semi-structured format was considered most
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helpful in approaching sensitive issues such as those relating to human rights 
violence.
A list of topics (available with the author), focusing on truth, justice and 
memory, to be discussed during the interviews was prepared beforehand, and 
these themes were explored further during each meeting. Questions on the guiding 
framework were flexible and phrased differently depending on each interviewee 
and the evolution of the discussion. This elastic format allowed for new (and often 
unexpected) questions to emerge spontaneously and be considered accordingly.
Open-ended and informal questioning functioned as invitations allowing 
respondents to talk at length on a topic, elaborating their thoughts in their own 
terms with time to reflect, offer their interpretations of events and tell their own 
story in a familiar language. (Devine, 2002; Gaskell, 2000)
The data that was collected through the interviews was not treated as hard 
evidence to be measured and observed. Rather, it was used to comprehend the 
experiences and practices of key informants that had often directly lived through 
the events being discussed or studied them deeply.
The purpose of the interviews was for the author to gain a deeper appreciation 
and understanding of political, institutional, social and cultural dynamics on the 
ground in Argentina and Uruguay. Additionally, it was important to interact with 
significant social and political actors in TJ or scholars thereof.
Open-ended interviews were deemed suitable in seeking to understand people's 
motives and interpretations, as well as to gather insights into their world-views 
and experiences. (Devine, 2002) This holistic approach let the author gain 
invaluable information, together with a fuller knowledge than one that could 
provided by only employing secondary sources.
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Furthermore, visiting museums and other locations of memory (some of which 
opened to the public only as recently as late 2007] permitted the collection of 
primary materials as photos.
The fieldwork experience generally, and specific events like participating at the 
commemorations on 30 August 2008 (International Day of Disappeared- 
Detainees] organised in Montevideo, the Thursday marches of the Madres or a 
human rights march on 18 September 2008 for disappeared-witness Jorge-Julio 
Lopez in Buenos Aires, could also be seen as a very limited exercise in participant 
observation.
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